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Abstract
During the 1980s, the pendulum swung back from the socialism doctrinaire that 
dominated the post-war period, and the one that emphasised public ownership of the 
productive and services sectors. During the last decade new values emerged questioning the 
role of the state in the economic activities, and the development strategies of the 1960s and 
1970s. It was claimed that, the pursuit of equality had done more harm than good, that 
central planning had been inefficient in allocating resources, and that public ownership had 
failed to accelerate economic growth. As a result, the pressures mounted to shift to a market 
economy, and to rely on private initiatives to spearhead the development process. Indeed, 
an increasing number of governments around the globe, including the communist countries, 
have announced their intentions to rolling back the frontiers of the state. The move was 
partly attributed to the poor performance of public enterprises, and partly to the political 
changes that took place during the latest decade.
In this thesis, we investigated the rationale for, and the scope of privatisation in 
developing countries, with special reference to the Sudan. The conclusion is that, the actual 
implementation of privatisation proved to be exceedingly difficult in developing countries. 
Moreover, research failed to establish a clear cut economic case for the privatisation policy. 
As a result, there is no firm evidence on either how to implement privatisation, or its 
economic benefits. Indeed, the term itself has never been clearly defined. In its broader 
form, privatisation refers to total retreat of the state from economic activities traditionally 
reserved to public entities. In its narrow form, privatisation refers to change of ownership 
from public to private through sale (in whole or part), change of management and control 
through leasing or a management contract, liquidation, or contracting-out. In this thesis, the 
main emphasis will be on the broader definition of the policy, solely because the narrow 
definition (denationalisation) appears to be of limited relevance to the vast majority of 
developing countries. The fact is that, the implementation of denationalisation in developing 
countries has faced serious political, economic, and technical constraints, and its potential
benefits are not at all certain. However, it must be stressed that, the transition to a market 
economy has also faced formidable hurdles and proved to be extremely painful.
The thesis will consist of four main parts. The first part will outline the basic motives 
for establishing public enterprises in the post-war period, their size, performance and 
problems, as well as the drive for privatisation in developing countries (chapter 1 to 4). Parts 
two and three will report the findings of the empirical investigation in the Sudan. Part two 
will outline and discuss the state of the art in the Sudan, viz: the privatisation experience, 
and the structure and performance of public enterprises (chapters 5 to 9). Part three will 
examine the various reform efforts to improve the performance of public enterprises, and the 
relevance of privatisation to the Sudan. The fourth part will bring this research to a 
conclusion, viz: the main findings, the possible alternative policy options, and the 
implications for policy makers in other developing countries (chapter 14).
Abbreviations
BoS Bank of Sudan
BG British Gas
BT British Telecom
CBPE Central Bureau for Public Enterprises
CPO Central Pricing Office
DCs Developing Countries
DFSC Duty Free Shop Corporation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GRIP Guaranteed Recovery of Investment Principal
HCP High Commission for Pricing
IAS Individual Account System
ICP Industrial Costing and Pricing
IDA International Development Association
IDC Industrial Development Corporation
IFC International Finance Corporation
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPC Industrial Production Corporation
JAS Joint Account System
MCCS Ministry of Commerce, Cooporation and Supply
MFEP Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
OGL Open General License
PEs Public Enterprises
PCST Public Corporation for Sugar Trading
SPIC Sugar Project Implementation Cell
SNWA Sudanese Nationals Working Abroad
TFP Total Factor Productivity
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USAID United States Agency for International Development
Introduction and Summary
Introduction
Between the late 1940s and 1970s, a universal consensus existed regarding the role of 
the state in economic activities. Both socialist and capitalist governments, in both developed 
and developing countries engaged in creating a wide range of enterprises to provide goods 
and services at reasonable prices. The prevailing ideology in most developing countries 
(hereafter DCs) was that, political independence must be supported by economic 
independence, which meant full state ownership of the productive capacity, and expulsion 
of foreign firms. It was believed that, due to the widespread market failures, central planning 
was more efficient in allocating resources than the market forces. Thus, governments around 
the globe established a considerable number of public enterprises (hereafter PEs) in the post­
war period, on the assumption that public ownership not only contributes to rapid economic 
growth, but also to socio-political stability. According to public corporation theory, as 
developed in the UK, this required the creation of enterprises that were accountable to the 
government, while their operating decisions were to be left to their management.
Ideology apart, state ownership was further supported by the Keynesian demand 
management theory, which stressed the role of public spending in stimulating economic 
growth, creating jobs, and raising the standards of living. Indeed the theory seem to have 
worked satisfactorily in the post-war period, as inflation remained under control and so did 
unemployment. Therefore, during this period (late 1940s and 1970s), the role of the state in 
economic activities was hardly ever challenged.
By the mid 1970s, however, that universal consensus began to disappear, as both 
inflation and employment soared. Consequently,governments around the globe started to 
reassess their economic role. PEs, it was claimed, were inefficient way of doing business,
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simply because they had no incentives to control costs, or to provide quality goods demanded 
by consumers. Moreover, with their unlimited access to public funds, PEs could not go out 
of business. PE managers, the argument went, had no incentives to be efficient, to respond 
to market forces, or to discipline trade unions.
To these economic arguments, an ideological shift took place during the last decade 
adding another contributory factor against PEs, which Hemming and Mansoor (1988) 
attribute to the election of governments in industrial countries (e.g. the UK and USA), 
committed to "rolling back the frontiers of the state." Their arguments were based on an 
implicit assumption of the superiority of private firms, and a strong belief in the efficiency 
of free markets. Moreover, it was argued that, state ownership undermined consumer choice, 
resulted in higher prices and lower productivity, and that high taxation to finance public 
spending reduced incentives to invest, work and maximise profits. Therefore, it was argued 
that, the role of the state should be restricted to ensuring that the right conditions for doing 
business prevailed. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer summarised these views as 
follows:
"Strong sustainable growth is achieved not through any artificial stimulus, 
but by allowing market forces to work again and by restoring enterprise 
culture, by removing unnecessary restrictions and controls, and by rolling 
back the frontiers o f the state, by removing all trade union laws, promoting 
all forms o f capital ownership, and reducing taxation."
(Budget speech, March 20,1989)
Thus, the poor performance of PEs, it was argued, is a direct consequence of their 
ownership structure. Therefore, the only enduring remedy that emerged was to change 
ownership.
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As for DCs, the current interest in "rolling back the frontiers of the state" is attributed 
to a number of economic factors. These include rapid inflation and unemployment rates, 
mounting external debts, stagnating exports, severe shortages of basic consumer goods, and 
that foreign loans started to slow down. At the domestic level, PEs were blamed for the 
economic difficulties experienced by almost all DCs during the 1980s. It was argued that, 
PEs are incurring persistent losses, mainly borrowers, both locally and abroad, and they did 
not give value for money. John Nellis (1986) highlighted the magnitude of PE losses in 
Africa: "Cumulative PE losses in Mali reached 6% of GDP by the end of 1970s; a 1980 
study of eight Togolese PEs revealed that their losses alone equalled 4% of GDP (leading 
one to think that the losses as a percentage of GDP figures given in other countries might be 
severely underestimated); half of a sample of 39 industrial PEs in Madagascar ran substantial 
losses in the period 1981-83;and reports from the Sudan, Nigeria; Mauritania and Senegal 
reveal, at best, heavy losses ...". Similarly, Shirley (1983) showed the impact of a slight 
improvement in performance, "a 5 percent increase in SOE revenues plus a 5 percent drop 
in costs would generate resources amounting to: some 1.5 percent of GDP in Tanzania , 
enough to finance all its spending on health .. as much as 2.2 percent of GDP in Mali ... 
some 1.4 percent of GDP in Bolivia - 14 percent of tax revenues...".
Thus, a growing dissatisfaction with the performance of PEs, and sweeping political 
changes have led both socialist and capitalist governments around the globe to reassess the 
role of the state in the economy. And the Sudan is no exception.
During the last decade, the Sudan has experienced severe economic and financial 
difficulties. The prices of principal exports (cotton) shaiply declined, the productive sector 
and infrastructure collapsed, external debts mounted, and the country lost its highly trained 
and experienced staff to competitors abroad. Part of the blame is attributed to political and 
natural causes, while others relate to the poor performance of PEs.
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In its 35 year history since independence in 1956, the Sudan has enjoyed peace for only 
11 years (1972-1983). Apart from its human cost, the civil war in the Southern part of the 
country has disturbed development. Indeed, development in other parts of the country has 
been seriously hindered, as the war absorbed the meagre resources available and engaged a 
great deal of the government attention and time. Moreover, the country has also been 
affected by external natural causes, including three years drought (1982-85), and flood and 
locust in 1988, which have had a detrimental impact on the agricultural output, the country’s 
main exports.
Apart from these external factors, a large part of the blame for the poor economic 
performance was levelled at PEs. The Sudan, a former British colony, inherited a number 
of PEs at independence, and subsequently established a wide range of PEs during the 1960s 
and 1970s (see chapter 8). At present, there are some 200 PEs, covering all the irrigation, 
rail, telecommunications, electricity and air transport, and a significant portion of industry, 
trade, hotels, and road transport. PEs are responsible for about 45 percent of GDP, and 75 
percent of exports.
However, the financial performance and productivity of PEs have been extremely poor, 
resulting in a significant budgetary burden and hardship to consumers. A number of factors 
contributed to this state of affairs, including lack of a clear public policy towards PEs, 
massive brain-drain to the Gulf states, severe shortages of foreign exchange to acquire spare 
parts and imported inputs, distorted pricing systems, inept management, poor financial 
management and reporting systems, and inadequate supply of public utilities (e.g. power). 
However, it must be stressed at this stage that, these factors equally affected private firms 
(see chapter 7).
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Nevertheless, as public finances dwindled, and foreign capital flows came to an end 
following the 1982 debt crisis, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (hereafter 
MFEP) became less patient with the budgetary burden of PEs. Moreover, the fact that almost 
all PEs were operating at very low levels of capacity, resulted in severe shortages of basic 
consumer goods causing great hardship. That is because, unlike the situation in industrial 
countries where consumers have access to imported goods, the severe shortages of foreign 
exchange has forced the authorities to curtail imports. Thus, the poor performance of PEs 
affected not only the Treasury, but also the public at large. As a result, the poor performance 
of PEs received the attention of the successive governments, as well as external creditors, 
notably the World Bank and the International Monetaiy Fund. Subsequently, various pieces 
of reform were devised to revitalise the PE sector. The result of these reform efforts, 
however, has not been encouraging, because implementation was flawed in many respects 
(see chapters 10 and 11). In effect, the poor financial performance, the low productivity, and 
the drain on the Treasury persisted. Also, the privatisation of some loss-making PEs has been 
contemplated, though without major progress (see chapter 6). Recently (mid 1990), the 
incoming military government decided to abandon the reform efforts, and instead proposed 
to privatise a wide range of PEs.
Thus, throughout the 1980s the issue of PEs has been a topical issue in the Sudan. In 
1987/88, the researcher participated in a study for the World Bank on the accounting systems 
in the irrigated agricultural schemes. It was during this period that the idea of conducting a 
research work on the ills of PEs and the reform agenda matured.
Definition
For the purpose of this research, PEs are defined as those productive entities owned by 
the state, have a separate legal entity, and earn the bulk of their revenues from the sale of 
goods and services. Thus, in this sense, PEs have the following characteristics: engaged in
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producing goods and rendering services, owned by the state, and their product prices must 
bear some relationship to cost of production. In the Sudan, PEs refer to public corporations 
organised under the 1976 Public Corporations Act, and the private limited companies 
organised under the 1925 Companies Act.
Summary of Findings
Ideological considerations apart, the economic arguments in favour of privatisation were: 
to reduce the budgetary burden, to improve efficiency, to resolve the management and 
control problems of PEs, and to widen ownership. However, the research established that 
there was no clear cut economic case for the policy in DCs (chapter 3). In addition, although 
it was claimed that privatisation is spreading throughout the world, the emerging evidence 
indicates that "there was more rhetoric than action" (Pfeffermann, 1988). It is certainly true 
that governments worldwide, including the former communist countries, have announced 
ambitious privatisation plans. In practice, however, implementation was hampered by a 
combination of political, economic and technical constraints, resulting in a wide gap between 
plans and actual privatisation. The principal political constraints to privatisation have been 
the lack of political commitment, the role of foreigners and ethnic minorities and concerns 
about its distributional impact. The economic and technical impediments include the lack of 
capital, the weakness of the private sector and the lack of experts to plan, manage and 
implement a viable privatisation programme.
Moreover, we found that the business environment in the Sudan is distorted in many 
respects, and nothing has been done to create a supportive legal and economic environment. 
In particular, the Sudanese authorities rely heavily on administrative controls, basically to 
protect employment and consumers, though the administrative capacity of the state has been 
seriously undermined by the massive brain-drain and the disarray of the civil service. There 
are stringent controls over price and labour policies, trade and foreign exchange, very high
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taxation rates, under-valued exchange rate, inadequate supply of public services (power, 
roads, communication services), and unstable political and legal systems. Therefore, 
assuming that the Sudanese authorities managed to privatise part of their PEs, it is likely that 
the economic benefits would be limited, not least because there is no firm evidence to suggest 
that privatisation in itself would generate major economic benefits. For all these reasons, 
therefore, it could argued that, the scope and pace for privatisation in the Sudan would be 
limited and slow. As a result, internal PE reform would need to be emphasised, through 
clarifying objectives, creating a sound macroeconomic environment, strengthening 
management selection, appraisal, incentives, autonomy and accountability. Towards this end, 
a model will be provided to improve the performance of PEs in the interim (see chapter 14).
Structure of the Thesis
This thesis will be composed of four main parts. Part one starts by outlining the major 
reasons behind the establishment of PEs (chapter one). This will be followed by a review of 
the theory and practice of privatisation in DCs (chapters two - four). The primary purpose 
of this literature survey will be to familiarise ourselves with the salient features of the policy, 
viz: its objectives, mechanisms, obstacles and the emerging lessons before conducting the 
fieldwork. This is important, because as Diesing (1973) argues "a prospective fieldworker 
will acquaint himself with a variety of theories (the more the better) that may be applicable 
to his case."
Parts two and three will report the findings of the empirical investigation. Part two starts 
by outlining the research methodology (chapter 5), the state of the art in the Sudan (chapter 
6), the cases (chapter 7), and then examines the structure, and performance of PEs in the 
Sudan (Chapters 8 and 9).
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Part three will examine the various pieces of reform devised to improve the performance 
of PEs (chapters 10 and 11). Thereafter, the relevance of privatisation to the Sudan will be 
critically examined (chapters 13 and 14).
The final part brings this study to a conclusion. It will outline the state of the art in the 
Sudan and other DCs, the alternatives to privatisation, and the implications for policy makers 
in DCs (chapter 14).
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Part One




The Rationale, Size and Performance 
of PEs in Developing Countries
The structure of the world economy in the post-war was characterised by a prominent 
role of PEs in the productive and services sectors. The last decade, however, has witnessed 
significant changes to the policy of public ownership. As we shall see below, a growing 
dissatisfaction with the performance of PEs, the rise of the right in the West, and the collapse 
of socialism in the East, have led governments worldwide to reassess the role of the state 
in the economic activities. It is therefore convenient to start by examining the reasons behind 
the creation of PEs, their performance record, and their major problems.
The purpose of this introductory chapter, therefore, will be to give a brief account on 
the rationale, size, performance, and the main problems of PEs. The discussion will be 
devoted, in the main, to DCs, and particularly African countries as the Sudan with which this 
research is concerned, is part of that continent. However, it worth noting that DCs are by 
no means a homogeneous group. As Short (1984) points out, PE’s share of Gross Domestic 
Product varies from one percent (Nepal) to 14% (Taiwan) in Asia, from 7% (Liberia) to 
40% (Zambia) in Africa, and from 1% (Guatemala) to 38% (Guyana) in Latin America. 
These variations, therefore, highlight the various motives behind the creation of PEs, the 
nature of their problems and hence the difficulty of approaching DCs as a homogeneous 
group. Similarly, Heald (1990) states that "Thailand is dramatically different from Pakistan 
and the newly industrialising countries of South East Asia bear little relationship to Sub- 
Saharan Africa'1. Indeed, even within Africa, major differences exist.
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1.1 The Rationale For PEs
The origins of PEs in most DCs is attributed in part to the colonial administration, where 
many DCs inherited a large number of PEs at the time of independence. For instance, Bauer 
and Yamey (1984) argue that "Nigeria inherited powerful, centralised instruments such as 
export monopolies; imports controls and local development corporations from the British 
Colonial administration". Indeed, a similar legacy was left in Ghana, India, Pakistan, the 
Sudan and Uganda (Aylen, 1987). However, in addition to this legacy, state domination was 
accepted in the post-independence, since this was the formula to which the new national 
governments were acquainted. As Nellis (1986) argues "the point is that most of the national 
elites who came to power in the 1960s were thoroughly accustomed to legally strong, 
hierarchically centralised and economically intrusive governing systems". Therefore, national 
governments subsequently established a wide range of PEs for both ideological and pragmatic 
reasons.
The ideological reasons stemmed largely from the fact that, in many DCs, the leaders 
of the "Independence Movements" were more or less socialist oriented or at least impressed 
by the socialist model of development (e.g. Nasir of Egypt; Singhor of Senegal; Nyreeri of 
Tanzania; and Nehru of India). As a result, many newly independent states adopted one form 
or another of socialism, on the belief that this was the only way to accelerate economic 
development and political stability (Nellis, 1986; Hemming andMansoor, 1988) .In addition, 
ideological considerations often led national governments to take a hostile attitude towards 
multinational firms on political grounds (recolonialisation). Thus, public ownership was 
deemed essential to create jobs, and ensure equal distribution of wealth and balanced regional 
development. Hemming and Mansoor (1988) argue that "public ownership and control of 
the so-called ’commanding heights’ of the economy was given special emphasis within this 
context in both industrial and developing countries". These ideological considerations were 
more or less evident in countries that have adopted a socialist system at one stage. Examples 
from Africa include Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Sudan, Senegal, Somalia,
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Tanzania and Zimbabwi. Indeed, Nellis, (1986) asserts that "at least 16 African countries, 
either at present or at some point in the past, have claimed to be socialist or using basically 
socialist approaches to development".
However, this is not to suggest that ideological considerations were the only motives 
behind state ownership in the post-independence period. Indeed, in the vast majority of cases, 
PEs have grown regardless of the political system, or the ideology of the party in power. In 
the UK, for example, both the Conservative and Labour governments have established a 
substantial number of PEs in the post-war period (Kay, 1987). Similarly, the highly 
conservative Middle East countries have nationalised the oil corporations. The pragmatic 
considerations were numerous. In most DCs, the lack of capital and management expertise 
was the rule. Therefore, DCs had no choice but to rely on public investment. More 
importantly, the social objectives behind the creation of PEs normally do not attract private 
investors. Other pragmatic factors included the generation of investible surplus, establishment 
of import substitutes, and in some cases governments had acquired private firms that failed, 
so as to preserve jobs or provide essential services (e.g. transport).
This brief account does not exhaust the varied motives behind public ownership of the 
productive and services sectors in DCs. Nevertheless, it is evident that for both ideological 
and pragmatic reasons, state intervention was the norm throughout the world. Hemming and 
Mansoor (1988) argue that "while market failures provide strong justification for state 
intervention, such intervention need not take the form of public ownership. Market failures 
could be corrected through regulation, taxes or subsidies". However, public ownership was 
the accepted form of intervention for a number of reasons. Most important of these was the 
fact that taxes and subsidies were thought to be costly, and regulation has its own practical 
difficulties. First, regulation essentially depends on the legal system, and by then the newly 
independent states had no established legal system, nor sufficient qualified judges and
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lawyers. Second, regulation required a certain cadre of technical experts, which many DCs 
did not have by then. Third, the lack of adequate, timely information caused by lack of 
standardised accounting systems, rendered regulation at best difficult.
1.2 Size of PEs
Whatever the motives were, between the late 1940s and 1970s, PEs were the norm 
worldwide, regardless of the stage of economic development or the political system. 
Nevertheless, the exact number of PEs in DCs, and Africa in particular, is not known with 
any degree of accuracy. The reasons are two-fold. First, there is no standardised and precise 
definition of PEs. As Shirley (1983) points out, the telephone system in Jamaica is a public 
corporation, while it is a government department in both Mauritius and Bangladesh. Second, 
information on the number of PEs in DCs is sktechy and unreliable. For example, in relation 
to the size of PEs in Africa, Nellis (1986) argues that "The greatest difficulty when dealing 
with African PEs is obtaining accurate, aggregate facts and figures. Different sources give 
different figures, even for such essential items as total number of PEs in a country". Indeed, 
even in middle-income countries, such problems exist. For example, Trebat (1983) states 
that "In Brazil, we still have no precise data on the total number of public corporations".
Nevertheless, the available evidence indicates that PEs have grown dramatically in 
the post-war period. In relation to Africa, Nellis (1986) estimates that there are some 3000 
PEs in 30 countries. However, the author claims that "The actual total must be considerably 
higher, since several of the countries for which no summary figures are available, are those 
with heavily interventionist economic policies - Angola, Burkino Faso, Guinea Bissau, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe, for example". As we saw earlier, there is little correlation 
across countries in terms of PE’s contribution to GDP. Moreover, as the following table 




Public Ownership of Selected Industrial Subsectors (%).
Subsector Telecomm Electricity Post Gas Coal Rail Air-line Steel Motor
VehicleCountry
Brazil 100 100 100 100 100 100 25 75 -
Britain 100*7 100* .100 100* 100 100 75* 75 50
Canada 25 100 100 - - 75 75 - -
France 100 100 100 100 100 100 75 75 50
Ghana 100 100 100 100 50 100 100 N.A. N.A.
India 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 75 -
Italy 100 75 100 100 N.A. 100 100 75 25
Japan 100* - 100*7 - 100 75 75 - -
Mexico 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 75 25
S. Korea 100 75 100 - 100 100 - 75 -
Tunisia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 N.A. N.A.
Zambia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 N.A. N.A.
a/: Before privatisation 
N.A.: Not Available
Source: Veljanovski (1987), "Selling the State", Weidenfled and Nicolson, London.
Ayub and Hegstad (1986), "Public Industrial Enterprises", Industry and Finance Series, Vol 17, The World Bank.
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1.3 Performance
To start with, it must be emphasised that, performance measurement is an extremely 
difficult and complicated issue. In fact, even for private firms, the available methods of 
profitability, return on investment and residual income have been heavily criticised in the 
accounting literature. As for profitability, the hyper inflation experienced by all countries in 
the late 1970s onwards, made its calculation a protracted and complex business. Thus, it is 
by no means clear which profit figure should be used as a performance indicator- that is 
profits based on historical costs, or those based on current replacement costs. As for DCs, 
however, inflation accounting is simply unknown (Likiermann,1984). Second, the absence 
of standardised accounting systems in most DCs creates wide variations in the treatment of 
depreciation charges, inventory valuation and cost of capital, which affect comparability and 
consistency. Third, absolute profit figures are entirely meaningless indicators, since they are 
not related to the investment base used to generate the profits.
Return on Investment, on the other hand, could lead to dysfunctional decisions. For 
example, in a bid to maximise the rate, management could simply cut costs (e.g. training, 
research and development), reduce the investment base by disposing of marginally-producing 
assets, or lease rather than buy, all of which would affect the long term value of the firm. 
Finally, the residual income method charges the cost of capital as an expense, which makes 
a firm with a high debt ratio less profitable than that with a high equity ratio.
As for PEs, however, the issue of performance measurement is further complicated 
by a number of factors. First, performance measurement essentially requires a regular flow 
of reliable, timely information. However, in many DCs, accounting systems are rudimentary, 
qualified accountants are in severe shortages, and the available financial statements are not 
prepared according to sound accounting practices (Shirley, 1983). The information problem
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is further complicated by the fact that, the available figures cover the whole public sector 
units, which makes it difficult to separate those applying for PEs from those of government 
departments (Short, 1984). Second, performance measurement essentially requires comparing 
standards or targets with the actual results achieved. However, PEs were normally assigned 
multiple and often contradicting goals, simply because they were created primarily to 
accelerate socio-economic development, and hence profitability was not a main objective. For 
example, to promote rural development, PEs were often located in remote rural areas that 
lack the basic infrastructure or the raw material supply; to curb inflation their prices were 
often set at unrealistic levels; and to contain unemployment they were normally overstaffed. 
As a result, their poor performance could be attributed to the presence of these social and 
macroeconomic objectives. Similarly, PE managers were often selected on the basis of 
political acceptance and personal ties, rather than knowledge and experience in business 
management. PE managers have no autonomy overprices or personnel policies, no incentives 
or punishments if performance improved or deteriorated, and they are often constrained by 
tight bureaucratic controls that limit their operational autonomy.
On the other hand, PEs have unlimited access to public funds, and exempted from 
custom duties. They might be required to acquire their inputs from other PEs at a price far 
below (or above) the prevailing market prices, and the suppliers may never be paid. Last, 
but not least, both public and private enterprises in most DCs are often protected from 
imports, which makes the local market more profitable than the international market. 
Therefore, good performance could be attributed to the market structure, rather than internal 
efficiency.
For all these reasons, therefore, financial performance as reflected in "the Profit and 
Loss Account" might be a poor and misleading indicator of financial performance. Indeed,
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recognising these pitfalls, Herbert Morrison argued that:
"The public corporation must be no more capitalist business, the be-all and 
end-all o f which is profit and dividends, even though it will, quite properly 
be expected to pay its way. It must have a different atmosphere at its board 
table from that ofshare-holderfs meeting; its officers must regard themselves 
as high custodians o f public interest
(Quoted by Nath, 1986).
Similarly, the 1978 White Paper in the UK stressed the need to publish not only 
financial indicators but also non-financial indicators, including international comparisons.
A second indicator often used to compare public and private enterprises is the "Total 
Factor Productivity" (TFP), defined as the ratio of gross output to labour. The method is 
straightforward when both output and labour are homogeneous. However, in most cases the 
various labour categories must be unified into a total labour input. Moreover, the labour 
factor must be adjusted for any overmanning imposed by the state.
A third attempt to evaluate the performance of PEs was recently adopted in Pakistan 
and South Korea. Pakistan’s signalling system consists of three main components : a 
management information system, a performance evaluation system and a bonus system. It 
adjusts private profits (after tax) for those elements that are irrelevant for PEs. That is,
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Public Profits =  Private Profits (after tax).
+  direct taxes 
+  interest payments 
+  depreciation charges
- non-operating income
- opportunity cost o f capital 
±_ adjustments
Public Profitability =  Public Profits
operating fixed assets.
(Hartmann and Nawab, 1985).
The system requires four main prerequisites : (1) strengthening managerial selection 
and autonomy. (2) comprehensive information system, (3) highly skilled personnel to operate 
the system, and (4) political commitment (Shirley,1989). Nevertheless, Hartmann and 
Nawab (1985) assert that "the system has had greatest impact on performance and managerial 
behaviour".
With these Caveats in mind, we now turn to review the available evidence on the 
performance of PEs in DCs. The available evidence, however, is inconclusive, and indeed 
yield mixed results. For example, Nellis (1986) concluded that "African PE present a 
depressing picture of inefficiency , losses, budgetary burdens, poor products and services, 
and minimal accomplishment of the non-commercial objectives so frequently used to excuse 
their poor economic performance". On the other hand, Susungi (1988) surveyed 48 African 
PEs in 1984 and found that, 12 PEs reported net profit margins of more than 4 percent, 
while 5 PEs reported net profit margins in excess of 10 percent. Moreover, almost 20 
percent of PEs investigated attained a return on investment in excess of 25 percent. Indeed, 
even Nellis (1986) made some reservations in a later study, "...not all PEs, even in a region 
as difficult as Africa, are loss-makers (and 1984 was a very difficult year in Africa). In every
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developing country one will find one or several PEs or even whole subsectors which, despite 
commonly perceived problems, still manage to run at a profit” (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989).
Thus, it is evident that, there is no conclusive evidence on the performance of PEs. 
Nevertheless, the losses of PEs were often financed through government subsidies and 
massive borrowing from both internal and external capital markets. However, as local 
resources dwindled and foreign loans started to slow down in the 1980s, the fiscal deficits 
of PEs became no longer sustained, and the need for a radical enduring solution became 
widely recognised.
1.4 Problems of PEs
The various problems facing PEs have been subject to numerous studies in recent 
years (e.g. Shirley, 1983; Nellis, 1986; Ayub and Hegstad, 1986; Wortzel and Wortzel, 
1989; Hemming and Mansoor, 1988). These include lack of clear objectives, excessive 
political intervention, and deficient control systems. Indeed, a number of studies attribute the 
poor performance of PEs to the control systems, which are due to lack of information flows, 
duality of objectives, the multiplicity of principals (i.e. the number of government 
departments monitoring PEs), and lack of a clear policy towards PEs (Ghai, 1985; 
Ramamurti, 1987).
Other problems include overstaffing for political reasons, bureaucratic controls over 
all operating decisions (e.g. salaries, budget preparation and approval, purchases, finance and 
investment), which are ill-suited for commercial enterprises operating in a dynamic 
environment. Moreover, the boards of directors are composed, in the main, of civil servants 
who have no financial stake in the profitability of the enterprise, poorly rewarded, and often 
lack knowledge and experience in business management. As we saw earlier, PE managers
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are selected on political basis rather than professional qualifications, have no autonomy to 
raise prices, to lay-off redundant staff, or to close unprofitable product lines or subsidiaries.
Nevertheless, although there is no conclusive evidence regarding the relationship 
between ownership and efficiency, the view that poor performance is a direct consequence 
of the ownership structure has gathered momentum. As a result, change of ownership or 
control was suggested as the only enduring remedy. In the following chapter, we shall 
discuss the privatisation concept and the various techniques suggested for its implementation.
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Chapter Two
The Privatisation Concept 
and Techniques
2.1 Introduction
As we saw in the previous chapter, state intervention in the economic activities in the 
post-war period has been the norm around the globe. The last decade, however, has seen a 
major reversal to the political and economic consensus that dominated in the post-war period. 
State intervention and the over-extended PE sector, it was argued, "has robbed the economy 
of the flexibility it needed to achieve the necessary adjustment" (Hemming and Mansoor, 
1988). As with the rise of PEs in the 1960s and 1970s, the driving force to "rolling back 
the frontiers of the state" has been both ideological and pragmatic. Yet, a third factor that 
led to the recent interest in privatisation in DCs has been the external pressures exerted on 
DCs to rely more heavily on free markets to allocate resources, and on the private sector to 
spearhead economic development. In this chapter we will outline the ideological contents of 
the policy, its meaning, and its various techniques. The economic arguments for and against 
the policy will be the main concern of chapter three, while the role of the external factors 
will be discussed in chapter four.
The ideological impetus to privatisation is largely attributed to rise of the right as the 
most significant political feature of the 1980s. As we saw earlier, industrial countries, 
notably the UK and the USA, witnessed the election of governments pledged to "rolling back 
the frontiers of the state". Their arguments were based on a strong belief in the efficiency 
of free markets, and a deep-seated belief in private ownership on the grounds that ownership 
is the sole determinant of enterprise performance (Wortzel and Wortzel, 1989). Moreover,
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the right is largely influenced by the "monetarist thoughts" which emphasise reducing public 
spending, restricting money supply, return to free markets, and less state intervention in the 
economic activities. Therefore, it was argued that, as many functions as possible should be 
transferred to the private sector "to reduce the burden on the state" (World Bank Report, 
1981).
In the UK, for example, the large scale privatisations that were carried out during 
the last decade, were attributed basically to the election of a government committed to 
"rolling back the frontiers of the state". The Conservative Party which dominated the British 
politics during the 1980s strongly believes in free markets and private ownership. Indeed, 
their economic goals throughout this period were to curb trade union powers, to bring 
inflation under control, and to curtail public spending, which essentially required reducing 
public sector borrowing requirement (Rees, 1986; Kay and Thompson, 1986; Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988).
Related to the ideology of free markets was the belief that public ownership had 
created a "dependency culture", where the British people have lost their self-reliance and 
responsibility, and became wholly dependent on the sate. Therefore, it was argued that, a 
new ’enterprise culture’ was needed to revive the economy (Ve(janovski, 1987). In this 
context, wider share ownership was seen as a means to creating popular capitalism (share 
owning democracy). Towards this end, enormous media advertising was deployed 
encouraging individuals to take "the enterprise initiative", and start their own business. 
Moreover, shares in the privatised industries were targeted to the small investors, and for 
that purpose, highly under-valued (see chapter 3). Politically, it was thought that, wider 
ownership would make the election of a Labour Government less likely, renationalisation 
extremely difficult, and more importantly, denotionalisation would undermine the powers of 
the trade unions (Ve(janovski, 1987).
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These views were further fuelled by the political developments that swept Eastern 
Europe, which were taken as evidence of the failure of socialism and central planning. 
Indeed, these sweeping political reforms have facilitated the move towards a market 
economy, which the communist countries have been opposing for more than 70 years. Even 
in China, which remained loyal to the principles of communism, it was reported that 
individuals have been allowed to own and control certain economic activities, mainly in the 
agricultural sector (Berg,1987).
As for DCs, however, the current interest in privatisation is attributed to two main 
factors: the poor performance of PEs and the external pressures to implement fundamental 
economic reforms. As foreign loans slowed down and internal resources dwindled, the 
deficits generated by PEs became no longer sustained. Therefore, it was argued that "the 
state has to establish tighter priorities and cut back in areas where its presence is not 
essential" (Van De Walle, 1989). An African version of the "Russian Perstroika", however, 
seems unlikely as manifested by the irony that, by the time that popular uprisings against 
totalitarian regimes were sweeping Eastern Europe, new dictators were emerging in Africa 
(e.g. the Sudan in mid - 1989). Therefore, it could be argued that, without sweeping political 
reforms, foreign investment might not be forthcoming, which would hinder the privatisation 
process, due to lack of capital. Moreover, without a stable political system with sufficient 
public support, it might be extremely difficult for the government to implement radical 
economic reforms, not least because they would entail heavy political costs.
2.2 Privatisation Defined
As the following quotations reveal, there is no specific precise definition of the term. 
Privatisation is "an ugly word" (Heald, 1985), "a fuzzy concept that evokes sharp political 
reaction" (Starr, 1988), "a word which should be heavily escorted by inverted commas as 
a reminder that its meaning is uncertain and often tendentious" (Donnison, 1984). Indeed,
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it does not even appear in the Oxford Dictionary. Nevertheless, its a word used to describe 
various policies designed to substantially reduce the role of the state in economic activities, 
and strengthen the role of the market forces. It is thus about denationalisation and 
deregulation.
Denationalisation refers to the transfer of ownership or control from the public to the 
private sector. However, how much shares should be sold to private investors is inconclusive 
in the literature. Beesley and Littlechild (1983) specify "... at least 50 percent", Peacock 
(1984) maintained that "... a predominant share sold", yet Cobum and Wortzel (1986) 
assert that "If after sale, the government is willing to limit its role to that of investor, and 
leave management to the private shareholders, a one percent sale would accomplish as much 
as 100 percent divestment".
2.3 Denationalisation Mechanisms
The following techniques were often suggested for the transfer of ownership and/or 
control.





4. Leases and management contracts




Under this method, the state offers shares to the general public, either at a
predetermined price or on tender basis. Under the former, the state sets a price in advance,
and invites the public to subscribe at that price. To eliminate the risk that supply might 
outpace demand, the state might seek the services of underwriters, who accept to acquire 
unsubscribed shares for a fee. Under the tender basis, on the other hand, the share price is 
determined by the market, where applicants decide the price and the number of shares they 
are willing to acquire. The following example might clarify this method. Assume there are 
2,650,000 shares offered, and that the following tenders were made by the public :
150.000 shares at £2.75 per share
330.000 shares at £2.70 per share
475.000 shares at £2.65 per share
745.000 shares at £2.60 per share
950.000 shares at £2.55 per share
1.350.000 shares at £2.50 per share
4,000,000 shares
Thus, since, there are only 2,650,000 shares, only those who tendered at £2.55 or 
more would receive shares, either at £2.55 per share, or at the price at which bids were 
made. The UK experience shows that the fixed offer often leads to over- subscription, which 
leads to the accusation that shares were under-valued. The tender offer while alleviating over­
subscription and could lead to a higher price, has the risk of being too complex for small 
investors (Vickers and Yarrow, 1989).
Apart from underwriters, the method requires the services of investment banks to 
plan, manage and execute the offering. Equally, a change of legal form of the privatisation 
candidate might be required prior to a public offering (e.g. from a public corporation to a 
limited company),as well as changing the accounting systems. The success of this method
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depends veiy much on the status of the financial market, the level of education and income 
in the country concerned, and adequate information to be disclosed to the public.
The method has the advantage of widening share ownership, and the transparency by 
which it is carried out reduces the possibility for irregularities. Indeed, Vuylsteke (1988) 
asserts that "for these reasons, the method is often more politically palatable". On the other 
hand, if the enterprise is not in a sound financial position, financial restructuring might be 
needed prior to sale so as to attract investors. Moreover, the pricing of shares needs adequate 
preparation, because a high price lessens investor’s interests, while a low price leads to the 
allegation that public assets were sold too cheaply, both of which are undesirable. Finally, 
the state needs to ascertain the ability of the market to finance the sale prior to flotation, and 
hence the timing of flotation is critical (Vuylsteke, 1988).
2.3.2 Private Sales
Under this method, part or all of the government equity is sold to a group of private 
investors through tendering or direct negotiation. The method is usually preferable where the 
financial market is underdeveloped and level of education is too low to permit a public 
offering. Also, if the PE is in poor financial position, the state might sell part of its equity 
to private investors with a view of turning the entity around prior to full privatisation. The 
assumption is that, the sales proceeds and the presence of private partners would improve 
performance to facilitate a public offering (Vuylsteke, 1988).
It has the advantage of being much easier than a public offering. But, unlike a public 
offering, it lacks transparency which increases the chances of irregularities, and could lead 
to concentration of wealth, with all its political consequences (Ghai,1985). In the case of 
joint ownership, the state needs to ensure private partners that it will not intefere in the 
operations of the enteiprise, or use it to achieve social objectives, often a difficult task (Rees,
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1986). As with a public offering, adequate information must be disclosed to prospective 
investors, and pricing needs careful planning (Vuylsteke, 1988).
2.3.3 Liquidation
This method is preferred when the PE can not be sold as a going concern, and hence 
it must be liquidated with its assets sold to interested investors. Thus, here the state sells 
assets rather than shares, which could be affected through tendering, open auction, or direct 
negotiation (Vuylsteke, 1988).The major problems with this technique are that assets are 
usually sold without the related debts, implying that the state must assume such obligations. 
Moreover, since the PE is liquidated, all the work force must be laid-off, which complicates 
the employment question. And the pricing of assets is often a protracted business.
2.3.4 Management/Employee Buy-out
Under this technique, the PE is usually sold to the work force as a going concern. 
Thus, it provides a feasible solution to the employment problem, the single most limiting 
obstacle to privatisation in DCs (see chapter 6). Its success, however, depends on the 
viability of the enterprise, the competence of management, and the level of education of the 
work force (Vuylsteke, 1988).
However, despite its political advantages, Vuylsteke (1988) found that it has not been 
widely used in DCs. The most limiting constraint, the author claims, is its funding problem. 
Moreover, if the level of education is low, and where there is no history of share ownership, 
the method may not be that attractive.
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2.3.5 Leases and Management Contracts
The emphasis here is on management and control, rather than the transfer of 
ownership. It is often advocated when the PE is in poor financial position to permit the 
transfer of ownership, and hence private management is introduced to turn the firm around.
Under the lease arrangement, the state could lease its assets to a private investor, for 
an agreed period of time, in return for a fee. The lease agreement often specify the rights 
and responsibilities of both the lessor and lessee. The lessee assumes all financial 
responsibilities, and the lease fee is paid to the state regardless of performance. Therefore, 
the lessee must operate the assets in an efficient manner, while the state must ensure that the 
leased assets would be returned back in a good condition at the end of the contract 
(Vuylsteke, 1988).
Under the management contract, private management is hired to manage the enterprise 
for a certain period, in return for a fee. The arrangement is advocated to solve "management- 
related problems" (Hegstad and Newport, 1987). The state continues to be responsible for 
all operating expenses, and the management fee would be paid regardless of performance 
(Vuylsteke, 1988).The success of both arfangements depends very much on the business 
environment in the country concerned, and the degree of operational autonomy granted to 
the management contractor. Under both methods, the design and enforcement of the contract 
is the most important and difficult task.
These are some techniques suggested to transfer ownership and / or control to the 
private sector. However, the choice of the appropriate technique would depend on the 
privatisation objectives, the status of the capital market, the viability of enterprises selected 
for privatisation, and the sector in which they operate (Vuylsteke, 1988).
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A second version of privatisation involves deregulation. That is, removal of all 
government controls over entry, prices, labour, and profits. However, such retreat by the 
state, Swann(1988) claims "may not be complete". That is, the state might need to regulate 
prices or profits so as to protect consumers against abuses by firms with considerable market 
powers, such as the natural monopolies. Moreover, critics have emphasised three main 
drawbacks of deregulation. First, Bishop and Kay (1989) argue that "The removal of 
statutory entry barriers does not ensure real competition", simply because other non-statutory 
barriers, such as size, information and experience, might deter entry. Second, deregulation 
allows private firms to engage only in profitable lines and drop the unprofitable ones, i.e. 
"cream-skimming11. Advocates argue that the force of this argument will depend on the extent 
to which unprofitable services should be provided. Third, it was argued that, in the case of 
natural monopolies (i.e. where a network is involved, such as electricity, rail and gas), 
competition between numerous suppliers would lead to higher prices. That is because, 
average costs would decline as output increases, and hence a single supplier would be able 
to provide the service at a lower price. In this case, it was argued that "competition for the 
market rather than competition in the market" should be created (Yarrow, 1986). That is to 
allow various suppliers to use the network and provide the service, through franchising. 
However, despite its theoretical appeal, franchising suffers a number of deficiencies. These 
include the availability of sufficient bidders, risks of collusion among competitors, the 
valuation of assets at the end of the contract, and the design and enforcement of the contract 
(Yarrow, 1986; Bishop and Kay, 1989).
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that, both advocates and opponents of privatisation 
emphasize the role of deregulation in enhancing efficiency (see chapter 3). Indeed, it was 
argued that, if privatisation and deregulation are not in harmony with each others, the latter 
should be adopted (Rees, 1986; Kay and Thompson 1986; Heald, 1990).
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A third privatisation mechanism involves contracting-out of publicly provided services 
to the private sector. That is instead of employing direct labour to provide the service, the 
state could hire private contractors. Examples include refuse collection, school meals and 
hospital cleaning.
Bienen and Waterbuiy (1989) claim that only the sale and leasing of public assets, 
and contracting out are "instances of privatisation". For the purpose of this research, 
however, privatisation will be defined in a broader form to include not only denationalisation, 
but also deregulation and measures to expose PEs to the disciplines of the market forces, 
including the market for corporate control. The reasons are three-fold. First, experience 
shows that denationalisation is facing various difficulties in DCs (see chapter 6). Second, 
there is no conclusive evidence to support the view that ownership is a sole determinant of 
performance, or that a change of ownership in itself would lead to improved efficiency (see 
chapter 3). Third, where serious efforts were made to clarify objectives, strengthen 
management selection, incentives and autonomy, and hold them accountable for the results, 
as in Pakistan and South Korea, remarkable results have been achieved (Hartmann and 
Nawab, 1985; Park, 1987). Indeed, similar approaches to privatisation in DCs, particularly 
Africa, have been proposed by Ramanadham (1986); Callaghy and Wilson (1988).
Thus, while ownership changes are considered, we will emphasize the broader 
concept of the policy1. However, it must be stressed that, we are by no means suggesting 
that denationalisation should be avoided. But, rather that its implementation is facing serious 
constraints, and in the absence of a sound economic, legal, and political environment, its 
potential benefits are by no means assured.
1 This broader approach, which we refer to as privatisation of operating 
criteria, is sometimes referred to as commercialisation (e.g. Nigeria) or 
corporatisation (e.g. New Zealand).
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Chapter Three
The Privatisation Theory : The Debate
3.1 Introduction
Ideological considerations apart, the recent impetus to privatisation in DCs is 
attributed to two main factors : the economic factors, and the external factors. In this 
chapter, we will review the economic arguments made for or against the policy, with 
reference to DCs. However, it must be stressed at the outset that, no explicit objectives were 
ever clearly stated, nor had the privatisation techniques been thought out. In addition, the 
search for the privatisation objectives is often complicated by the fact that, no systematic set 
of objectives were ever clearly stated for the policy, and that the motives differ across 
countries, and over time in the same country. Indeed, even in the UK, where major 
privatisations were carried out, the privatisation motives have evolved through time. As Kay 
and Thompson (1986) argue,
"The reality behind the multiplicity o f objectives is not that the policy has a 
rather sophisticated rationale, but rather that it is lacking any clear analyses 
o f purpose ... any objective which seems achievable is seized as 
justification ",
Moreover, even in the UK, there was no specific and clear privatisation plan. Indeed, 
Wortzel and Wortzel (1989) claim that, "For the most part, countries have chosen 
privatisation candidates opportunistically. Rather than formulating and implementing a 
cohesive privatisation strategy, they have selected candidates on some other basis".
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Nevertheless, a number of arguments have been made in favour of privatisation. 
These claims, Rees (1986) argues "should be regarded as economic hypothesis capable of 
being tested against empirical evidence". These are that:
(1) Privatisation would reduce PE's deficits, decrease the crowding-out o f private 
investment, and generate resources to the Treasury , which could be used to 
reduce taxes and pay external debts.
(2) Privatisation would expose enterprises to the market forces, clarify objectives, 
enhance management incentives, and consequently leads to significant 
economic efficiency.
(3) Privatisation would lead to wider "real" ownership by the public.
(4) Privatisation would eliminate political intervention, and resolve the 
management and control problems o f PEs.
In what follows, we will analyse the potential benefits of privatisation, with special 
reference to DCs.
3.2 The Fiscal Benefits
There are three main claims made in favour of the fiscal benefits of the policy. First, 
it was claimed that PEs constitute a significant budgetary burden in all DCs, and major 
borrowers both at home and abroad. Therefore, privatisation was suggested as the most 
enduring solution, in the sense that the privatised firms would no longer have access to public 
funds. Second, PEs often use the limited resources available, at the expense of private 
investment. Third, privatisation would generate substantial sales proceeds to finance tax cuts, 
pay external debts, or provide better health and education services.
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At the theoretical level, these benefits might seem plausible to the authorities in DCs, 
where internal resources are limited, and foreign capital is no longer available following the 
international debt crisis of the early 1980s. However, we shall argue that the fiscal benefits 
of privatisation are likely to be limited, due to a number of reasons. First, the sale of 
profitable PEs - often selected for sale to ensure the success of privatisation - is unlikely to 
generate fiscal gains in the long run. That is because, if the sales price is exactly equal to 
the discounted net present value of profits that a PE would generate, the fiscal gains would 
be zero. In that case, the state would simply substitute cash for the future remittances. On 
the other hand, if the sales price is less than what the state would receive in the future had 
privatisation not taken place, the government stands to lose at a certain point in the future 
(Van De Walle, 1989).Indeed, for a number of reasons, under-valuation of shares has been 
the norm (see below).
Advocates claim that "On the expectation that they can increase profitability, the 
buyers may pay the government a price higher than the discounted stream of profits that the 
Treasury would receive under continued public ownership" (Galal, 1990). However, the 
available evidence indicates that this has never been the case. In the UK, for example, 
despite its well established financial market and formidable help from its sophisticated 
banking systems, there is evidence that shares have been heavily under-valued (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988). Indeed, Harris (1988) points out that "the net present value of foregone 
income will exceed flotation income as early as 1990". As for DCs, however, the lack of 
sophisticated banking systems and technical expertise, and the generally distorted business 
environment, suggest that privatisation in itself will not lead to significant turnaround in 
performance.
Second, if the PE selected for sale is a loss-making enterprise, it would need to be 
turned around prior to privatisation, so as to attract investors. Such restructuring might
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involve "writing-off debts and tax arrears; writing-down assets to reflect market values, 
rehabilitation and injection of capital" (Vuylsteke, 1988). The fact is that, in the vast 
majority of cases, governments have initiated massive financial restructuring programmes to 
prepare PEs for sale. Examples include Canada, Chile, France, Hungary, and the UK 
(Yarrow, 1986; Vuylsteke, 1988). On the other hand, poor performing PEs can not be sold 
in their present financial condition, or sold at the minimum price, both of which are 
undesirable. Failure to sell would have a negative impact on future privatisations, while sale 
at the minimum price would lead to the allegation that public assets were sold too cheaply.
Apart from financial restructuring, the privatisation of both profitable and loss-making 
PEs would involve various transaction costs, such as administrative expenses and payment 
of worker’s benefits. Administrative expenses would include the advisory fees (e.g. 
investment banks, accountants and lawyers), and advertising expenses, while the workers 
benefits would involve severance payments, retraining, and possibly extension of loans to 
acquire shares. Therefore, financing privatisation is likely to cause major concerns for the 
authorities in DCs in the short and medium term. Indeed, the available evidence indicates 
that, such costs have brought privatisation to a stand still in a large number of DCs 
(Vuylsteke, 1988; Kikeri, 1990; Cowan, 1990). In addition, to induce the limited number 
of "acceptable" buyers available, governments had provided subsidies (sweeteners), 
exemption from custom duties on imported machines and raw materials, deterred (soft) 
payment terms, or protection against imports. Needless to say, such fiscal concessions would 
cost vast sums of money, and hence reduce the fiscal benefits of privatisation.
Third, in the vast majority of cases, PEs selected for privatisation were the smaller 
enterprises, while the large enterprises that constitute a real burden on the Treasury, such as 
the rail, the telecommunications, and the agricultural schemes were classified as 
"untouchables". The following examples probably provide a powerful demonstration.
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In Mexico, the number of PEs was reduced from 398 to 90 (i.e. 77 percent), but the 
privatised PEs represented around 23 percent of the total PE’s assets (Kikeri, 1990). In 
Senegal, the 26 PEs selected for sale represented only two percent of the government equity 
in the PE sector (Galal, 1990). In Brazil, of total assets in the PE sector valued at $40 
billion, those privatised had a value of only $27 million (Galal, 1990). In Guinea, the 70 
transactions executed were small and non-operating PEs (Kikeri, 1990). Indeed, similar 
treatments took place in Chile, Bangladesh, Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia (Berg and 
Shirley, 1987; Cowan, 1990; Kikeri, 1990).
Fourth, in most cases, PE’s deficits were caused by the government policies, and 
hence not a conclusive justification for privatisation (Heald, 1990; Ramanadham, 1988). 
That is, their prices were often set at levels far below the market prices, basically to protect 
consumers and curb inflation; they were often located in uneconomic sites, largely to 
promote rural areas; and they provided suitable jobs for political supporters, army officers 
and former ministers. Moreover, their unlimited need for fimds was caused by their social 
objectives (e.g. building of roads, schools and hospitals) and failure of other PEs and 
government units to pay for the goods and services provided to them (Nellis, 1986). Finally, 
Heald (1990) claims that "cases of corruption and looting are not hard to find".
Similarly, for a number of reasons, sales proceeds are unlikely to be significant. To 
start with, the generally poor performance and out-dated plants of most PEs are likely to 
reduce sales revenues. Likewise, the smaller PEs, operating in competitive markets, often 
selected for privatisation, are unlikely to yield significant proceeds. Second, striking a correct 
selling price has not always been easy, because PEs were not listed on the stock markets, and 
there are no identical private firms to compare them with PEs. In addition, in most DCs, 
there are no sophisticated banking systems to carry out the complicated valuation process of 
enterprises that often lack a proper set of accounts, and have not been audited for years.
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Foreign advisers, if allowed, are likely to face resentment from the bureaucrats and PE 
managers, and the lack of appropriate records could hinder their job (Leeds, 1988). For these 
reasons, therefore, establishing a correct price is technically difficult.
Indeed, it might not be desirable either. For example, in order to ensure the political 
success of the policy, the state might deliberately under-value shares. The case of the UK is 
again illustrative in this respect. Despite its well-established financial institutions and its 
sophisticated accounting standards, there were accusations that shares have been under-valued 
to the extent that the Treasury is said to have lost billions of the tax-payer’s money 
(Veljanovski, 1987; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988).
9
Third, the government objectives could also reduce the sales proceeds. For example, 
to promote popular capitalism, shares may be under-valued, payment staged over a number 
of years, and management buy-out might be preferred to other mechanisms regardless of the 
price received. Foreign investors and certain local residents might be excluded, thereby 
reducing the number of bidders, which in turn reduces the sales revenues. To attract buyers, 
the state might provide soft loans, accept instalment payments, provide incentives to 
encourage stakeholders to hold on their allocations (bonus shares), provide discount against 
bills (as in the case of British Gas), or tariff and quantitative protection. Indeed, Vuylsteke 
(1988) argues that "the special privileges granted to investors, have been a source of 
considerable controversy, especially in Africa". In Togo, for instance, a steel mill plant was 
leased with a protection rate of 41 percent and tax-free on all imported inputs, in return for 
a lease fee of $175,000, which covered "a fraction of the interest charges the Government 
of Togo must continue to pay on the original large investment" (Nellis, 1986). Similarly, 
Kikeri (1990) argues that "In Guinea, six of the fifteen completed transactions accorded the 
purchasers more favourable terms than those foreseen under the new investment code". These 
cases clearly raise serious questions regarding the government ability to negotiate sound
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economic deals. As we shall see later, there is a conflict between the revenue generating 
objectives and other objectives, such as efficiency and popular capitalism. Moreover, Cowan 
(1990) points out that the socio-political consequences of Labour retrenchment have led the 
governments of Banama, Bangladesh and Malaysia to impose on potential buyers to retain 
the whole work force for a certain period. Needless to say,such commitments, the difficulty 
of establishing a correct price, and the concessions provided to attract investors would 
undoubtedly reduce the sales revenues.
Finally, there is no firm evidence to support the proposition that PEs have created a 
‘crowding-out’ effect. For example a recent study carried out by the "International Finance 
Corporation" - the World Bank group - concluded that "This analysis does not prove 
conclusively that public investment goes hand-in-hand with private investment, or that 
‘crowding-out’ takes place" (Madarassy, 1990). Indeed, Vuylsteke (1988) points out that, 
where the capital market is underdeveloped, privatisation could cause significant ‘crowding- 
out’ effects, because the limited internal resources available could have been used to establish 
new firms, or expand the existing business.
As noted above, the state might provide various fiscal concessions so as to attract 
buyers, which would cause a real burden on the Treasury and the banking systems. 
Moreover, Bienen and Waterbury (1989) argue that "in many DCs private enterprises raise 
capital through the banking system rather than by directly selling shares on capital 
markets". Finally, in the case of debt: equity swaps, the central bank of the indebted country 
would be required to redeem the external debt in local currency at the prevailing exchange 
rate (see chapter 6). However, given the fact that, most DCs have devalued their currencies 
many times during the last decade, these transactions are likely to cost a substantial amount 
of money.
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For all these reasons, therefore, privatisation is unlikely to have a significant impact 
on the financial market. As Rees (1986) argues, "Simply to reclassify borrowing as private 
rather than public does nothing to change the pressure of demand on financial markets". As 
a result, the argument that privatisation would generate fiscal gains in DCs is highly 
debatable. Similar conclusions were reached by Hemming and Mansoor (1988); Heller and 
Schiller (1989). Indeed, even in the UK, Rees (1986) argues that, "Possibly the 
unconvincing nature of this hypothesis explains why it has been deemphasised in more recent 
Ministerial statements on privatisation”.
3.3 The Efficiency Benefits
Although the microeconomic theory never established a firm link between efficiency 
and the ownership structure, a number of arguments were made suggesting that 
denationalisation would generate significant allocative and productive efficiency benefits. 
Allocative efficiency implies that the correct combination of goods will be produced, while 
productive efficiency means that the maximum amount of goods will be produced at the least 
possible costs. These arguments were based on the property right theory (Alchian, 1965; 
Leibenstein, 1966; Williamson, 1975). First, it was argued that, public ownership inhibits 
efficiency, due to lack of incentives and shareholders with a direct interest in the operations 
of a PE. The tax-payers cannot exert real pressures on management to operate efficiently, 
and fmance is often obtained from the Treasury regardless of performance. Therefore, 
public managers have no incentives to be financially viable, and the absence of market 
disciplines imply that PEs can never go out of business. Private enterprises, on the other 
hand, are exposed to the disciplines of market forces, including the market for corporate 
control. Thus, if the capital market is efficient, a firm that fails to control costs, reduces its 
profits, and hence becomes a target for takeover or bankruptcy. The threat of bankruptcy or 
takeover, therefore, would force management to cut waste and innovate so as to stay in
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business. As a result, the product market will enhance allocative efficiency, while the capital 
market enhances productive efficiency.
Second, it was claimed that, management incentives to maximise profits and control 
costs are seriously hampered by the structure of ownership. PEs are often given numerous 
and contradicting goals, and supervised by numerous, ill-coordinated government agencies. 
Therefore, denationalisation would clarify objectives, reduce the number of principals, and 
eliminate the excessive political interference. Third, a change of ownership would replace 
the "uninterested" civil servants by "real" shareholders who have a direct financial stake, and 
hence exert pressures on management to minimise costs, innovate and seek new markets. 
Finally, the absence of market disciplines encourages trade unions to demand higher wages, 
regardless of performance. Therefore, privatisation, it was argued, would undermine the 
trade union powers.
For these reasons, it was claimed that, PEs are less efficient than their private 
counterparts. These claims, however, could be refuted on the following grounds. First, in 
the vast majority of DCs, the capital markets are highly inefficient. As Heald (1990) argues 
"Existing capital markets are not only thin and underdeveloped, but also rife with insider 
trading and other dubious practices". International takeover is unlikely to be effective, simply 
because the generally distorted macroeconomic environment, and the unstable legal and 
political systems in most DCs is likely to deter foreign investors. Second, there is no reason 
to suggest that the market for corporate control would be efficient once privatisation was 
implemented. That is because the government could still control takeover bids through the 
"golden share" mechanism. The "golden share" is a special share that can only be held by 
the state, and gives the state a "veto power" over certain decisions, including takeover, if the 
national interest so demands (Vuylsteke, 1988).
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Third, PEs were originally created to facilitate political intervention in the interest of 
development. Indeed, there are those who claim that "Public enterprises and the way they 
operate are ultimately the consequences of the relations between the social forces in a society 
. . . I f  you roll back the state in its more visible manifestations, these forces will come back 
in another form, less accountable and perhaps even more irresponsible" (Ghai, 1985). 
Moreover, privatisation would deprive the state from maintaining effective control over 
macro-economic policies, such as employment, wages and rural development, which are still 
high on the national agenda. Fourth, due to various reasons (e.g. uncertainty, tax structure 
and information problems), the profit maximisation objective was questioned in the theory 
of the firm (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Ekem and Wilson, 1974). This is particularly true 
for stakeholders who are also consumers of the firm’s products, because there might be a 
trade-off between higher dividends and higher prices paid for the goods (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988).
Fifth, there is no firm evidence to support the proposition that private firms in DCs 
are more efficient than their public counterparts. The same factors that contributed to the 
poor performance of PEs apply equally to private firms. These include the excessive 
government intervention in internal markets, the distorted business environment, and the 
protectionist policies adopted in most DCs to protect the so called "infant industries", public 
and private. As Nellis and Kikeri (1989) argue "... leaping from this point to the conclusion 
that the private sector can not do worse is not a serious argument". More importantly, 
comparing the performance of public and private firms is a technically difficult task, not least 
because performance comparison involves comparing identical firms in terms of objectives, 
size, age, technology, management and market structures. However, it is often rare to find 
such identical firms, which makes the comparison incomplete and misleading.
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Nevertheless, apart from these methodological problems, the relatively small amount 
of empirical work carried out so far in DCs, does not indicate that private firms are superior 
to PEs. A good example is Millward (1988) who concluded that "There is no conclusive 
evidence of a statistically satisfactory kind to suggest that Public enterprises in LDCs have 
a lower level of technical efficiency than private firms operating at the same scale of 
operations". Similar conclusions were reached by Kirkpatrick (1986); Gupta (1982); 
Perkins (1983); Tyler (1979).
More importantly, the available evidence suggests that, the efficiency of an enterprise 
is determined by the quality of its management and the market structure within which it 
operates, rather than who owns it.
"In theory efficiency will be highest when an enterprise strives to maximise 
profits in a competitive market, under managers with autonomy, capacity and 
motivation to respond to competition, and when enterprises that cannot compete go 
bankrupt".
(Shirley, 1989)
"The basic difficulty o f arguments for divestiture on the grounds o f an alleged 
superior allocative efficiency is that, while mainstream micro-economic theory does 
point to the allocative superiority o f competition, it is actually silent on the 
ownership issue".
(Commander and Killick, 1988).
Thus, it is competition, local or foreign, that enhances efficiency by forcing 
management to minimise costs, innovate and develop new products, and seek new markets. 
In the absence of competion and challenges, there is no reason to suggest that any enterprise, 
public or private, would be efficient, indeed the balance could go either way. For example, 
the empirical evidence from the American electricity industry (Pescatrice and Trappani,
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1980), Australian air transport (Davies, 1971) and the German insurance industry (Fiiisinger 
et el,1985), point to the superiorrity of PEs operating in a competitive environment. In the 
context of DCs, examples include Hindustan Machine Tools in India, CVRD in Brazil, Tea 
Development Authority in Kenya, and the Telecommunication Authority in Ethiopia (Shirley, 
1983; Ayub and Hegstad, 1986). The satisfactory performance in all these cases was 
attributed largely to the fact that they operate in a competitive market. "Domestic and foreign 
competition, which leave no room for complacency, appears to have been an important factor
 An environment where challenges are non-existent can suffocate the initiative of the best
managers, public or private" (Ayub and Hegstad, 1986). Such evidence clearly indicates that 
significant efficiency gains could be achieved by exposing enterprises, public or private, to 
greater market forces. Therefore, it is essential to remove entry barriers, encourage exports, 
expose local firms to foreign competition whenever possible, restructure giant corporations 
into smaller entities so as to foster competition, rather than to transfer ownership.
Advocates claim that privatisation is a necessary condition for deregulation, because 
PEs backed by the cheap state funds would be able to deter entry. However, apart from the 
fact that private firms with considerable market powers could equally deter entry, experience 
shows that privatisation had actually inhibited deregulation. The reasons are three-fold. First, 
breaking-up giant enterprises is often time-consuming, lessens investor’s interests, and 
reduces the sales proceeds, because enterprises operating in a fierce competitive market are 
unlikely to attract investors. Therefore, preoccupation with the success of the policy for 
political and financial reasons, could lead to competition, domestic and foreign, being 
sacrificed. Second, experience shows that the management of the privatisation candidates 
often resist the breaking-up of their entities, so as "to enjoy the quiet life of monopoly" 
(Kay, 1987). Therefore, to ensure their commitment and cooperation, which is essential for 
the success of the policy, competition could be sacrificed. As Bishop and Kay (1989) argue 
"The political power of senior management arises from the observation that any privatisation
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which does not enjoy their support will be at best a difficult and protracted process". 
Similarly Vuylsteke(1988) states that "preparing large PEs for privatisation can not be done 
without the full commitment of top management". Third, to attract buyers, an increasing 
number of governments have granted more protection for the privatisation candidates. 
Examples include Togo and Guinea (Nellis, 1986; Kikeri,1990). In the UK, Moore (1986 
a) stressed that "The long term success of the privatisation programme will stand or fall by 
the extent to which it maximises competition. If competition cannot be achieved, an historic 
opportunity will have been lost". In reality, that "historic opportunity" has been lost,and 
powerful enterprises, such as the telecom and gas, were privatised as a whole, raising serious 
concerns about the effectiveness of the market for corporate control. The point is that, the 
size of such firms would hinder the efficiency of the capital market, which hinders the 
efficiency claims.
Thus concerns to maximise sales revenues, to ensure the success of the policy, and 
to maintain the support of management, had led to the relegation of competition to lower 
levels. In effect, a regulatory system was suggested to protect consumers against monopoly 
pricing and poor quality services. As Moore (1986 b) claimed, "I firmly believe that where 
competition is impractical, privatisation policies have now been developed to such an extent 
that regulated private ownership of natural monopolies is preferable to nationalisation". 
However, there is no firm evidence to support the view that regulation is more efficient than 
public ownership (Rees, 1986; Van De Walle, 1989). Moreover, regulation raises difficult 
questions regarding the capacity of DCs to design and operate a regulatory system. Vuylsteke 
(1988) asserts that "a number of governments have increasingly come to the conclusion that 
the introduction of an adequate regulatory framework is the more effective control tool than 
ownership". This is debatable, not least because DCs lack the necessary conditions for the 
creation of an adequate regulatory framework. The fact is that, in most DCs, there are no 
standardised reporting systems, no active agencies to protect consumers, the media is
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controlled by the state, and no established, respected, and consistently applied legal system. 
Indeed, even in the UK, there are growing concerns regarding the efficiency of the 
regulatory of regulated industries, such as British Telecom and British Gas (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1989). Nevertheless, it is evident that there is a conflict between privatisation and 
deregulation, and experience shows that the former has often been preferred at the expense 
of deregulation.
However, advocates claim that the threat of potential competition might be sufficient 
to enforce greater efficiency as does actual competition, and hence the number of firms in 
the market is irrelevant. This argument, based on the "contestable market theory" proposed 
by Baumol et al (1982), suggests that it is possible to create a competitive market behavior 
regardless of the number of firms, if the incumbent firm is exposed to threat of potential 
competition. The theory assumes that if entry involves no sunk costs-defined as costs that 
are irrecoverable by leaving the industry - there would be no exit barriers. Therefore, even 
a monopolist will not be able to earn monopoly profits, because he would be vulnerable to 
"hit and run" by a transient, who could enter the market, undercut prices/costs, earn a profit 
and leave costlessly. The theory suggests that the following properties hold in a contestable 
market:
(1) Prices are always equal to average costs, I f  prices are greater than average
costs, a new firm will enter, reduce prices, and earn a profit. I f  prices are 
less than average costs, existing firms will incur losses, some will disappear 
(costlessly), allowing prices to rise,
(2) There are no unnecessary costs, because i f  existing firms are inefficient in
production, entrants could produce more efficiently, earn a profit, and, i f  
necessary, depart costlessly.
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As Baumol et al (1982) argue:
"Even a very transient profit opportunity need not be neglected by a potential 
entrant. For he can go in, and, before prices change, collect his gains and 
then depart without costs should the climate grow hostile. "
Thus, the theory suggests that, it is the entry threat and not the number of firms that 
determines the competitiveness of a market. And it is the presence of sunk costs that 
constrains entry.
Opponents argue that the assumptions upon which the theory is based are unrealistic 
and difficult to satisfy. In particular, the assumption of zero sunk costs was criticised as 
unrealistic and irrelevant to real life industries, such as the import substitutes. Second, the 
theory assumes that the entrant can establish itself, earn a profit without any response from 
the existing firms. This implicit assumption of zero time lag was criticised as unrealistic. 
Third, the incumbent firm might be able to deter entry through aggressive pricing, raising 
wages or advertising (Rees,1986; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Kirkpatrick,1988).
In the UK, for example, the road transport was deregulated in the early 1980s, and 
a number of rivals entered the market in direct competition with the state-owned National 
Express. However, the National Express taking advantages of its access to major city 
terminals, its name, experience and financial advantages managed to dispose of its rivals. In 
effect, it was argued that "Liberalisation did not significantly reduce the market share of the 
state-owned National Express" (Bishop and Kay, 1989). However, it could be argued that 
the National Express can not raise fares above competitive levels or allow its services to 
decline due to the presence of potential competition. Another example of a contestable market 
is the aviation industry provided that the routes were deregulated. In this case, a transient 
could enter the market, earn a profit, and leave costlessly by shifting to another route or sell
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his assets. It follows that the road and air transport could be made contestable, provided that 
routes were deregulated. In the road and air transport the sunk cost is zero, because the 
entrant could lease rather than buy, or shift to another route when "the climate grow hostile". 
However, we are here mainly concerned with large development projects, which required 
substantial costs to establish. These costs are by no means recoverable, and hence the 
contestability conditions are unlikely to be satisfied.
Finally, although the efficiency argument was cited more than often as a case for 
privatisation, it is not yet clear how privatisation has affected the performance of privatised 
industries. The reasons are two-fold. First,it appears that the primary goal of the available 
studies, particularly those carried out by the World Bank, is to advice policy makers in DCs 
on how to implement privatisation (e.g. Vuylsteke, 1988; Nankani, 1988; Candoy-Sekse, 
1988). Second, there were major restructuring introduced prior to privatisation and it is 
difficult to speculate about what would have happened had the privatised industries remained 
under public ownership. These methodological problems, therefore, make performance 
evaluation at best difficult (Yarrow,1986).
Nevertheless, the relatively small amount of empirical work carried out so far does 
not provide conclusive evidence on the effects of privatisation on performance. For example, 
Formann-Peck and Manning (1988) compared the performance of the British Telecom (BT) 
with the performance of four European telecom industries, using the "Total Factor 
Productivity method". They found that BT is less efficient than its counterparts in Norway, 
where the industry is state-owned, and in Denmark where the company is a joint venture. On 
the other hand, BT is more efficient than its counterparts, in both Spain and Italy where 
ownership is mixed. Clearly such intra-country comparison raises a host of political, cultural, 
and other factors in the broader environment. Nevertheless, the study failed to show the
45
effects of denationalisation on the performance of BT. In any case, BT was performing 
profitably under public ownership (see below).
In another study, Bishop and Kay 1989) compared the performance of various 
privatised industries in the UK with others that remained public. The authors reported that 
the privatised industries have improved remarkably, but this improvement, the authors claim, 
"has more to do with the nature of industries concerned ... the privatised industries that have 
grown rapidly (BT, Cable and Wireless) were doing so before privatisation. The Associated 
British Ports, however, performed poorly under both public and private ownership". Bishop 
and Kay also found that the greatest gains in TFP occurred in PEs that were not selected for 
privatisation (e.g. British coal). In effect, they concluded that "The significant improvement 
in the performance of the remaining public sector denies any simple views about the 
relationship between ownership and performance".
In summary, there is no firm evidence to support the claims that ownership is the sole 
determinant of performance. Indeed, the available evidence suggests that enterprises (public 
and private) tend to perform better when they are exposed to the disciplines of the market 
forces (Ayub and Hegtstad, 1986; Hemming and Mansoor, 1988; Kay and Thompson, 
1986; Shirley, 1989). But, as noted earlier, in DCs, government intervention in internal 
markets is quite excessive, and firms (public and private) are protected against imports. 
Therefore, there is no reason to suggest that a change in ownership in itself would pave the 
way for economic efficiency.
Indeed, for these reasons, privatisation is unlikely to correct the distortions in the 
labour market, because in the absence of competition, trade unions will still demand a share 
in monopoly profits. Equally the claims that privatisation will tighten the financial constraints 
on management and reduce political intervention in wages is largely invalid in DCs. That is
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because, in the absence of the income support systems, wages and employment policies 
become a sensitive political issue. It is true that PEs are not exposed to the market disciplines 
confronting their private counterparts. But, this is not a conclusive ground for privatisation. 
Internal reform through exposing PEs to a more demanding, competitive environment could 
generate significant efficiency gains. As Hemming and Mansoor (1988)argue "despite the 
inconclusive nature of the evidence, it is difficult to believe that existing public enterprises 
are not capable of achieving significant improvements in efficiency".
3.4 The Wider Ownership Benefits
A third privatisation objective is that privatisation would lead to real ownership by 
the public, and give the public the right to choose. Public ownership, it was argued, forces 
the public to hold shares which they might not wish to hold if they were free to do so. In 
addition, privatisation would lead to wider ownership, and thus helps to promote popular 
capitalism.
The force of this argument would depend on the privatisation mechanism. In industrial 
countries where there is a well developed equity market, privatisation was carried out 
through a public offering of shares. Therefore, privatisation may widen share ownership, 
though if shares were under-valued, stakeholders might sell their allocations, collect their 
gains and depart in the early days of trading. Consequently, ownership will be transferred 
to the financial institutions and possibly foreigners. In the UK, for example, where public 
offering was used quite extensively, there is evidence of such behaviour. In the recent water 
privatisation, for example, the opposition spokesman asserted that "ownership will be 
transferred in a matter of weeks" (Gould: The Independent, 13/12/1989).
In DCs, however, a public offering is unlikely to be a predominant privatisation 
mechanism, due to the under-developed and inefficient capital markets, poor reporting
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standards, weak confidence in the financial system, and under-developed private sector. 
Indeed, this has been the case even in some middle-income countries such as Turkey, 
Mexico, Egypt and Venezuela (Bienen and Waterbury, 1989; Escobar,1988). Likewise, 
in Eastern Europe and other DCs that were adopting a socialist system, the effective revival 
of the capital market faces serious hurdles and might take a considerable time to evolve. In 
the words of the Hungarian Finance Minister "a financial intermediary culture is now needed 
for the successful evolution of the market" (The Guardian, 30/1/1990).
Another privatisation mechanism that might lead to wider ownership is the 
management/employee buy-out. But, as we saw in chapter two, this technique has not been 
widely used in DCs, due to its funding problems. Therefore, private sales are likely to be 
the main privatisation mechanism in DCs, which would lead to the concentration of wealth, 
rather than widening ownership.
3.5 The Management and Control Benefits
A final major objective of privatisation relates to the management and control 
problems of PEs. The argument runs as follows. Public managers are often required to 
persue contradicting objectives, and report to numerous, ill-coordinated government agencies. 
The selection of managers and board members is based, in the main, on factors other than 
professional qualifications, and their operational autonomy is limited. The civil servants who 
monitor PEs are not interested in their financial performance, and tend to observe the rules 
and regulations that are irrelevant for commercial entities. Likewise, it was argued that, PEs 
have become a burden on the government officials, whose limited staff is devoted to PE’s 
problems. As the World Development Report (1983) put it "state-owned enterprises are 
stretching the scarce managerial skills". These claims were further supported by failure of 
governments to establish a satisfactory control system over PEs. For these reasons, it was 
claimed that it is difficult to run a business efficiently under public ownership. Therefore,
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the only solution that emerged was to change ownership, and let the market forces maintain 
control.
However, while we do agree that no satisfactory control system has ever been 
developed, we shall increasingly argue that, privatisation is unlikely to provide a perfect 
remedy in all cases. First, some of the privatised industries are the "commanding heights" 
of the economy, and hence the central government would need to get involved in their 
operations to ensure public interest. The regulatory mechanisms created for the public 
utilities in the UK and elsewhere provide a powerful demonstration of this assertion. Second, 
for a number of reasons, governments have opted for joint ownership rather than complete 
privatisation. These reasons are summarised by Vuylsteke (1988) as follows: (a) to maintain 
effective control over strategic industries, (b) to improve performance, and (c) inability 
of the financial market to acquire the whole enterprise. Nevertheless, regardless of the 
reasons, mixed ownership raises a number of questions regarding the relationship between 
such joint ventures and the state (Steel, 1984; Heald, 1985). This is particularly a serious 
problem in DCs, where the legal framework within which private enterprises operate is not 
clearly defined or strictly adhered to. In most cases, whenever an economic crisis arises, the 
"President" could simply repeal the existing laws and introduce new set of rules that suit the 
situation. More importantly, joint ownership is unlikely to lead to significant changes in 
managerial behaviour, access to state funds might yet be available, the government might 
guarantee foreign loans, and possibly some form of bureaucratic control to ensure public 
interest. In the UK, the government announced that it will not interfere in the operations of 
the joint ventures. However, such provisions were not stated in a legal and precise manner 
in the prospectus, which casts doubts on whether the state will abide by such commitments. 
As Rees (1986) argues "In those circumstances, privatisation becomes essentially a statement 
of intent or a self-denying ordinance". Similarly, Littlechild (1983) states that "As long as 
the ultimate control lies with the government, one cannot hope to avoid all the problems".
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Third, the argument that private management is more efficient than public 
management, we believe, is not a serious argument. The reason is very simple, worldwide, 
there are inefficient private enterprises (Kay and Thompson, 1986). It is true that private 
firms are exposed to the disciplines of the capital market, but PEs could also be exposed to 
the threats of market forces. The problem of multiplicity of objectives, numerous principals, 
and excessive political interference could be rectified by internal reforms, as in Pakistan and 
South Korea. Indeed, Shirley (1983) argues that "The Key factor determining the enterprise 
performance is not whether it is publicly or privately owned, but how it is managed. In 
theory, it is possible to create the kinds of incentives that will maximise efficiency under any 
type of ownership".
In the end, it is difficult to suggest that privatisation would put an end to political 
interference in most DCs. The fact is that, in most DCs, political interference in internal 
markets is quite excessive, and hence applies to both public and private enterprises. Yet, it 
must be stressed that, the management and control problems of PEs probably provide the 
strongest case for the complete privatisation of PEs operating in competitive markets. As 
Rees (1986) argues "Where a public enterprise is financially viable, and will be subject to 
full and effective competition ... there is no case against privatisation on economic grounds. 
Competition is the best regulator". However, no such a case exists for the privatisation of 
public utilities, as Rees (1986) argues "Wholesale privatisation is a leap in the dark". Finally, 
the argument that regulation is more efficient than public ownership is simply 
unsubstantiated.
3.6 Conclusion
Ideology apart, the drive for privatisation in DCs is attributed, in part, to the poor 
performance of PEs, and the substantial deficits they generated. In economic terms, however, 
privatisation in itself is unlikely to enhance efficiency, not least because no firm evidence
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exists to show that ownership is a sole determinant of performance. The fiscal benefits of 
privatisation are likely to be limited, or in the words of Heller and Schiller (1989), "strictly 
speaking nil". The sale of profitable PEs improves the liquidity position of the state in the 
interim, while the sale of loss-making PEs would require massive financial restructuring to 
be undertaken prior to sale.
The claims that privatisation would lead to wider ownership (popular capitalism), is 
unrealistic, given the status of capital markets and the private sector in most DCs. The 
strongest case for privatisation is perhaps the failure of all efforts to design and operate a 
satisfactory control system for PEs. Indeed, as we noted in chapter one, a number of studies 
attribute the poor performance of PEs to their control problems, which in turn contributed 
to the current interest in privatisation. As Heald (1985) argues, "This is an important 
contributory factor to the vacuum into which privatisation as a solution to the problem of 
control has surged". However, it is not at all clear how would privatisation solve the control 
problem in the case of joint ventures or public utilities (e.g. telecom, rail, electricity and 
water).
Therefore, it could be concluded that, the potential benefits of privatisation in DCs 
are by no means certain. As Harris (1988) argues "The case for privatisation is not clear cut 
from an economic point of view, and many of the arguments remain political in nature". As 
a result, the search for a rationale for the policy continues (Kay and Thompson, 1986).
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Chapter Four
The Role of International Organisations
4:1 Introduction
Having identified the economic rationale for privatisation, we now turn to investigate 
the role of international institutions in promoting the policy in DCs. However, it must be 
stressed that, some DCs mainly South East Asian countries, have planned and executed their 
privatisation programmes without any significant external pressures. Nevertheless, in most 
DCs, particularly African countries, the impetus to privatisation is attributed, in part, to the 
external pressures exerted on DCs to implement radical economic reforms. As Callaghy and 
Wilson (1988) argue "For Africa more than other regions, the push factors have been very 
important, probably predominantly so. Directly or indirectly through various types of 
conditionality by a wide variety of external actors, privatisation has been placed on the 
African agenda in a forceful way11.
One of these international organisations that has been heavily involved in promoting 
privatisation in DCs is the World Bank. Indeed, the World Bank publications during the 
1980s specified clearly areas into which aid funds would be channelled. "Priority 
consideration should be given to action in three areas : (i) allocating a higher proportion of 
foreign funds to local development finance institutions and commercial banks for onlending 
to small and medium enterprises; (ii) encouraging private investors to take over inefficient 
state-owned enterprises and to undertake new projects currently included in public investment 
plans..; (iii) introducing private sector development loans to meet the short and medium term 
foreign exchange requirements of private enterprises, linked to policy reforms that promote
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competitive markets and efficient resource allocation" (Marsden and Belot, 1987). Indeed, 
in most cases, loans were made conditional on implementing privatisation (see below).
Ideology apart, it was argued that, the poor performance of PEs was attributed solely 
to ownership. "PEs in diverse activities share common problems, many of which are the 
product of public ownership" (Galal, 1990). As a result, a change of ownership or control 
was suggested as the only remedy. "The more enduring solution is to sell to the private 
sector those which can be sold; and for those for which no buyer can be found, one should 
go further and simply close them permanently and liquidate their assets" (Nellis, 1986). 
Thus, privatisation was suggested as the "enduring solution", though the author (i.e. Nellis) 
correctly noted that "domestic African private sectors are mostly dominated by traders and 
artisans, not enterprise managers or investors". The poor performance of PEs is "the product 
of public ownership ", though a senior Bank official noted that "The key factor determining 
enterprise performance is not whether it is publicly or privately owned, but how it is 
managed "(Shirley, 1983). Nevertheless, the emphasis remain on privatisation as the long 
term objective. "Devolution of marketing functions to the private sector may be difficult in 
some parts of Africa, but this should affect only the pace for change, not the objective" 
(World Bank Report, 1981).
Other international actors include "the International Monetary Fund" and the "United 
States Agency for International Development". In this chapter, however, we shall investigate 
the role of the World Bank, not least because the Bank has been outspoken in formulating 
"agenda for reform" to its member countries. In considering that role, we shall rely solely 
on the World Bank publications, as well as our interviews with the Bank staff. Such 
publications arguably represent the views of the authors and not the Bank. Indeed, there are 
a variety of views even among the Bank staff, such as Mary Shirley referred to above.
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Nonetheless, these are the people who formulate the policies for the Bank, and hence their 
views are important.
4.2 The Role of the Bank
During the 1980s, the World Bank has published a number of reports on the size and 
performance of PEs in DCs. In all these reports,the Bank wasted no chance in criticising the 
efficiency of PEs, and advocating privatisation as "the most revolutionary innovation in the 
recent history of economic policy" (Hanke, 1987). The Bank takes the view that the private 
sector is the only way to accelerate economic growth in DCs. "Development in many 
countries throughout the world has shown that the initiatives and drive of private investors 
and entrepreneurs can be important agents for economic growth" (Marsden and Belot, 
1987). Dabani (1988) points out that, this is a change of policy stance that was adopted by 
the Bank in the post-war period, where the Bank had supported public ownership. The major 
deficiencies of that support were that, the main emphasis was on transferring modem 
technology so as to improve productivity. However, many DCs did not have the technical 
expertise to operate such a technology, and the breakdown of repair and maintenance at a 
later stage, due to lack of foreign exchange to acquire the necessary spare parts, resulted in 
wasted capacities. As a consequence, many DCs failed to payback the debts used to acquire 
the plants, and more importantly the import substitutes objective never materialised. A 
related drawback was that, the Bank did not give any due consideration to the management 
aspects, which proved to be critical , due to the severe shortages of qualified managers 
(Shirley, 1983). Indeed, Heald (1990) claims that "Unfortunately, however, the World 
Bank’s interest in management reforms probably came rather late to have much effect as 
attention swung towards the privatisation option".
Nevertheless, during the last decade, the Bank issued a series of reports emphasising 
the role of private investment to spearhead the development process. The following
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statements are probably illustrative of this message. The 1981 report : "Accelerated 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action", concluded that:
"The Keystone o f any marketing reform must capitalise on the indigenous trading 
system, a proven asset, and let it play a bigger role in the distribution system. The 
private sector with its small scale, decentralised andflexible structure is particularly 
well-suited for this task ".
and,
"It is now widely evident that the public sector is over-extended, given the present 
scarcities o f financial resources, skilled manpower and organisational capacity. This 
has resulted in slower growth than might have been achieved with available 
resources, and accounts in part for the current crises. Without improved 
performance o f public agencies, stepped-up growth will be difficult to achieve".
Similarly, the 1983 World Development Report stated that:
"In many countries, the expansion o f the public sector has stretched its 
managerial capacity to the point where serious inefficiencies result... indicating a 
need to reassess priorities, prune what has become unmanageable and strengthen 
the effectiveness o f the state9s core responsibilities".
It is thus evident that, the theme of these reports is that PEs are "over-extended”, and 
"inefficient" resulting in slower growth. However, there is no firm evidence to support the 
view that economic growth is related to the size of PEs, or that PEs are less efficient than 
private firms. For example, Kirkpatrick (1986) compared the share of PEs in GDP in a 
sample of 12 African countries with the growth in GNP per capita, using rank correlation, 
but failed to find a significant correlation. The author concluded that "The cross-country data 
fail to show any significant correlation between the size of public enterprises and the level 
of development. Nor is there evidence to support the view that the expansion of the public
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sector has led to slower economic growth. The contention that the state-owned sector has 
been, in general, over-extended and that its future role should therefore be reduced is 
unsubstantiated". Similar conclusions were reached by Heller and Tait (1983), and 
Nunnenkamp (1986). Indeed, if this were so, then most European countries (e.g. the UK, 
Germany, France and Italy) should have been lagging far behind, because the 
industrialisation process was carried out, in the main, by PEs.
Likewise, there is no firm evidence regarding the poor performance of PEs. The main 
criteria adopted by the Bank to evaluate the performance of PEs is profitability. "PE earnings 
are generally low; many run losses; often these losses are of a a large magnitude. Far from 
contributing to government revenues, African PEs have more regularly become a heavy 
burden on already strained budgets" (Nellis, 1986). But, as we saw in chapter one, 
profitability is an irrelevant indicator, because the primary objective was socio-economic 
development and not profitability. As Garner (1988) argues, "PEs are not just a business". 
Similar points were made by Ayub and Hegstad (1986); Ghai (1985); Nellis and Kikeri
(1989), among many others.
Nevertheless, even if we accepted profitability as a performance indicator, worldwide, 
there are several examples of profitable and well-managed PEs. Examples from DCs include: 
The Tea Development Authority in Kenya, Telecommunication Authority in Ethiopia, CVRD 
in Brazil, Hindustan Machine Tools in India-just to mention a few (Shirley, 1983; Ayub and 
Hegstad, 1986; Nellis, 1986; World Development Report, 1988).
There remains, however, a considerable number of chronic loss-making PEs. But 
why? In the words of Nellis (1986), "The reasons for this are several: poor initial investment 
decisions and inappropriate pricing policies top the list ... African PEs tend to be 
undercapitalised - high debt/equity ratios are the norm. Large amounts of working capital are
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tied up in inventories and especially receivables. Governments fail to pay PEs for the goods 
and services they provide .... overstaffing, political interference .. unclear objectives .. 
inadequate incentives for good managers ...".
A few comments are necessary before we move on to examine the suggested 
"enduring solution". First, almost all these factors are controlled by the government and 
hence poor performance should be attributed to the government policies, rather than internal 
inefficiency of PEs. As Garner(1988) argues "In so far as PEs have failed, it is a failure of 
governments rather than the institution of a PE itself’. Second, although generalisation may 
be harmful, in many DCs, price controls apply to both public and private enterprises. Third, 
the "unclear objectives", "inadequate incentives", and "overstaffing" could be rectified 
through internal reforms without privatisation. Indeed, the evidence from Pakistan and South 
Korea clearly demonstrates that such an alternative is possible, and could improve 
performance. Fourth, political interference in most DCs takes place over both sets of firms, 
and there is no conclusive evidence that privatisation would contain such intervention in the 
case of joint ventures or the privatised public utilities (Likiermann, 1984; Steel 1984). 
Fifth, the claims that PEs have "high debt/equity ratios" is not at all clear, because there is 
no precise definition for these terms as they apply to PEs - both are provided by the state. 
More important, the debate on the effects of capital structure on performance is far from 
conclusive in the literature (Bromwick, 1976). Sixth, "undercapitalisation" was solely caused 
by failure of governments to pay PEs the goods and services they provided, the higher input 
pricess arising from their obligations to use local resources, overstaffing for political 
purposes, and the fact that PEs were often required to build roads, schools, hospitals, and 
other social obligations.
Finally, the poor initial investment decisions argument is difficult to accept, because 
the primary objective was socio-economic development, in particular rural development.
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Indeed, any government that neglects its responsibility towards rural areas is bound to face 
serious difficulties, sooner or later. The influx of rural population to urban areas that 
characterises many African countries today provides a powerful demonstration (Ghai, 1985). 
In the Sudan, for example, out of an estimated total population of 23 million, some seven 
million were estimated to have migrated to urban areas, mainly Khartoum. In addition, a 
civil war is currently taking place, and one of the reasons is the so-called "unbalanced 
development". Indeed, even in the UK, Bishop and Kay (1989) assert that "In the debates 
over the privatisation of British Telecom, the issue of most concern to Conservative 
backbenchers was the continued provision of public telephone services in rural areas".
Nevertheless, it appears that the Bank initially ignored completely the politics of 
economic reforms and privatisation. However, experience shows that governments in DCs 
have been reluctant to implement the Bank prescriptions (e.g. devaluation, trade 
liberalisation, price rationalisation and public spending reduction), largely due to their socio­
political consequences. Indeed, a newly emerging research findings suggest that 
implementation of economic reforms in all DCs has been very slow, due to political and 
administrative factors (Whitehead, 1990; Gulhati, 1990; Thomas and Grindle, 1990; 
Hawkins, 1991). It is evident that the World Bank wants DCs to manage their economies 
as a corporation (i.e. on pure profit and loss basis) which is unrealistic at this stage of 
development, and the social-political costs are likely to be too high, in a context where 
political systems are far from stable.
In the end, although there is no conclusive evidence about the poor performance of 
PEs, privatisation was advocated as the only remedy to all the ills of PEs, in all DCs. "To 
rationalise the size of the sector, the Bank supports divestiture (in the form of liquidation, 
sale of assets, contracting-out ..) when such an action is expected to promote efficiency" 
(Galal, 1990).
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4.3 The World Bank Efforts
As of June, 1989, the Bank approved a total of 71 projects with privatisation 
components, of which "divestiture is a condition in at least 45 policy-based loans" (Kikeri, 
1990). As table (4.1) reveals, two-thirds of these projects were devoted to Africa, which is 
due to "the existence of large, over-extended and loss-making PE sector, pressing public 
finances and debt pressure, ready market, greater Bank leverage in the region.." (Kikeri, 
1990). The main objective of these loans was to provide assistance to formulate a 
privatisation plan, and a timetable for implementation (Kikeri, 1990). The Bank has also 
provided assistance to DCs to undertake restructuring measures prior to privatisation, such 
as financial and legal restructuring, alleviating the side effects of privatisation, and 
strengthening the government capacity to implement privatisation (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989).
Table 4.1 








PE"7 loans Others* Total
Africa 25 8 9 6 48
Latin America 11 3 2 0 16
E.M.E.N.A.C/ 1 0 2 0 3
Asia 1 0 1 2 4
Total ~ 38 11 14 8 71
a/ include PE Rationalisation/Rehabilitation loans; PE sector adjustment loans and 
institutional development projects.
b/ include (5) operations for industrial sector adjustment and (3) operations for private sector 
development.
c/ Europe, Middle East, North Africa.
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Graph 4.1 










Source: Kikeri(1990), "Bank lending for Divestiture", The World Bank working paper 
No.338.
However, this is not to suggest that privatisation was the only solution adopted by the 
Bank to cure the ills of PEs. The Bank has also provided substantial assistance to its member 
countries to improve the performance of PEs. As table (4.2) shows, a total of 147 projects 
in support of PE reform were approved by the Bank, as of June, 1989 (these include the 71 
projects with privatisation component). Also, the Bank support for PE reform has been 
concentrated in Africa (about 54 percent of projects approved).
Total Africa Latin America E.M.E.N.A Asia
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Table 4.2 
Number of PE Reform Projects 





PE loans Others Total
Africa 36 21 8 15 80
Latin America 16 10 2 4 32
E.M .E.N.A. 8 3 2 11 24
Asia 7 0 1 3 11
total 67 34 13 33 147
Graph 4.2 

















Total Africa Latin America E.M.E.N.A Asia
Source: Ahmad Galal (1990) "PE Reform: A challenge for the World Bank", World Bank 
working paper No. 407.
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However, as far as the World Bank is concerned, all PEs should be privatised. "The 
most logical and expedient approach is to begin implementation with the divestment of 
commercial PEs operating in competitive markets, while leaving the more complex cases 
(quasi or full monopolies) for the second stage" (Kikeri, 1990). Indeed, even when PE 
reform was considered, this was usually followed by privatisation in its various forms. "This 
discussion closes with a review of alternatives to state ownership and the issues involved in 
liquidating and privatising SOEs (Shirley, 1983).
Moreover, the strong belief that PEs in DCs are over-extended, has spurred the World 
Bank to adopt "a sector-wide" approach as opposed to "case-by-case" approach (Kikeri, 
1990). The author argues that, this approach has the following advantage, "it addresses the 
fundamental question of a reorientation of the state’s role in economic activities". However, 
an increasing number of DCs have found this approach ill-suited, as it exceeded their 
economic and technical capacity, and more importantly it allowed the political, bureaucratic, 
and trade unions opposition to gather momentum against the policy, which the fragile 
political systems in most DCs may not be able to tolerate. But, it indicates clearly that the 
Bank is keen to speed up the privatisation process. This approach, however, might do more 
harm than good, simply because in their rush to privatise as soon as possible, assets may be 
under-valued, costly fiscal concessions granted, as well as protection from imports. As Heald
(1990) argues "Unsubtle approaches by international organisations might well prove counter­
productive, both in terms of how much privatisation actually takes place and the forms it 
takes". A similar point was made by Shirley (1989).
Nevertheless, despite this heavy involvement and support by the Bank to sell the 
policy, the outcome in terms of actual privatisations implemented has not been encouraging. 
However, it must be stressed that, the actual number of PEs privatised is not yet clear, even
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among the Bank staff, For instance, while Kikeri (1990) claims that "the record in terms of 
the number of divestiture is quite large in several countries", Pfeffermann (1988) asserts that 
"... the actual privatisations that have taken place as January, 1988, is disappointing". 
Nevertheless, Kikeri (1990) conceded that "although the number of PEs privatised is quite 
large, the magnitude of asset sales is relatively small". As noted earlier, the number of PEs 
in Mexico was reduced by 77 percent, which represented about only 23 percent of state 
equity in the PE sector. In Guinea, most of the privatisations that took place so far were 
small and non-operating plants (Kikeri, 1990). In Senegal, not a single PE has been sold, 
though the state announced its intentions to roll back of the state since 1985 (Galal, 1990). 
And the story is not different in Brazil, The Philippines, Pakistan, Turkey or Nigeria (see 
chapter 6). All these cases clearly indicate that governments in DCs have found it extremely 
difficult to implement privatisation.
This is largely because the Bank has assumed that there is a "ready" market to absorb 
the sale, an established private sector, a conducive business environment, a stable political 
system committed to the policy, and technical expertise to execute privatisation. In most 
DCs, however, the market is thin and inefficient, very few DCs have sophisticated merchant 
banks and technical advisers to handle this complicated policy, the number of business 
investors is often limited, and even those available might be ruled out on political grounds 
(Ghai, 1985; Callaghy and Wilson, 1988; Heald, 1990). The government intervention in 
internal markets is typically quite excessive, and the legal framework within which business 
enterprises operate may not be at all clear. As Likiermann (1984) argues "The widespread 
corruption, the use of payments to ensure political support or that bureaucratic favour is 
granted are facts of life in many DCs, found at all levels and in both public and private 
sectors". The thinness of the capital market means that private sales are likely to be the 
predominant privatisation technique, which could lead to the concentration of wealth in the 
hands of the "undesirables" or foreigners, both of which are likely to pose serious political
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concerns. Similarly, the weak administrative capacity of most governments in DCs is likely 
to lead uneconomic deals, which defeat the very basic idea of the policy (Shirley, 1988). The 
case of Togo referred to earlier is a case in point. But, we strongly believe, Togo is not an 
isolated case. Indeed, it represents the actual situation in the vast majority of the African 
countries.
Nevertheless, the "conditionality" approach adopted by the Bank and other creditors 
and aid donors, which emphasised the implementation of privatisation as a condition to 
extend loans, appears to be ineffective as reflected by the wide gap between plans and actual 
implementation (see chapter 6). Yet, there are those who still insist on this approach as a 
means to speed up the privatisation process in DCs, such as Cowan (1990) who strongly 
recommends that privatisation should be made a condition to receive loans from the Bank, 
or debt rescheduling negotiations. This approach, however, is inappropriate, because when 
governments are in a desperate need for loans and aid, and most DCs are, they tend to accept 
any conditions, regardless of the existence of the necessary conditions for the long term 
success of the policy. In that case, however, the potential benefits of privatisation are 
unlikely to be realized. Privatisation is not an end in itself, but rather a means to achieve 
certain goals, such as economic efficiency. But, unless privatisation is supported by wider 
macro-economic reforms, its benefits are likely to be limited (Shirley, 1988). Indeed, there 
are claims that African countries are turning to privatisation, simply because they have no 
other alternatives. "African governments are turning to privatisation out of desperation, in 
an attempt to stem the drain on their budgets, even though they are aware of the experimental 
nature of this effort" (Nellis, 1986). Similarly, Callaghy and Wilson (1988) state that "This 
sense of confusion has allowed the ‘been down so long, why not try it’ syndrome to play a 
role in economic reform efforts in general and in privatisation in particular".
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Nevertheless, these flaws have exposed the Bank to heavy criticisms from both 
outsiders and insiders. For example, The Financial Times (16.9.1987) argues that "aid 
agencies and organisations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, are falling over each others 
in their efforts to sing the praises of the private sector". Similarly, Heald (1990) warns that 
"International organisations will have to be extremely careful not to be seen as vehicles of 
either aggressive ideology or of foreign commercial interests". Indeed, even the Bank staff 
are unhappy about the Bank involvement in DCs. For example, Kikeri (1990) concluded 
that:
"Since Bank support for divestiture may be construed as involvement in internal 
policies o f borrower countries, and since the political and social conditions vary 
from country to country, a fundamental conclusion o f this study is that the Bank 
cannot use a single design and implementation blue print fo r all countries. Bank 
operations should be flexible, paying careful attention in strategy formulation to 
prevailing country conditions",
Another flaw about the World Bank approach is that, the first privatisation candidates 
must be profitable,"since viable and profitable PEs are likely to have the greatest chances of 
success" (Kikeri, 1990). Similarly, Cowan (1990) states that "Ideally, the first privatisation 
candidates would be well-known, preferably successful PEs that have not required subsidies 
and have been operated by efficient, business-like behaviour". Clearly, there is an overlap 
here; simply because while the main argument against PEs is that they incur persistent losses, 
it is the profitable PEs that are targeted for sale. However, profitable PEs are generating 
sufficient earnings and normally do not constitute a budgetary burden. Indeed, a number of 
DCs have found it extremely difficult to justify the sale of revenue-producing PEs. 
Consequently, the PEs often selected for privatisation in DCs are the small, non-operating 
PEs. For example, Kikeri (1990) states that "In Senegal, the most interesting cases were
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excluded from the divestiture list". Similar treatments took place in Ghana, Guinea, Morocco 
and Tunisia (Galal, 1990; Bouaouaja, 1989).
Nonetheless, moving to phase two (i.e. public utilities), privatisation is likely to pose 
serious political, economic and technical concerns. As we saw in chapter 3, there is no 
objection to the privatisation of PEs operating in competitive markets, though the status of 
capital market in most DCs, casts doubts on the potential benefits of the policy. Nevertheless, 
the idea of exposing public utilities to the disciplines of market forces is hard to accept in the 
context of DCs, where the market is inefficient and uncompetitive. Indeed, even in industrial 
countries, notably the UK, the privatisation of these industries has drawn the attention of both 
politicians and academicians (Rees, 1986; Harris, 1988; Kay and Thompson, 1986; Heald, 
1990). The point is that, the size of these organisations would hinder the efficiency of the 
market for corporate control, and in the absence of product markets, there is no reason to 
suggest that privatisation would enhance allocative efficiency. Indeed, even if there are some 
gains in productive efficiency, such gains might be retained by the industry, rather than 
transferred to consumers in terms of lower prices (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Moreover, 
the absence of sound reporting standards, a free media, a functioning Parliament, specialised 
cadre, and established, respected legal system, would render regulation at best difficult. 
Likewise, the_ internal market might be unable to finance the sale of such industries, and 
foreign investors might not be allowed to own "the commanding heights" of the economy.
Probably this is the problem with privatisation. As Heald (1990) points out, once the 
privatisation process starts, it becomes very difficult to draw the line between "appropriate" 
and "inappropriate" privatisations. Privatisation is appropriate when both the capital and 
product markets are efficient and competitive, where there are no administrative controls for 
dong business, and where the private sector is well-established (Bishop and Kay, 1989).
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Nevertheless, in a bid to accelerate the flow of foreign investment into DCs so as to 
speed up privatisation, the Bank has established an agency called " Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency". As its name implies, the main purpose of the Agency would be to 
provide a guarantee for foreign investors against non-commercial risks. Such risks, Shihata 
(1988) explains, would include risks to repatriate capital gains and dividends in any 
acceptable currency, risks of breach of contracts, and risks of political instability. These 
guarantees, Shihata claims, would be provided to both foreign investors and nationals who 
invest in their own country through capital repatriated from abroad. In addition, the Agency 
would provide advisory services and technical skills needed to plan and implement 
privatisation in DCs.
Similarly, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Banks affiliate promoting 
private sector development in DCs, is also involved in providing technical assistance to DCs, 
as well as acquiring shares in privatised enterprises. The World Bank itself has never 
acquired equity in privatised industries (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989). Moreover, the IFC also 
introduced a new arrangement called "Guaranteed Recovery of Investment Principal" (GRIP), 
so as encourage private investment in DCs. The arrangement works as follows: the 
prospective foreign investor provides the capital to be invested in a certain country, the IFC 
invests the capital in its name, and assumes full responsibility for the loss of principal, on 
an income sharing basis. At the end of an agreed period, the investor has the choice either 
to assume full ownership and control of the investment, or to take his principal and depart 
costlessly (Silkenat, 1988).
In the end, despite the heavy involvement and support by the Bank, privatisation in
DCs appears to be facing considerable difficulties. As Kirkpatrick (1988) argues " the
significance of privatisation as a policy option for LDCs has been exaggerated. 
Denationalisation is likely to be difficult to achieve, its potential benefits often appear to be
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limited, and its adoption may involve political costs". Similarly, Nellis (1986) argues " A 
basic fact must be faced : Even if every contemplated or conceivable African PE divestiture 
candidate were sold or liquidated in the near future there would still remain in every sub- 
saharan country a substantial PE sector". As a result, a large number of PEs are expected 
to remain under public ownership for a considerable time to come, and hence internal reform 
must be given a higher priority.
Now that having identified the rationale for privatisation in DCs, a question arises 
regarding the scope and pace for privatisation in DCs, and the Sudan in particular. This will 








This chapter will be composed of two main sections. In the first section, we shall 
outline the research objectives and the research framework. The second section will be 
devoted to the research methodology, and the research methods used to collect the data.
Experience shows that, governments in most DCs have found it extremely difficult 
to implement privatisation (see chapter 6). Moreover, the available evidence tend to focus 
on the number of PEs privatised in DCs, rather than on the objectives of privatisation, the 
size of PEs privatised, or the implementation process. As Kikeri (1990) argues "Information 
on the characteristics of divested enterprises are quite sparse, and systematic evaluation of 
the financial and economic impact of ownership and/or management changes are lacking". 
This is largely because, the available studies, in particular those carried out by the World 
Bank, were based on "desk studies", rather than empirical investigation at the enterprise level 
in different DCs (e.g. Vuylsteke, 1988; Nankani, 1988; Candoy-Sekse, 1988; Kikeri, 
1990). However, PEs in different countries, and different sectors in the same country are 
likely to encounter different problems, which require different solutions. As Heald (1990) 
argues "The proper approach to discussing the future of the public sector in particular 
countries is to adopt a tough and questioning attitude towards the performance of existing 
public sector organisations".
5.1 Research Objectives and Framework
The objectives of this research are three-fold. First, to explore the scope of 
privatisation in the Sudan, and to identify the similarities and differences with the experience
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elsewhere (chapter 6). Second, to investigate the structure, performance and major problems 
of PEs in the Sudan, as well as the measures devised to improve performance. Towards this 
end, various case studies at both macro and micro levels were investigated by the researcher 
(chapters 7-11). The third objective will be to investigate the constraints and the relevance 
of privatisation to the Sudan. To achieve this objective, specific contingent variables, outlined 
in the model below, were investigated at the macro level (chapters 12 and 13).
Thus, the purpose will be to explore the scope, constraints and the likely benefits of 
privatisation in the Sudan, and to see whether the Sudanese experience is consistent or 
inconsistent with the experience elsewhere. Unlike those who want to H export" the 
privatisation "model" of industrial countries (e.g. Walters, 1985; Young, 1986), we shall 
approach the policy from a contingency framework (see below). The logic is that, countries 
differ widely in terms of stage of economic development, level of development of capital 
markets, political, legal and economic systems. These differences, in turn, are likely to 
influence the decisions to privatise, what and how to privatise. Based on the literature survey 
reported in the previous part, we developed the model, which incorporates the variables that 
are likely to influence the scope and speed of privatisation in DCs.
Model 5.1 
Contingent Privatisation Model
Business environment Sector of activity
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5.1.1 The capital market
It is here argued that, the level of development of the capital market, the number of 
local investors, and the capacity to mobilise private resources in any country are critical to 
the success of privatisation, and key determinants of the privatisation techniques. In industrial 
countries, (e.g. the UK,)where the capital market is well-developed and properly regulated, 
and where the number of business investors is large and the level of education is high, 
privatisation was carried out, in the main, through a public offering of shares. But, in a 
context where the capital market is too-thin or non-existent; where there is no tradition of 
share ownership, and the public confidence in the financial system is rather weak, a public 
offering of shares is unlikely to be a predominant privatisation mechanism. Instead, private 
sales to local and foreign investors are likely to be the predominant privatisation techniques. 
Similarly, the small, inefficient and uncompetitive internal markets are likely to inhibit large- 
scale privatisations, as well as the effectiveness of the market for corporate control.
5.1.2 Socio-Political Factors
The socio-political factors in any country are likely to influence the decision to 
privatise; what to privatise, and may even determine how to privatise. For example, if 
authorisation is required in a democratic manner, the process is likely to be more complex 
and time-consuming, whereas in a one-party system the authorisation process is likely to be 
easy and simple. The degree of political stability in a country would influence the 
government’s ability to mobilise private resources and the flow of foreign investment.
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Similarly, the government objectives could determine how to implement privatisation, i.e. 
the appropriate technique.
The stage of economic development could influence the scope and pace for 
Privatisation. In most DCs, the issue of rural development is still high on the national 
agenda, which may not be the case in industrial countries. Moreover, in the absence of the 
income support schemes of industrial countries, and in a context where job opportunities in 
other sectors of the economy are bleak, employment issues are likely to be far more 
complicated. Likewise, concentration of wealth, dramatic rise in consumer prices, the role 
of foreigners and ethnic minorities are likely to be topical issues in DCs. In industrial 
countries, however, ownership pattern may be of secondary importance, and the well- 
established regulatory systems and consumer protection groups could influence prices.
5.1.3 Preparing PEs for sale
The financial performance of PEs selected for sale is likely to determine the success 
of the policy. Profitable and potentially viable enterprises are likely to attract buyers, while 
loss-making and unviable PEs are unlikely to be sold in their present financial condition, and 
hence must be prepared for sale. In that case, detailed studies would be needed to collect 
basic data on the financial and technical position, so as to determine the nature of the 
restructuring needed. Such activities, however, cost money and require variety of skills (e.g. 
accountants, lawyers, technical experts, and investment analysts), which may not available 
locally. The financial performance could also influence the selection of the privatisation 
mechanism. For example, to qualify for a public offering, the privatisation candidate must 
be profitable or capable of being turned around. In short, preparing PEs for sale would cost 
money, takes time, and requires qualified experts. Thus, if the skills needed are in short 
supply and finance is meagre, preparing PEs for sale is likely to be a major constraint.
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5.1.4 Administrative Capacity
This refers to the government ability to formulate, organise and implement a viable 
privatisation plan, and establish an adequate regulatory mechanism. As noted above,
privatisation requires a variety of skills to plan and execute the policy. However, the newness 
of the policy suggests that challenges facing DCs are formidable. The use of external 
advisers, on the other hand, is likely to face resentment from the bureaucrats and political 
opponents.
5.1.5 The Business Environment
In industrial countries, a firm that is privatised is likely to move to a well-established 
business environment, where there are no administrative controls and where there are 
challenges. In DCs, however, the available evidence suggests that government intervention 
in internal markets is typically excessive (see chapter three). However, it is here asserted 
that, the long term success of privatisation depends entirely on the political, legal and 
economic environment within which enterprises operate.
5.1.6 Sector of Operation
The sector in which a PE operates often influences the decision to privatise and how 
to privatise. Smaller PEs operating in competitive markets are often easier to privatise than 
the public utilities, such as the rail, electricity and water industries. The authorisation to 
privatise the latter concerns is likely to raise serious political problems, the internal market 
might be unable to finance the sale, and their size would require the establishment of a 
regulatory system in order to protect consumers with all the problems of regulation. Indeed, 
even in the UK, the privatisation of such industries has drawn heavy criticism, and regulation 
proved to be rather difficult, not least because, of the information problems (Rees, 1986; 
Bishop and Kay, 1989; Vickers and Yarrow, 1989). Thus, if that was the case in the UK,
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it could be fairly argued that, the privatisation of public utilities is expected to be a complex 
and time-consuming process in DCs.
5.2 Research Methodology
The choice of a research methodology depends on a number of factors, such as the 
nature of the research topic. Table 5.1 developed by Robert Yin (1983) outlines the factors 
that influence the choice of a research methodology, and shows how to select the appropriate 
strategy.
Table 5.1 
Relevant Situations for 
Different Research Strategies








Experiments Why?, How? Yes Yes
Survey What?, How many?,
How much? No Yes
History How?, Why? No No
Case Study How?, Why? No Yes
Source: R.Yin (1983), "Case Study Research", Sage Publications
Similarly, Jaggi (1973) categorises research in DCs as :
(1) descriptive research which provides information regarding the current state o f 
the art o f the phenomenon under investigation. Such studies, Jaggi claims, are 
usually exploratory in nature that attempt to define the status o f a particular 
subject matter.
(2) conceptual studies in which a model or a framework is developed and then 
tested. The data required fo r testing the model comes from the descriptive 
studies.
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(3) hypothesis-testing studies in which a set o f hypothesis are developed, and then 
tested by data obtained from the field.
This study is an exploratory study aimed primarily to investigate the scope and 
relevance of privatisation to the Sudan, the other measures initiated to improve the 
performance of PEs, and the structure, performance and problems of PEs in the Sudan. It 
is thus meant to explore and explain a real situation. To achieve this objective, the study will 
provide several case studies from various levels, i.e. the enterprise level, sectoral level and 
macro level.
For this purpose, a case study is defined as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context when "what", "why", and "how" 
questions are being asked, when the boundaries between phenomenon are not clearly evident, 
and in which multiple sources of evidence are used" (Yin, 1983). In addition a comparative 
analysis of the different privatisation cases was planned, in terms of comparing the 
mechanism used, obstacles, concessions granted, etc. These two strategies are in no sense 
a deficiency, but rather desirable. For instance, on the methodological integration in social 
sciences, Warwick (1973) argues that "The past two decades have seen a growing 
recognition for the need for merging more than one or two research methodologies in the 
same study". Similarly, on the integration between case studies and surveys, Diesing (1973) 
raises the following questions," how distinct are these methods after all ? Are they parts or 
variants of the same method or are they in the process of combining into a new method?" 
Nevertheless, the comparative analysis method was deleted in the field, simply because we 
found that privatisation is still at its infant stage, and no actual implementation has occurred. 
As a result, we concentrated on the efforts made to reform PEs, and the business 
environment so as to assess the relevance of privatisation to the Sudan.
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5.3 Research Methods
The main research methods used to collect data for this research were interviews. 
Maccoby and Maccoby (1954) define interviewing as "Face-to-face verbal interaction, in 
which one person (the interviewer) attempts to elicit information or expressions of opinions 
from the interviewee". The main advantages of interviews are: (i) flexibility. Referring to 
this flexibility, Berner et al (1985) claim that "because interviewing as a research tool is 
very flexible, it can deal with a variety of subject matters at different levels of detail or 
complexity", (ii) the researcher can cross-examine evidence, and come back to fill in gaps 
and seek answers to emerging issues.
The method, however, is not without limitations. The most important is that 
informant’s statements may not be free from bias, and hence a great care needs to be exerted 
to check their reliability. A second limitation is that, interviewing is normally costly and a 
time-consuming process. Indeed the greatest difficulty we faced in the field was how to get 
hold of the person required for interviewing. In the Sudan, formal appointments are totally 
unreliable. It is not at all uncommon to fix an appointment, and you then discover that the 
official is not available in his office at the specified time, or in a meeting. The only solution 
is to try again. In fact, in most cases, we had to look for informal ways for arranging a 
meeting. The unreliability of the communication systems in the Sudan further complicate the 
problem.
Types of Interviews
There are three main approaches for collecting data through interviews (Misher, 
1986; Sudman and Bradburn, 1982; Khan and Carrell, 1957). These are:
(1) Informal Conversational Interviews
(2) General interview guide approach
(3) Standardised open-ended interviews
(1) Informal Conversational Interviews
This approach is often used when the researcher has no idea of what he can learn 
from the discussion with the persons involved. Therefore, there are no predetermined 
questions or issues, rather they emerge from the conversation with people, and the researcher 
has to persue information as they emerge. The issues raised with different people may be 
quite different, and the conversation can be held more than once depending on the research 
progress and the emerging data.
The advantage of this approach is that, it allows the interviewer greater flexibility and 
freedom to respond to individual differences, and situational changes. On the other hand, it 
requires greater conversational skills, it is time-consuming, and the analysis of data may be 
difficult, since different people are asked different questions.
(2) General Interview Guide Approach
This approach requires the researcher to prepare in advance a set of questions or 
issues to be raised with the interviewee. Such questions, however, can be asked in any order 
as the interview progress. The researcher is free to conduct the interview within a specific 
topic prepared in advance, and to sequence the questions according to the emerging 
evidence.The main advantages of this approach is that, the discussion will be more focused 
and relatively systematic. However, as with the first approach, it is time-consuming, and the 
analysis of data may not be easy.
(3) Standardised Interviews
Under this approach, the questions are carefully set in advance, and in a 
certain order. Moreover, any clarification needed is included in the questionaire. Thus, the 
interview is systematic across all participants. Therefore, the data analysis is more easier, 
since all participants will be asked the same questions, and in the same sequence. Its main
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weakness, on the other hand, is that it lacks flexibility, which prevents the interviewer to 
follow up issues that emerge and which were not included in the questionaire.
In the field, we found the three approaches veiy useful, and consequently they were 
all used. The first two approaches were useful in the exploratory phase about the economic 
and legal environment within which PEs operate; the objectives, limitations, and outcome of 
the reform process; and the response to privatisation. So, they were used with the Auditor 
General, the Attorney General, the officials in the sectoral ministries and the MFEP, The 
World Bank (Khartoum), the Sugar and Agriculture Rehabilitation Projects. The third 
approach was used to investigate the structure and performance of PEs, and the measures 
taken to implement privatisation. Therefore, it was used with the managing directors and 
functional managers of six PEs, the Pricing and Costing Unit, the Industrial Research and 
Consultancy Centre, and the Minister in charge of privatisation.
The Wording of Questions
The objective of an interview is to collect reliable data so as to answer the research 
questions. However, as Payne (1951) argues "interviewing is an art". Therefore, there is no 
one best way-to ask the questions, and no universal way of conducting an interview. Yet, 
questions for interviewing purposes should have the following properties : (a) open-ended. 
That is, questions that allow the interviewee to answer freely in his own words. The 
interviewer should not ask leading questions in order to obtain certain answers, (b) Neutral. 
That is the interviewer should not form preconceived ideas about the topic under 
investigation, should not express his own views, and must take more than give, (c) Clear and 
singular. That is, the questions should not contain more than one idea, as this normally leads 
to confusion for the interviewee. If any clarification to the question is needed, must be 
provided in a non-leading manner. In this regard, Patton (1980) suggests conveying the 
notion that "failure to understand is my fault".
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Apart from the problem of clarifying the questions, there are also the problems of 
inadequate answers, refusal to answer, and incomplete answers. Inadequate answers are those 
unclear answers for one reason or the other. At times, the interviewee may firmly refuse to 
answer, in which case his refusal must be accepted. But, if the refusal is "half-hearted", the 
interviewer may use other means to persuade him, such as assuring him that the data 
obtained will be dealt with in absolute secrecy. At other times, the answers might be 
irrelevant or incomplete. In that case, the question may be repeated, or the interviewer could 
ask questions, such as "can you tell me more", "can you think of other reasons", "why", "in 
what way".
Controlling the Interview
During the interviewing process, the interviewer must exert a considerable effort to 
keep the interview under control. This is achieved by knowing precisely what he wants to 
find out, and by asking the right questions. Moreover, he must encourage and motivate the 
interviewee to answer in an adequate and complete manner. "This requires from the 
interviewer continuous efforts to reduce or eliminate the negative forces, or barriers to 
communication" (Khan and Carrell, 1957). Understanding the purpose for the data 
collection may help in this respect, and hence the initial statement should clarify the purpose 
in a simple, honest and understandable manner.
Recording the Interview
The primary data of interviews are the statements made by the interviewees. 
Therefore, such statements need to be recorded as they were said. There are three main ways 
of recording interviews. The first is tape recording, which provides the best recording. 
Therefore, the reason for using tape recording should be made clear, and the interviewee 
should be allowed to stop it whenever he feels so. The second to is to write every word said 
during the interview. This is a second best solution, since it distracts the interviewer from
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following up data as they emerge. That is, writing all the time makes it difficult for the 
interviewer to pick up rich information and persue them further. Third, is note-taking during 
the interview, and write the report later. Although it alleviates the shortcomings of the 
second method, it suffers two main deficiencies, (a) There is the problem of forgetting what 
exactly interviewees said, (b) Interviewees may not feel at ease, on the grounds that, what 
they are saying is not important.
In our case, the use of tape recording was firmly rejected by all the Sudanese, due 
to the political nature of the topic. The second method was not used, due to the problems 
mentioned above. As a result, we found it more useful and effective to take notes during the 
interview, and write a report later (in the same day). To avoid embarrassing interviewees that 
what they are saying is useless, we used to tell them in advance that we are not writing all 
the time because of the problems encountered. Indeed, almost all interviewees were very 
understanding after such explanation.
Summary of Rules
Berner et at (1985) summarise the interviewing rules as follows:
(1) Rules of asking questions
- Read the questions as they are worded .
- Read slowly.
- Use correct intonation and emphasis.
- Ask the questions in the correct order.
(2) Rules for dealing with answers
- Record exactly what respondants say.
- Do not answer for the respondant.
- Show interest in the answers given by respondants.
- Make sure you understand the answers adequately.
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- Make sure each answer is adequate.
- Do not show approval or disapproval on any answer.
(3) Rules for interacting with respondants
- Probe only non-directively.
- Clarify where necessary and repeat the question, if needed.
- Do not give directive information about question meaning.
- Do not give information not related to the question.
- Thank respondants from time to time for cooperating.
- When given inadequate answers, try to obtain further information by means 
of non-directive probing; repetition of the question or non-directive 
clarification.
- When refusal is "half-hearted", that is although refusing still provides a basis
for discussion, try to obtain an answer by clarifying non-directively, probing
non-directively or repetition of the question.
Source : Berner et al (1985), "Research Interview"
5.4 The Fieldwork
The fieldwork for this thesis lasted for about six months (from mid-February, 1990 
to mid-August, 1990), and was successful to a large extent. By the time we arrived in the 
field, the Sudanese government started publicising its intentions to get rid of all loss-making 
PEs. Two months later, the Minister of Industry issued an advertisement in local newspapers 
offering six industrial PEs for sale, and inviting local investors to submit their bids. A 
couple of weeks later, a master privatisation plan was announced by the government as part 
of a three-year "Economic Salvation Plan". Therefore, privatisation was a hot issue at the 
time, and almost all the officials I have spoken to were very enthusiastic to discuss; explain 
and criticise.
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Upon arrival in the field, we started by reviewing the resolutions and 
recommendations of the "National Economic Conference", organised by the incoming 
military government, in which adherence to free markets and rolling back the frontiers of the 
state were recommended, and later adopted as the main economic policy of the new regime. 
Having reviewed these documents, we met a number of participants in that conference, and 
in particular the committee in charge of the public corporations (their names and addresses 
were listed in the document).
A few weeks later (March 12-15, 1990), a workshop on investment promotion in the 
Sudan was arranged. The workshop provided a golden opportunity for the researcher to meet 
local businessmen; government officials and foreign investors, mainly Arabs, to discuss the 
investment climate; opportunities; obstacles and their willingness to invest in the Sudan. 
Nevertheless, it then became clear to me that the government was serious in implementing 
the recommendations regarding the state participation in the economy, and was heading 
towards privatisation. That is not surprising, however, because the military government now 
in power, is supported by the right wing "Muslim fundamentalists", who strongly believe in 
the principles of private ownership. They argue that "God had created human beings 
unequal"; "there are those who are rich and those who are poor solely by the act of God"; 
and "it is God who gives and takes". Therefore, any attempt to equating people through 
socialism or any other mechanism, is totally prohibited in Islam. Without getting into the 
different interpretations and schools of thought between those strictly adhering to this line of 
thinking, and those who claim that there is socialism in Islam, broadly speaking this is the 
stand of the present military regime, supported by the National Islamic Front ( a political 
party in the Sudan).
The next step was to conduct interviews with the pertinent technocrats, previous and 
current ministers on the structure and performance of PEs; the nature and outcome of the
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various reform efforts; and why and how privatisation. As we pointed out earlier, one 
method that was absolutely useful in conducting these interviews was personal contacts. In 
almost all cases, either we got to know the official in advance or looked for some one who 
knew him and let introduction through a third party be made. In some cases, the graduates 
of the Gezira University, where the researcher works, have facilitated the introduction 
process. In addition, we had two formal letters, one from the employer (Gezira University) 
and the other from my supervisor. At the beginning, we used to contact the officials through 
these formal letters, but that proved to be inadequate and ineffective, as we were met, in the 
main, with a very hostile attitude. However, the same person when approached informally, 
became very friendly and cooperative. The supervisor’s letter (in English), was very useful 
for the World Bank, the foreign consultancy firm carrying the diagnostic studies of ten PEs 
in the Sudan (see chapter 11), and even the Sudanese who were graduated from the Sudanese 
universities (medium of instructions in the Sudanese universities is English), or had been 
trained in the UK.
Conducting interviews and data collection in general is a costly, time-consuming 
process. But, in my case it was made somewhat easier, because I had a car in Khartoum, 
which facilitated my movements greatly. Public transport in the Sudan is totally unreliable, 
due to the frequent oil and spare parts shortages. We managed to obtain a weekly quota of 
oil, albeit, on an informal basis.
All in all, about 24 working weeks (6 days a week), were spent in the field, in which 
the following government departments and international organisations were visited:
(1) Public Corporation Department, Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning.
(2) Public Corporation Bureau, Ministry of Industry.
(3) Costing and Pricing Unit, Ministry of Industry.
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(4) Industrial Research and Consultancy Centre.
(5) The Rehabilitation Units for sugar; textile and agriculture.
(6) Bank of Sudan and two stated-owned commercial banks (Bank of 
Khartoum and the Sudan Commercial Bank).
(7) Investment Secretariat Bureau (Ministry of Finance),
(8) Imports and Exports Units - Ministry of Commerce, Supply and 
Cooperation,
(9) The Taxation chamber,
(10) The Auditor General Chamber,
(11) The Attorney General Chamber,
(12) The Sudan Chamber of Commerce,
(13) Ministry of Labour,
(14) The Minister of Industry, as well as a previous minister who proposed 
the legal restructuring of the industrial enterprises in the early 1980s.
(15) The Chairman of the Public Investment Authority (ministerial status and 
coordinator of the interministerial committee in charge of privatisation.
(16) Managing Directors of two long-standing privatisation candidates (Rea 
and Kirikab sweet factories).
(17) Managing Directors, Financial and Personnel managers of:
- Sudan Airways Company,
- Sudan Telecom Corporation,
- Guneid Sugar Company,
- Friendship Textile Company,
- Gezira Scheme,
- Duty Free Shops Corporation.
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(18) Managing Directors of two private firms (International Tyre 
Manufacturing and Distributing Company, and the Sudan-Arab oil and 
soap company).
(19) Managing Director of the Industrial Production Corporation (1971-1976).
(20) The Accountancy Institute, The Management Development Centre and the 
Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences.
(21) The foreign consultancy firm, BMB (Dutch) and Cooper and Lybrand 
(British).
(22) The World Bank Resident Representative (Khartoum), and the World 
Bank Headquarters in Washington (the latter was made possible by a grant 
from the British Council).
In most of these places, officials were visited more than once to fill in gaps, or to 
check puzzling questions that emerged during the investigation process. Around 80 percent 
of the interviews and discussions were conducted in "Arabic", and later translated into 
"English" by the researcher. Admittedly, part of the respondant’s statements must have been 
affected in this translation process, but not to the extent that it changed the meaning entirely. 
But nevertheless, had it been in English, it would have reflected the actual words and 
behaviour of the interviewees. To minimise the possibilities for misunderstanding, we used 
to translate immediately to the respondant what he has said, before proceeding to the next 
issue. For the Sudanese who were graduated from the Sudanese Universities or had some sort 
of training in the UK or the U.S.A., we found no problem or embarrassment in translating 
what he said. For those graduated from non-English-speaking universities (e.g. Arab and 
Eastern Europe) repetition of the respondants statements in different terms was used to clarify 
the meanings.
85
A second valuable source of data was the workshops organised by the foreign 
consultancy firm carrying out the diagnostic studies of 10 PES in the Sudan. Before and after 
each study, the consultants used to hold a workshop, in which all concerned parties (the 
enterprise under investigation, and representatives of sectoral ministries and the Ministry of 
Finance) were invited. At the start, they would summarise all the previous studies and reports 
regarding the PE in question, or those related to its sector of activity, and then to formulate 
a plan for the study. At the end of each investigation, the consultants also used to arrange 
another workshop to discuss their findings with the concerned parties, before submitting their 
final report. The researcher was invited to attend three of these workshops and participate 
in the discussions. These were: Karima Fruit Canning Factory; Guneid Sugar Company and 
the Sudan Telecom Corporation. By all measures, these meetings, and the brief discussions 
with the consultants before and after each workshop, were very useful and fruitful.
A third source of data were the published reports by the government; the Auditor 
General; the rehabilitation units; the World Bank; and a host of previous reports. In a few 
cases, public seminars were arranged by the students union, in which cabinet ministers were 
invited. Also, the media (local newspapers, radio and television) provided a rich source of 
data.
A fourth useful source of data were the lengthy, in depth discussions with the World 
Bank officials in Washington, which was made possible by a grant from the British Council. 
As we pointed out in chapter four, the World Bank, among other international organisations, 
has been addressing the issue of PEs in DCs for quite some time, and has published a stream 
of reports on privatisation in DCs. The visit, therefore, provided a golden opportunity for 
the researcher to interview the World Bank officials in various sections (e.g. East Africa 
department, the PEs management division and the private sector development department), 
regarding the state of the art in the Sudan, and the privatisation experience in DCs. It was 
by all measures a very useful experience, and the Bank staff were extremely helpful,
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cooperative, and provided me with first-hand information. Apart from the interviews, we 
managed to collect valuable, up-to-date publications about privatisation and PE reform in 
DCs.
Finally, the researcher also spent a good time in different PEs observing behaviour 
in their natural setting, and talking to workers and lower level managers. The primary 
purpose was to gain insight into the internal operations of PEs, and to find out what the 
employees think of their organisation (i.e. the style of management, productivity, 
performance, etc) and how they perceive the government policies, that is privatisation. In 
addition, we visited two private firms, primarily to explore the similarities and differences 
with PEs in terms of worker’s behaviour at work; the working conditions; and the major 
problems faced by the private sector in the Sudan.
5.5 Research Limitations
Probably the most serious limitation of this study, is that the researcher was unable 
to capture the views of the politicians and trade union leaders, who were banned by the 
incoming military government (in mid-1989). By the time the fieldwork was conducted, 
almost all political and trade union leaders were either under arrest, or in hiding, and even 
those left free, we were advised not to approach them. Ideally, it would have been more 
informative had the opposing views been explored to assess the continuity of the policy (i.e. 
would political opponents be abide by the policy, or would they reverse it if they come to 
power).
Another limitation of this research is that, in most cases, there was a complete lack 
of records and documents regarding the major economic policies adopted. For example, the 
only document that we found regarding the legal restructuring of industrial PEs, was a "two- 
lines" Presidential decree issued in 1981. Therefore, the only source of information were the 
officials who were present at the time, and who participated in implementing the Presidential
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decree. But, due to the very high turnover in the civil service, in most cases, these officials 
were not available for interviewing, and we had to trace them and find them if they are still 
in the country. Moreover, due to the sharp decline in real incomes, the deteriorating working 
conditions (e.g. power cuts; lack of transport, etc), and the job insecurity caused by the 
indiscriminate dismissals on political grounds by the new regime, the civil servants, including 
PE managers and staff, were so demoralised and disinterested. Therefore, getting the proper 
data and the appropriate officials for interviewing was not at all an easy task.
5.5 The Research Design
The research design was meant to be as loose as possible so as to allow for 
developments in the field. As Diesing (1973) put it "too strict a design ties the research down 
and inhibits changes in concepts that are characteristics of the fieldwork". For example, 
initially we intended to use the comparative analysis method to supplement the case study 
strategy, but, in the field the method proved to be irrelevant, and was consequently deleted 
(see above). Moreover, before conducting the fieldwork, the researcher had no idea about 
which PEs to investigate, nor the individuals to be interviewed. However, this is not a 
deficiency in any way. Indeed, as Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue "In a research carried 
out for discovering theory, the sociologist can not cite the number and types of groups from 




in the Sudan and other DCs
In the Sudan, privatisation has been on the national agenda for almost a decade, but 
no major progress has been made. In mid-1990, however, the incoming military government 
announced a master privatisation programme for a wide range of PEs, under its "Three-Year 
Economic Salvation Plan” (1990/91-1993/94). The purpose of this chapter will be to outline 
and discuss the early privatisation initiatives, the current privatisation plan, and the 
privatisation experience and implementation issues in other DCs.
This chapter will consist of three main sections. In the first section, we will outline 
and discuss the case of two sweet factories, which the authorities were trying to sell for 
almost a decade without much success so far. The second will be devoted to the recent 
privatisation plan, viz: the privatisation candidates, the management of privatisation, and 
other implementation measures taken. In the final section, we will investigate the 
privatisation experience and the implementation constraints in the Sudan and other DCs. The 
major obstacles to the current Sudanese privatisation plan, however, will the subject of 
chapters 12 and 13.
6.1 The Early Privatisation Initiatives
6.1.1 Introduction
From 1979, the Sudanese authorities have been trying to privatise two sweet factories 
(Rea and Kirikab), without much success so far. In mid-1986, the factories were closed 
down, and a decision was taken by the Council of Ministers to denationalise them. However,
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no decision regarding employment was taken until October, 1989. At present, all the staff 
of the two factories are laid-off, and only a "care-taker" management was retained until 
ownership is finally transferred to the new owners. In what follows, we shall outline and 
discuss the organisation structure of the industry; its financial performance; and the main 
steps taken towards its privatisation.
6.1.2 Organisation Structure
Both factories were owned by a Greek family, and came under public ownership 
through nationalisation in 1970, but were never returned back to their original owners. 
Nevertheless, following nationalisation, both factories were placed under the control of the 
Industrial Food Corporation, and when the sectoral corporation was abolished in 1981, as 
part of the legal restructuring process (chapter 10), they came under the direct control of the 
Ministry of Industry. The following charts depict the organisation structures of both factories.
Organisation Structure:






















As the above charts reveal, both factories were headed by a Managing Director 
assisted by functional managers. As we shall see in chapter 9, this is a typical organisation 
structure found across all PEs in the Sudan, where the authorities have adopted a unified 
organisational set up regardless of the environment in which the enterprise operates, the 
technology used, its size, age and objectives. As we shall see in chapter 9, this is largely 
inconsistent with the modern organisation theory, which has clearly demonstrated that there 
is no universal management system that is appropriate in all situations. The essence of the 
"contingency theory" is that there is no one best way to manage business enterprises, and that 
management should be based on the situation in which the enterprise operates. For example, 
a dynamic environment might necessitate differentiation and decentralisation of decision 
making powers to enable divisional and regional managers to respond to the opportunities and 
threats in their environment. A static environment, on the other hand, might cope with 
standardised rules and centralised decision making.
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6.1.3 Employment
The total number of staff of the two factories as at October, 1989, was 232 (Rea: 
129, and Kirikab: 103), composed of 42 officers and 190 workers. However, apart from 
the voluntary resignations of some skilled technicians, who have joined the private sector or 
travelled abroad, the size of the work force remained constant over the years.
6.1.4 Financial Performance
As the following financial statements reveal, both factories have been incurring 
persistent losses over the years.
Table 6.1 
Combined Balance Sheets 
Between 1979/80 and 1985/86 
(£s 000)


























































Combined Income Statements 
Between 1979/80 and 1985/86 
(£s 000)
Particulars 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86
Sales
Cost of Sales 
Gross Profit (Loss) 
Other income 
Administrative Expenses 
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The following observations can be made from the above financial statements. First, 
it is evident that the persistent losses incurred by the factories have wiped out their capital. 
As a result, the tangible net worth of the factories is negative, indicating that they are 
technically bankrupt (table 6.1). Second, both factories have failed to cover their production 
costs, let alone administrative and selling expenses (table 6.2). Third, the ratio of cost of 
sales to sales has been erratic in both factories. In Kirikab factory, for example, the ratio of
a
cost of sales to sales increased from 72.7 percent in 1979/80 to 171 percent in 1985/86, 
while in Rea factory the ratio increased from 87 percent in 1979/80 to 110 percent at the 
time of closure (table 6.3). Nevertheless, our investigation revealed that the reasons for the 
very high production costs have never been systematically investigated, nor has there been 
any significant effort to control costs in order to minimise losses (see below).
Fourth, the receipts classified as "other income", though not showing any strong 
trend, have on average, been rising. Indeed, they increased from £s 22,000 in 1979/80, to 
£s 146,000 in 1985/86. The care-taker management indicated that the real nature of "other 
income" were receipts from levies made by the factories over and above the regulated prices. 
As we shall see later, due to the severe liquidity problems facing the factories, the 
management entered into agreements with prospective customers to sell their products in 
advance, at an agreed price above the official price set by the government. The mechanism 
was meant to enable the factories to obtain their inputs from the local market at the
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prevailing market prices. As we shall see in chapter 7, in the Sudan, there are official prices 
for all inputs, local or foreign, but such prices are not available in real life. As a result, 
public and private enterprises have either to stay idle until inputs are made available at the 
official price, or resort to the unofficial market to obtain their needs at much higher prices, 
which are not recognised for pricing purposes.
The unsatisfactory performance of the sweet industry outlined above is attributed to 
a number of factors. First, over-staffing. At the time of nationalisation in 1970, the factories 
were operating on three-shifts basis. Thereafter, however, the industry was barely operating 
on a one-shift basis, but has retained the same work force employed for the three shifts. 
Indeed, the annual wage bill at the time of closure was £s 734,000 , representing around 60 
percent of turnover. Although the factories were not operating between 1986 and 1989, the 
staff received all their wages, including salary increases announced by the state in the 
interim. Second, an investigation by the Industrial Research and Consultancy Centre, of the 
Ministry of Industry, in 1985, reported that the plants are too old, and in poor condition, due 
to the breakdown of repair and maintenance. The report stated that, "the vacuum pumps need 
to be replaced, and the wrapping machines not only caused delays due to frequent stoppages, 
but also considerable loss of wrapping papers due to bad alignment of machines". Third, due 
to the heavy indebtness of both factories to the commercial banks, they were unable to 
borrow from the open market. Moreover, the "care-taker" management asserted that their 
repeated requests for the government backing were simply neglected by the authorities. 
Nevertheless, the withdrawal of the banking support, and failure to get access to public 
funding, created severe liquidity problems, which crippled the industry from operating on 
sound commercial basis. Indeed, as table (6.1) reveals, current liabilities since 1983 were 
greater than current assets, indicating that the factories were unable to meet their current 
maturing obligations. To overcome this liquidity problem, the factories used to sell their 
products in advance to traders, so that they can finance their operations. A fourth
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contributory factor to the poor performance of the industry is its inept management, namely 
the poor financial management systems, as illustrated by the absence of any effort to collect 
accounts receivables, the backlog in accounts, and failure to follow up tax assessments and 
recover refunds due. For example, the two factories have taxes over-paid in an amount of 
£s 80,000 ($229,600) since 1978. The Taxation Department did not make the refunding, 
because "no claims were made by the factories" argued a senior tax official. Fifth, the selling 
prices which were fixed by the Pricing and Costing Unit of the Ministry of Industry with a 
10 percent profit margin on "allowable costs", were considered unrealistic by management. 
The care-taker management bitterly argued that "although input prices have pushed up 
dramatically during the 1980s, and were virtually not available at the official prices, revision 
of prices was not granted on time, or not granted at all". Other factors common to all 
enterprises, public and private, include the frequent power failures, shortages of fuel, and 
the inadequate transportation and telecommunication services (see chapter 7).
6.1.5 Efforts to Improve Performance
During the 1980s, a number of studies were carried out to investigate the operations 
of the factories, but no action was ever taken. For example, in 1980, a government 
committee investigated the operations of the two factories and recommended a capital 
injection of £s 995,790 ($2,489,475). The idea was to rehabilitate the plants so that they 
could operate at reasonable levels of capacity. However, due to lack of finance, the 
recommendation was never implemented. A second study conducted by the Industrial 
Research and Consultancy Centre and the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO) in 1983, suggested the rehabilitation of the Kirikab factory at a cost 
of $0.4 million, and injection of capital in an amount of £s 3.37 million. But, due to the huge 
investment required, the recommendation was not implemented. A third study carried out by 
the Industrial Research and Consultancy Centre in 1985, concluded that the factories were 
over-burdened with debts, over-staffed and poorly managed. In effect, the study proposed
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two solutions: one, the state should provide the necessary financial support that enables the 
factories to operate efficiently. Alternatively, the state should consider selling the factories 
to interested investors. Soon after, however, the factories were closed down, and a decision 
taken to privatise the industry.
Consequently, a study team assissted by a World Bank adviser was formed to 
investigate the financial and technical conditions of the two factories, and to suggest an 
appropriate privatisation mechanism. After careful investigation, the study team proposed the 
following privatisation techniques: (1) Selling the factories as going concern to interested 
investors. (2) Encouraging the work force to form a cooperative and acquire the factories. 
To implement this course of action, the study recommended that the government should 
consider providing soft (deterred) terms of payment, extend concessions regarding the 
allocation of foreign exchange that enables buyers to rehabilitate the industry, fix realistic 
selling prices, and supply the factories with sufficient sugar. (3) Liquidate the factories and 
sell their assets, through open auction or competitive bidding. (4) Lease the factories with 
an option to buy at the end of an agreed period. (5) Close the factories, use their buildings 
as warehouses, and consider selling the assets in due course.
Following this investigation and the comprehensive recommendations presented, the 
Council of Ministers decided to adopt the first option, selling the factories as going concern, 
and the Minister of Industry was mandated to implement the decision. In effect, the Minister 
of Industry addressed the Industrial Research and Consultancy Centre to carry out the 
valuation process, the Auditor General to certify the accounts, and the Civil Service Chamber 
to assess the staff benefits. The overall responsibility for the management of privatisation was 
assigned to ad hoc committee, chaired by an official from the Ministry of Industry, and 
representatives of the MFEP, the Auditor General, and the Attorney General.
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6.1.6 Valuation
In 1979, a committee composed of civil servants valued the two factories at £s 5 
million. Although, the factories grew more older, without any major repairs, and that the 
factories were incurring persistent losses, the Industrial Research and Consultancy Centre 
valued the factories at £s 23 million in 1987, a large portion of which was assigned to the 
fixed assets, namely land and buildings. The two factories were established over a huge tract 
of land, and had some good buildings, in a highly demanded area. Indeed, the head of the 
team that carried out the valuation asserted that "our valuation was based solely on the 
current market value of land, and the rent rates of warehouses in that area". Nevertheless, 
the valuation appears to be over-estimated, as the subsequent bids showed (see below).
6.1.7 Accounts
As we shall see in chapter 7, the accounts of almost all PEs in the Sudan are years 
behind, and the sweet industry is no exception. Indeed, both factories have not been audited 
since 1978/79. The Assistant Auditor General for corporations argued that "we found the 
accounts of both factories have not been closed since 1981/82. Therefore, we started by 
making up the accounts for all subsequent years. Moreover, a lot of primary documents were 
missing, and we had to rely on unofficial documents and verbal statements by management. 
Therefore, we issued qualified audit reports indicating that, these accounts do not represent 
a true and fair view of the financial position of the factories". Indeed, the "care-taker" 
management refused to affirm these financial statements, though they agreed, in general, with 
the audit findings. They pointed out that, in view of the fact that we were unable to obtain 
receipts for the actual input prices paid, it is difficult to ascertain these statements1.
For accounting purposes, they used to record the official input 




Although the Civil Service Chamber submitted its final report in May, 1987, no 
decision regarding employment was taken until October, 1989, by the incoming military 
government. The total severance payments amounted to £s 597,658, and the state assumed 
the liabilities of both factories, in an amount of £s 7.6 million.
6.1.9 The Privatisation Scenario
Following the finalisation of the above preparatory measures, but before laying-off 
the staff, the privatisation committee issued on March 16, 1988, advertisements in local 
newspapers inviting investors to submit their bids. The bidding process was closed a month 
later. However, the highest bid received was around £s 6 million, and hence it was decided 
to reopen the bidding process. But, the bids were again less than £s 6 million, and the 
privatisation committee came to the conclusion that selling the factories as going concern was 
inappropriate. Therefore, it was decided to effect privatisation through open auction.
Nevertheless, until August, 1990, when the data collection for this thesis was 
completed, both factories were still under public ownership, though all the work force were 
retrenched. Hie officials interviewed indicated that the privatisation committee is no longer 
functioning, as a new ministerial committee has been created to oversee the privatisation 
process. It worth noting that, the Public Enterprise and Economic Management Project (see 
chapter 11) envisaged that the industries should be privatised by October, 1988.
6.2 The Overall privatisation Plan
Based on the recommendations of a National Economic Conference arranged by the 
incoming military government in October, 1989, a ’’Three Year Economic Salvation Plan" 
(1990-93) was announced in mid 1990, in which wholesale privatisation was adopted. In what 
follows, we will outline the main features of the Economic Salvation Plan, with special
98
emphasis on privatisation and its related agenda. However, it must be stressed at this stage 
that, we will outline the Plan in a descriptive form. The analysis and discussion of the main 
constraints to privatisation in the Sudan will be the focus of later chapters.
6.2.1 The General Goals of the Plan
The official document cited the following major objectives of the Economic Salvation
Plan:
(1) Revitalisation o f the Sudanese economy by redirecting the economic activities 
towards production.
(2) Optimum utilisation o f available local resources, and encouraging interested 
investors (local and foreign) to participate.
(3) Ensuring that the revitalisation o f the economy shall not be sought at the expense 
o f the low-income group, and hence create social imbalances.
6.2.2 Means to achieve the goals
The following means were cited to achieve the above broad goals
(a) concentration on agricultural development.
(b) -Liberalisation o f exports through removal o f export licences and replacing 
it by "export contracts" so as to ascertain the quantity and 
value o f exports. Exporters shall be allowed to retain 40% o f foreign exchange 
generated, which shall be used fo r the importation o f the following inputs, in 
accordance with the prevailing import policies.
- Agricultural inputs,
- Industrial inputs,
- Spare parts fo r the transport sector.
- Building materials.
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(c) elimination o f all administrative, economic, and legal investment obstacles to 
enable investors and businessmen at home and abroad to take an active part. 
These include:-
- deregulation o f all economic activities, with the exception o f the 
mining sector.
- privatisation o f PEs through sale (in fu ll or part), liquidation, leasing 
or any other mechanism deemed relevant.
- introducing radical changes in all the rules governing the economic 
activities, such as taxation, custom and excise duties, and labour 
policies to facilitate the direction o f resources towards production 
and development.
- initiating amendments in the structure and operations o f the financial 
institutions.
- immediate liberalisation o f exports, and gradual liberalisation o f 
prices.
(d) establishment o f a comprehensive social security system to enable low-income 
group (inside and outside the civil service) to meet the effects o f price rises,
- which are expected to follow the structural adjustment measures.
6.2.3 Ancillary Arrangements
(i) Investment Climate
To promote investment, the programme envisaged the followings: 
a- review all investment regulations in the country, 
b- payment o f "critical" debts that might affect the existing development 
projects, or otherwise exerting more effort to reschedule these debts.
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c- establishment o f a *national fund’ in an initial amount o f £s 100 million, to 
attract competent Sudanese staff working abroad, and amendment o f labour 
policies fo r that purpose, 
d- declaration and application o f additional incentive package to promote 
agricultural and industrial investment. These incentives shall 
include :
- tax exemption on the first 15% o f profits fo r a minimum 
period o f 10 years;
- exemption o f imported inputs and equipment from custom 
duties,
- allowing investors to open a foreign exchange account at 
home, to be supplied by the amounts retained from exports, 
fo r the importation o f inputs,
- provision o f free land,
- allowing the use o f foreign experts in accordance with the 
agreement with each investor.
e- establishment o f a fund in an amount o f £s one billion to finance 
-  agricultural and animal production investments undertaken by national 
investors.
f-  establishment o f a fund in initial amount o f £s 100 million, to finance small 
scale industries.
g- exemption o f all funds provided by the commercial banks to agricultural 
and industrial projects from the ceilings imposed by the central bank.
(ii) Fiscal Policies
Regarding the fiscal policies, the programme - among a lengthy list - 
envisaged the followings:-
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a- removal o f price subsidies through the use o f dual 
pricing with a view o f gradual liberalisation o f prices. The dual 
pricing means a subsidised price fo r a certain quota, and another 
higher price fo r any amount in excess o f that quota. For instance, 
the following quota and dual prices were declared fo r fuel and 
sugar. Each car is entitled fo r  four gallons a week at £s 12.5 ($1) 
a gallon, and each family member fo r 2 lb o f sugar a week at £s 3 
($0.25) per lb. Any amount in excess o f these quotas, shall be 
obtained at £s 30 ($2.5) a gallon, or £s 20 ($1.65) per lb o f sugar, 
b- reduction o f chapter one expenses (salaries and wages), through 
retrenchment o f surplus staff, and establishment o f a rationalisation 
fund fo r that purpose, 
c- encouragement o f the banking systems to provide reasonable rates 
o f return on deposits so as to mobilise public savings fo r investment 
purposes.
(iii) Monetary Policies
-The programme envisaged the followings :
a- stabilisation o f the exchange rate system fo r "a reasonable period". 
b- establishment o f a stock exchange market, 
c- Islamisation o f the banking systems.
d- privatisation o f the commercial banks, starting immediately with the 
"Sudan Commercial Bank".
(iv) Public Corporations and Companies
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Regarding the public enterprises, the economic plan (1990-1993) envisaged the 
privatisation of the following enterprises, through sale (in full or part), liquidation, or any 
other mechanism deemed relevant by the privatisation committee.
(-) Agricultural Enterprises
- The Blue Nile Agricultural Corporation.
- The White Nile Agricultural Corporation.
- Nuba Mountains Agricultural Corporation.
- Northern Agricultural Corporation.
- Tokar Agricultural Corporation.
(-) Industrial Enterprises
- All Textile and Weaving industries (12).
- All Food companies (7).
- All Tanneries (4).
(Figures in brackets indicate the number o f enterprises).
(-) Hotels and Tourism Corporations
- All hotels and guest houses owned by the state.
- Government equity in joint venture hotels.
- Any other tourism corporation owned by the state.
(-) The Transport, Commerce and Energy Sectors
- Conversion o f both the Sudan Airways and Sudan Shipping lines into joint ventures, 
with the state participating by the existing assets in both companies.
- deregulation o f :
- Post and Telegram services.
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- Telecommunication systems.
- Air ; sea and river transport.
- Electricity generation.
- Sale or liquidation o f all loss making trading enterprises.
Finally, in order to minimise the side effects of the programme (e.g. the general price 
rise that are expected to follow), the plan envisaged the establishment of a "social eguity 
fund”, in an initial amount of £s one billion. The objectives of this fund" shall be to provide 
assistance for the low-income group-inside and outside the government domain - who are 
expected to suffer most".
6.2.4 Actions Taken
Following the announcement of the Three-Year Economic Salvation Plan in mid-1990, 
the authorities established a series of committees to prepare for the implementation of the 
Plan. First, the Minister for cabinet Affairs - an army officer leading a campaign to 
"revolutionise" the civil service - formed the following committees. One, a committee to 
provide specific definition for PEs and to classify them into strategic/non-strategic units. A 
second committee to clarify the objectives of public corporations and companies, and to 
design a performance evaluation system for each. A third committee to review existing PE 
regulations and rules. A fourth committee to investigate management practices, the basis of 
selection, and to review existing organisational structures with a view of establishing an 
effective balance between autonomy and accountability. All the four committees were 
composed of civil servants representing concerned ministries, and army officers from the 
Military Economic Board.
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Second, before these committees started work, the Minister of Finance - a man who 
spent all his career in the private sector, notably the Islamic banks - issued a ministerial 
decree number 63, dated June 24, 1990, which reads as follows
"To achieve the objectives o f the three-year Plan and pave the way for its 
implementation, we decided to form the following committees, which shall be 
coordinated by the Undersecretary For Finance ",
ONE : Social equality Fund Committee to
- Secure finance for the fund.
- define beneficiaries.
- suggest ways of distributing funds made available, ways of retraining 
retrenched staff, and ways of managing the fund.
TWO : Investment Guarantee Fund Committee to
- Secure finance for the fund.
- define beneficiaries.
- define the relationship between the fund and the commercial banks.
- establish administrative and legal regulations to avoid exploitation by the 
- ‘opportunists’.
THIRD : Monetary Policies Committee to
- suggest ways of controlling monetary supply and ways of Islamisation of 
financial institutions.
- review the existing banking system regulations.
FOURTH : Private and Public Enterprises debts committee to:-
- ascertain the size of these debts to the banking systems
- ways of clearing these debts.
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FIFTH : A committee to:-
review the existing investment codes, and to suggest ways of ratifying these 
codes to promote investment.
SIXTH : Pricing Policies Committee to:
review the existing price mechanism, legislation, administrative units, and to 
propose a timetable for price liberalisation for both locally produced and 
imported goods.
SEVENTH : Public Corporations Committee to
- suggest a detailed privatisation programme for 1990/91 (i.e. the privatisation 
candidates, privatisation mechanism, etc).
- privatisation management and ways of promoting the privatisation 
programme at home and abroad (especially among the Sudanese working 
abroad).
- prepare detailed studies on enterprises selected for privatisation during the 
fiscal year 1990/91.
These various committees were composed of civil servants, academicians, 
businessmen, and local private consultants. Although the ministerial decree stipulated a four- 
week period for the committees to submit their final reports, we found that no major progress 
was made in any of the above listed tasks. The chairman of the public corporations 
committee - a local private consultant - argued that "this is a very demanding assignment for 
which one month is not sufficient even for data collection". Similarly, the chairman of the 
committee charged to sort out PE’s debts - an academician - stated that "due to lack of 
reliable data in one place, we expect this task to take at least three months of hard work by 
a dedicated, full time staff; while all the members of our committee are part-timers, 
participating on voluntary basis". "So far (August, 10, 1990) we met three times, and have 
just started the data collection", he added. Other committees barely started in mid-July, and
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were not expected to meet the deadline by any means. Little has happened since August, 
1990, perhaps due to the fact that the country is facing severe shortages of food supply, and 
a civil war, which must have affected the pace.
Authorisation and Management of Privatisation
To facilitate the implementation of the privatisation plan, "the Revolutionary 
Command Council" issued a decree authorising the privatisation of all enterprises listed in 
the three-year plan. The decree further established a permanent, inter-ministerial committee 
to supervise the implementation process. The committee is chaired by the Minister of 
Finance, and includes the Auditor General, the Attorney General, the concerned ministers, 
and the chairman of the Supreme Authority for Investment (ministerial status). The latter was 
assigned the coordination fimction, as well as the responsibility for finalising the sale, viz: 
negotiating the price and signing the legal sales documents.
The ministerial committee is assisted by a higher technical committee to perform the 
following tasks : ascertaining the number of PEs; the government equity in each; size of staff 
and the required severance payments; valuation of assets and liabilities; preparation of sales 
brochure; suggestion of the appropriate privatisation mechanism, analysis and evaluation of 
offers; and preparation of recommendations there of. The higher technical committee in turn 
is assisted by a number of sub-committees, each specialising in a sector and sub-sector (e.g. 
a sub-committee for industry and various committees within the industrial sector, i.e. food, 
leather and textile.)


















All PEs selected for privatisation come under the direct control of the privatisation 
committee. In what follows, we shall comment briefly on the above privatisation plan, 
leaving the main analysis and discussion to later chapters.
First, due to economic and practical factors, it would be difficult to privatise all these 
PEs in such a short time period. The point is that, the internal capital market is unlikely to 
absorb all these PEs. Foreign investment, on the other hand, is unlikely to come in, because 
the business environment is highly distorted, and the political system unstable(see chapter 
12). Second, despite the fact that privatisation is a new and a very complicated policy, and 
that technical expertise is in short supply in the internal market, the use of foreign advisers 
was firmly rejected. The Minister in charge of implementation argued that "we believe, 
there are sufficient and competent national experts to carry out the plan, and more important 
we want to make it a Sudanese endeavour in all respects". As a result, the authorities 
resorted to civil servants and local private consultants, who are participating on voluntary
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basis. Nevertheless, it appears that the authorities are very keen to privatise as urgent as 
possible. For example, the privatisation plan was announced in mid-1990 to be completed 
in 1993, and the committees preparing for privatisation were given just four weeks to submit 
their reports. This is unrealistic, not least because basic data about the number of PEs, the 
size of staff, and the financial and technical conditions of PEs is not known with any degree 
of accuracy.
Third, there were no clear, transparent privatisation rules developed to govern 
valuation, selection of buyers and other implementation issues, so as to reduce the chances 
for irregularities. This is a serious defect, given the fact that private sales are likely to be the 
main privatisation mechanism, due to the thinness of the financial market. Thus, as 
Vuylsteke (1988) argues "individual sales should be subject to clear minimum standards that 
ensure orderly disposition, maximum return to the state, a fair process for the general public, 
and assurance that the purchaser is qualified to run the enteiprise productively". Fourth, the 
fact that the privatisation plan was formulated and announced in some haste (just 9 months 
after the government assumed power via a military coup), meant that the policy was not 
exposed to consultation and debate with interested parties, such as labour unions, political 
parties and the general public. It is true that such a democratic process is time-consuming, 
and might allow opposition to become more focal. But it is equally true that, the lack of this 
democratic process and transparency could lead to serious irregularities, and possibly 
renationalisation by a future government.
Finally, it seems that there is a confusion between the various government units 
involved. For example, although a cabinet-level committee was established to oversee the 
implementation process, the Minister for Cabinet Affairs - an army officer - is establishing 
his own committees. Moreover, we found that sectoral ministries, notably the Ministry of 
Industry, are not at all happy about the organisational arrangement made, and insist that they
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are the appropriate body to privatise their PEs. Indeed, only a few weeks before the 
privatisation programme was announced, the Minister of Industry issued an advertisement 
in local newspapers offering to sell six industrial PEs, and inviting investors to submit their 
bids. Needless to say, the persistence of this situation damages the credibility of the 
programme, and leads to confusion, overlapping and frustration.
6.3 Lessons from experience
In this final section, we shall outline some of the emerging lessons from the Sudanese 
experience and the experience in other DCs. Our primary objective is to find out the major 
constraints to privatisation in DCs, and their implications on the recent privatisation plan in 
the Sudan. To start with, it is evident that, privatisation has been on the agenda since the 
early 1980s, but no major progress has been made. This is largely consistent with the 
experience in most DCs, such as Brazil, Morocco, Nigeria, Turkey, The Philippines, and 
Senegal (Kapstein, 1988; Kikeri, 1990; Callaghy and Wilson, 1988; Leeds, 1988; 
Haggard, 1988; Galal, 1990). Indeed, Berg and Shirley (1987) found that, apart from 
Bangladesh and Chile, very few denationalisations have been implemented in DCs (less than 
20). Even liquidations, leases and management contracts, which require no ownership 
transfer, have-been scarce. Although things might have changed since then, it is evident that 
the privatisation policy has been progressing very slowly in DCs. As in most other DCs, the 
impetus to privatisation has been a combination of economic factors and mounting pressures 
by the World Bank and other international creditors to implement fundamental economic 
reforms. Indeed, in 1987, the World Bank initiated a Public Enterprise and Economic 
Management Project, aimed primarily at reducing the number of PEs (see chapter 11).
The major privatisation constraints in DCs have been a combination of political, 
economic, and technical factors. The political constraints to the policy include the 
political/ideological opponents, the parties who have a vested interest to maintain the status
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quo (e.g. workers, bureaucrats, etc), the role of foreigners and the ethnic minorities, and the 
impact of privatisation on jobs, consumer prices and regional development. These political 
obstacles, in turn, had influenced the initial decision to embark upon privatisation, what and 
how to privatise. As Kikeri (1990) argues " Senegal, Morocco and Ghana are examples 
where ideological and socio-political factors, and the reluctance to privatise firms which 
generate revenues for the government, affected the choice of initial candidates and delayed 
implementation".
The point is that, the well-organised interest group have managed to paralyse the 
privatisation process in most DCs. First, there is the political opponents who oppose the 
policy on the grounds that, a market economy - a prerequisite for the success of privatisation 
- would lead to serious unemployment problems, higher consumer prices, and unemployment 
problems, and social imbalances. These concerns, in turn, have influenced the scope and 
pace for privatisation, and created political tensions and fragmentation. Indeed, the evidence 
from Turkey, The Philippines and Nigeria indicates that even ideologically - committed 
governments have been reluctant to move ahead on the privatisation front, solely because of 
its socio-political consequences (Leeds, 1988; Callaghy and Wilson, 1988; Haggard, 1988). 
Second, the military, who often oppose the policy on security grounds, though their real 
concerns is that they stand to lose material interests by the advent of privatisation. The 
support of the military, however, is critical in DCs, simply because they could arrange a 
military coup and seize power. A third interest group is the civil service who are also 
potential losers, and have been active opponents in a number of DCs (Heald, 1990; Bienen 
and Waterbury, 1989; Leeds, 1988; Haggard, 1988). The fourth and most important 
opponents have been the trade unions and PE managers, who are expected to lose their jobs. 
Essentially, drastic labour lay-offs have to be made prior to privatisation, so as to attract 
prospective buyers. Indeed, the available evidence indicates that, this single preparatory 
activity has caused serious concerns to policy makers in DCs, because they lack the income
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support systems of industrial countries, and lack funds to provide generous retirement 
benefits to retrenched staff. Moreover, the fact that privatisation has been initiated at a time 
when the economy is declining, meant that job prospects are bleak. Likewise, the very basic 
idea of exposing management to the disciplines of the market forces has often been opposed 
by the management concerned. As Kay and Thompson (1986) argue, "If this were so, then 
it would be expected that the prospects of privatisation would be distinctly unwelcome to the 
management concerned". Indeed, the evidence from the UK indicates that, the management 
of some enterprises (the Gas, Telecom and Airports), have shaped the way their organisations 
were privatised (Kay, 1987; Yarrow, 1989). Nevertheless, experience shows that, the 
employment problem has been the single most limiting constraint to privatisation in DCs 
(Vuylsteke, 1988; Cowan, 1990).
Indeed, this is exactly what happened in the Sudan, regarding the implementation of 
the early privatisation initiatives. Fears of the consequences of privatisation on employment 
have deterred the previous democratic government (1986-89) from taking any action 
regarding the staff of the sweet factories, though they were closed down in 1986. Indeed, that 
government had also paid the staff salaries of private firms, such as "the Gulf Textile 
company". This is a private concern, which ceased operations in mid-1986, basically due to 
financial difficulties. However, for socio-political considerations, the government paid the 
staff salaries for more than three years, at a cost of £s 30 million per year (a decision was 
taken in May, 1990, to terminate the services of staff and close the factories).
Under the present military government, however, all political parties and trade unions 
are banned, which enabled the government to terminate the employment staff of both sweet 
factories and the private textile company. Indeed, the absence of political opponents has made 
the decision to embark on privatisation quite easy and quick, which might have not been the 
case had political parties been active. However, lack of consultation and discussion with
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political parties and worker’s unions could have a detrimental impact in the long run. For 
example, a future government might renationalise these industries, and if investors are 
uncertain, they will be reluctant to participate, thereby reducing the number of buyers. 
Nevertheless, unlike the situation in most DCs, so far the political constraints have been 
insignificant in the Sudan.
The economic constraints to privatisation centre around the lack of capital in most 
DCs, not only to acquire PEs, but also to finance the transaction costs, such as advisers and 
advertising expenses, the benefits to laid-off workers, and the cost of preparing PEs for sale. 
The point is that, the financial markets in most DCs are under-developed, poorly regulated, 
the confidence in the financial system is rather weak, and foreigners and local minorities may 
be ruled out on political grounds (Heald, 1990; Kirkpatrick, 1988; Callaghy and Wilson,
1988). As we shall see in chapter 12, the capital market in the Sudan is too thin, interest 
rates are negative in real terms hindering the mobilisation of public savings, and inflation 
rates are above the 100 percent level making it unrewarding to lend. Indeed, the absence of 
a well-functioning capital market, the low-level of income and education, and the absence 
of accounting standards have rendered a public offering almost entirely irrelevant. Moreover, 
management/employee buy-out in the form of "cooperatives", suggested a number of 
concessions to be granted, such as deterred payment and special treatment regarding foreign 
exchange allocation, sugar quotas and favourable prices. Such concessions, however, are 
likely to be costly, and might induce other investors to demand the same treatment. More 
important, concessions in the form of protection from imports and access to state financing, 
defeat the very basic idea of privatisation, i.e. efficiency via increased competition.
The flow of foreign capital is likely to be minimal, not least because the business 
environment is highly distorted and the political system unstable (see chapter 12). Likewise, 
the use of debt: equity swaps as a means of accelerating the flow of foreign investment into
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the Sudan is unlikely to be a feasible alternative. This mechanism, designed basically to solve 
the debt problem of DCs, works as follows. First, a creditor sells his loans to a private 
investor at a discount. Second, the buyer presents the debt certificate to the central bank of 
the country concerned to be redeemed in local currency at the prevailing exchange rate. 
Third, using the local currency, the buyer could acquire equity in the privatised PEs 
(Blackwell and Nocera, 1988). The method has the following main advantages. It allows the 
creditor to get rid of the problematic debts, and it enables the debtor to reduce his foreign 
obligations and restore his creditworthiness. The buyer, on the other hand, would be able to 
obtain local currency at a cheaper rate, due to the discount offered. However, it suffers from 
serious technical difficulties. First, it is technically difficult to determine the appropriate 
exchange rate to redeem the debt. In the Sudan, there are two exchange rates : the official 
rate set by the state and the black market rate, which is way ahead of the former. Second, 
the technique requires a favourable business environment, a stable political and legal system, 
and a developed private sector, all of which are absent in the Sudan. Third, to be eligible for 
the conversion, the external debt must be owed to commercial banks, rather than 
governments (Blackwell and Nocera, 1988). However, around 90 percent of the Sudan’s 
foreign debt is owed to international organisations and foreign governments (Bank of Sudan 
Report, 1988). Fourth, if the country financed the swap through the banking systems, it 
could lead to serious crowding-out effects and more pressures on the financial market. In 
summary, the lack of capital in the Sudan is a serious threat to the government privatisation 
programme, which is consistent with the experience in most DCs.
The technical constraints to privatisation in the Sudan and other DCs are mainly the 
lack of experts to formulate a viable privatisation plan, and to help in its implementation. 
Privatisation essentially requires adequate, time-consuming preparations by highly qualified 
institutions, such as merchant banks, law and accounting firms, and technical experts in the 
nature of the PE to be sold, which are not available in the local market. Indeed, as Kikeri
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(1990) argues "The recent experience indicates that the design and implementation of 
divestiture have been more complex and time-consuming than anticipated, and that the 
efficiency and fiscal gains potentially arising from such reform have not been fully realised, 
due to a combination of practical and contextual factors".
As regards valuation, for example, failure to sell the sweet factories was attributed, 
in part, to the high price set by the bureaucrats. The Sudanese have resorted to the 
inexperienced civil servants and local consultants to implement the master privatisation plan, 
partly due to lack of foreign exchange to pay for the foreign advisers. However, as Cowan 
(1990) argues "Civil servants when faced with the complexities of privatisation often tend 
to delay the work indefinitely, rather than admit their ignorance". More important, a civil 
servant appointed by virtue of position might not be committed to the policy, leading to 
considerable delays, which would affect future privatisations. Indeed, failure to privatise the 
sweet factories was cited by a number of interviewees as evidence that the current 
privatisation plan is bound to fail.
The major similarities and differences with the experience in other DCs include the 
followings. The management of the recent privatisation plan was assigned to a high level 
ministerial committee, which is consistent with the experience in most DCs, such as Brazil, 
Malaysia, Senegal, and the Philippines (Vuylsteke, 1988; Cowan, 1990; Kikeri, 1990). 
Unlike the experience elsewhere, however, no privatisation rules were developed, the use of 
external advisers was rejected, no adequate preparations were made prior to embarking upon 
privatisation, and consultation with other parties involved was sacrificed to speed up the 
implementation process. But, unlike the situation in most African countries, no local residents 
were excluded as "unacceptable" buyers, and it appears that foreign participation is highly 
welcomed. This is illustrated by the fact that, a few weeks before announcing the policy, a
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conference was arranged in Khartoum to assess the investment climate, in the course of 
which foreign investors were invited (see chapter 5).
In summary, regardless of the economic appeal of the policy, implementation 
has faced increasing difficulties in DCs and the gap between plans and actual privatisation 
remained very wide. As Pfeffermann (1988) argues "The reality of privatisation, according 
to empirical data, is far less impressive than the rhetoric would suggest". And the Sudan is 
no exception. Although privatisation was contemplated a decade ago, no major progress was 
made. Needless to say, the persistence of this state of affairs (lack of action) would undoubtly 
create chaos, confusion, uncertainty, and possibly policy reversal. The Sudan shares with 
other DCs the economic and technical constraints to privatisation. However, the political 
constraints found in so many DCs, have been insignificant, solely due to the absence of 
political parties and trade unions, which were banned in mid-1989 by the present military 
regime. This lack of consensus, however is a serious deficiency, because the policy might 





The case study approach was followed to investigate the structure, performance, and 
major problems of PEs in the Sudan. The enterprises selected for the study included public 
corporations organised under 1976 Act and private limited companies under the 1925 Act. 
These were:




Gezira Scheme Public Corporation Agriculture







Sudan Airways Company Transport
The selection was based on:
(.) sector of activity and strategic importance,
(.) contribution to national economy,
(.) size,
(.) possibility for privatisation.
In addition, two private enterprises were also visited, primarily to identify the main 
problems of the private sector, and to assess the business environment in the Sudan. The 
main research methods used for data collection were interviews with senior management of
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the above enterprises, the officials in the sectoral ministries, the MFEP, the Bank of Sudan, 
and the Auditor General1. Another, research method used to supplement the interviews were 
the audited financial statements whenever possible.
Case I: The Sudan Telecommunication Public Corporation (STPC)
In 1978, the Department of Telecommunications, Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, was converted into a public corporation, under the Public Corporation 
Act, 1976, and named "Sudan Telecommunications Public Corporation"(STPC). The range 
of services to be provided by the STPC as per its "Warrant of Establishment" include:
(1) Telephone and Telex services,
(2) supply of communication equipment,
(3) lease lines for commercial and government subscribers.
The following key figures, taken from the corporation’s budget for 1988/89, indicate 
the magnitude of its operations (no actual reliable data are available):
Revenues £s 37.9m
Expenses:
Chapter one: salaries and wages £s 37.9m
Chapter two: operations £s 38.4m
Chapter three: development £s 3.6m 79.9m
Net surplus £s 33.9m
Total number o f staff (estimated) : 8400
Number o f telephone lines (estimated) : 70800 
Number o f telex installed : 1380
1 A sample of Interviewing guidelines will be provided In the appendix.
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Institutional Environment
As per its "Warrant of Establishment", STPC has a monopoly position, though it is 
not free to set tariff levels. The government sets the tariffs based on subjective criteria, such 
as unit costs or the rate of inflation2. Indeed, as with all other public utilities, there is no 
regular price adjustment, and virtually no costing of services is undertaken upon which to 
set prices.
The corporation generates some $200,000 a month, but has a limited freedom of 
disposition. All its foreign earnings must be deposited with the Bank of Sudan, and 
reallocated according to the government priorities. Thus, an application must be filed to the 
Bank of Sudan for all its imported needs, and approval is subject to availability of foreign 
exchange and the government priorities. The financial manager - on secondment from the 
MFEP - asserted that the lack of foreign exchange has seriously hindered repair and 
maintenance, and that the corporation often faces a severe working capital problem, to the 
extent that at times it fails to pay its staff salaries. The latter, he claims, is attributed to the 
rigid unrealistic fares, subjective cuts in the annual budget, and inability to collect charges 
from government units.
Although the Public Corporations Act 1976, provided PEs with a considerable degree 
of operationaLautonomy, in reality all public corporations have a limited freedom over all 
operating decisions. The institutional framework within which STPC operates consist of the 
sectoral ministry, the MFEP, the board, and a host of other government agencies (see chart 
9.2). However, the lack of any medium or long term planning demonstrates clearly that the 
sectoral ministry has not been able to provide any strategic guidance. The board of directors 
-before being dissolved in mid 1989 - was composed of civil servants, with no clear terms 
of reference and insufficient remuneration (£sl00 a month, £5 at the official exchange rate). 
Indeed, there is no evidence that the board has protected the corporation against external
At present, a local telephone call costs about 3 pence a minute, at 
;he official exchange rate of £s!2/US$.
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influence. The General Manager is of the opinion that a full-time professional chairman 
should be appointed to provide support and strategic guidance.
As with all other cases, however, the influence of the MFEP is excessive, where all 
financing, purchasing and investment decisions must be approved by the MFEP. The civil 
service chamber - a department of the MFEP - sets the salary scales, creates posts, and 
decides on all promotion and remuneration policies. Moreover all disputes between unions 
and management are resolved by the central government. All public corporations organised 
under the 1976 Act, except the Sudan Railways, the Sudan Airways, and the National 
Electricity Corporation, use a common salary scale set by the government. Although the 
salary scales for public corporations are relatively better than those offered to the government 
employees, and that public corporations tend to provide better allowances, the personnel 
manager asserted that, the corporation has failed to retain its competent technicians, who 
have travelled abroad. Indeed, while salaries were increased by 130 percent in 1985, and 
100 percent in 1988, they failed to keep pace with the ever rising inflation rates and the 
continuous devaluations. The personnel manager reported that, the corporation has lost about 
70 percent of its skilled staff during the last decade.
Finally, due to the lack of foreign exchange in the economy, STPC relies heavily on 
external aid and foreign loans, However, the General Manager complained about the lack 
of coordination between donor agencies and the corporation. He explained that foreign loans 
and aid are negotiated at a higher level without consultation with the STPC. Yet, it must be 
stressed that, the corporation has no long term master plan that enables it to negotiate 
effectively with external parties, both at home and abroad.
Organisation and Management
The corporation is organised into functional and regional departments. However, 
there are serious deficiencies in a number of areas. In particular, the absence of clearly
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defined roles within the corporation and the absence of specific terms of reference for 
functional and regional managers, have led to overlapping of responsibilities. As we shall 
see later, this state of affairs is common in all other cases, and not unique to STPC. There 
is a long chain of command, and the information flows between regions and the headquarters 
in Khartoum are inadequate. The span of control of the General Manager is very large, with 
some twenty one functional and regional managers directly reporting to him (see chart 9.3). 
Given the fact that there are no terms of reference for these managers, meant that they have 
to consult the General Manager on all routine operating decisions. There is no post for a 
Deputy General Manager, which could reduce the General Manager’s span of control. The 
present number of regional managers (7), exceeds the needed level, considering the level of 
capacity utilisation (see below). The planning function is currently oriented towards technical 
planning, and does not extend to corporate or manpower planning. The General Manager 
is politically appointed, with no specific terms of reference or terms of office.
Our investigation also revealed that communication channels are generally irregular 
and informal. Functional managers asserted that they rarely meet, and team meetings with 
the General Manager occur primarily at the budget time. Similarly, interface between 
regional and functional managers is virtually non-existent, and middle management, we met, 
complained of being bypassed by senior management. Likewise, managers are not in a 
position to provide specific, target-related instructions to their subordinates, due to the 
complete lack of management information systems (see below). The total number of staff 
is around 8400 employees, which amounts to one employee per eight telephone lines 
connected, is rather very low. Moreover, the budgeted chapter one expenses (salaries and 
wages) are almost equal to the budgeted operating expenses, which is probably indicative of 
the overstaffing situation for a capital-intensive industry (in 1988 and after the budget was 
approved, salaries for the whole civil service were increased by 100%). As regards the 
quality of staff, deficiencies in most key areas exist, and in particular, grading is inconsistent 
with job contents. For example, the unsatisfactory promotion system in the civil service
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implies that school leavers could be promoted from a position of an unskilled worker to that 
of a technician, without any proper training.
The training function, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. The STPC has 
its own training institute. But, the training facilities are inadequate, training needs are not 
systematically identified, there is almost total absence of consultation between the training 
director and other directors, and the institute has failed to pay attention to the development 
of managerial and administrative skills.
Capacity Utilisation
At present, STPC is operating at less than 30% of its capacity, and there is a waiting 
list for telephone connections of 100,000 (STPC is not accepting any new applications since
1989). The General Manager indicated that the inland transmission network is heavily under­
utilised, due to various problems. It suffers from poor maintenance of equipment, and even 
transport for staff. The poor quality of services provided by STPC is best illustrated by the 
scarce statistics on faults, call completion rates, and waiting times. Indeed, due to its poor 
services, a number of organisations, including the Gezira Scheme, have established their own 
telephone networks, though the STPC has a monopoly position as per its Warrant of 
Establishments The General Manager attributed this state of affairs to the lack of foreign 
exchange and the migration of skilled, highly trained staff. As regards the international 
network, it was reported that the installation of Arabsat earth station has greatly enhanced 
calling capacity. However, we understood that STPC has not paid the rent for many years.
Long term planning in STPC virtually does not exist, and the corporation responds 
reactively to donor proposals. However, the unplanned, uncoordinated external assistance 
has resulted in a variety of technical systems within the network. The diversity of the 
systems, in turn, has resulted in multiple spare parts requirements, multiple training needs, 
and inefficiencies in the use of equipment. More important, the inadequacy of the
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transportation facilities has resulted in considerable delays in billing, collection, distribution 
of materials, operation and maintenance.
Performance Evaluation Systems
All PEs in the Sudan use the standardised government evaluation systems for staff 
appraisal, and are used only for staff promotion. There are three forms used: management 
staff, clerical staff and workers. The forms for the first two groups, require the appraiser 
to rate certain aspects of the staff performance by indicating in the appropriate box the scores 
achieved. For example, on the form for the management staff, knowledge of the relevant 
rules and regulations would score 7,5,4 or 2. The forms for workers, on the other hand, are 
merely descriptive, and do not involve allocating points. In reality, however, all employees 
are invariably found to be outstanding. The following table for a random sample of 89 forms 











90 - 100 34 38-20 38.20
79- 89 44 49-44 87.64
68- 78 10 11 -24 98.88
57- 67 1 1 - 12 100.00
46- 56 - -
belovr45 - -
Total 89 100
(1) These ranges are printed on the forms.
Source : STPC, Khartoum
Thus, all employees are found to be working at peak, and hence get promoted and 
receive their annual bonus. The rating system, however, is based on subjective judgement, 
lacks consistency in the completion of forms, and carried out by incompetent staff. The 
promotion decisions are often based on a formula, where 70 percent is given to performance, 
20 percent to qualifications, and 10 percent to seniority. However we also understood that
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this formula is not always adhered to, and at times seniority is given a heavier weight than 
performance.
Incentives
PEs have their own salary scales which are well above those offered for government units, 
and with adequate flexibility to provide for bonuses. However, the soaring inflation rates, 
devaluation and the lucrative job opportunities abroad, have made such payments 
uncompetitive. More important, they failed to bring about a significant turnaround in 
productivity, simply because the incentives are not linked to performance. And the STPC is 
no exception.
Bonus payment, though used quite extensively, it is based on subjective judgement, 
paid to all staff regardless of performance, and because it is calculated on the bases of 
budgeted net surplus, there is a reason to manipulate the accounts.
Indeed, when we suggested that the amounts paid out could be related to performance, 
all the personnel managers in all the cases disagreed. They pointed out, it would create 
labour unrest, and it is difficult to find a satisfactory system to measure performance. The 
latter reason may have an element of truth, but the former indicates that they do not want to 
create troubles, and keep the boat sailing. Such attitude, we shall increasingly argue, runs 
counter to the privatisation policy, which essentially requires drastic labour reduction prior 
to implementation. But, without the commitment of senior management, this preparatory 
activity would undoubtedly pose serious problems (see Chapter 3).
Accounting Systems
The corporation prepares its accounts on the basis of government accounting systems, 
defined as a system where revenue/expenses are recognised only when cash is received/paid. 
Thus, failure to use accrual basis of accounting, defined as a system where revenues/expenses 
are recognised when earned/incurred, regardless of whether cash is received/paid, means that
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the annual accounts are not prepared on sound commercial basis. As a result, management 
is not in a position to define the resources needed to replace worn out equipment, nor to 
assess the corporation’s ability to meet its current maturing obligations. Moreover, 
management is unable to negotiate effectively with external parties, including budget 
approval. Until February 1989, the corporation’s accounts were audited by the Auditor 
General Chamber. Since then, however, the Auditor General had mandated a local private 
auditing firm to certify the corporation’s accounts from 1982 to the present.
Thus, given adherence to the government accounting systems, STPC has never had 
to incorporate in its accounts a fixed assets amount. As a result, it has not kept a fixed asset 
registry, nor is it aware of the type and state of assets it possess. In a bid to establish a 
commercial accounts system, STPC formed a committee in 1988 to value its assets, chaired 
by the financial manager. But, it was reported that the work of the committee was contested 
by the board, because buildings and other assets shared with the postal services were 
excluded from the valuation. Therefore, the fact that the value of fixed assets is not known 
with any degree of accuracy resulted in an under-stated provision for deprecation. Indeed, 
the amount assigned to provision for depreciation in 1987/88 (not audited) was only £s 2.5 
million. Thus, apart from the fact that the under-stated depreciation would distort the Profit 
and Loss Account (Net surplus), and prices, it meant that STPC has not reserved sufficient 
funds to replace its assets, In effect, whenever an asset replacement is contemplated, the 
government financial backing will be sought. Moreover, the corporation’s records do not 
show loans contracted prior to 1983, even though the period between 1978 and 1983 
correspond to the period when 80% of its projects were carried out. It was reported that an 
agreement has been reached with MFEP not to hold the corporation accountable for these 
loans.
As we pointed out above, STPC has very little influence on the allocation of foreign 
loans or aid. It must accept what donors offer, regardless of its urgent needs. At present, 
STPC has six loans for rehabilitation purposes. USAID Loan of $5 million contracted in
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1983/84; Japanese Loan of $2 million contracted in 1984/85; Arab Fund Loan of KD 1.3 
million contracted in 1987/88; German Loan of DM 25 million contracted in 1987/88; World 
Bank Loan of $12.2 million contracted in 1988/89; and a Netherlands Loan of DFI5 million 
contracted in 1986/87.
The management information systems, on the other hand, are very limited, unreliable 
and irregular. Therefore, they are of little value for planning, controlling and decision 
making purposes. The financial manager attributed this state of affairs to the lack of 
qualified accountants. The corporation has no costing systems, and prepares its annual 
budget in accordance with the government budget format and timing (see chapter 9).In the 
end, the fact that the corporation’s accounts have not been audited since 1981 (not to mention 
price controls) makes any objective judgement of its financial position a difficult task, though 
its records for 1988/89 show a net surplus of £s33.9 million.
Financial Management Systems.
The poor quality of the accounting data inevitably leads to poor financial management 
systems. For example, STPC’s records showed accounts receivables in 1987/88 at £s53.7 
million, of which about 63% are due from other government units, notably the Sudan Rail, 
Civil Aviation Authority, General Petroleum Corporation, and the Post and Telegraph 
Corporation (whose relations with STPC still need to be clarified). However, we found no 
evidence that STPC has exerted any effort to collect these debts. Indeed, some accounts 
receivables were carried forward since 1978. The financial manager attributed this state of 
affairs to lack of vehicles, and inability of government units to pay. However, we found that 
there is no centralised office where billing data are collected, which makes the above figure 
is highly questionable. The accounts payable, on the other hand, amounted to £s75.3 
million, creating a working capital deficit of more than £s20 million. Nevertheless, the fact 
that there are no records of loans contracted prior to 1983, makes this figure also contestable. 
An internal auditor position exists within STPC. But, this position has never been filled, and 
we failed to establish a specific reason for that.
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Capital and Surplus Tax
STPC, as all other PEs, is required to pay 5 % on its operating capital at the start of 
each fiscal year. Its records show a total equity of £s50 million, of which £s40 million are 
termed as "operating capital", while the other £slO million is shown as "investment capital". 
This distinction originates from the fact that in 1978 when it was transformed into a public 
corporation, its physical assets were valued at £slO million, and the government made a cash 
payment of £s40 million. In effect, the capital tax is paid only on its operating capital. 
STPC, is also required to pay 15% of its net surplus to the Treasury, of which a fixed 
amount of £sl.5 million is paid in advance (i.e deducted from its budget).
All enterprise managers interviewed attributed the poor performance and low 
productivity to lack of autonomy and lack of inputs. The MFEP, on the other hand, blames 
the corporation and all other PEs for mismanagement and lack of accountability. But, we 
found no evidence of constructive dialogue between the two to remedy the situation. In 
effect, the disputes have proved to be never-ending, and more important unproductive.
Case 2: Gezira Scheme
In the Sudan, the agricultural sector is the single most important productive sector of 
the economy,, as it generates most of the country’s foreign earning. In the recent years, 
however, the returns to the economy from the agricultural sector have been much below its 
potential, due to poor production performance caused by lack of agricultural inputs, 
inadequate incentives, inadequate water delivery and distorted macro policy, particularly the 
exchange rate.
The Gezira Scheme, established by the British Administration in 1925, spreads over 
2.1 million feddans, and cultivates a number of crops, of which cotton is single most 
strategic crop, as most of the production is available for exports. In terms of administration, 
the scheme is divided into 107 blocks, each of which represents an accounting unit headed
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by an agricultural inspector. All the blocks maintain the same books of accounts, which 
would include: Cash Book, Day Book, General Ledger, Cash Receipt and Payment 
Vouchers, Stores Cards and Tenants Advance Book.
Traditionally, the scheme operated on a tenancy relationship between tenants, 
management and the government, often referred to as the "Joint Account System". However, 
the fact that this system does not reward good producers and in fact subsidised inefficient 
tenants, forced the government to change the production relations to an "Individual Account 
System", which was introduced in 1981/82. The system was mainly designed to provide 
adequate incentives for tenants to improve productivity, since rewards to tenants are directly 
related to output (i.e the tenants would receive their net proceeds in full). In addition, good 
producers normally receive wide publicity in the media. Under the new system, each tenant 
is personally responsible for all the production costs, and receives his net proceeds in full at 
a certain date, regardless of whether the crop was sold or not. Whereas under the old 
system, payment to tenants was effected after all the output was sold, which normally takes 
more than a year to be completed. This made the link between productivity and financial 
reward weak, and the real value of returns were eroded in the interim. Under the new 
system, the government receives an annual predetermined land and water rates, and acquires 
the whole output at a price set by a central committee.
The system works as follows: each tenant has a separate account wherein all advances 
made to finance agricultural operations and the tenant’s revenues are recorded. The scheme 
management borrows from the Bank of Sudan to provide the advances, on which 8% interest 
charges are levied. These advances are assumed to be self-liquidating, in the sense that they 
will be repaid at the end of the season. However, this has seldom been the case, and the 
accumulated debts to the Bank of Sudan at the end of 1988 were £sl.2 billion. Tenants 
whose expenses exceed their revenues due to low productivity, are personally debited for the 
difference, and carried forward to the following season. In addition, there are indications
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that once tenants become indebted to the scheme, they tend to collude with others not in debt 
and sell their output indirectly through them, rather than to the scheme, and thereby avoid 
having to repay the debts (see chapter 10). In 1985/86 when the scheme was last audited, 
tenants debts were £s471 million, showing an increase of £sl31 million from the year 
before(see below).
As it is, however, the new system suffers from a number of deficiencies, not least of 
which tenants have no control on how much cotton to be planted, which cotton variety to be 
planted, the selling price, the amount of fertilisers to be used, or the frequency of watering 
(i.e neither the cost structure not the selling price).
Organisation and Management
The scheme is organised as a public corporation, reporting directly to the Ministry 
of Agriculture. However, as all other public corporations, it is kept under a tight control, 
and the management has no autonomy over all the operating decisions. As all other PEs, 
salaries and wages are not related to productivity, and the personnel department has to 
observe all the civil service rules and regulations regarding promotion, creation of posts, etc. 
Finance is obtained from the MFEP after lengthy negotiations, the purchases have to follow 
the government purchasing procedures, and the annual budget is prepared in accordance with 
the government budget format and timing. Equally, the scheme, as all other PEs in the 
country, has no freedom to dispose of marginally-producing assets. Instead, an application 
must be filed to the "Disposition of Surplus Asset Department" of the MFEP, to arrange an 
auction for that purpose.
The Scheme Governor is appointed by the head of the state in consultation with the 
Minister of Agriculture, and there are no specific terms of office. By law, the Governor 
must hold a degree in agricultural sciences. Indeed, even his deputy is the agricultural 
manager. Moreover, at the block level, the agricultural inspector is the head of the unit,
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who must sign all cash receipts and payments, which hinders the smooth functioning of the 
accounting department. That is because, by the nature of his job, the agricultural inspector 
spends most of his time in the field, and is not available in his office to perform his 
administrative tasks. The Governor is supported by six main functional managers for 
agriculture, finance and administration, engineering, public relations, statistics, and internal 
auditing. Unlike all other cases, authority delegation throughout the scheme is quite 
adequate. Indeed, authority relations were established during the British Administration, and 
have remained as they are over the years.
Productivity
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, productivity decreased progressively, from 5 
kantars per feddan in 1972/73 to only 2.1 kantars per feddan in 1980/81. Following the 
introduction of the new system in 1981/82, however, productivity improved remarkably to 
an average of 4 kantars per feddan (see below). However, it is difficult to attribute this 
turnaround in productivity to the new system alone. During the last decade, the scheme was 
under a massive rehabilitation project through foreign loans, which made possible the flow 
of imported inputs on a regular basis. At present, however, as foreign capital dried up, the 
supply of physical inputs (fertilisers, pesticides, insecticides and jute sacks) became irregular, 
due to the lack of foreign exchange in the country. Indeed, the senior management 
interviewed indicated that they spend quite a considerable time in Khartoum chasing finance, 
rather than managing operations and focusing on improving productivity. Another area that 
works to the detriment of production relates to the delivery of water to tenants. Some of the 
problems with water supply require long term solutions, such as the raising of "Roseires 
Dam" to enhance the water flow from the Nile. Others relate to the removal of silt deposits 
and weed growth in the canals. At present, this task is performed by the "Earthmoving 
Branch Corporation" - a PE - and as all other PEs in the country, the corporation suffers 
from the lack of spare parts and obsolete equipment. Indeed, there is no reason why this 
activity was not contracted out to the private sector. Finally, water management is the
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responsibility of the Ministry of Irrigation, and the relationship between the scheme and the 
ministry has been uneven, ranging from a happy marriage to a complete divorce, due to lack 
of specific legislation to that effect. The scheme has a fleet of agricultural machinery to 
provide agricultural services (eg. deep ploughing), at subsidised rates.
Cost of Production
Production costs of cotton have increased progressively in recent years. They 
increased from £s233.88 per feddan in 1981/82 to £s834.93 per feddan in 1986/87. The 
costs of agricultural inputs (fertilisers, pesticides and insecticides) represent around 50% of 
the production costs. They increased from £sll7.13 per feddan in 1981/82 to £s396.9 in 
1986/87. Other cost items are: Land preparation operations, plantation, harvesting, land and 
water charges, transportation to ginneries, and interest charges.
Under the new system, management has no financial stake in the profitability of the 
scheme, and hence has no incentives to control cost. All sales revenues accrue to tenants 
after deducting the production costs. Indeed, the management main concern is to increase 
productivity so as to maximise the country’s foreign earnings, regardless off the cost 
incurred. Thus, as tenants have no say on the cost structure and no say on the selling prices, 
they tend to regard cotton as "the government crop", and hence exert more effort on other 
cash crops (wheat, groundnuts and vegetables) at the expense of cotton, the strategic crop. 
The ratio of tenants who failed to break even was 48% in 1987/88.
Administrative Expenses
Administrative expenses also increased in nominal terms from £s25.61 million in 
1981/82 to £s53.5 million in 1985/86, which resulted in losses for the scheme. However, 
as we shall see below, in the last two years for which audited accounts are available (1984/85 
and 1985/86), the scheme reported a net profit of £sl7.8 million, which reduced the 
accumulated losses to £sl6 million. The policy is to recover these expenses from the land
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and water rates. However, the collection of these rates has become a major problem for the 
scheme. For example, while the recovery of the rates in 1985/86 and 1986/87 averaged 
about 80% of the amount assessed, they covered only 65 % of the scheme costs. The MFEP 
officials argued that the rates are set too low, although they showed an upward trend over 
the years (see table 10.3). Nevertheless, increases in land and water rates are not a solution, 
since they would necessitate a corresponding increase in prices, which would add a burden 
on the Treasury. On the other hand, if prices were not increased to match the increase in 
costs, tenants might refuse to grow cotton. A long term solution is to try to cut 
administrative costs, (eg. through lay-offs). However, it should be noted that, the scheme 
is unable to collect land and water rates on other crops, which are directly sold by tenants. 
In effect, the rates on these crops are added to cotton costs and deducted from the cotton 
proceeds, which creates a distorted cotton costs.
The present pricing system, based on the cost plus principle, is in many years greater 
than the domestic equivalent of export proceeds, given the over-valued exchange rate (see 
chapter 12). Consequently, the state makes losses through the Sudan Cotton Company and
the seasonal advances made to finance agricultural operations. These advances are supposed
be
to^self-liquidating, but due to losses incurred by tenants and other illegal practices, collection 
proved to be difficult.
Financial Structure
The following tables summarise the financial structure and the operating results of the 
scheme in the years for which audited accounts are available.
From the tables below, the following observations could be made. First, the scheme 
relies heavily on external financing, which increased from £s910 million in 1984/85 to 
£sl277.8 million in 1985/86. This external financing is composed of foreign loans (£s48.7 





















1981 / 82 41.6 (5.3) 299.6 332.8 332.8 289.3
1982 / 83 41.8 (2.5) 388.0 405.4 405.4 350.7
1983 / 84 41.6 (0.9) 479.6 492.2 492.2 439.7
1984 / 85 41.8 (7.1) 910.0 929.3 929.3 873.6
1985 / 86 43.0 (10.7) 1227.8 1245.5 1245.5 1179.1
Source : Auditor General Report 1987/88
Table 7.3 









1981 / 82 3.87 25.71 20.39 78.5
1982 / 83 4.66 29.36 26.86 91.3
1983 / 84 4.92 38.31 37.41 125.8
1984 / 85 5.21 53.35 60.45 340.2
1985 / 86 3.60 47.72 58.42 471.2
*K: Kantar, F: Feddan
Source: Scheme Records
Second, chapter one expenses (salaries and wages) represent about 30% of total 
expenses, and almost 80% of operating expenses. The breakdown of administrative 
expenses is as follows:




Chapter m  
£s (m)
Total
1981/2 7.19 9.35 9.17 25.71
1982/3 7.14 10.59 11.63 29.26
1983/4 8.39 16.54 13.38 38.31
1984/5 9.06 13.62 14.00 36.63
1985/6 11.01 18.82 23.70 53.53
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The scheme employs around 20 000 staff, and it is difficult to say whether it is 
overstaffed or not, though the ratio of salaries to operating expenses appears to be high. 
However, it must be stated that the salaries and overhead expenses of agricultural inspectors 
are treated as administrative expenses rather than cost of production, and included in the 
scheme budget. Third, the current asset to current liabilities ratio is almost 1:1, but this does 
not mean that the scheme is able to meet its current maturing obligations, simply because a 
large amount of current assets is tied up in accounts receivables from tenants. The danger 
is that these debts might be written-off under union pressures and other political 
considerations. Finally, although the scheme has a comprehensive accounting system, an 
accounts manual, and sufficient number of book-keepers, its accounts are a number of years 
behind.
The arrears in accounts are largely caused by the centralised posting for all scheme 
transactions. The accounting data in the form of journal entries come to the Posting Office 
from all other accounting offices (stores, payments, tenants, general office). The Posting 
Office is supposed to post all the journal entries and produce a trial balance for the whole 
organisation. Our investigation revealed that this office represents the bottleneck of the 
accounting system. All journal entries coming to the Posting Office are first recorded in the 
Day Book. Accountants (around 26), each responsible for a ledger, compete for the Day 
Book, and those who fail have to stay idle until the Day Book is available. The fact that 
most journal entries are complex (affect more than one account), require a considerable time 
to post. Second, the flow of accounting data to the headquarters in delivered by vans on 
dusty, unpaved roads. Therefore any delays in delivery of data due to breakdown of vans 
or difficulties on roads, particularly during the rainy season, affects the smooth functioning 
of the accounting system3. Finally, the timing of budget preparation (April- June), coincides
3 In 1989, the scheme Introduced a telephone communication network 
covering the whole scheme, at a cost of $30 million, financed by Japanese 
Loan.
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with the preparation of tenants statements (payment of revenues), and hence overburden the 
accounting department. The scheme employs around 760 accountants, of whom only 56 have 
a university degree, while the others are school leavers with no background in accounting.
In June of each year, a group of 11 senior accountants perform the job of closing the 
accounts and preparing the annual financial statements: Balance Sheet, Production Account 
and the Administration Account. However, this job starts only when the whole posting is 
completed, which is years behind. Indeed, when we visited the scheme in May, 1990, they 
were posting the journal entries of 1987/88. In addition to extracting the final accounts, the 
team also has to allocate actual expenditures to various budget items, and then compare them 
with the budgeted items to calculate variances. However, since the accounts are years 
behind, the variances are not used for planning purposes.
Case HI: Duty Free Shops Corporation (DFSC)
DFSC was established in 1970 to serve the following markets/customers:
1. Conventional duty free goods.
2. The Sudanese working abroad (maihty household equipment/electrical 
appliances).
3. Residents (Sudanese/Expatriates).
DFSC conducts all its transactions in dollars. However, occasionally it has been 
requested by the government to sell certain scarcity goods, such as foodstuffs, in local 
currency. Among DFSC’s total trade volume for 1987, the most important product lines 
were: appliances (34.8%), foodstuffs (17.7%) and tobacco (13.3%). The main sales outlets 
are: Khartoum (3 shops), Port Sudan, Juba and Medani.
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Institutional Environment
The Coiporation’s Act provided that "in the discharge of its functions, the corporation 
shall be bound by such directives on questions of policy as may be given to it by the Minister 
having regard to public interest". In the past, DFSC has been supervised by the MFEP. In 
1989, however, that role was assigned to the Ministry of Commerce, Corporation and Supply 
(MCCS). But, the influence of the MFEP is still pervasive in a number of operating 
decisions. First is the remittance of revenues and taxes to the Treasury. In 1989, for 
example, the MFEP, presumably acting on information from the taxation department, wrote 
a letter to DFSC requesting payment of £s4.5 million capital tax for 1988.89, and some 
£s62.5 million defined as arrears in payment of the government’s share in profits for 
previous years. The capital tax, as for all other PEs, is 5 % on a capital account of £s0.5 
million. Therefore, the capital tax, management argued, should be £s25,000. As for the 
share in profits, they noted that the amount required by the MFEP is equal to the net profits 
of the corporation in five years. Therefore, they maintained that this figure is incorrect, and 
hence refused to pay.
The custom department - part of the "extended family" of the MFEP - determines the 
percentage of duties on imported items. Similarly, the civil service chamber, another 
department of the MFEP, decides the salary scales, creation of posts, and staff promotion. 
Other government departments able to influence its operations include the Attorney General, 
the Auditor General, Ministry of Works and Public Utilities and the Mechanical Transport 
Department.
The MCCS in addition to its supervisory role, also grant import licenses for the 
DFSC. The management acknowledges a relatively flexible and expedient processing of its 
applications by the officials in the Ministry of Commerce. However, this is only valid in 
comparison with the time-consuming, lengthy, painstaking procedures for which other PEs 
are exposed. For example, for all items previously imported by DFSC, import licensing
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must follow all the normal procedures (6 steps), and not automatic. Moreover, import 
licenses are valid for only three months, which pose another constraint, because it is often 
difficult to finalise a transaction within this period. Therefore, the renewal of the license 
must be obtained. However, the DFSC is an organisation which deals primarily in buying 
and selling on dollar basis, and hence the import licensing requirement-introduced due to lack 
of foreign exchange is irrelevant.
Organisation and Management
The corporation is organised on functional basis, and the organisation structure is 
quite reasonable, given its size and nature of activities. There is little overlapping of 
responsibilities between functional departments, though divisional managers have no clear 
terms of reference. Moreover, the post of commercial manager has been vacant for a year, 
resulting in an additional load to the General Manager. However, it must be stressed that, 
even if a commercial manager is recruited, it appears that the span of control of the General 
Manager is rather large, with eight people directly reporting to him. The General Manager 
is an economist, graduated in 1977, and there are a number of functional managers who were 
graduated earlier than him, and most important have spent all their career with the 
corporation. To overcome this problem, they were all placed on the same grade, and receive 
the same salary. The internal auditor reports to the financial manager, and the responsibility 
for strategic planning is unclear, where most senior managers are contributing in one way 
or another. The board of directors reportedly has defended the corporation’s autonomy, 
including budget approval. In this context it worth mentioning that, the last chairman of the 
board was the chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority, and not a representative of the 
sectoral ministry. At present, the boards of all PEs were dissolved in 1989, upon the change 
of government.
The main platform for management communications are the weekly meetings of the 
purchasing committee, the monthly meetings of functional managers, and, of course, the
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meetings in the context of annual budget preparation. However, the communication between 
the Purchasing and Sales Department leaves room for improvement. Not seldom, delays 
occur in notifying the Sales Department of the receipt goods by the Purchasing Department. 
A related weakness is the sole responsibility of the Purchasing Department for the in-country 
movement of goods.
The total number of staff is around 680, which is considered reasonable, given the 
size of its operation. However, DFSC suffers from the lack of qualified accountants, where 
all the accounting staff are school leavers, with no accounting background. Moreover, the 
officials complained that the stores and sales staff suffer from the lack of product knowledge 
and customer relations skills. As with all other PEs, DFSC has no autonomy over training, 
which is under the responsibility of the National Administration for Training. Similarly, as 
all other PEs, staff appraisal follows the government standardised appraisal forms. Indeed, 
all employees are found to be efficient, and hence receive their bonus and get promoted. 
The following table demonstrates this assertion.
Table 7.2 
DFSC: Staff Scores 
Between 1986 and 1988
Rating Range 1986 1987 1988
Number % Number % Number %
90 - 100 320 62.3 426 75.3 473 86.0
79- 89 116 22.6 90 16.0 42 7.6
68- 78 34 6.6 33 5.8 26 4.7
57- 67 21 4.1 13 2.3 8 1.5
46- 56 23 4.4 4 0.6 2 0.2
below 45 - - - - - -
Macro-Economic Environment
As we shall see in Chapter 13, the macro-economic environment in the Sudan is 
characterised by tight administrative controls over pricing, and over-valued exchange rate, 
and severe shortages of basic consumer goods. To a large extent, the DFSC has benefited 
from this distorted environment. The main elements of DFSC exceptional position are:
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1. DFSC receives a relatively preferential treatment from government units involved in 
import licensing.
2. The Sudanese Working Abroad pay considerably less import duties on goods ordered 
through DFSC, than on goods brought home during or after their service abroad.
3. DFSC does not have to obtain the Bank of Sudan approval for transactions from its 
foreign exchange account.
4. At present, possession of foreign exchange is illegal, and any one entering the country 
must declare his foreign exchange, which can only be used to acquire goods from the 
DFSC or sold to the banks at the official rate, which is unwise.
5. DFSC does not face any price control on duty free goods. Indeed, only those goods sold 
on the government request in local currency reflect a direct price control.
Thus, compared to the vast majority of PEs, DFSC suffers considerably less from 
both external interference and the country’s economic situation. This is largely due to its 
own profitability (see below), and the widespread awareness among the government agencies 
that, the operations of a corporation generating the much needed foreign earnings must be 
facilitated. Moreover, its type of business means that DFSC has much less need for 
specialised technicians, and the costly spare parts from abroad. Nevertheless, as all other 
PEs, DFSC has no autonomy over all personnel issues.
Accounts
The accounting books of DFSC consist mainly of a journal and a general ledger, and 
the financial statements prepared are the Trading Account, Profit and Loss Account, and the 
Balance Sheet. At present, the accounts are a few years behind, which the financial manager
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attributed to shortages of qualified staff. However, as in all other cases, a more fundamental 
reason seems to lie in the limited demand for accounting data. Second, the corporation does 
not have a continuous inventory system, which makes the task of providing frequent accounts 
and management reports rather difficult. Third, foreign exchange transactions are translated 
into local currency at the over-valued official exchange rate (£s4.5/$), which has the effects 
of exaggerating the operating expenses (see below). Fourth, the fixed assets of the 
corporation, notably land and buildings, are carried over at their historical costs in 1970, and 
hence the provision for depreciation is highly under-stated and unrealistic. Indeed, even its 
capital account (only £s0.5 million) is unrealistic. Finally, there is a long running dispute 
between the corporation and the MFEP regarding earlier tax exemptions, creating a taxation 
problem.
Budgeting
DFSC’s fiscal year runs from on January to December, whereas all other cases follow 
the government budget timing of July to June. Nevertheless, the budget format follows the 
government budget structure (chapters I, n  and HI). This adherence to the government 
budgeting format, in effect, leads to more emphasis being placed on the justification of 
expenditures and little attention is paid to the planning format of the budget. Moreover, the 
corporation has no formal long range planning. The budgeting process is initiated by asking 
the Purchasing department to prepare a purchase budget, rather than starting by a sales 
budget, which is a common practice for commercial enterprises. Other departments also 
submit their budgets independently to the Financial Manager. In November of each year, 
the financial manager prepares a consolidated budget, which is presented to the General 
Manager for discussion and presentation to the board for approval. The board’s approval 
of the budget, however, has always been an area of dispute between DFSC and the MFEP. 
But, it was reported that the board has successfully contested the MFEP’s right to review and 
approve the budget. Finally, as in all other PEs, no variance analysis between plans and 
actual achievement has ever been performed.
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Financial Performance
A review of the corporation’s past performance reveals an impressive growth in 
turnover and profits. For example, on a 1987 turnover of £s87 million, its net profits 
amounted to £sl5.2 million - thanks its monopoly position and more important the severe 
shortages of basic consumer goods in the internal market. Nevertheless, taking into 
consideration the fact that its dollar sales are translated into local currency at the over-valued 
official exchange rate of £s4.5/$, considerably distorts its financial position. For example, 
at the official rate, the ratio of labour costs to sales is about 6%. Therefore, had the 
corporation been allowed to translate its foreign earnings at the more devalued commercial 
rate of £sl2/$, its financial position would have been much stronger, and the labour costs 
insignificant. Nonetheless, unlike all other PEs in the country, its liquidity position has been 
healthy over the years, its financial structure is free from debts (except the dispute over the 
tax liabilities mentioned earlier), and external interference is relatively minimal.
Case IV: Sugar Industry
In the Sudan, sugar is characterised by extremely high consumption - in the 
neighbourhood of 24kg per capita compared to an Africa-wide of about 16kg per capita 
(Sugar Trading Corporation). In a bid to satisfy local demand, and even export sugar, the 
government established two sugar estates at Guneid and New Haifa in the early 1960s, 
followed by the establishment of two other estates at Sennar and Assalaya in the mid 1970s. 
In addition, a large joint venture sugar complex at Kenana was established in 1979. The five 
sugar estates have a designed capacity of 685 tons of sugar per year, of which Kenana alone 
has a capacity of 330 tons.
Guneid Sugar Company
The Guneid sugar company is almost 30 years old, and has a designed capacity of 
60,000 tons of sugar a year. It consists of a sugar cane farm (37000 feddans), canals and 
a factory. The company achieved its peak performance in the mid 1970s (55070 tons), but
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since then production has fallen to its lowest levels ever. Although well laid out, parts of 
the factory are in a bad state of repairs, due to lack of spare parts to replace obsolete and 
worn out equipment. The factory efficiency has now fallen to a stage where more than 10% 
of the recoverable sugar is lost, because of: (i) poor milling efficiency due to poor operation 
of the hydraulic equipment, (ii) sugar losses due to poor condition of vacuum filters, and (iii) 
high losses due to start-stop operations, caused by lack of cane or power. In addition, the 
bagasse storage is inadequate, the laboratory and workshop equipment are inadequate, and 
the factory roof leaks resulting in severe damages to machinery.
Institutional Environment
The responsibility for sugar production in the Sudan is divided among a number of 
government departments, without any central unit to coordinate between them. These 
include: the Ministry of Industry responsible for the overall sector policy; Ministry of 
Irrigation responsible for water management; Ministiy of Agriculture responsible for the 
sugar cane research, Ministry of Finance responsible for providing finance, setting selling 
prices, labour policies and marketing; Ministry of Energy providing the power supply; 
Mechanical Transport Department providing vehicles and agricultural machinery to the sugar 
companies. These are only a sample of government agencies that are able to influence the 
operations of Ihe sugar estates, with no central unit to provide any effective coordination. 
In the past, the coordination function was performed by the "Sugar and Distillery 
Corporation", which was liquidated in the early 1980s as part of the legal restructuring 
process (see chapter 10).
Organisation and Management
As all industrial PEs in the country, the Guneid factory was converted from a public 
corporation to a private limited company under the 1925 Companies Act. It reports directly 
to the Ministry of Industry, and its shares are. owned by the MFEP(99%) and ElNilein 
Bank(l %). However, for all practical purposes, the company is still operating under all the
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same rules and regulations governing public corporations. Indeed, the implementation of the 
legal restructuring was flawed in all respects. There was no financial restructuring, no 
changes in accounting or management practices, no changes in staff or salary scales, no 
central unit to coordinate between the sugar companies, or even clarification of the 
company’s objectives. For example, according to the 1925 Companies Act, all the staff 
should have been liquidated and reappointed under individual contracts. The companies 
should have been freed from the imposition of salaries by the state to enable them to set their 
salary scales as they see fit so as to attract and retain competent staff, and to link pay to 
performance. But, as we shall see in chapter 11, that never happened, due to political 
reasons. In effect, management has no autonomy over all operating decisions (financing, 
pricing, labour policies, purchasing), which are determined at the central level, particularly 
the MFEP. The company prepares its accounts according to the government accounting 
systems, and its annual budget follows the government budget format and timing. Budget 
approval is performed by the MFEP, and according to the financial manager is subject to 
irrational cuts. At the company level, timely performance reports are not prepared regularly, 
and detailed analysis comparing actual results with plans does not exist.
The General Manager is appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the 
Minister of Industry, based on no transparent criteria, and usually comes from the 
engineering ranks. The personnel manager indicated that in the last decade, the company has 
had four General Managers. The General Manager is supported by functional managers for 
agriculture, factory, finance, personnel, public relations, and welfare and social security. 
However, there are no specific terms of reference for functional managers and authority 
delegation is extremely poor. Indeed, when we went to meet the General Manager, we had 
to wait in a queue of functional managers, each coming to consult him on routine operating 
decisions, such as fuel distribution, overtime premiums or movement of cars. Team 
meetings with the General Manager occur primarily at the budget time, the internal auditor 
reports to the financial manager, and the responsibility for cane transportation is unclear,
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hindering the flow of cane to the factory. The total number of staff is around 2500, which 
all managers interviewed consider to be rather high, given the present level of capacity 
utilisation. Nevertheless, given the numerous difficulties they face, the poor working 
conditions, and the shaip deterioration in real income, morale is unduly low and turnover is 
very high.
Capacity Utilisation
As the following table reveals, the company achieved its peak production in the mid 
1970s. But, since then, sugar production has declined sharply.
Year Production(tons) Year Production(tons)
1970/71 18,460 1980/81 29,601
1971/72 37,080 1981/82 15,744
1972/73 28,345 1982/83 20,130
1973/74 42,133 1983/84 22,699
1974/75 45,268 1984/85 14,905
1975/76 52,727 1985/86 19,731
1976/77 54,155 1986/87 28,956
1977/78 55,070 1987/88 26,995
1978/79 48,500 1988/89 22,673
1979/80 36,539
Source: Public Corporation for Sugar Company
At present, the company is operating at about 30% of its capacity (60,000 tons). The 
General Manager gave the following main reasons for the sharp decline in production. First, 
the unrealistic pricing policy adopted by the government without any due consideration to 
either production costs or economic efficiency. In 1987/88, for example, the cost of 
production per ton was £sl325, while the transfer price to the Public Corporation for Sugar 
Trading was only £s850. Similarly, in 1988/89, a national committee formed by the 
government recommended a transfer price of £s2750. But the transfer price adopted was 
£sl900, though the cost of production per ton was £s2246. As a result, the company failed 
to purchase its essential inputs or maintain its assets. Moreover, the financial manager 
asserted that the annual budget is usually subject to cuts by the MFEP, the company is unable
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to borrow from either the Bank of Sudan or the commercial banks, and at times, the 
government announces salary increases or bonus payments in the middle of the season and 
requires the company to finance such payments from its resources. In most cases, therefore, 
the limited amounts allocated for operations are transferred to the payroll department due to 
fears of strikes. The company is unable to borrow from commercial banks due to its poor 
financial position, and the Bank of Sudan does not extend credits to companies.
A second reason is the lack of foreign exchange, contributing to lack of spare parts, 
and hence poor maintenance of factory equipment and agricultural machinery. Third, 
insufficient supply of irrigation water due to frequent power failures, and inadequate 
provision of fertilisers, pesticides and other cultivation inputs. Indeed, about 60% of 
operating costs require foreign exchange for imported inputs. Fourth, severe shortages of 
seasonal workers for cane cutting, due to the poor pay rates under the civil service rules. The 
legal minimum wage rates allowed for the unskilled workers (grade 18) are £s300 a month 
(£15), which the personnel manager argues, is entirely uncompetitive. Fifth, loss of skilled 
staff and highly trained technicians, due to sharp deterioration in real income and lucrative 
job opportunities abroad.
Marketing
The purchase and marketing of sugar is a government monopoly, under the Public 
Corporation for Sugar Trading (PCST), which is responsible for purchasing all local 
production, importing sugar, distributing sugar throughout the country, and selling at 
specified wholesale prices. PCST acquires the entire local output, and operates a network 
of storage depots in all major towns. Levels of permitted consumption are determined 
annually in the form of regional quotas by the MCCS, which is meant to ensure that the 
sugar is available throughout the country at the legal price. In practice, however, an 
unofficial market has developed, because supplies to remote regions are inadequate. In 
effect, much of the sugar appears to enter this market after leaving PCST’s control. But, 
with the current information systems, it is difficult to trace sugar losses.
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Financial Performance
The last time the company was audited was in 1983/84. Therefore, the following 
financial indicators are somewhat outdated, but they might give an indication of the 
company’s financial performance.
Capital £s 10.2 million
Working capital £s(19.9) million
Accumulated Losses £s 66.0 million
External financing £sl00.7 million
Ratio o f losses to capital: 660%
The company’s most recent budget (1988/89) showed the following facts:
Chapter I  £sl 0.118 million
Chapter II £s26.793 million
Revenues £s30.141 million
Net Surplus £s(6.77) million
Thus, it is evident that the company is technically bankrupt due to the huge 
accumulated losses, which wiped out its capital. However, one must caution against this 
conclusion because no revaluation of assets has ever been made, despite the fact that the 
country experienced hyper inflation rates, and the currency was devalued many times during 
the last decade. These losses were caused, in the main, by the rigid pricing policies, low 
productivity, and lack of incentives and autonomy to control costs. Nevertheless, it must be 
repeated that the arrears in accounts and the price controls, among others, denied any simple 
conclusion regarding the company’s financial performance. But, the limited available data, 
such as its 1988/89 budget, suggest that it is incurring losses.
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The whole sugar sub-sector is currently under a massive rehabilitation project financed 
by foreign loans, at a cost of $183 million. However, for a variety of reasons (see Chapter 
11) the rehabilitation project has so far failed to produce a significant turnaround in sugar 
production.
Case V: The Friendship Textile Company
This is an integrated textile plant established by the Chinese in the mid 1970s, and 
located at Hasaheisa in the central region, largely to promote regional development. It was 
part of the Public Corporation for Textile Industries, and when the corporation was liquidated 
as part of the legal restructuring of the industrial PEs, it was organised as a private limited 
company, whose shares are owned by MFEP (99%) and the Unity Bank (1 %). However, 
as all other PEs converted into companies, there was no financial restructuring prior to legal 
restructuring. In effect, its inherited poor financial structure considerably hampered its 
performance. As a company, it cannot borrow from the central bank, and is unable to 
borrow from the market, because of its poor financial position. Therefore, it relies entirely 
on the Treasury financing, which the Financial Manager says, is obtained after lengthy, 
painstaking negotiations. Equally, no changes were introduced regarding its accounting 
systems, budgeting, staff, salary scales, or even clarification of its objectives.
The General Manager is an economist, which is rather unusual in industrial sector, 
where chief executives normally come from the engineering ranks. He is supported by six 
functional managers for finance, sales, personnel, maintenance, transport, public relations 
and a deputy. Authority delegation is reported to be quite reasonable, and the functional 
managers stated that they meet regularly. However, this situation is attributed to the present 
General Manager who, all managers interviewed argued, encourages participative decision 
making. Indeed, when we visited him, we noted that his desk was empty of bulky files,
14 7
which characterise most senior manager’s offices in the Sudan. Yet, there are no specific 
terms of reference for functional managers, which cast doubts on the continuity of this 
situation. Moreover, we noted that his deputy and the Maintenance Manager have virtually 
identical roles, and it is not clear whether both are needed. Similarly, supervisors and some 
of their subordinates are in the same grade, with no clear role for each. The internal auditor 
reports to the financial manager, and as all other PEs, there is no board of directors at the 
moment.
The company employs around 2000 staff, which appears to be rather high, given the 
current level of capacity utilisation (see below). As we shall see later, the budgeted salaries 
for 1988/89 are almost equal to the operating expenses, but this is a poor indicator of 
over/under-staffing, since textile is normally a labour-intensive industry. Nevertheless, the 
personnel manager indicated that staff turnover, especially among technicians, is very high. 
Apart from the brain drain to the Gulf, the local private sector is well established, and offers 
better salaries. Indeed, the personnel manager asserted that his monthly salary is around £s 
2000, whereas his private counterpart earns as high as £s 7000, which we were unable to 
verify. The quality of staff, however, needs careful review, and there is no systematic 
evaluation of the training needs.
Financial Performance
The company has no costing systems, no inventory control systems, and its accounts 
are years behind. The accounting staff are predominantly school leavers with no background 
in accounting. The last time the company was audited in 1983/84. The following key 
figures indicate its financial position at that time:
Capital £s 14.6 million
Working Capital £s 1.3 million 
Accumulated Losses £s 6.5 million
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The company’s most recent budget (1988/89), showed the following facts: 
Chapter I  £s 8.5 million
Chapter II £s 9.3 million
Revenues £s 19.8 million
Net Surplus £s 2.0 million
The financial manager attributed the arrears in accounts to lack of qualified 
accountants, and the company’s poor performance to the rigid pricing, low productivity, and 
dramatic increase in production costs caused by inflation and devaluations, which were not 
matched by a corresponding increase in selling prices.
Capacity Utilisation
The plant is over 15 years old, and the General Manager indicated that maintenance 
has been irregular due to lack of spare parts. It has a designed capacity of 18 million yards 
per year when operated on two shifts basis. It is currently operating on one shift, at less 
than 30% capacity due to lack of raw materials, imported inputs (chemicals, lubricants, etc), 
and irregular power supply. The company relies entirely on the Sudan Cotton Company for 
its raw material supply. But, as cotton is the country’s main export, priority is given to 
export, while local consumption is allocated the lowest grades that are unsuitable for export. 
Moreover, the Sudan Cotton Company normally insists that local factories must acquire all 
their annual needs at the start of the season and must pay in cash. However, the financial 
manager argued that the company usually faces a severe liquidity problem, and it is 
impossible to pay for all its annual needs in cash. In addition, the storage and insurance are 
very expensive. He explained that the annual budget is paid in 12 monthly instalments, 
subject to cuts by the MFEP, and the company is unable to borrow from commercial banks. 
He further added that, spare parts in the local market are not available at the legal price, and 
the company has to acquire them at much high prices, which are not budgeted for. For 
example, the legal price of a tyre is £s 300 and a dry cell £s 450, but they are traded in the
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market at £s 3000 and £s 5000 respectively. These differences are not accounted for in the 
budget, hence they create severe liquidity problems. The company faces fierce competition 
from private producers and smugglers, and is unable to compete effectively.
The whole textile industries are currently under a rehabilitation project, financed by 
the Kuwaiti Government, at a cost of KD16.5 million. But, the Government of Sudan sided 
with Iraq in the recent Gulf crisis, and it is not known what effects that might have on the 
rehabilitation process.
Case V I: Sudan Airways Company 
Organisation and Management
The company was established by the British Administration in the early 1950s, and 
since then has experienced a series of organisational changes, ranging from a government 
department, to a public corporation, to a private limited company. Similarly, sectoral 
supervision changed from the Ministry of Defence, to the Council of Ministers, to the 
Ministry of Transport. At present, it is organised as a private limited company, whose shares 
are owned by the MFEP (99%) and the Sudan Development Corporation (1%), and 
supervised by the Ministry of Transport. However, as all other PEs converted into 
companies, it is still operating under all the rules and regulations governing public 
corporations. Unlike public corporations, however, the company has a different salary scale, 
set by the government in consultation, but not through negotiation, with the company, 
basically to allow the company to hire competent staff so as to compete effectively in 
international market in which it operates. But these salary scales failed to keep pace with 
inflation and the continuous devaluation. Until mid 1980s, the engineers were given part of 
their salaries in hard currency, but that arrangement was suspended in 1987 in accordance 
with the law issued by the Council of Ministers, which ruled that all local obligations must 
be met in local currency. The decision was met with a series of industrial actions, and 
consequently led to loss of most experienced and highly trained engineers.
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The present General Manager is an engineer, who has spent all his career with the 
National Electricity Corporation. In contrast, his predecessor has a vast experience in the 
aviation industry, where he used to work with the Gulf Air for 10 years, and hold a Ph.D 
in Business Administration. He was removed for political reasons. In the last decade the 
company has had five General Managers, and with every change in management, several 
organisational and personnel changes took place. Indeed, by the time we visited the company, 
all senior management were newly recruited, and the company was undergoing major 
reshuffles. The total number of staff is around 3000, but staff turnover, mainly engineers, 
is reportedly very high.
Capacity Utilisation
The General Manager asserted that the company’s main assets, (planes) are very old, 
very poorly maintained, and in urgent need for replacement. The company has only four 
planes that are capable of flying abroad (Boeing 737), but with each flight massive ad hoc 
repairs must be made, and it is not unusual for a flight to be postponed or cancelled in the 
very last minute. In effect, the operating costs are very high, and the financial manager 
reported that the sudden breakdown in outside stations costs the company vast sums of money 
in terms of airport fees and hotel expenses. The company used to lease planes from other 
carriers, but the financial manager stated that this alternative is uneconomic, given the fact 
that the number of passengers has dropped sharply. He added that the lease fee per annum 
is quite sufficient to rehabilitate all existing planes. At one time, the company also entered 
into an agreement with ZAS (an Egyptian private carrier) to use its route to London on profit 
sharing basis. But, the financial manager indicated that, as the company failed to ascertain 
the cost items, its profit share was minimal, and that is why the contract was cancelled. He 
also asserted that, the company does not want to lease this route, because its presence on this 
route is essential.
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The company’s main international routes are Egypt, the Gulf and London, though the 
latter has been subject to on-off operations. In fact, we understood that, at times it was 
refused landing at Heathrow, because it failed to pay the airport fees for many years. The 
company has a monopoly position in internal routes, but is unable to satisfy demand, due to 
lack of spare parts and fuel shortages. There are no price controls on its international flights, 
it enjoys a considerable degree of flexibility in fixing its fares, subject to the approval of the 
sectoral minister. However, like STPC, it has a limited freedom in using the foreign 
exchange it generates. But nevertheless, the financial manager indicated that all its foreign 
earnings are not sufficient to meet its operating needs given the poor state of its assets. For 
all these reasons, therefore, the company’s flights are totally unreliable, its public image is 
poor, and consequently the company lost its markets to other competitors. Indeed, those 
who travel with the company are either the government employees who are obliged by law 
to use its services, or the private travellers who are unable to purchase tickets in hard 
currency from other international carriers. As international carriers failed to repatriate their 
accumulated earnings in the Sudan, they limited the number of passengers paying in local 
currency per flight, just to cover their local obligations. Indeed, for this single reason, a 
number of international carriers, such as Swiss Air and the British Airways, have suspended 
their flights to_ Khartoum.
Financial Performance
The company’s accounts are years behind, has not been audited since 1979/80, and 
the internal control system is utterly poor. Indeed, the assistant Auditor General for public 
corporations pointed out that, the Sudan Airways Company is one of the most problematic 
cases in the whole public sector. "We know nothing about it", he added. Therefore, we 
failed to obtain reliable information regarding its financial performance. However, the 
company’s most recent budget (1988/89) showed the following facts:
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Chapter I  £s 60.0 million
Chapter II £s 369.5 million
Chapter III £s 24.9 million
Revenues £s 480.5 million
Net Surplus £s 26.1 million
Moreover, from the company’s records for 1984/85 (not audited), we found that its 
accounts receivables from other government units were £s 750 million. The financial 
manager attributed this situation to a policy, only recently abandoned, where government 
units were not required to pay in cash for the services provided by the company. Instead, 
they simply issue a letter to the company requesting tickets for their staff on credit4. But, 
such debts were never collected, which the financial manager argued, should have been 
cleared prior to the legal restructuring. Nevertheless, he asserted that the company has no 
liquidity problems to meet its local obligations. The company’s internal flights, and to a 
lesser extent its external flights, are generating sufficient resources in local currency. But 
the problem is foreign exchange to acquire spare parts and fuel. At present , the company 
relies heavily on the Bank of Sudan for its foreign exchange needs.
Admittedly, this last case was probably the most demanding of them all. There is a 
complete lack of records in any one place, and all senior management were newly recruited, 
and hence not yet acquainted with the internal operations of the company, or the industry 
as a whole. Indeed, in all cases, the lack of records and the high turnover of senior 
management was the norm, which made data collection at best difficult. Apart from the 
brain drain to the Gulf, the dismissal of top civil servants on political grounds is quite 
extensive, creating a sense of malaise, apathy and disinterest. In fact, in most cases, the most
4 According to the civil service rules, all civil servants in grades one 
to five, including their families, are entitled for air tickets each year, to 
anywhere in the country.
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experienced PE staff who have spent all their careers in PEs, have either been dismissed or 
transferred to the headquarters in Khartoum, with no specific duties to perform. To gather 
as much data as possible, we spoke to a number of ex-managers of various PEs, and indeed 
that proved to be more informative and gave us detailed account of their former PEs.
At the macro level, although there are bureaus responsible for PE’s operations in all 
sectoral ministries, and the MFEP, they lack any comprehensive knowledge on the number 
of public enterprises, their financial position, number of employees or the government equity 
in each. Indeed when reviewing the annual budgets, neither the MFEP nor the sectoral 
ministries obtain the actual achievements to compare them with the plans. Clearly this 
indicates that the flow of information between PEs and the central government leaves much 
to be desired. In contrast, the Auditor General Chamber does not obtain the annual budgets 
to be compared with the actual results, though such a comparison is likely to be meaningless 
given the accumulated arrears in the accounts of all PEs. Nevertheless, it clearly 
demonstrates that efficiency auditing in Sudan is not accorded much importance. In fact, it 
appears that the main concern of auditors is to ensure that PEs conduct their transactions in 
accordance with the rules and regulations stipulated in the Financial Regulations Act, 1977, 
basically to safeguard public money against fraud. Equally, there is no any central unit within 
the government to monitor and analyse the inter-enterprise accounts which have grown out 
of all proportion.
In a reply to the allegations made by all financial managers that, the annual budgets 
are subject to irrational cuts at the MFEP, the Director for Budget asserted that the annual 
budgets of all government departments, including PEs, are normally highly inflated. 
Therefore, these cuts are necessary because the available resources are limited. He then cited 
the following example: "for the last three years I have been in charge of this office, we used 
to cut chapter one expenses of all government .units, including PEs, by 15%, and yet no 
enterprise has ever complained of this practice. This clearly indicates that PEs normally
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inflate their budgets to pay bonuses and other allowances for their staff, though all PEs are 
incurring losses”. In all fairness, the fact that PEs are incapable of promptly producing 
evidence of the real underlying financial position, due to lack of management information 
system and up-to-date certified accounts, considerably strengthen the MFEP’s argument.
Case VII: Private Enterprises
We also visited two private firms, basically to identify, in broad terms, the similarities 
and differences with PEs. Our main concern was to answer the question regarding the 
relevance of privatisation to the Sudan. Therefore, we concentrated on the broader 
environment within which both sets of firms operate.
These enterprises were the International Tyre Manufacturing and Distributing 
Company (ITMD), and the Sudan Arab Oil and Soap Company. The ITMD is a private joint 
venture between a Sudanese entrepreneur (chairman) and the South Korean Dawoo 
corporation, which started operations in 1980. However, we failed to get its articles of 
association on confidentiality grounds. The company is fully protected from competing 
imports, and is the only tyre manufacturing company in the country5. Also, we failed to get 
access to the company’s financial records, but we were told that the company is in a sound 
financial position.
The Sudan Arab Oil company is a joint venture between the Government of Sudan 
and the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (an Arab Investment 
company established by the Arab league in 1980 to supply the Arab countries with food­
stuffs). It used to be a public corporation and became a joint venture in 1983. However, we 
failed to get its articles of association,how much was paid to the Government, and we were
5 There are rumours that the previous President (1969-1985) is a major 
shareholder, and this is why the company was granted a monopoly position.
155
not allowed to investigate its financial records. But, we were told that the company is in 
a healthy financial position, and does not face any external interference. The General 
Manager is a Sudanese, while the chairman of the Board of Directors is a Kuwaiti.
As regards the external environment within which they operate, the officials in both 
companies made a number of complaints. First and foremost both companies complained 
about the rigid and unrealistic pricing policy for both inputs and output adopted by the 
government, and the allocation of foreign exchange for their imported input needs. The 
pricing of both companies products is determined by the Ministry of Industry on the "cost 
plus basis" (see chapter 12). Similarly, both companies obtain their foreign exchange needs 
from the Foreign Exchange Allocation Committee, which they consider to be time- 
consuming, and considerably hinders their operations. Indeed, when we visited them, both 
companies showed us valid import licenses, which the government failed to honour with 
foreign exchange. They told us that, in the past they used to acquire their foreign exchange 
needs from the open market at the market rate, and import their input needs. Although such 
a rate was not recognised for pricing puiposes, they were able to stay in business, be it at 
a loss. This financing practice is now suspended because possession of foreign currency is 
illegal and violaters executed.
However, this is not to suggest that this solution was not without problems. In 1988, 
as ITMD incurred losses, it halted its sales on the grounds that the legal price is uneconomic. 
In particular, the officials complained about the official exchange rate used for pricing 
puiposes, which is far below the market rate. They noted that, in 1987, the company was 
allocated only $10 million, whereas it needed $30 million per year to acquire its imported 
needs ( the company relies entirely on imported raw materials). In turn, the authorities 
raided the company’s stores, confiscated all the tyres (under the Hoarding of Goods Act) and 
arrested the chairman and two of his deputies. A few weeks later, a compromise solution 
was reached, whereby the exchange rate was raised to £s 9.75/$, and the company resumed
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its sales. However, the officials claimed that the problem is far form over. They correctly 
noted that the market price for a tyre is way ahead of the legal price due to the excess 
demand. They pointed out that apart from the unrealistic prices, the real issue is the 
availability of foreign exchange on a regular timely fashion to enable the company to operate 
at reasonable levels of capacity. The chairman pointed out that the company is currently 
operating at less than 50% of its designed capacity, though demand by far outpace supply. 
The same line of argument was made by the officials in the oil company, where the company 
is reported to be operating at an average of 30%. Indeed, both companies reported that the 
excess demand is being exploited by the middlemen, at the expense of legitimate producers. 
For example, the legal price of a box of soap (45 pieces) is £s 70, but is traded in the black 
market at than £s 200. The same applies for tyres, dry cells and other basic consumer 
goods.
Second, the officials in both companies complained about the lengthy procedures 
involved in reviewing prices by the Ministry of Industry. They asserted that by the time a 
price adjustment is granted, the ever rising inflation rates and the continuous devaluation 
would necessitate another application to be submitted. Indeed, the financial managers in both 
companies asserted that the file preparation for price adjustments takes a considerable time 
at the expense_of their normal duties. Moreover, the officials in the oil company stated that 
price determination is not firm-specific, i.e the Ministry of Industry usually sets one price 
for the whole oil and soap produced in the country, regardless of the cost structure of the 
firm that produced the commodity. To change this price, they argue, requires detailed 
checks on each cost item, which is cumbersome and time-consuming.
A third complaint by both companies related to power supply, which they claim, is 
irregular and unreliable. Both companies have generator sets, but the frequent fuel shortages 
have rendered even this costly alternative inadequate. The officials noted that, apart from 
the production loss, the sudden power cuts while the machines are operating, cause serious
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damages to the machines, which would take time to repair, if the required spare part is not 
available in the local market. Both companies reported that, they have no marketing 
problems, as demand by far outpace supply. In fact, at times of scarcities, which is quite 
often, both companies have to submit all their output to the local authorities to be distributed 
according to a rationing system.
We failed to get the salary scales for either company. There is a legal minimum 
wage rate of £s 300 a month. But, both companies reported that they are actually paying 
their unskilled staff higher rates, though they refused to say by how much. This is rather 
an unusual phenomenon for a developing country, where one normally finds the private 
sector paying unskilled workers the minimum rate, while paying substantial premium to 
skilled categories. But, in the Sudanese context, the finding is consistent with other pieces 
of evidence indicating the tightness in the labour market, even for the unskilled staff: the 
inability of the Guneid Sugar Company to attract seasonal workers for cane cutting is a case 
in point. The only way in which private companies have apparently been affected by the 
minimum wage legislation is that, whenever the government adjusts the minimum wage rate, 
trade unions normally demand an equal increase, even though their wages are already above 
the new rate. Moreover, at times the government grants all employees in the country certain 
payments ancLask private employers to do the same , as happened on the first anniversary 
of revolution in mid 1990 (see chapter 13).
The only complaint that the officials in both companies have expressed against the 
existing labour legislation is that, it is difficult for them to dismiss workers. The Individual 
Relations Act, 1981, stipulates that in order to dismiss a worker, the employer has to give 
him three written warnings over one month suspension period. He then has to appeal to the 
Commissioner of Labour, who may approve the request, in which case the worker can be 
dismissed. On the other hand, if the request is not approved, the employer must terminate 
the suspension, or pay the worker for the one month suspension and also six month’s gratuity
1 58
before dismissal. The officials in both companies argued that the whole procedure is time 
consuming, cumbersome and expensive. They asserted that it is difficult to make a reasonable 
case before the Commissioner since this requires witnesses, who usually come from the 
worker’s side and unlikely to testify against a colleague. They further complained that the 
Commissioner always sides with workers, which we were unable to verify.
As regards the internal operations of their entities, the officials in both companies 
reported that they have complete freedom to operate their companies. There is no 
requirement to follow government budgeting format and timing, the government accounting 
systems, or the purchasing procedures. They raise finance from the open market, and their 
investment/expansion policies are approved by their boards of directors.
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Chapter Eight
Evolution, Size and Performance 
of PEs in the Sudan
Since the primary objective of this research is to investigate the various measures 
devised to improve the performance of PEs, and the scope and relevance of privatisation to 
the Sudan, we do not intend to provide a detailed account of the evolution of PEs. Indeed, 
we will discuss briefly the structure and performance of PEs solely to identify their 
implications on privatisation.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the first two sections we will outline the 
historical development of PEs, and the rationale for their establishment. Section three will 
be devoted to the size and productivity record of PEs. The final section examines briefly the 
financial performance of PEs. For the most part of this section, reference will be made to 
the cases presented in chapter 7.
8.1 Evolution of PEs
As elsewhere in DCs, the Sudan inherited a number of PEs at the time of 
independence, such as the Gezira Scheme, the Sudan Rail, Airlines and Electricity. 
Thereafter, the successive national governments have established a substantial number of PEs 
in the various sectors of the economy, basically to accelerate economic development. At the 
post-independence, however, the structure of the economy has changed from full reliance on 
private initiatives to primary reliance on public ownership, including nationalisation and 
confiscation of private firms. As we shall see below, these changing views on the structure
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of the economy are attributed to both ideological and pragmatic reasons. In what follows, we 
will provide a brief account of that history in a chronological order.
Prior to 1956 (independence date), the private sector initiatives were the dominant 
force in the economy, and indeed remained for years to come. At independence, the first 
national government (1956-1958) was preoccupied with laying down the foundations of an 
independent state (e.g the constitution, the Sudanisation of posts and the like). On the 
economic front, "The Approved Enterprises (concessions) Act, 1956", was issued, which 
provided a system of incentives to encourage local and foreign investment. The incentives 
package included tax exemptions for an initial specified period (tax holidays), duty free 
imports for inputs and machines, low rates on public utilities and land rent, as well as 
protective tariffs. These incentives, however, remained unchanged in all the subsequent 
investment codes that followed in 1967, 1972, 1974, 1980 and 1990. Nevertheless, no PEs 
were created, and the private initiatives continued to be the engine for economic 
development.
In 1958, however, a military coup took place, which started the first steps of state 
participation in economic activities. Indeed, in 1960, a Ten-Year Economic and Social 
Development Plan (1960/61-1970/71) was issued, which called for direct state ownership in 
areas that are "unattractive for private investors". Consequently, nine factories were 
constructed, the Approved Enterprise (concessions) Act, 1956, was replaced by the 
"Organisation and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act, 1967", and the Sudanese 
Industrial Bank and Agricultural Bank were established to provide finance for industry and 
agriculture. The move, however, did not signify any shift in the basic philosophy, but rather 
reflected the desire to diversify the base of the economy, rather than relying solely on 
agriculture. Indeed, there was no political motivation behind the move, and there were no 
nationalisation of foreign firms. The main reasons behind the establishment of the nine
161
factories were to take the country along the road towards industrialisation, to invest in areas 
that exceed the capacity of local private investors, and more importantly to promote regional 
development, which is quite evident from the distribution of the nine factories (see table 8-1).
Thus, the private sector had virtually a monopoly position in light industries, such as 
textile, oil and soap, cement, shoe making, and cigarettes, with an estimated investment of 
£s 77 million (Abu Affan, 1986). The public sector, on the other hand, gained a monopoly 
position in the sugar industry, and a significant portion in the food industry, with an 
estimated investment of £s 24 million (table 8.1).
Table 8.1
PEs Constructed between 
1960 and 1969
Factory Region Estimated 
Cost 
(£S 000)
Creditor Start of 
Construction
Karima Dates Factory Northern 850 Russia 1960
Khartoum Tannery Khartoum 1003 Yugoslavia 1962
Guneid Sugar Factory Central 10460 West Germany 1962
Aroma Cardboard Eastern 720 Yugoslavia 1963
Haifa Sugar Factory Eastern 8312 West Germany 1964
Onion Dehydration Eastern 605 Russia 1966
Karima Fruit Industry Northern 1088 Russia 1967
Wau Fruit Factory Southern 1000 Russia 1967
Babanousa Dairy Western 1050 Russia 1967
Total £S 24098
Source: B. Abu Affan (1986), "Industrialisation policy in the Sudan", Khartoum University 
Press.
In the 1970s, however, PEs expanded substantially not only by the establishment of 
new PEs, but also through nationalisation and confiscation of a wide range of private firms
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in both industrial and agricultural sectors. Thus, the dramatic expansion of the sector was, 
by and large, politically motivated. Indeed, in his first broadcast after assuming power 
through a military coup on May 25, 1969, "Colonel Nimeri" declared that “time has come 
to set the country on the road to freedom, equity and socialism". To achieve that, the 
government, backed by the Communist Party, launched a comprehensive programme of 
nationalisation and confiscation of a large number of private firms. The objectives of these 
nationalisation and confiscation measures were "to ensure state domination of the agricultural 
and industrial sectors, and to liberate the economy from the grip of foreign firms" (The 
Nationalisation Act, 1970). These measures, in turn, increased the number of industrial PEs 
from only 9 in 1969 to 47 in 1971, representing around 60 percent of total investment in the 
sector, compared to only 23 percent in 1969 (Abu Affan, 1986). Subsequently, the 
government made substantial investments in new PEs, basically "to distribute wealth 
throughout the country, and to achieve self-sufficiency in basic consumer goods, such as 
sugar, food and popular cloth" (The Six Year Plan, 1970/71-1976/77). Indeed, between 
1972 and 1979, some $900 million were invested in the industrial sector alone (table 8.2).
However, the government soon reversed its economic policy, and the political dogma 
began to give way to pragmatism. The change of policy was solely attributed to the fact that, 
the Communist Party, the main supporter of the new regime, arranged a military coup in 
mid-1971, which collapsed after only three days, and "Nimeri" was reinstated. Consequently, 
the government returned most of the confiscated enterprises to their original owners. Indeed, 
only five enterprises of those confiscated were retained for no clear reasons. These were the 
Nile Cement Company, Maspio Cement Company, the Blue Nile Packing Company, Rea and 
KiriKab sweet factories. (The latter two were offered for sale since the early 1980s but 
without much success so far, as we saw in chapter 6).
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Table 8.2 
Industrial PEs Constructed 








Abu Na’ma Kenaf 7,000 1972 1976 Central
Assalaya Sugar Factory 30,000 1974 1979 Central
Duem Weaving Shed 5,000 1974 1979 Central
Gadow Textile Mill 34,000 1975 not yet Northern
Gezira Tannery 2,800 1972 1977 Central
Haj Abdalla Spinning 20,000 1974 1981 Central
Hasaheisa Textile Factory 4,000 1972 1976 Central
Kadogli Weaving Shed 5,000 1974 1979 Western
Khartoum Central Foundry ,300 1971 1975 Khartoum
Khartoum North Spinning 10,700 1975 not yet Khartoum
Kosti Weaving Shed 5,000 1974 1978 Central
Mangala Weaving Shed 5,000 1974 1979 Southern
Mangala Sugar Factory 26,000 1974 not yet Southern
Malakal Tannery ,828 1973 not yet Southern
Nyala Weaving Shed 5,000 1974 1979 Western
Port Sudan Spinning 14,000 1972 not yet Eastern
Sennar Sugar Factory 28,000 1972 1976 Central
Shendi Weaving Shed 5,000 1972 1978 Northern
Sudan-Ren Fertilizer 187,000 1975 not yet Khartoum
Tonj Kenaf Factory 17,000 1974 not yet Southern
White Nile Tannery 1,300 1972 1975 Khartoum
White Nile Brewery ,900 1973 not yet Southern
Mellut Sugar Factory 49,000 1976 not yet Southern
£S 462,828
$847,118(,)
(a) based on the exchange rate of £S = $2.87 for all projects, except Sudan-Ren 
Fertilizer where an exchange rate of £S = $0.4 was used (see below).
Source: op. cit.
Moreover, in a bid to regain the private sector confidence, the Government issued 
"The Development and Encouragement of the Industrial Investment Act, 1972", which 
provided a package of incentives and assurances against confiscation. However, by then, the 
harm had already been done, and despite continuous and persistent efforts by the "President" 
himself to convince private investors, the annual growth of factories decreased from 13.3 
percent in 1969 to 9 percent in 1972 (Abu Affan, 1986).
During the 1980s, no major investments were made to create new PEs. In fact, the 
poor performance of PEs was causing deep concerns to the Sudanese authorities and the 
international creditors and aid donors, notably the World Bank and the IMF, on the grounds 
that this is a main cause of the economic and financial crisis experienced by the country. 
Therefore, vertical investment (i.e investment in existing PEs) through various reform and 
rehabilitation measures was deemed necessary to improve the productivity and financial 
performance of PEs. Among these reform processes were legal transformation of all 
industrial PEs from the public corporation form to "private" limited companies under the 
1925 companies Act (the latest in the country), massive rehabilitation projects for various 
sectors of the economy, changes of the production relations in the irrigated schemes from 
"the Joint Account System" to the "Individual Account System"1 commercialisation of 
operations, and more recently by a wave of privatising a wide range of PEs. These various 
reform efforts are the main concern of this research, and will therefore be discussed in 
greater detail in subsequent chapters.
8.2 Rationale for PEs
To start with, it must be stressed that the Sudanese authorities have never spelt out
JUnder the Joint Account System, the total production costs were 
deducted from the gross proceeds and the remainder distributed among the 
partners (tenants, management, and the state) in a certain ratio. Under the 
new system, each tenant is held responsible for his costs and receives his net 
proceeds in full (see chapter 10)
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a clear policy specifying areas that are restricted to public ownership and those open for 
private investors. Nor had the authorities clearly defined the economic and social objectives 
of PEs, or how would accountability be maintained. Indeed, as noted above, the development 
of PEs has followed a process of contraction-expansion, nationalisation-renationalisation, 
creating thereby an uncertain business climate. Thus, these changing views on the role of 
public and private enterprises resulted not only in a lack of a clear policy towards PEs, but 
more importantly had prevented the development of a vigorous private sector, which is 
critical for the success of privatisation.
Nevertheless, after careful scrutiny of different sources, such as "the Ten Year Plan, 
1960/61-1970/71", "The Organisation and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act, 1967", 
"the Six Year Plan 1970/71-1976/77", and "the Development and Encouragement of 
Industrial Investment Act, 1972", we identified the following main reasons for the state 
participation in the economy. First, to invest in areas that do not attract private investors, due 
to the low returns, high risks or the capital outlay required. Second, to invest in areas that 
are deemed necessary for the public interest, due to their strategic importance. However, it 
should be noted that, at present almost all industrial PEs are operating in economic 
activities, where the private sector has a tangible presence, including the sugar industry 
which is considered a strategic industry. Therefore, the output of almost all PEs has either 
been solely produced by the private sector in the past, or is currently competing with 
identical goods produced by private firms. Indeed, there are industries, such as textile, soap, 
sweet, oil and shoe making in which the private sector has long established itself, long before 
the state, and has achieved a reasonable degree of success over the years. Therefore, the 
original rationale to invest in projects that do not attract private investors is highly 
questionable.
Indeed, even the strategic criteria argument has recently been questioned by the 
privatisation of public utilities, such as Gas in the UK, the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
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in Japan, and the Telecommunications in Malaysia. Moreover, the public interest argument 
could be protected by the "golden share", as applied in the UK, France, and Senegal 
(Vuylsteke, 1988). However, it must be stressed that the privatisation of these industries is 
likely to be complex, time-consuming, and would require the creation of a regulatory system, 
with all the problems of regulation.
Other economic objectives cited in the above documents included: to achieve a policy 
of import substitutes, to promote exports, and to generate investible surplus. Nevertheless, 
as elsewhere, PEs in the Sudan have never lived up to these expectations. Indeed, as the 
cases showed, they failed to satisfy local demand, let alone export, and their persistence 
losses became a burden on the budget, rather than supporting it as planned. On the other 
hand, the social objectives behind public ownership were incorporated in the statute of the 
"Industrial Development Corporation (IDC)", which was organised in 1965 to oversee the 
public factories (see chapter 9). These were: (1) to distribute PEs throughout the country so 
as to stop rural-urban migration, (2) to train people in rural areas, and (3) to provide basic 
consumer goods at reasonable prices.
Indeed, as tables (8.1) and (8.2) reveal, most PEs were established in rural areas, 
basically to create jobs and promote regional development. For example, 8 out of the 9 PEs 
established in the 1960s, were located in rural areas, while only 5 of the 23 PEs established 
in the 1970s were located in Khartoum, the capital. The price stabilisation objective, on the 
other hand, was supposed to be maintained through rigid price controls on all the goods 
produced in the country or imported.
These social objectives, however, have never been accomplished, and more 
importantly have had disastrous effects on these industries. First, in a bid to promote rural 
development, the industries were located in remote rural areas that lack the necessary raw
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materials supply and adequate infrastructure, such as power, roads or communication 
services. Second, in order to curb inflation and provide basic consumer goods at reasonable 
prices, their product prices were set at levels well below the production costs, which created 
severe liquidity problems for PEs. Consequently, PEs failed to create employment 
opportunities, and the exodus from rural to urban areas, particularly Khartoum, continued 
at an increasing rate. Similarly, price controls have also failed to achieve their objectives, 
because as scarcities developed, due to the deteriorating productivity, goods were removed 
to the illegal black market where they were sold at a price well above the official price.
8.3 Size and Productivity of PEs
8.3.1 Size
As in other DCs, there is no clear, precise definition of PEs in the Sudan. Therefore, 
the PE sector tends to include government departments, such as "The Commission for 
Relief1, the "Sudan News Agency", and "The National Council for Research". Indeed, the 
lack of a precise definition for PEs has resulted in a large number of government departments 
being converted into public corporations, simply to enjoy the higher salaries and other 
benefits of a public corporation, without due considerations of whether they could be 
operated on commercial lines, such as the above examples. In effect, the actual number of 
PEs is not known with any degree of accuracy. Indeed, different sources give different 
number of PEs. For example, according to the Auditor General Chamber, the total number 
of PEs is 230, for the World Bank the total number is 264, and for the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning, the total number is only 141 PEs. Table (8.3) below outlines these 
different views about the total number of the Sudanese PEs and their sectoral classifications.
However, we believe, these figures are inaccurate and misleading, in particular those 
of the MFEP. First, the MFEP list includes only PEs that are financed by the Public 
Corporation Department of the MFEP, and in particular PEs that bring their annual budgets
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for approval by the MFEP. Thus, PEs that are financed from the central budget are 
excluded, such as the Arts and Letters Publishing Company; the Government Printing Press; 
the Agricultural Research Corporation and the Irrigation Works Corporation. More 
important, all PEs organised as companies under the Companies Act, 1925, are not legally 
obliged to bring their budgets for approval by the MFEP, and hence are not included in the 
MFEP. Examples include all industrial PEs; the Sudan Airways; the Sudan Shipping Lines 
and the Sea Ports Company. Second, the MFEP list excludes all non-operating PEs, i.e PEs 
which were never made operational or were operating and then stopped for one reason or the 
other (see table 8.6 for a summary of this category). Third, the MFEP list excludes PEs that 
are still under construction, and hence financed from the Development Budget of the 
Planning Wing of MFEP. Examples include, Atbara Cement Expansion, Western Savanna 
Corporation, Livestock Roads Corporation and the Development of Amatong Mountains 
Forest Company.
Table 8.3 
Number and sectoral 
distribution of PEs
Sector MFEP Auditor General World Bank
Industiy 39 63 66
Agriculture 15 31 54
Commerce - 92 54
Tourism 22 19





Total 141 230 264
Source: - MFEP, Public Corporation Administration.
- Auditor General Chamber, Khartoum.
- World Bank Resident Representative, Khartoum.
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On the other hand, both the Auditor General Chamber and the World Bank lists 
classify the subsidiaries of a PE as separate, legal entities, though they are centrally managed 
by the parent company, such as the Mechanised Farming Corporation and the Hotels and 
Tourism Corporation. In addition, the World Bank’s list includes PEs which were liquidated 
in 1983, following the introduction of Islamic Laws, such as Aybe National Corporation; 
Blue Nile and White Nile Breweries, Watania Distillery Corporation, etc. Indeed, as table 
(8.3) reveals, these sources not only differ on the number of PEs, but also their sectoral 
distribution. Finally there are a large number of PEs, mainly in the commerce sector, under 
the "Military Economic Board", on which no information is available regarding their size or 
operating results.
Nonetheless, the PE sector, which is dominated by the agricultural sector, plays a 
significant role in the Sudanese economy. They are responsible for an estimated 45 percent 
of GDP and 75 percent of eOxports2. The following table shows the contribution of the 
different sectors to GDP, between 1976 and 1986.
Table 8.4 
Sectoral Contribution to GDP 
(1975/76 - 1985/86)
Sector 1975/76 1981/82 1983/84 1985/86
Agriculture 38 34 30 31
Industiy 7 8 9 9
Construction 5 5 6 5
Energy 2 2 2 3
Services 47 52 54 52
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Bank of Sudan Report, 1987.
2




As with the number of PEs, information on the government equity in PEs is sketchy, 
unreliable and misleading. According to the Public Corporations Administration of the 
MFEP, the cumulative government equity in the PE sector is £s 1,123 million as of March, 
19883. However, for a variety of reasons, this figure appears to be far from accurate. First, 
it reflects the historical cost of the investments made over the years, hence does not reflect 
in any way the current market value of these investments, or their replacement costs. That 
is because no revaluation of investment was ever made in the Sudan, though the country has 
experienced very high rates of inflation during the last decade, and the local currency was 
devalued many times. Second, the government investment administration was established only 
in 1981. Before this date, government investment was usually accounted for in the recurrent 
budget, and treated as expenses at the end of the fiscal year. For example, the Auditor 
General managed to calculate the sum of £s 12 million that were charged to the expense 
account between 1978 and 1980 (The Auditor General Report, 1983/84).
Third, according to the Auditor General Report, 1983/84, there were substantial 
payments made as contribution to the capital of some PEs, but has not been recorded as 
investment in the books of the MFEP. The following examples might illustrate this point: (A) 
Payment of £s- 3 million to the Islamic Cooperative Development Bank, and £s 5 million to 
the National Bank for Exports and Imports as the contribution to the capital, but do not 
appear in the investment account of the MFEP. (B) Payment of £s 157 million as the 
government contribution to the capital of Kenana Sugar Company (joint venture), which was 
not included in the investment account of the MFEP, though reflected in the company’s 
records. (C) Included in the investment account of the MFEP were amounts belonging to 
confiscated firms, which were subsequently returned to their original owners, hence should 
have been written-off, in an amount of £s 5.9 million. (D) The investment account of the
3It is difficult to convert this figure into hard currency, because it 
was incurred over a long period of time, under various exchange rates.
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MFEP showed the amount invested in the textile sheds completed during 1978/79 as only 
£s 2 million, whereas the actual amount invested was £s 25 million.
Fourth, the government units that negotiate, monitor and distribute foreign loans are 
numerous and dispersed, without any coordination to facilitate the flow of information 
regarding loan principal; purpose; and how it was disbursed. These include: the MFEP with 
its two wings, Planning and Finance, which were merged in 1983 but continued to act as 
autonomous units with separate budgets; the Bank of Sudan; the Ministry of Commerce; and 
the Sectoral ministries. In fact, the necessary linkages between these units were not 
adequately specified and what coordination that occurs often depends on a network of 
personal contacts. Probably this is why the Sudanese authorities are unable to determine with 
any degree of accuracy, the exact amount of the country’s foreign debt, nor how it was 
spent. Nevertheless, assuming that part of these external loans were used to establish new 
PEs in the 1970s, would undoubtedly render the MFEP investment figure of £s 1,123 million 
highly contestable. As the case of the Sudan Telecom showed, the corporation’s records show 
only loans contracted after 1983. Prior to this date, no records are available, even though the 
period between 1978 and 1982, correspond to the period in which the corporation carried out 
some 80 percent of its infrastructural projects, which were wholly financed through foreign 
loans. However, we believe, the Sudan Telecom is by no means unique in this respect. This 
is a common phenomenon permeating throughout the entire PE sector due to the rudimentary 
and unreliable nature of the accounting systems and the lack of a central overseeing agency 
to monitor and evaluate PEs (see chapter 9).
In summary, there is no accurate and reliable data on vital issues, such as the number 
of PEs, the size of staff, government equity, or even sectoral classification. The implication 
of this situation on privatisation is that, it leaves a great deal of preparatory work to be 
carried out before embarking upon any privatisation process. The point is that, such basic
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data would require a considerable time to assemble and cost a lot of money, which contradict 
the government intentions of doing it "further and faster" (see chapter 6).
8.3.3 Productivity
In the Sudan, PEs are the major suppliers of most consumer goods, and responsible 
for about 75 percent of exports. Therefore, their performance has a major influence on the 
Treasury, as well as the public at large. However, the productivity of almost all PEs has 
been disappointing. As the cases showed, many factors have contributed to this state of 
affairs including lack of a clear government policy towards PEs, massive brain-drain, 
obsolete plants, severe shortages of foreign exchange to acquire necessary inputs and spare 
parts, inept management, poor financial management systems, and inadequate infrastructure. 
As a result, capacity utilisation is unduly low, creating severe shortages of basic consumer 
goods. The following examples from the industrial sector may clarify this assertion.
Table 8.5 
Capacity Utilisation of the 
Sugar Industry00 
(1984/85 and 1989/90)
YEAR Actual Production (Tons) Ratio of actual capacity0’’
PEs Kenana PEs Kenana
1984/85 192,939 306,000 54.1 92.7
1985/86 158,679 292,838 44.1 88.7
1986/87 174,102 309,621 49.0 93.6
1987/88 143,291 266,245 40.3 80.7
1988/89 121,543 260,103 34.2 78.8
1989/90 152,000 229,000 43.0 69.8
(a) The sector is composed of 4 state factories and one joint venture (Kenana).
(b) The designed capacity of the state factories combined is 355,000 tons, and Kenana 330,000 
tons of sugar per year.
Source: Public Corporation For Sugar Trading, Khartoum.
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Figure 8.1 
R atio  o f Capacity U tilisation 
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It is evident from table (8.5) and Figure (8.1) that the productivity of the state factories has 
been on a declining trend. As the Guneid Sugar Company showed, the reasons for this 
decline were numerous. First, a growing scarcity of foreign exchange to acquire imported 
inputs (i.e agricultural inputs and factory spare parts). Second, irrigation problems caused 
by power shortages, poor canal maintenance and the lack of coordination between the various 
government units involved in the sugar production. For example, irrigation is under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Irrigation, and the sugar research unit is affiliated to the 
Agricultural Research Corporation under the Ministry of Agriculture, without either specific 
regulations or legislation to that effect. Third, very high turnover rates among management 
and technicians, and a demoralised work force due to poor pay; poor working conditions and 
continuous changes in management (see chapter 11).
The Kenana Sugar Company is a joint venture with majority private investment, 
mainly Arabs, and a private management, which has produced about 65 percent of total
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production during this period (1984/85-1989/90). However, as table (8.5) reveals, its 
productivity, although much higher than that of the state factories, has also been on a 
declining trend over the years. This is largely attributed to foreign exchange shortages 
required to acquire inputs and to pay its expatriate staff. According to the initial agreement 
between the Government of Sudan and the private partners signed in 1976, the Government 
of Sudan is entitled to acquire the first 150,000 tons in local currency at a price negotiated 
with its board of directors. Any production in excess of 150,000 tons, could either be 
exported or sold to the Government of Sudan in hard currency, according to the international 
sugar prices. In reality, however, the Government had acquired all production to satisfy local 
demand, but failed to pay in hard currency, which created the situation noted above.
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that, the example of Kenana Sugar Company was 
not meant to compare the two sets of enterprises (public and private), simply because they 
are not alike. For example, while the Kenana Sugar Company is only ten years old, some 
state factories (e.g Guneid and Haifa) are almost 30 years old. As we shall see in chapter 11, 
the transfer price of sugar from Kenana to the Sugar Trading Corporation is much higher 
than those offered for PEs. The designed capacity of Kenana (330,000 tons) and the size of 
its farm (95,000 feddans), is almost equal to those of the four PEs (355,000 tons, and 
120,000 feddans), thus enabling Kenana to gain advantages of scale. Finally, the institutional 
framework within which both sets operate is entirely different, being bureaucratic in the case 
of PEs, and flexible in the case of Kenana. For example, the personnel policies for PEs are 
determined by the civil service chamber, purchases subject to the approval of the central 
purchasing committee and availability of funds, and finance is obtained from the MFEP after 
lengthy, painstaking negotiations. In Kenana, however, all these operating decisions are made 
by its board of directors and the chief executive.
The Kenana case was cited simply to point out that both public and private enterprises 
are constrained by factors in the broader environment, such as lack of foreign exchange. In
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effect, we shall increasingly argue that, given this distorted macroeconomic environment, 
denationalisation is unlikely to generate significant economic benefits (see chapter 13).
The textile industry is operating at even lower levels of capacity. Indeed, as the 
Friendship Textile company showed, the industiy is operating at less than 20 percent of its 
capacity, due to lack of inputs, spare parts and power. However, it must be stressed that,the 
Friendship company is the only one that has been consistently in operation, albeit at low 
levels of capacity. The other textile sheds rely entirely on "Haj Abdalla Spinning Factory 
(PE) for their raw material supply, but the supplier is operating at less than 15 percent of its 
capacity, due to air conditioning problems, soil movement that inhibits the plant being 
operated at full speed, and lack of dust evacuation systems. These are inherited problems that 
combine to halt production for five months a year, and hence the textile sheds have to stay 
idle in the interim.
It is thus evident that the history of government involvement in the textile industry 
has been disappointing. Indeed, despite the huge public investment made in the sector, the 
private sector is still predominant in terms of actual production, with some 60 percent of total 
production (Abbas, 1986). More important, its an area in which the private sector has long 
established itself, well before the state, and has achieved a reasonable degree of success.
The food and leather industries are another bitter story of the government 
industrialisation policy. There are seven food plants and four tanneries, most of which are 
located in remote rural areas, basically to promote rural development. However, they are 
hampered by lack of inputs, inadequate power supply, and highly centralised powers at the 
Headquarters in Khartoum. For these reasons, therefore, capacity utilisation is very low. 
Indeed, due to the poor performance of the food plants, four of them were closed down in 
the mid 1980s. However, all the food plants and the tanneries are currently selected for sale 
under the recent master privatisation plan (see chapter 6).
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In short, the whole industrial sector is operating at low levels of capacity, causing a 
burden on the Treasury and severe shortages of consumer goods. More important, since 
prices are based on the "cost-plus" formula, the idle capacity would raise unit costs, implying 
that prices could be set at higher levels, possibly above international prices, to the detriment 
of consumers. As the cases showed, the major factors inhibiting greater capacity utilisation 
include frequent power failures, breakdown of repair and maintenance, lack of imported 
inputs and spare parts due to lack of foreign exchange, and excessive price controls creating 
severe liquidity problems.
8.3.4 Non-operating PEs
Apart from the idle capacity phenomenon, there are a number of non-operating PEs 
in the Sudan. Some of these PEs were operating and were subsequently closed down either 
due to low productivity or the out-break of a civil war in the Southern part of the country. 
Yet, others have never been made operational for one reason or the other. The following 
table summarises this state of affairs for the industrial sector.
Table 8.6 
Industrial PEs: State of Operation
-Subsector Operating PEs Non-operating Total
Cement 2 0 2
Fertiliser 0 1 1
Food 3 4 7
Sugar 4 2 6
Tanneiy 3 1 4
Textile 8 6 14
Miscellaneous 2 5 7
Total 22 19 41
Source: Ministry of Industry, Khartoum.
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Of the 19 non-operating industrial PEs, 10 are located in the South, and were made 
non-operational, due to the out-break of the war. The rest were either closed down due to 
poor performance, such as the food plants, or were never operated, such as the fertiliser 
factory. In all cases, however, the state is still paying vast sums of money, in terms of staff 
salaries, because no decision regarding staff was taken, though the factories were closed.
Indeed, for a variety of factors, the authorities have done virtually nothing to utilise 
these wasted resources. These include the political and legal instability, the civil war, the 
effects of the three years drought (1982 - 1985), and the pervasive chaos in the civil service 
caused by the sharp deterioration in their real income. All these macro issues, in turn, 
engaged much of the government attention and time, at the expense of economic issues. In 
effect, PE issues were neglected, though the country is facing acute shortages of consumer 
goods. Needless to say, these goods could have been produced by these PEs, and hence 
saved the meagre foreign exchange used to import these goods.
8.4 Financial Performance
As we pointed out in chapter one, measurement of PE’s financial performance is by 
no means an easy task, due to the duality of objectives assigned to them (i.e economic and 
social objectives). In the Sudan, as it is in many other DCs, the problem of performance 
evaluation is further complicated by the lack of accurate and reliable information to enable 
a researcher to make an objective judgement. This is mainly due to the fact that PE’s 
accounts are not prepared according to the "Generally Accepted Accounting Principles" to 
permit comparability and that inflation accounting is unknown. Indeed, in the Sudan, even 
those rudimentary sets of accounts available, lag years behind, and hence are irrelevant for 
performance evaluation or decision making puiposes.
The following table, taken from the most recent Auditor General Report, shows the 
number of PEs audited vis-a-vis those not audited, over a three-year period. It is evident that
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the number of PEs that failed to present their accounts for auditing were increasing during 
the three-year period. For example, the number of PEs not audited increased from 133 PEs 
(58 percent) in 1984/84, to 202 PEs (88 percent) by 1986/87. Indeed, there are some PEs 
which were not audited for more than 10 years, such as the Blue Nile Agricultural Scheme 
(1980/81); Nuba Mountains Agricultural Corporation (1976/77), and Elsuki Agricultural 
Scheme (1978/79).
Table 8.7 
Auditing Status of PEs 
as at June, 1978











Agriculture 8 23 6 25 3 28
Industry 36 27 26 37 4 59
Commerce 32 60 23 69 6 86
Finance 17 5 15 7 13 10
Hotels 4 18 2 20 2 19
Total 97 133 72 158 28 202
Source: Auditor General Report, 1987/88
Apart from the fact that lack of reliable and timely information would render financial 
performance measurement a difficult process, it has far reaching implications for 
privatisation. Clearly, a viable privatisation process requires accurate, up-to-date information 
to be disclosed to the investing public, to enable them to evaluate the technical and financial 
position of the enterprise upon which to base their bids. Similarly, the state needs basic 
information about the financial position of the enterprise and the size of staff, to determine 
the floor price and the amount of the severance payment required. Therefore, the appropriate 
course of action would be to form task forces or hire expatriate staff to assemble such data 
before embarking upon any privatisation exercise. However, these preparatory measures are
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likely to be time-consuming, which contradict the government intentions of privatising a large 
number of PEs over just a three-year period.
Nevertheless, the available evidence indicates that the financial performance of PEs 
has been disappointing over the years. Indeed, 7 of the 9 factories established in the 1960s, 
incurred losses in an amount of £s 7.3 million ($2.68 million), or 30 percent of their original 
investment up to 1969 (Auditor General Report, 1970). These losses were attributed by a 
committee formed in 1970 to evaluate the state factories to the following factors. First, no 
scientific criteria for the selection of the factories was followed, feasibility studies were either 
non-existent or improperly prepared, and no attempt was made to secure the flow of raw 
material supply. Second, the factories were established without preparing the qualified staff 
to operate them, in particular management. In fact, in the post-independence period, the 
"Sudanisation" of posts was a national issue, and hence managerial posts were often filled 
in haste by non-professional managers. Indeed, the committee concluded that "no scientific 
principles for the evaluation of jobs, and putting the right person in the right place ever 
existed". Third, inadequate delegation of authority, leading to massive irregularities, which 
went undetected and violators unpunished for a long time.
As the_ cases showed, the recent history (post-1980) does not fare better than the 
earlier history. Indeed, performance has even deteriorated further, as plants grew older and 
the repair and maintenance broke down due to lack of foreign exchange, severe liquidity 
problems partly due to the stringent price controls, inadequate infrastructure, and massive 
brain-drain (see chapter 7). Indeed, the persistent losses have wiped out the capital of some 
PEs (i.e technically bankrupt), others are not in a position to meet their current maturing 
obligations, while some have even failed to pay the staff salaries. Another noticeable fact in 
the Sudan is the poor collection of accounts receivables, creating severe working capital 
problems. In the Gezira scheme, for example, the accounts receivables from tenants and the
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Cotton Public Corporation were about 71 percent of current assets. Indeed, this situation of 
inter-departmental accounts is so pervasive across all PEs, and surprisingly there is no any 
central government agency with a comprehensive knowledge of the magnitude of these 
transactions. Clearly, this would require a considerable amount of work to be done, which 
contradicts the government intentions of privatising as urgently as possible.
In summary, the poor performance of PEs is attributed, in the main, to the highly 
distorted macroeconomic environment in which they operate. That is the severe shortages of 
foreign exchange, the rigid pricing systems and inadequate infrastructure. There is no any 
central government unit with accurate data about the number of PEs, the size of the work 
force, the government equity or the financial position of PEs. For these reasons, therefore, 
the privatisation process is likely to be difficult, and its potential benefits are unlikely to be 
realised. We shall pick up these points in more detail in chapters 12 and 13. In the following 
chapter, we shall investigate the internal issues relating to the organisation and management 
of the Sudanese PEs.
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Chapter Nine
Organisation and Management 
of PEs in the Sudan
The purpose of this chapter will be to investigate the organisation and management 
of PEs. It will be composed of three main sections. The first section will be devoted to the 
macro organisational set up and the emerging organisational issues. The second section deals 
with the managerial functions of planning, organising, staffing and controlling. The final 
section will critically examine the subject of managerial autonomy in theory and practice.
9.1 Macro Organisation
The macro organisational set up of PEs in the Sudan has experienced numerous 
changes since their creation in the early 1960s. Nevertheless, the basic model of control over 
PEs has been a sectoral ministry model, where PEs were attached to a particular ministry to 
provide sectoral policy, monitor and evaluate PEs attached to it. This sectoral ministry 
control model, however, appears to be not unusual and found in many countries, such as 
Brazil (Trebat, 1983). Indeed, Hanson (1965) asserts that it is only through ministerial 
control that PEs can achieve the overall socio-economic policy of the country. The author 
argues that "The alternatives are either no control at all or control by bodies with no political 
responsibility, both of which may be ruled out as harmful and/or impractical".
As elsewhere, however, we found that the ministerial control model proved to be 
ineffective, partly due to lack of a clear, transparent public policy towards PEs, and partly 
due to lack of information flows between PEs and the central government. Moreover, there 
are so many government units that are able to influence, directly or indirectly, the operations
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of PEs, creating great confusion as to who has the authority to act on behalf of the state. 
This is largely because the various laws establishing PEs have proposed central overseeing 
agencies to be created to supervise PEs, but they never came into existence. Indeed, we 
found that there is no single central overseeing agency with accurate and reliable data on the 
number of PEs, government equity, financial position of each PE, or the inter-departmental 
accounts between PEs (see below).
In what follows, we will outline the macro organisational structure of the industrial 
PEs as a case study, to show how the government control over PEs has evolved, the current 
state of the art, and then comment on the emerging organisational issues.
9.1.1 Organisation of Industrial PEs
Initially, the supervision of the nine factories established in the early 1960s was 
assigned to "the Government Factories Authority", which was converted in 1965 into "The 
Industrial Development Corporation" (IDC). The IDC was mandated to complete the 
construction of unfinished factories, recommend new projects, and manage the factories. To 
perform these tasks, the IDC was granted a considerable degree of autonomy (see 9.3). 
However, the nationalisation and confiscation measures of the 1970 substantially increased 
the number olPEs, which necessitated the reorganisation of the sector to accommodate the 
new comers. In effect, "the Public Corporations Act, 1971" was issued, which established a 
"Supreme Authority for the Public Sector Corporations" to monitor the operations of all PEs. 
The Act also established a two-tier system : sectoral and branch corporations. As a result, 
"The Industrial Production Corporation" (IPC) was created as a sectoral corporation to 
operate all industrial PEs. It was charged with the responsibility of "general supervision, 
control, coordination, and performance evaluation of branch corporations, without interfering 
in the internal affairs of such branch corporations" (1971 Act, Section 3.1). The main 
governing body of the IPC was its board of directors responsible for "drawing up the general 
policy of the IPC in accordance with policies laid down by the Supreme Authority". The
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main tasks of the EPC included the execution of projects in accordance with the development 
plan, supervising the activities of the production units, evaluating possibilities for establishing 
new projects and/or developing existing projects. Initially, the 1971 Act provided for the 
creation of eight branch corporations under IPC. These were branch corporations for food, 
sugar, oil, mining, tobacco, building materials, electrical, and leather.
However, due to the hasty denationalisation measures that took place in 1972, the 
number of industrial PEs dropped from 47 to 32. As a result, the industrial sector was 
rearranged into four branch corporations instead of eight. These were branch corporations 
for food, sugar, leather, and mining. In 1975, and due to the establishment of a substantial 
number of new factories, the industrial sector was reorganised into seven branch corporations 
for food, sugar, oil, leather, mining, building materials, spinning and weaving industries. 
The following chart summarises these organisational developments between 1971-1975.














Supreme Authority for Public 
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Although, this organisation appeared to be sound and logical, it was claimed that the 
buffer corporation has lengthened the chain of command and deprived the production units 
of the autonomy provided for in the law. Accordingly, a new legislation "The Public 
Corporation Act, 1976" was passed, which resulted in the liquidation of the IPC. Under the 
new Act, only one type of a corporation was to be established by a "Warrant of 
Establishment", vaguely defined as a "corporation established in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act, for the purpose of achieving the objectives for which it was created". 
The corporation was to be supervised by a Minister named in its "Warrant of Establishment", 
to give "general and specific direction to the board of directors in any matter relating to the 
corporation as he may think to involve public interest, and the board shall act according to 
such directions" (section, 7.1). The governing body of the corporation was its board, 
"responsible for the management of its affairs". In particular, it was to lay down the general 
policy, to conclude contracts and agreements, to approve annual budgets, to appoint staff and 
to submit periodical reports to the Minister concerned (section 7.4).
In practice, however, this framework of ministerial control never functioned as it was 
originally intended. As elsewhere, while the original intention was that ministers should 
provide strategic guidance, and refrain from detailed interference in day-to-day operating 
decisions, in .reality the opposite occurred; strategic guidance was never provided and 
intervention in operating decisions mounted. The Sudanese authorities failed to establish 
incentives for managers and ministers to act in the "public interest", which was, in turn, 
politically defined, according to the political party in power.
The 1976 Act also replaced the "Supreme Authority for Public Sector Corporations" 
with a "Supreme Council for Public Corporations", chaired by the Minister of Finance, and 
empowered to: (1) recommend to the "President of the Republic" the establishment of new 
projects, and winding up or amalgamation of any corporation that fails to achieve its objects 
or if the public interest so requires, (2) coordinate among corporations and settle disputes,
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(3) set limits to borrowing, and (4) determine the percentage of revenues to be remitted to 
the Treasury (section 6.1).
In relation to the personnel issues, the Act established a separate organ, "The General 
Administrative Organ for Corporations", under the Minister of Public Service and 
Administrative Reform. The organ was entrusted with the following tasks: (1) evaluation and 
classifications of posts for corporations; (2) recommend to the Minister the service 
regulations for corporations; (3) supervise and control annual budgets for posts, and (4) assist 
the corporations in reconsidering their organisational structures (section 8).
Nevertheless, as with the "Supreme Authority for Public Sector Corporations" under 
the repealed 1971 Act, neither the Supreme Council for Public Corporations, nor the 
"Administrative Organ for Corporations" has ever come into existence. As a result, an 
organisational vacuum was created in the entire system concerning the location of specific 
responsibilities and authorities. Moreover, the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative 
Reform was later liquidated, with its functions scattered across different government units, 
which had had disastrous effects on the personnel issues, as we shall see later.
In addition to these pieces of legislation, the government also issued "The Financial 
and Accounting Regulations Act, 1977". This Act considerably diluted the role assigned to 
the sectoral ministries, and centralised in the MFEP the powers to approve budgets; to make 
regulations regarding financial management and accounting systems; to control purchases and 
contracts; stores; foreign loans and subsidies. PEs were required to strictly adher to the 
provisions of the Act, according to section(2.B), viz: "The heads of corporations must 
commit themselves to the execution of this statute and any procedures obtained from it". 
Nevertheless, we shall increasingly argue that this piece of legislation was in conflict with 
the provisions and the spirit of the 1976 Act, particularly regarding the autonomy of PEs (see 
9.3).
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Finally, in 1981, a Presidential decree was issued to convert all industrial public 
corporations into "private limited companies" under the Companies Law, 1925 (the latest in 
the country). This is a form of organisation under the 1925 Act, which restricts its 
membership; prohibits inviting the public to subscribe to its shares and debentures, and 
expects the enterprise to adopt a private sector behaviour in its operations1. The objective 
was to grant industrial PEs more flexibility and autonomy in their operating criteria. We shall 
discuss these legal restructuring measures in more detail in chapter (10), registering for the 
moment the fact that, however sound and desirable these objectives were, the implementation 
was flawed in many respects. At present, the PEs converted into companies continued to 
operate under the same laws and regulations; under the same management and work force, 
and hence no significant improvement in productivity or financial performance materialised.
9.1.2 Emerging Organisational Issues.
The government control systems were based, in the main, on the law (i.e the Acts of 
1965, 1971, 1976, 1977 and the 1925 Company Law). This is largely due to the seeming 
success and the attractiveness of the British public coxporation model (Ghai, 1985). The 
Sudan, a former British colony, adopted the British legal system, and has only recently been 
changed to the Islamic Laws (the company law, however, remained unchanged since 1925). 
As in the UK,, the law clearly defined the interface relationship between the government and 
the corporations. For example, the 1976 Public Corporations Act stressed that, the 
corporations should be accountable for the performance of their functions by requiring the 
Boards of Directors to submit to the sectoral ministry half yearly reports on the progress of 
the business of the corporation, the final accounts and the audit reports (section 17).
1 The companies Law, 1925, provides for two types of companies; public 
and private. The primary differences between them are that: (1) the number of 
share holders, (private; no less than two and no more than fifty; public; no 
less than seven but no maximum limit); and (2) ability to trade shares: 
private, only among partners; and public to any investors in the open market. 
Thus, in the context of the current Sudanese Law, the state can own all the 
shares in a private company. Therefore, the term "private" should not be 
construed as the opposite of government (see chapter 10).
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However, the law maintained that such accountability "should not impinge unduly upon the 
management of the corporation". This was to be achieved by the establishment of the 
corporation’s "legal entity, having a perpetual succession, a common seal, and may sue and 
be sued in its own name".
The enactment of the law, however, was very weak, and so was the commitment of 
the state not to intefer in the management of the corporation. As elsewhere, the distinction 
between the corporation and the central government, which was emphasised by Morrison, 
the founder of the public corporation model, was never adhered to. As the cases showed, the 
boards were composed, in the main, of civil servants representing concerned ministries, 
which allowed bureaucracy to creep in and influenced managerial behaviour and attitudes. 
As Ghai (1985) argues "An influential minister or civil servant can stifle enterprise initiative 
at an early stage, or force it into action that is contrary to its own good sense... If the board 
is an extension of the government, then management is an extension of the bureaucracy". 
Indeed, in the very rare cases where the chairman of the board was not a representative of 
the sectoral ministry, as in the case of the Duty Frees Shops Corporation, we found that the 
board has managed to defend the corporation’s autonomy in a number of respects, including 
the MFEP’s prerogative in reviewing the corporation’s annual budget.
Second, it appears that there is a positive relationship between the tightness of the 
government control and macro-economic situation. For example, in the 1970s when inflation 
rates were under control and there were no major balance of payments and unemployment 
problems, PEs have enjoyed a higher degree of operational autonomy, than in the 1980s 
when the country faced serious economic and financial difficulties. Consequently, there were 
often swings between centralisation and decentralisation, regardless of the provisions of the 
law, which Ayub and Hegstad (1986) referred to as "the vicious circle control".
Third, although both the 1971 and 1976 legislation have provided for the creation of 
a central overseeing agency, in fact they have never been created. As a result, a state of
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confusion emerged regarding the location of the authority and responsibility in the whole 
system. The following simplified chart, theoretically illustrates the current state of the art.
Chart 9.2 
The Institutional Environment 
of PEs in the Sudan.




















However, it must be stressed that the above chart is by no means exhaustive of the 
various government units that are able to influence the operations of the Sudanese PEs. For 
example, our investigation revealed that there are about 12 departments within MFEP alone 
that exercise some sort of control over PEs. The most important are: (1) The’ Public 
Corporation Administration, which was created only in 1983, presumably to assume the 
functions and responsibilities of the Supreme Council for Public Corporations. In reality, 
however, the Administration is only concerned with the approval of the annual budgets, and
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to see to it that the corporations are operating within the budget limits. Indeed, the 
Administration is not even able to obtain actual achievements to be compared with the plans; 
to seek explanations for deviations, and to take corrective measures when necessary. The 
reason often cited by the officials interviewed is that "we asked for reports on actual 
performance, but failed to get a response from the corporations". PE managers, on the other 
hand, referring to the 1976 Act (section 7.2), claim that such reports will be submitted only 
to the sectoral ministry, through the board of directors.
However, our investigation revealed that, even sectoral ministries, notably the 
Ministry of Industry, were complaining about lack of feedback. An official in the Ministry 
of Industry attributed this situation to the inadequacy of the communication services in the 
country. He argued that "you need months to contact Nyala in the West or Karima in the 
North, and by the time the report arrives, it becomes totally irrelevant for decision making 
purposes". It is true that the communication systems in the Sudan are totally unreliable and 
in complete disarray. Indeed, a number of PEs, such as the Gezira and Rahad agricultural 
scheme, have established their own telecommunication networks, basically due to the 
extremely poor services provided by the telecommunication corporation, though it has a 
monopoly position as per its "Warrant of Establishment". But nevertheless, as the cases 
showed, even_PE managers are not receiving regular reports, largely due to the absence of 
management information systems in all PEs. A second department within the MFEP is the 
Civil Service Chamber; which determines all personnel issues including wages, posts; 
promotion and approval of the salaries budget; often referred to as "chapter one". A third 
is the Planning Wing of the MFEP, empowered to approve the development budget, reffered 
to as "chapter three", as well as allocation of foreign exchange for PEs. A fourth, is the 
central purchasing department responsible to approve all foreign purchases and local 
purchases in excess to £s 500,000 (£12,500). A fifth,is the Financial Accounting Department 
entrusted to appoint financial managers to PEs, often on secondment basis from its own staff, 
largely to ensure adherence to the financial regulations contained in the 1977 Financial
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Regulations Act by the corporations. Other departments within the MFEP able to influence 
the operations of PEs include: The custom duties, the money and banking, the government 
revenues, and the disposition of surplus assets departments.
The list also includes: the sectoral ministries in their theoretical role to provide 
strategic guidance and the sector policy. The Ministry of Industry, for example, is 
empowered to set ex-factory prices for all manufactured goods; to monitor quality control; 
to transfer modem technology; and to devise and implement modem management practices 
(see below). There is also the Bank of Sudan, the main lender to PEs, the Ministry of 
Commerce to issue import licences and to set wholesale prices; the Attorney General 
responsible to ensure that PE’s transactions are carried out in accordance with the Financial 
regulations; the Foreign Exchange Allocation Committee; the Mechanical Transport 
Department; the Ministry of Labour; and the Auditor General Chamber.
The fourth organisational issue is the frequency of changes of the macro 
organisational set up of PEs. As we saw above, the industrial sector has witnessed some five 
reorganisations in less than two decades. This phenomenon is largely inconsistent with the 
experience elsewhere, notably the UK from which the public corporation theory was 
borrowed. In the UK, for example, organisational changes took place over much longer time 
periods, and more importantly were based on vigorous studies, which came out in the 
successive White Papers of 1961; 1967; 1978. In the Sudan, on the other hand, such studies 
on the deficiencies of existing forms and the need for change were never undertaken before 
the abolition of one form, and introduction of the other. For instance, Idris (1986) alleged 
that the IPC was a main reason for the poor performance of the industrial sector, as it 
centralised powers and lengthened the chain of command. The researcher, however, failed 
to establish a firm evidence to this effect. On the contrary, taking the productivity of the 
Sugar factories as a case study-due to the strategic importance and the size of investment 
made in the industry - we found that the productivity of the two sugar factories, established 
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Source: Sugar Trading Corporation, Khartoum.
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It is quite evident that, productivity reached its peak between 1971 and 1975 (the IPC 
era), before declining to its lowest levels ever (30 percent) in later years. However, we are 
not claiming that the holding corporation was the best organisational form, but simply to 
point out that, the so-called deficiencies that this organisational form were claimed to have 
made, were not substantiated by empirical investigation.
Thus, from the above discussion, it could be concluded that, government controls in 
the Sudan have not been introduced on a systematic basis. As Ghai (1985) argues, The 
inadequacy of one type of control leads to the establishment of another set of control, so that 
there is cumulative effects". This is largely because the Sudanese authorities have never spelt 
out precisely what the government wants to control, nor what it wants to achieve. As a 
result, neither the state knows exactly what it wants to achieve, nor could PEs be held 
accountable to a predetermined target. The government charges a 5 percent on the capital 
invested, and takes a percentage of the profits made by PEs. According to the provisions of 
the 1976 Act, the responsibility to set the percentage of profits to be remitted to the Treasury 
was assigned to the "Supreme Council for Public Corporations (section 2.2e). In practice, 
the MFEP used to deduct the 5 interest charge in advance, from the annual budget of each 
corporation.
The following observations could be made against this practice. First, some profitable 
PEs do not bring their annual budgets for approval by the MFEP, on the grounds that this 
is the function of the boards of directors (see case 3 in chapter 7). Thus, loss-making and 
financially-troubled enterprises, which need the government support bring their budgets for 
approval, and hence suffer more. Second, from the government point of view, the interest 
charge is under-estimated because the government equity in PEs is unknown with any degree 
of accuracy, and that no revaluation of assets has ever been undertaken despite the hyper 
inflation and the continuous devaluations that took place during the last decade. Equally, the 
5 percent interest charge is far below the 30 percent interest rates prevailing in the economy, 
and hence does not reflect the opportunity cost of this scarce resource.
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As regards the profit share to be remitted to the Treasury, there is a great controversy 
concerning the legitimate body to set the rate. According to the provisions of the 1976 Act, 
this role was assigned to the Supreme Council for Public Corporations, while the Financial 
Regulations Act, 1977, assigned this task to the MFEP. Nevertheless, as the Supreme 
Council never came into existence, the MFEP assumed this role "by elimination", which 
created a problem of goal congruence. That is, the same ministry setting the rate is the 
receiving ministry. Therefore, in a bid to maximise the government revenues, the MFEP 
could set the rate at unrealistic levels, as the DFSC case showed (see chapter 7).
In any case, according to the provisions of the 1976 Act, the rate was supposed to be 
paid out of the actual profits generated, based on certified accounts. In reality, since the 
accounts of most PEs are years behind, the MFEP used to deduct its profit share from each 
corporation’s budget, based on budgeted profits. Thus, the annual budget is the only way 
through which the government exercises control over PEs. However, the budgeting system 
itself is deficient in a number of scores, and indeed it is no more than allocating the meagre 
resources among competing users in a subjective manner. As a result, it is irrelevant for 
planning and controlling purposes (see below).
9.2 MicrojOrganisation
In this section, we shall examine issues relating to the managerial functions of 
planning, organising, staffing and controlling. The analysis will be based on the cases 
outlined in chapter 7.
9.2.1 Planning
Planning as a management function can be defined as identifying alternative courses 
of actions, setting realistic and attainable objectives, and specifying the strategies to achieve 
those objectives. Thus, planning is supposed to bridge the gap between the present and the 
future, to focus attention on goals, and attempt to offset uncertainty by forecasting events.
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However, planning in this sense, simply does not exist in the Sudan. As the cases 
showed, absence of long and medium term planning is the norm. Indeed, the only form of 
planning performed is the annual budget, which follows the government budget structure and 
timing. Therefore, it is of limited operational value to commercial enterprises (see below).
Objectives
Many writers would claim that, the cornerstone of any planning exercise is the 
formulation of realistic, unambiguous objectives. Indeed, if planning is the most important 
managerial function, objective setting is the most important step in planning. In the Sudan, 
however, the objectives behind the creation of PEs has never been clearly defined, let alone 
enterprise objectives. Indeed, the Public Corporation Act, 1976, did not define in a clear, 
precise manner the corporation itself. The former 1971 Act, over- emphasised the political 
motives for the government intervention in the economy, such as "with the aim of liberating 
the economy from the grip of foreign firms", "the establishment of the basis for a socialist 
economy", "in order to serve public interest and get rid of the selfishness and greediness of 
private firms". However, the Act was completely silent on the enterprise objectives. 
Similarly, the Six-year Plan (1977/78 -1983/83) over-emphasised the social objectives, such 
as rural development and job creation, but said nothing on the enterprise objectives. As a 
result, the absence of realistic, clearly formulated and communicated objectives is the norm 
throughout the cases investigated. Ideally, such enterprise objectives should be derived from 
the overall macroeconomic objectives. But, even in the absence of macro objectives, micro 
objectives developed at the enterprise level could provide a basis for performance evaluation. 
At present, however, there are no clear, quantified objectives across all the cases, in terms 
of financial targets or physical production that could provide guidelines for PE managers.
The reasons for the absence of enterprise objectives are numerous. First, is the 
absence of a clear rationale for the whole sector from which enterprise objectives could be 
derived. Second, the multiplicity of principals (i.e the numerous government units that are
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able to influence the operations of PEs) often leads to conflicting messages being transmitted 
to PEs. Third, the fact that the budgeting system is closely related to the state budget format 
and timing, discourages long and medium term planning. Fourth, the very high turnover rates 
among senior management, and more importantly so many operating decisions are beyond 
the control of management (e.g foreign exchange allocation, pricing and labour policies, 
financing, purchasing and power supply). All of these, inhibit medium and long term 
planning.
This state of affairs has created a sense of confusion and frustration among PE 
managers. Indeed, the objectives often cited by PE managers interviewed were so broad, and 
in most cases confusing, as the following quotations reveal.
(-) "Achieve self-sufficiency, manufacture our raw materials rather than export 
them ",
(-) "Earn foreign exchange through the export o f finished goods",
(-) "Establish factories in rural areas so as to contain rural-urban migration, and 
raise the standards o f living in those areas",
(-) "Satisfy local demand",
(-) "Generate profits for the Treasury",
In no case, however, were these broad, long term plans translated into quantified, 
monitorable annual targets. As a result, all PEs concentrate on annual budgets as the only 
form of operational planning. Indeed, all PE managers interviewed indicated that they have 
no freedom to formulate long term plans for their Arms. They are obliged by law to follow 
the government budget format and timing as specified in the "Budget Manual" issued 
annually by the MFEP.
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In what follows we will outline the budgeting process, and then analyse its main 
deficiencies2. The Public Corporation Act, 1976 (section 15) maintained that "the budget of 
each corporation should be prepared on sound commercial and accounting basis". In practice, 
however, the budgeting system practised in the Sudanese PEs is the same as the conventional 
government budget, which is composed of three chapters: chapter one deals with personnel 
benefits and approved by the civil service chamber; chapter two deals with operating 
expenses and approved by the Finance Wing of the MFEP; chapter three is divided into two 
sections: section one deals with minor capital expenditure and approved by the Finance Wing 
of the MFEP, while major capital investment are approved by the Planning Wing of the 
MFEP, under the "development budget".
The procedures run as follows: each year the "Budget Administration Department" 
of the MFEP sends to all government departments, including PEs, a "Budget Preparation 
Manual" specifying the objectives of the government budget for the forthcoming financial 
year and the specific guidelines that govern the estimation of the budget items. In effect, PEs 
as well as all other public sector units, such as hospitals and educational institutions, must 
structure their budgets in accordance with the instructions contained in the "Budget 
Preparation Manual".
For example, the Budget Preparation Manual for 1990/91, outlined the following 
major objectives of the government budget.
(1) self-reliance, through optimum utilisation o f available resources; productivity 
increase and efficiency enhancement.
(2) increase internal revenues to increase total government revenues in relation to 
GDP.
2
this budgeting process applies to all government units, including all 
PEs in the country.
(3) reduce government and PEs borrowing from the central bank, with the aim o f 
reducing total money supply in the economy.
(4) reduce inflation rates in the economy.
(5) reduce public expenditures.
(6) development o f exports to generate more foreign resources.
To achieve these broad macro objectives, the Budget Preparation Manual went on to 
specify a series of measures on how the budgetary items can be made for the 1990/91 budget 
proposals. For example, it specified that the expenditure for wages and salaries should be the 
same as those of the previous year, without creating any new jobs. The expenditure for 
operating expenses were to be reduced by 15 percent from the previous year’s level. For 
chapter three items, the Manual specified that the appropriation should be centralised and 
disbursed according to "priorities".
Upon the receipt of the Budget Manual, the Financial Manager of each PE forwards 
these instructions to the functional managers, and inform them about the timing of presenting 
their departmental budgets. An initial meeting is then held in early March - just 3 months 
before the end of the fiscal year - between the General Manager and functional managers. 
Following this introductory meeting, a series of meetings are then arranged between the 
financial manager and other divisional managers, theoretically to discuss how to comply with 
the guidelines specified in the Manual. In reality, these meetings are more to do with finding 
ways and means of evading the guidelines in anticipation of cuts by the MFEP. When all 
divisional budgets have been prepared, the financial manager constructs a global budget, and 
presents it to the General Manager, who in turn presents it to the board of directors for 
approval. However, the board approval is just a formality given the unlimited powers of the 
MFEP to modify the budget. The financial manager then takes the budget for discussion with 
the sectoral ministry, and then to the MFEP for. approval.
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Having broadly outlined the budgeting process, which is the same for all the 
government departments, including all PEs, we now turn to discuss its value as a planning 
tool. First, the budget horizon and format is closely linked to the government budget format 
and timing. As a result, PE’s budgets are not related to any long term plans, and must adher 
to the government budget structure and timing, regardless of the nature of their business or 
the production cycle. In the agricultural sector, for instance, the period between April and 
June of each year is the busiest time of the year, because it coincides with the preparation 
and payment of tenants proceeds. Thus, the budgeting system is not only of limited relevance 
to these PEs in the agricultural sector, but also severely limits their financial autonomy. 
Second, on the anticipation that the budgets will be exposed to the subjective cuts at the 
MFEP, PEs usually over-state their budgets. Consequently, the vicious circle of inflated 
budgets and cuts by the MFEP reduces the budgeting system to no more than a subjective 
way of apportioning the meagre resources between the government units. Nevertheless, it 
must be stressed that, during the budget discussion at the MFEP, PEs are not in a position 
to defend their budget estimates, not least because the budgets are not based on accurate, 
reliable data. Moreover, the financial managers in all the cases are on secondment from the 
MFEP, which creates a sense of divided loyalty between their PEs and their ultimate 
masters. Third, the approving authority (the MFEP) does not obtain actual results of the 
previous year budget to compare them with budgeted figures, to analyse variances and to take 
corrective measures. Apart from the fact that this practice hinders control (see below), it does 
not encourage PEs to control costs or improve productivity, which is the main function of 
a sound budgeting system. Indeed, we failed to find actual budget performance information 
at the government level. The Auditor General Chamber, has the actual results, though years 
behind. But, in carrying out the audit function, the Auditor General does not obtain the 
budgets to compare them with the actual results, implying that efficiency auditing is not 
known in the Sudan (see below). Fourth, there is complete separation between capital budget 
and the operating budget. For no clear reasons, the former is approved by the Planning Wing 
of the MFEP,and the latter divided between the finance wing of the MFEP and the Civil
Service Chamber. Although the Planning and Finance Wings were merged in 1983 to form 
the MFEP, they continued to operate as autonomous entities with virtually independent 
budgets. The Civil Service Chamber, on the other hand, was part of the Ministry of Public 
Service and Administrative Reform, which was liquidated in 1981, and the Chamber attached 
to the MFEP. This situation, in turn, created a number of government departments involved 
in the budgeting process, which complicated the system. The point is that there is no 
relationship between the planning of the capital and operating expenditure. Finally, as it is, 
the budgeting system is further distorted by the excessive bureaucratic controls, where PE 
managers must operate within the budget limits. Moreover, since managers who exceed the 
budget ceilings are subject to prosecution, the budgeting process has often meant that, PE 
managers put more emphasis on observing the ceilings, than the needs of the corporation, 
or to the changes brought by changes in the environment.
Planning Constraints
The major impediments to effective planning include a highly distorted economic 
environment, lack of reliable and timely data, and some underlying cultural factors.
The Economic Environment
In a static environment, events are likely to be easier to predict, which has never been 
the case in the Sudan. The continuous devaluations, the soaring inflation, the lack of foreign 
exchange, the frequent power failures, and the frequency of organisational changes are facts 
of life. We shall pick up these macro factors in chapter 12, registering for the moment that 
these uncontrollable factors have hindered planning and frustrated PE managers. Indeed, all 
PE managers interviewed claimed that they often spend an inordinate amount of time dealing 
with these external constraints, rather than performing their normal managerial functions.
Lack of Information
An essential prerequisite for effective planning is the availability of a comprehensive 
and timely data to assess the available opportunities, to formulate realistic objectives and the
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means to achieve those objectives. However, the data situation in the Sudan, at both micro 
and macro levels, is at best sketchy and unreliable. We have already seen that, at the 
enterprise level, the accounting systems are rudimentary, and the financial statements are not 
prepared according to sound accounting practices. More important, they lag years behind, 
and hence irrelevant for planning purposes. In addition, the accounts are usually prepared 
according to the government accounting systems, which are based on cash accounting (i.e 
cash received and paid out). As a result, the accrual basis of accounting, where expenses and 
revenues are recognised when incurred/earned, regardless of being paid/collected, is not 
used. Thus, the PEs are unable to prepare their financial accounts on sound commercial 
basis. For example cash movements are recorded under the same headings as those used to 
present the budget.












Budget surplus/deficits X __
Total XX XX
The reasons for this state of affairs could be attributed to the following factors. First, 
the Financial Regulations Act, 1977, originally designed to safeguard public money against 
misappropriation, has over-burdened financial managers with routine, clerical work, such as
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authorisation of cash payments and receipts, and issuance and receiving of raw materials. In 
effect, these daily routine tasks seem to occupy most of their time, at the expense of 
developing sound accounting systems. However, it must be emphasised that the responsibility 
to design and implement sound accounting systems in the industrial sector lies with the 
"Industrial Research and Consultancy Centre", under the Ministry of Industry (see below). 
So, PE managers have neither the authority nor the tools to initiate and implement proper 
accounting systems that suit their needs. Second, the financial managers in all the cases 
investigated were on secondment from the MFEP, and are career civil servants. Therefore, 
it might be difficult for them to depart from that experience. Third, as the cases showed, the 
accounting staff are predominantly school leavers with no accounting background, which 
makes it difficult to operate a sophisticated accounting systems. Fourth, the attitudes of PE 
managers towards the use of accounting data for decision making purposes is very low 
(Musa, 1987). As we shall see later, this is largely because PE managers are often civil 
servants with no experience in business management.
The situation at the macro level, however, is not much better. As noted earlier, the 
lack of statistics on vital issues, such as the number of PEs, the size of staff, the government 
equity and financial position of PEs is the norm. In fact, government departments do not 
publish regular reports and even those published are not systematcally distributed to the 
public, so as to inform them about the costs of operating PEs. As we argued earlier, there 
might have been less political opposition had the public been informed about the persistent 
losses of PEs. More importantly, the evidence from the literature indicates that publicising 
the financial performance of PEs greatly improves performance (Ayub and Hegstad, 1986). 
The authors attribute this to "Finsinger Social Comparison Theory" which states that "people 
most strenuously seek to evaluate their performance by comparing themselves to others, not 
by using absolute standards".
Cultural Factors
A final major constraint to effective planning relates to the prevailing cultural factors 
within the Sudanese society. For example, a recent study on the impact of cultural factors 
on the Sudanese management practices reported that, the prevailing attitudes among the 
Sudanese in general is "wait and see" (Hassan, 1982). The author argues that "The Sudanese
2 0 1
do not realise the need for planning, because they strongly believe in fate, and in God not 
only as a creator but also as a causal factor for everything". Although we do agree with the 
author, we are not in a position to comment on this highly complicated religious issue.
9.2.2 Organising
The second managerial function is organising, which refers to the grouping of 
enterprise activities into functional departments, product lines, or geographical locations to 
facilitate the attainment of objectives. In the Sudan, the colonial civil service provided the 
PEs with the basic knowledge of organising. However, as the cases showed, the organisation 
structure across all the cases is the same: usually a managing director supported by divisional 
managers for finance, personnel, production, sales, etc. Yet, the lack of specific terms of 
reference for the managing director or the functional managers is the norm. Indeed, it is not 
unusual to find the managing director and his subordinates placed at the same scale and 
receive the same salary. This is largely because posts were normally created to accommodate 
a certain individual without clear definition of the job. Moreover, there are departments that 
exist in name, but not functioning, such as training, research and development, and cost 
accounting.
This similarity in structure arguably is not always desirable, not least because 
different organisations with varying sizes and ages, facing different and environment, using 
different technology may require different structures. Therefore, the organising function 
should have been based on the situation within which PEs operate. Indeed, this is the core 
of the "contingency theory", which emphasised that there is no one best way to organise and 
manage different organisations in different situations (Otley,1980; Woodward, 1965; 
Lawerance and Lorsch, 1967). It is true that most PEs share common problems, such as 
obsolete plants, power failures, lack of foreign exchange, and the like. But, it is equally true 
that PEs in different parts of the country and in different sectors of the economy have 
different problems and face different threats. For example, the sugar industry involves two 
activities, the farm and the factory, which require the coordination of a number of 
government units. Needless to say, such interaction would necessitate a different organisation 
structure. Nevertheless, it appears that the Sudanese authorities have adopted a "ready made" 
model of organising, rather than a model based on the above contingent variables. The point
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is that, all these variables differ across PEs and change over time, and hence necessitate a 
different structure.
The effectiveness of the organising function depends entirely on the delegation of 
authority to managing directors, divisional managers and their subordinates to perform their 
tasks. The point is that, without adequate authority and clear lines of command, confusion 
will develop, to the detriment of long term success of the organisation. However, there are 
serious problems relating to authority delegation in the Sudan. The fact is that authority is 
often centralised at the top of the organisation or the central government. At the enterprise 
level, the span of management control provides a powerful demonstration of this 
phenomenon. In the Sudan Telecom Public Corporation, for example, there are 21 divisional 
and regional managers reporting directly to the Managing Director (chart 9.3).
More important, the very fact that there are no precise terms of reference for 
divisional and regional managers meant that they have to consult the Managing Director on 
routine operational decisions, such as distribution of fuel and recruitment of junior staff. In 
addition, simple decisions relating to minor changes in inputs prices often require approval 
from the central government. However, most PEs are located in remote rural areas with 
rudimentary communication services, and hence there are considerable delays caused by 
awaiting decisions from Khartoum.
The causes of this phenomenon (i.e centralisation) could be attributed, in part, to the 
lack of a clear public policy towards PEs, lack of specific terms of reference for PE 
managers, lack of qualified managers, and in part to cultural factors. For example, a recent 
study on the impact of cultural factors on management practices in the Sudan reported that 
"the pattern of organisation practised by the Sudanese managers is autocratic and 
paternalistic" (Hassan, 1982). The author attributes this state of affairs to the allocation of 
authority within the Sudanese family, where the father has absolute powers over the family 
members. This pattern, the author claims, "is transferred to the enterprise". Thus, the lack 
of interest, or even opposition to authority delegation and participative management among 
the Sudanese managers was attributed by the author to their belief that "participation 
undermines management powers, something they cherish and would like to keep".
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Chart 9.3 























































* : Numbers in boxes indicate grades.
** : The chart shows major reporting relationships. 
Source: Sudan Telecom Corporation, Khartoum.
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Another factor contributing to this anti-participative attitude relates to the fact that, 
in its 35-year history since independence, the country has experienced some 24 years of 
military regimes. Therefore, the dictatorship regimes have also influenced people’s attitudes 
towards participation in management, and the conduct of business in general.
In summary, the organising function is not based on the characteristics of different 
PEs, and the authority delegation is extremely poor, creating a state confusion and frustration 
to PE managers. Indeed, PE managers are often unaware about the roles of various 
government departments with which they deal, and are unable to adapt their operations to the 
situations in which they operate. Likewise, they are often constrained by a multitude of rules 
and regulations over all operating decisions (personnel, finance, purchases, pricing, etc), 
which reduces their autonomy to carry out their managerial functions in a proper manner.
9.2.3 Control
Control as a management function is defined as the comparison of actual performance 
to standards, analysis of variances between standards and actual results, and correcting 
deviations. Thus, controlling involves three main tasks: establishing standards, measuring 
actual results against standards, and seeking explanation for variances so as to take the 
necessary corrective measures.
In the Sudanese context, however, the practice of control is deficient at both the 
central government and the enterprise levels. At the macro level, we have seen that there is 
a lack of data on important issues. At the enterprise level, inadequate control is the norm, 
leading to poor performance and wasted resources. For example, the absence of a sound 
internal control systems and cash flow forecasts lead to detrimental consequences, where PEs 
experience severe shortages of cash and essential inputs at critical moments, receivables 
remain uncollected for years and short term obligations unpaid.
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A host of factors contribute to this state of affairs. First, is the lack of proper 
planning. Essentially controlling measures actual achievement against plans. But, in the 
absence of realistic targets, controlling becomes impossible. Second, since the accounts are 
years behind, accounting data are irrelevant for planning and control purposes. Moreover, 
efficiency auditing is unknown as illustrated by the fact that, the Auditor General does not 
obtain the annual budgets to be compared with actual results, though that might be 
meaningless given the backlog in accounts. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the 
Auditor General has initiated and designed sound management information systems so as to 
facilitate control. As a result, PEs have accumulated huge amounts of debts and losses, 
unable to meet their current maturing obligations, no costing systems, and internal auditors 
report to financial managers, but were never questioned by the Auditor General. Management 
reports are often irregular, improperly analysed, and are irrelevant for control purposes as 
they are not provided on timely basis. Third, the fact that poor performance does not result 
in rewards has led to loss of motivation to exercise control. Moreover, the poor pay and the 
frustration caused by factors in the broader environment (e.g foreign exchange), have led to 
low morale and very high turnover rates. A related factor is that communication channels 
within PEs are informal and irregular. As the cases showed, divisional managers rarely meet, 
and team meetings with the managing director occur primarily at the budget time.
9.2.4 Staffing
As the cases showed, there are personnel departments in all cases, and indeed rank 
among the basic functional departments. But, in virtually no case were the personnel 
departments assigned the responsibility for the development of the manpower needs. 
According to the provisions of the 1976 Act, a "General Administrative Organ" was 
proposed to develop appropriate personnel policies that suit the needs of PEs. In the event, 
the "organ" never came into being, and PEs found themselves constrained by the manuals 
and circulars of the Civil Service Chamber, and hence have no autonomy over all personnel 
issues.
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The quality of senior management, in particular, requires special comment, not least 
because the organisation success is determined, in part, by the competence of its top 
management. As the cases showed, however, the selection of management is often based on 
factors other than professionalism. The root cause of this problem dates back to the 
nationalisation period in the early 1970s, when a number of managers had to be appointed 
with some haste to cope with the influx of enterprises that came under public ownership. The 
natural concern of the government by then was political loyalty rather than qualifications in 
business management. At present, the criteria for the selection of PE managers is based, in 
part, on technical background and degrees. As a result, the chief executives of most 
industrial and the transport industries have come from the ranks of engineers, while those 
of the agricultural sector hold a degree in agricultural sciences. However, the system is 
distorted by complete reliance on political acceptance and seniority.
In the industrial sector, the responsibility to design and implement modem 
management practices was assigned to the Industrial Research and Consultancy Centre under 
the Ministry of Industry. The centre was established in 1965 by the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO), to render consultancy services for both public and 
private enterprises, in the fields of planning, production management, costing and financial 
management. Another unit, the "Efficiency Improvement Unit" was created to carry out these 
tasks for PEs. However, we found that the unit has failed to carry out its functions, solely 
due to severe staff shortages. Initially, the UNIDO brought in some expatriates to train the 
Sudanese nationals, on the assumption that they will takeover from the expatriates. But, due 
to the exodus of qualified staff to the Gulf, all the trainees have left, and the unit failed to 
operate in any efficient manner. At present, the unit is totally redundant, and the task of 
management development remains.
9.2.5 Turnover
As the cases showed, the turnover of senior management and trained staff has 
accelerated in the recent past, causing severe problems for the whole civil service, and in
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particular PEs. The reasons for this state of affairs are two-fold. First, the poor pay and the 
sharp deterioration in real income caused by the soaring inflation rates and the continuous 
devaluation of the local currency have led to mid-career departure. Second, in the Sudan, 
there is a law that empowers sectoral ministers to dismiss any civil servant for the so-called 
"public interest", without any specific reason or the right to appeal. It was meant to get rid 
of political opponents, and has been used quite extensively during the last two years (see 
chapter 13).
The higher turnover of management and experienced staff is detrimental for the long 
term success of any enterprise (public or private). In the Sudan, the problem is more acute, 
due to the scarcity of qualified managers, and lack of information. Indeed, as the cases 
showed, the lack of reliable, accurate data is the norm.
9.2.6 Training
Like all the other managerial functions, training is improperly planned and executed. 
Indeed, we found that no PE or sectoral ministry has a comprehensive manpower plan. The 
main reason is that, the training function for the whole civil service is the responsibility of 
the "National Administration for Training", under the Council of Minister. As a result, PEs 
have no autonomy to initiate training programmes. Nevertheless, it appears that training 
abroad is geared towards the needs of the individuals, rather than the needs of organisations. 
Indeed, all PE managers interviewed indicated that, university graduates often view training 
abroad as a right, and they usually go for the expensive academic training, which bears little 
or no relevance to the needs of their organisations. Similarly, on-job training is often 
neglected. Indeed, in the vast majority of cases, the training funds were used to finance other 
activities, or to supplement staff salaries, through bonuses and over-time premiums.
9.3 Managerial Autonomy
In this final section, we shall discuss issues relating to managerial autonomy, defined 
as the delegation of authority for PE managers to carry out their tasks in a proper manner.
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Indeed, the very basic idea of PEs as a form of organisation centres around autonomy as a 
critical prerequisite for their success.
In the Sudan, all the laws establishing PEs have specified a degree of operational 
autonomy for PEs, which stems from the British influence prior to independence in 1956. 
For example, the Industrial Development Corporation Act, 1965, maintained that "The Board 
shall at all times act on commercial principles and shall not be subject to the directions of 
any other person; body or authority". The Public Corporation Act, 1971, maintained that 
"The sectoral corporation shall be responsible for the general supervision; control; 
coordination and evaluation of performance of branch corporations attached to it, without 
interferring in the internal affairs of such branch corporations". Finally, the Public 
Corporation Act, 1976, granted public corporations wide powers "to carry out all transactions 
conducive to the achievement of its objects; to enter into contracts and agreements as it may 
think necessary and fit; to acquire shares in other corporations of similar objects; to employ 
such workers as it may consider necessary for the performance of its functions; to borrow 
money from banks; and subject to the approval of the Minister, to acquire land and to 
establish branches and offices inside and outside the Sudan, whenever the nature of its 
business so requires" (section 10.1). Moreover, the 1976 Act empowered the Board to be 
"responsible for the management of the enterprise affairs; to prepare and approve annual 
budgets; to conclude contracts and agreements; to lay down plans for the enhancement and 
improvement of the management of the corporation, and methods and styles of its business" 
(section 10.2).
However, it is clear that the legislation has only had a limited application in practice 
in the Sudan. Two main reasons are responsible for this state of affairs: the excessive 
political interference, and the influence of the Financial Regulations Act, 1977. First, the role 
of the Minister responsible for the operations, of a particular corporation (named in the 
Warrant of Establishment of each corporation) is decisive. It is interesting to note that the
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root cause of the problem lies in the law itself, which gave the Minister the power"to give 
general or specific directions to the Board in any matter relating to the corporation as he 
thinks to involve "public interest", and the Board shall act according to such directions" 
(1976 Act, section 7.1). However, the very fact that "public interest" is often a loose term 
that lacks a specific definition, and that there was no clear public policy towards PEs, often 
induced Ministers to get involved in the day-to-day operations of PEs, at the expense of 
strategic guidance. Second, the Board is usually appointed by the Minister, which places the 
board at the mercy of the Minister. Moreover, the fact that the Board is composed, in the 
main, of civil servants, makes it difficult to imagine that they could ignore ministerial 
instructions, or that they would neglect their material interests once they sit on the Board. 
Third, the lack of information flows between PEs and the sectoral ministries forces ministers 
to get involved in order to understand what is going on. Indeed, frequently we hear that "the 
Minister is on a working visit to corporation x, to find out and solve the problems in the 
field". A fourth situational factor is that, in the Sudan, PEs are largely sole producers of 
basic consumer goods (e.g sugar, soap and oil; popular cloth and school uniforms), and in 
the wake of shortages, street riots might break out, and the Minister made the scapegoat. 
Therefore, to secure adequate supply of these products, at least for the urban population, the 
Minister gets involved in the day-to-day operations of PEs.
The second factor is the influence of the Financial Regulations Act, 1977, which were 
in conflict with the provisions and the spirit of the Public Corporations Act, 1976. This piece 
of regulation diluted the powers of corporation, the Board, the sectoral ministries, and 
centralised in the MFEP wide financial and administrative powers. This is largely because 
the sole objective of the Financial Regulations Act was to safeguard public money against 
theft and defalcation. To achieve this objective, therefore, the Act regulated in great detail 
the procedures governing financial transactions, such as cash; stores; budgeting, purchases 
and accounting systems, to the detriment of PE’s financial autonomy.
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9.3.1 Cash and stores
The 1977 Act explained in major detail the procedures governing the authorisation and 
payments of cash; issuance and receipt of materials; the persons involved in the treasury 
business, such as the person authorised to keep the keys, timing of closure, and stock-taking. 
For example, by law, no cash should be paid or received after mid-day; all cash payments 
must be signed by the Financial Manager. Thus, in addition to severely limiting PE’s 
financial autonomy to structure their activities according to their needs, the Act has diverted 
the role of the Financial Manager from reporting to management, to devoting more time to 
routine and clerical work (Musa, 1987). However, while over-emphasising the objective of 
protecting public funds, the Act was absolutely silent on major issues, such as optimum 
inventory levels and optimum liquidity ratios to meet their current maturing obligations. As 
a result, PEs often run out of cash at critical points, and indeed some even fail to pay the 
salaries of their staff. Moreover, the Act made no attempts to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness of PEs.
9.3.2 Purchases
Likewise, the 1977 Act explained in great detail the procedures governing PE’s 
purchases. For example, PEs must adher to the following procedures whenever a purchase 
of raw materials or spare parts is sought: (a) A committee should be formed to handle the 
purchase, (b) All purchases should be acquired by means of open tenders, and a period of 
four weeks must be allowed between the date of advertisement and the closing date, (c) The 
tenders are to be opened by the purchasing committee only after the expiry date.
(d) All purchases in excess of £s 50,000 (£12,000) and all foreign purchases must be 
approved and executed by the Central Purchasing Committee of the MFEP. The main 
complaint of PE managers is that the procedures are cumbersome and time-consuming, which 
are of relevance to government agencies, than to commercial enterprises operating in a 
dynamic environment.
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9.3.3 Accounting and Budgeting Systems
PEs have no autonomy to design and implement accounting systems that suit their 
needs. Instead, they must adopt government accounting and budgeting systems, both in 
format and timing. Needless to say, the budgeting and accounting systems of commercially- 
oriented enterprises are entirely different from those applied in other public sector 
organisations, such as hospitals or the educational institutions.
9.3.4 Finance and Investment
PEs have no autonomy over financing decisions, where finance is obtained after 
painstaking negotiations with the MFEP. Indeed, almost all PE managers we have spoken 
to, have stressed this problem as the most limiting factor. They argued that "There are no 
rules or guidelines governing the procedures. It is totally subjective and depends solely on 
personal contacts". Similarly, PEs have no autonomy over investment decisions, which are 
the responsibility of the "Project Preparation Unit" under Planning Wing of the MFEP. 
Therefore, for all capital budgeting decisions (e.g expansion; replacement; and 
rehabilitation), an application must be submitted to the MFEP. Moreover, PEs are not 
permitted to sell redundant assets at their own discretion. Instead, an application must be 
filed to the "Disposition of Surplus Asset Department", of the MFEP, which organises an 
auction for that purpose.
9.3.5 Personnel
Under the 1976 Act, all personnel issues, such as creation of posts; promotion 
policies; salary structure and approval of annual budgets for posts, were assigned to the 
Boards of Directors and the "General Administrative Organ". The 1977 Act, however, 
assigned this role to the "Civil Service Chamber", under MFEP. In effect, PEs have no 




PEs have no autonomy to set selling prices for their products and services, that 
reflect market conditions. As we saw earlier, all goods sold in the country are subject to 
government control at the wholesale and retail levels. Similarly, PEs that generate foreign 
earnings, such as the Sudan Telecom and Sudan Airlines, are not allowed to retain such 
earnings. Instead, all the foreign resources generated must be handed over to the Bank of 
Sudan, at the official exchange rate, which are pooled and reallocated according to the 
government priorities.
In general, the MFEP has gained a pervasive influence over PEs, partly by the advent 
of the Financial Regulations Act, which reduced the financial autonomy of PEs, and partly 
due to the financial difficulties facing most PEs, which forced them to seek the MFEP 
assistance. Profitable PEs, however, have managed, to a large extent, to protect their 
financial autonomy, as the Duty Free Shops case showed.
9.4 Conclusion
From the above discussion, it could be concluded that the government control over
PEs involves too much intervention in operational matters, and little strategic guidance as
emphasised by the law. The reasons for this state of affairs are two-fold. First is the lack of
a clear public policy towards PEs, and lack of clarity of what the government wants to
control. Second, lack of information flows between PEs and the government which leads to
excessive government intervention in day-to-day management. Thus, as Ayub and Hegstad
(1986) argue "The relatively short experience of many governments with the management
of PEs, the excessive lines of control, the multitudinous objectives and tasks they are
assigned, and the lack of adequate information flows between PEs and the government
invariably lead to encroachment by governments on strategic and operational functions of 
w
PEs. Moreover, government controls over PEs rely exclusively on the extent to which they 
comply with the rules and regulations. A good example of this public administration
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philosophy is the fact that a main factor in evaluating PE managers is their knowledge of the 
relevant rules governing their activities.
Finally, it is evident that failure to exercise control is often attributed to a deficiency 
in the law, that requires the modification of the law. As a result, a large number of laws 
were issued to facilitate control (e.g the 1965 Act, 1971 Act, 1977 Act, etc). These laws, 
however, have created a multitude of rules, resulting in confusion and frustration to PE 
managers. Indeed, recognition that PEs are unable to function as autonomous entities, has 
forced the government to convert all industrial PEs into "private" limited companies, 
basically to allow them greater operational autonomy. However, the implementation was 
flawed in a number of respects, and hence failed to achieve its desirable objectives. These 
legal and other pieces of PE reform will be the main concern of the following two chapters.
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Part Three
Public Enterprise Reform 
and
Privatisation in the Sudan
Chapter Ten
The Reform Process (1)
The following two chapters will be devoted to the various pieces of the reform efforts 
devised by the Sudanese authorities to improve the performance of PEs. However, before 
outlining and analysing these efforts, a brief account of the macro-economic factors that led 
to the reform process will be outlined.
10.1 Macro-economic Environment
As we saw in chapter 8, the succeessive national governments have established a 
substantial number of PEs in the various sectors of the economy so as to accelerate socio­
economic development. However, due to the reasons discussed previously, the productivity 
and financial performance of PEs were disappointing. As a result, losses mounted, exports 
stagnated, and the imports substitutes strategy never materialised. By the late 1970s, as local 
resources dwindled and the flow of foreign capital came to an end, the country faced severe 
financial crisis, and hence the public investment strategy that dominated the 1970s came to 
a halt. Instead, the government initiated a series of reform measures to revitalise the PE 
sector. However, the outcome of these measures has not been encouraging, simply because 
they were implemented in an incomplete and unsustained fashion. For example, in the early 
1980s, the government tried to pursue a trade liberalisation policy, without preparing PEs 
to respond to a competitive environment, e.g. through clarifying objectives, improving 
managerial selection, rewards and autonomy, removing price controls and the like. As in 
other DCs, however, PEs failed to cope with the new environment, creating thereby a 
backlash against the policy, which was subsequently abandoned (Shirley, 1989). Similarly, 
in a bid to promote exports, the government devalued the local currency many times over
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the last decade, bringing its value from £s 0.35 / US$ in 1978 to £s 12 / US$ in 1987. 
However, due to the declining production capacity, the devaluation measures failed to 
promote exports. Indeed, in the absence of supportive policies (e.g. rationalisation of prices), 
the devaluation policy has had a detrimental impact on industries (public and private) as it 
pushed up production costs, which were not matched by a corresponding increase in prices. 
Consequently, losses mounted, and despite the quantitative tarriffs imposed, imports by far 
exceeded exports, creating a current account deficit (table 10.1).
Table 10.1 
Trade Balance Between 
1982/83 and 19888/89 
($ million)
1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89
Exports 821.1 942.2 800.4 702.4 701.6 660.9 750.3
Imports 1804.4 1640.4 1394.5 1394.5 1338.1 1132.3 1560.0
Source : Bank of Sudan, Khartoum
Similarly, the ratio of government revenues to GDP declined from 14.7 percent in 
1980/81 to 9 percent in 1986/87 (Bank of Sudan). The reasons for this sharp decline include 
the poor performance of PEs, and the abolition of all taxes on personal income, business 
profits, customs and excise duties following the introduction of Islamic Laws in 1983. They 
were replaced by the "Islamic zakat" (taxes) on wealth, at a flat rate of 2.5 percent to be 
used for social welfare purposes (i.e. not remitted to the Treasury). Moreover, the excessive 
price controls and the severe shortages of consumer goods, accelerated black market 
activities, on which no taxes were paid. Indeed, the officials interviewed indicated that the 




As the cases showed, almost all enterprises were incurring persistent losses, which 
were financed by foreign loans and government subsidies. However, as foreign finance 
started to slow down after the 1982 debt crisis, and public finances dwindled, these losses 
were no longer tolerated by the MFEP. Moreover, the under-utilised capacity noted earlier, 
resulted in acute shortages of basic consumer goods, which had to be satisfied through 
imports, using the meagre foreign resources available. Thus, the poor performance of PEs 
affected not only the Treasury, but also the public at large1.
Consequently, the poor performance of PEs received the increased attention of the 
Sudanese authorities and the international aid donors and creditors, notably the World Bank 
and the IMF. In fact, the poor performance of PEs was singled out by the World Bank 
(1987) as the primary cause of the financial crisis experienced by the country throughout the 
last decade. In effect, a series of reform efforts were devised to revitalise the economy 
through improvement of PE’s performance.
In this chapter we will discuss the reform processes of the industrial and agricultural 
sectors respectively. The following chapter will be devoted to the rehabilitation efforts, and 
the overall "Public Enterprise and Economic Management Project", proposed by the World 
Bank in 1987.
10.2 Industrial Sector Reform :
Legal Restructuring
In 1981, a "Presidential" decree was issued to convert all industrial public
At present. Imports are banned altogether on the grounds of self- 
reliance, under the slogan of "eat what we produce and wear what we make" 
introduced by the current government (see chapter 12).
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corporations organised under the Public Corporations Act, 1976, into "private" limited 
companies, under the Companies Act, 1925 (the latest in the country). In the context of 
current Sudanese laws, the state can own all the shares in a company, creating "a state-owned 
private company", with no less than two shareholders and a maximum of 50 shareholders; 
or majority of shares in a company, creating "a state-controlled public company", with a 
minimum of 7 shareholders, but no maximum limit.
However, the objectives behind the legal conversion into companies were never spelt 
out in any official document. Indeed, the Presidential decree was absolutely silent on the 
motives behind the move. Nevertheless, the most often cited objective by the officials 
interviewed at the MFEP, Ministry of Industry and former ministers, was to provide 
industrial PEs with greater operational autonomy. The corporate form, the officials argued, 
has deprived these PEs of the flexibility and freedom required for commercial enterprises 
operating in competitive markets. Public corporations, for example, whether or not they are 
organised under the Public Corporations Act 1976, are in principle constrained by the 
government in terms of basic salary they could offer to their staff. That is, either the 
common scales for all public corporations that fall under the 1976 Act, or individual scales 
set by the government for different corporations, such as the Sudan Rail; Sudan Airways and 
the National Electricity Corporation2. Thus, by turning these corporations into companies, 
these PEs would be freed from the imposition of salary scales by the state. The companies 
are then able to set salaries and wages as they see fit; adjust them whenever a need arises 
so as to attract competent staff, and to link pay to performance. On the other hand, under 
the company form, each employee would be appointed by an individual contract, under the 
"Individual Relations Act, 1981, which stipulates clearly the authorities and responsibilities 
of every employee — thus facilitating discipline; commitment and accountability of staff.
2 Although public corporations have much greater latitude to provide 
additional allowances and devise various Incentive schemes, all PE managers 
Interviewed Indicated that they are unable to compete with private sector for 
a number of skilled catergorles.
218
Second, the company form would relieve industrial enterprises from the pervasive 
inflluence of the MFEP, in terms of budget approval; purchase and investment controls; and 
all <other rules and regulations stipulated in the Financial Regulations Act, 1977. Under the 
cormpany form, all the strategic and operational functions would be assumed by the Boards 
of Directors and the chief executives; thereby enhancing PEs financial autonomy. In short, 
the; "private" limited companies were expected to develop and adopt private sector methods 
in ttheir operating criteria3.
Nevertheless, although these objectives seem sound and desirable, our investigation 
revtealed that the implementation process was flawed in many respects. As a result, the newly 
created industrial companies continued to operate under the same rules, the same work force, 
the same accounting, budgeting, and management systems, and rely exclusively on the 
Treasury financing. In what follows, we will analyse the implementation deficiencies in terms 
of institutional reform, financial autonomy, macro policies, coordination,relevance of the 
companies Act to PEs, and the overall objectives of the legal reform.
10.2.1 Institutional Reform
Shirley (1989) outlines the reform of institutional framework in four main steps :
(1) "setting clear objectives fo r SOEs that can be 
translated into quantified and monitorable targets".
(2) "Providing managers with sufficient autonomy to 
achieve their objectives, and be held responsible fo r results
(3) "Selecting managers competent to operate a commercial venture, and 
compensating them adequately".
3 The quotation marks (" ") are meant to distinguish between the normal 
usage of the term "private" known in the literature, and that used in the 
Sudan.
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(4) "Holding managers accountable fo r results including incentives and 
sanctions".
However, our investigation revealed that, the implementation process in the Sudan has 
deviated widely from the above steps. First, no effort was made to clarify the objectives of 
PEs. That is to distinguish clearly between social and economic objectives, and then to set 
specific financial targets, such as return on investment. Indeed, all the officials interviewed 
in the Ministry of Industry indicated that the primary objectives of Idustrial PEs remained 
as to :
(1) develop local resources to produce basic consumer goods, which 
otherwise would have been imported (i.e. import substitutes).
(2) develop rural areas, and create more jobs so as to contain 
rural-urban migration.
(3) promote exports so as to generate foreign earnings.
Likewise all PE managers interviewed emphasised the pursuit of the government 
socio-economic development plans as the primary objectives. The following statements are 
probably illustrative:
_ "our goal (textile) is to contain unemployment, and produce popular cloth at 
reasonable prices, and contribute to the Treasury through payment o f excise 
duties".
uthe primary objective o f this factory (sugar) is to achieve self- sufficiency o f 
this strategic commodity, at reasonable prices".
However, when asked about the changes in objectives that followed the legal 
restructuring, both the industry officials and PE managers responded "no changes". But why?
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A senior industry official responded:
"to be honest, I  really do not know. A Presidential decree was issued to 
convert all industrial corporations into companies, and we tried our best to 
implement i t”. He then added "by the way, the decree did not mention 
changing the objectives, you can read it”.
It is evident from these statements that, neither the industry officials nor PE managers 
have had a clear vision of the institutional reform that should accompany legal reform. As 
a result, no effort was made to clarify the objectives of the newly created companies, and 
hence the confusion between the social and economic objectives continued.
Second, no effort was made to improve the selection, appraisal, incentives and 
autonomy of management. Indeed, according to the provisions of the 1925 companies Act, 
all the staff, including the managing directors of the corporations turned into companies, 
should have been laid-off, and reappointed, if needed, under individual contracts, and placed 
under the "Individual Relations Act, 1981". In reality, however, that legal requirement has 
never been implemented. The reasons were two-fold. First, although PE managers and trade 
unions have accepted the legal restructuring as long as the conversion would relieve them 
from the civil service pay policy, they categorically rejected being placed under the 
Individual Relations Act, because that would give the employer a free hand to dismiss staff 
(the essence of autonomy). Second, the idea that each company would set its own salary 
structure based on its financial position was equally rejected on the grounds that, all workers 
are employed by the same ministry and hold the same qualifications. As a matter of fact, the 
trade unions were very militant on employment issues, and were able to draw a broad 
support for their cause among the intellectuals and the bureaucrats4.
4 This broad coalition was largely credited for overthrowing the former 
military regime in 1985, the regime that initiated the legal reforms.
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Nevertheless, failure on the part of the government to resolve these conflicts, meant 
that the companies had to operate under the same work force, and the same salary scales set 
by the civil service chamber. Similarly, management selection continued to rely on 
bureaucrats with technical qualifications (e.g. engineers), political loyalists, and army 
officers, rather than professional business managers. As a result, the primary objective of 
granting the newly-created companies greater autonomy over personnel policies that would 
enable them to recruit and retain competent staff was defeated. Thus, it is evident that, the 
desire to protect employment was a major constraint to PE reform, and hence it would hinder 
the privatisation process too.
Third, the available evidence from the experience in other parts of the world indicates 
that, legal restructuring was often accompanied by massive financial restructuring. In the 
UK, for example, prior to privatisation, every effort was made to turn the industries around 
financially. Thus, many were financially restructured with their debts written-off, additional 
capital was injected, redundant staff were laid-off, and new management and accounting 
systems introduced (Yarrow, 1986; Vuylsteke, 1988). In the Sudan, however, there is ample 
evidence to suggest that the legal reform was meant as an end in itself. This is illustrated by 
the fact that, the public corporations were converted into companies without any sort of 
financial restructuring to put them into operating form, or even clearing the massive backlog 
in their accounts. Consequently, their poor financial structure has had a detrimental impact 
on their financial autonomy (see below).
Finally, accountability often requires regular flow of reliable information, clear 
targets, and a competent body to monitor performance. However, we noted earlier the 
difficulties in relation to the accounts,the main source of financial information. As a result, 
performance evaluation was reduced to a very subjective judgement. The following criteria 
were cited by the officials of the Ministry of Industry as indicators of success of a PE :
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(1) "If the PE produced ‘sufficient’ goods that are ‘acceptable ’ in terms o f quality 
and price
(2) "If the PE contributed to community development, through creation o f jobs and 
improvement o f the standards o f living in the area".
(3) "If the PE managed to finance its operations, that is, i f  revenues exceeded 
expenses or at least broke-even".
10.2.2 Financial Autonomy
As noted above, public corporations were converted into companies without any effort 
to turn them around financially. As a result, the financially-troubled companies had no 
alternative to reliance on public funding, which hampered their financial auntonomy. This 
is because the Bank of Sudan refused in principle to extend credits to such companies on the 
grounds that, by law, the central bank can not lend to "private" limited companies. The state- 
owned commercial banks, on the other hand, hesitated to extend credits to these companies 
simply because their credit-worthiness was extremely poor. Indeed, in the few cases in which 
loans were granted, PE managers indicated that the procedures were cumbersome and time- 
consuming. The reasons are often two-fold. First, as noted in the previous chapter, there is 
no any single PE in the country with an up-to-date set of accounts upon which commercial 
banks can assess their ability to repay the loans. Needless to say, in order to safeguard 
themselves, bankers usually ask for more detailed and reliable information, which is often 
not readily available. Second, the very fact that these companies are public entitles, caused 
some "justified" concerns among bankers to extend credits to them. The banks fear that, if 
at a later stage the companies failed to pay, they might be instructed by the Minister of 
Finance or the Council of Ministers to write-off such debts, which is not uncommon in the 
Sudan. In fact, one state bank (The People’s Cooperative Bank) went into bankruptcy in 
1983, solely due to loans extended, and then written-off on Presidential instructions.
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Therefore, the only avenue that was available for these companies to obtain finance 
was the MFEP. However, being the fiercest advocate on accountability, the MEEP insisted 
that the companies must bring their annual budgets for review and approval by the MFEP 
before any funds could be made available - largely because the annual budgets are the only 
control tool available. Although the approval of budgets under the companies Act is the 
responsibility of the Board of Directors, the fact that these companies were in desperate need 
for finance and had no other alternative, forced them to obey. As a result, the legally 
autonomous companies continued the vicious circle of inflated budgets and subjective cuts, 
the rigid bureaucratic controls over budget structure and timing, purchases, investment and 
disposal of surplus assets. Consequently, the newly-created companies surrendered to the 
MFEP, thus defeating the other primary objective of legal restructuring, that is financial 
autonomy.
10.2.3 Macroeconomic Environment
A sound macroeconomic environement (e.g. flexible pricing and labour policies, 
realistic interest and exchange rates and adequate infrastructure) should be the key 
determinant for the success of PE reform. As it stands at present, however, the Sudanese 
authorities rely exclusively on administrative controls, rather than market forces. We shall 
discuss the macroeconomic environment in detail in chapter 12, registering for the moment 
the fact that, in the absence of a favourable business environment, legal restructuring in itself 
failed to generate significant turn around in productivity or financial performance. Indeed, 
the authorities have opted for sectoral reform rather than a comprehensive overall reform for 
the broader environment. The focus on sectoral reform, in turn, has meant that critical 
external issues common to all PEs were simply neglected. As noted in chapter 8, the 
principal factors contributing to the unsatisfactory performance of PEs were the distorted 
prices, controlled labour policies, severe shortages of foreign exchange, inadequate supply 
of public services, and unstable economic policies. Indeed, the various pieces of reform were
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seriously eroded by macroeconomic factors, not least because the success of PE reform 
would depend on the overall environment in which they operate.
The argument is that, given the excessive government intervention in the internal 
markets in the Sudan, the appropriate approach to PE reform is to implement profound and 
fundamental macroeconomic and legal reforms, and to ensure the continuity of such policies. 
However, as it stands, the macoreconomic environment has been far from stable, indeed 
economic policies often emerge on ad hoc basis, and do not follow any logical or systematic 
sequence, largely, due to the political instability in the country. For example, while the 
previous government (1986-1989) had adopted a liberal trade policy, legalised foreign 
exchange dealings, and tried, helplessly, to move towards a market economy, the present 
government has adopted stringent price controls, and prohibited posession of, and trade in 
foreign exchange5 (see chapter 13).
10.2.4 Coordination
As we pointed out earlier, the Presidential decree of 1981, abolished all sectoral 
industrial coiproations, such as the Sugar and Distillery Corporation, Industrial Food 
Corporation and Industrial Leather Corporation. However, without getting into the pros and 
cons of such, holding corporations, it worth noting that the abolition of the sectoral 
corporations, coupled with the absence of any central overseeing agency, has seriously 
affected coordination among the legally autonomous industrial factories. For example, the 
transfer of productive resources from one company to the other required the intervention of 
the Minister (see below). Moreover, there are considerable ambiguities regarding the exact 
legal status of the newly created companies; i.e. are they separate, autonomous legal entities, 
or just productive units to be attached to a central supervisory body ? Our investigation 
revealed that the exact legal status of these companies is not at all clear. Indeed, different
5 In the period between October and December, 1989, three 
Sudanese were sentenced to death for the mere possession of foreign exchange.
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structures were either being proposed or actually implemented in different sub-sectors. In the 
textile industry, for example, a "Sugar Board" to operate the whole industry, including the 
private sugar company (Kenana), while others advocate a holding company, "The Public 
Company For Weaving and Textile", was established to supervise the whole sector (12 
mills), with the exception of the "Friendship Textile Company". The latter was organised as 
a separate legal company, reporting directly to the Ministry of Industry. However, the logic 
behind this distinction is not at all clear. An official in the Ministry of Industry claimed that 
the "Regional Governor" opposed the attachment of the factory to a central body, which we 
were unable to substantiate. The food factories, on the other hand, report directly to the 
Ministry of Industry, as no central body was created. In the Sugar industry, as we shall see 
in chapter 11, there are proposals to create a central body, but the exact nature of this body 
is not yet clear. Some of the officials interviewed think of establishing a "Sugar Board" to 
operate the whole sugar industry, including the private sector (Kenana), while other advocate 
establishing a "holding company" with a "modified" role from that of the repealed "Sugar 
and Distillery Corporation". In the event, neither the "sugar board" nor the holding company 
has been created as we shall see later.
10.2.5 Relevance of the Companies Act
Our investigation also revealed that there are deep concerns among the officials 
interviewed in the Ministry of Industry and the MFEP, regarding the relevance of the 1925 
companies Act to public entities. The officials correctly noted that the 1925 Act was laid 
down by the British Administration to monitor the activities of private concerns. For 
instance, the Act has over-emphasised the role of shareholders in assuming ownership 
functions, such as appointing board members, reviewing and approving final accounts. Under 
the current Sudanese practice, however, the MFEP owns 99 percent of the shares of these 
companies and the other one percent is owned either by a state commercial bank or by the 
Sudan Development Corporation6. In effect, the shareholders of all industrial companies are
6 This is basically to satisfy the legal requirement that a "private" 
limited company must be composed of a minimum of two shareholders.
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only two government entities. Accordingly, the Annual Shareholders Meeting is attended by 
two civil servants, appointed by virtue of position, and without any financial stake in the 
operations of the company. Similarly, the Boards of Directors are appointed by the 
"shareholders" from the concerned minitries without specific terms of reference or adequate 
remunerations7.
This practice is deficient on a number of scores, and probably contradicts the spirit 
of the law. First, taking into consideration the very high turnover rates in the civil service 
noted above, it is not difficult that a company could have different faces attending its annual 
shareholders meetings and a different composition of the board members each year. Second, 
the fact that the shareholders have no financial stake in the operations of companies, meant 
that poor performance and financial irregularities went unnoticed and unquestioned. A good 
example is the arrears in the accounts of these companies. Typically the functions of 
shareholders meetings include ascertaining the financial position of an enterprise, setting 
dividend policy, and replacing management if performance deteriorated. Needless to say, 
given the lack of timely and reliable accounting information, such tasks would be at best 
difficult. Indeed, our investigation revealed that, the present shareholders have done very 
little by way of rectifying this situation. Third, as we saw earlier, a board composed of civil 
servants have allowed bureaucracy to creep in, and influenced managerial behaviour and 
attitudes. Fourth, it was argued that the company form of organisation could deprive the 
government control over the ‘private’ limited companies. Indeed, this point has been over­
emphasised by the officials of the MFEP. Although, at present, the officials managed to twist 
the arms of these companies due to their financial difficulties, the MFEP fear that in the 
future the situation might change. In the absence of an effective, well-staffed central 
overseeing agency, we believe, accountability could really be at risk. Nevertheless, as we 
shall see in chapterll, the MFEP insists that the central body must be accountable to it, but 
this was firmly rejected by sectoral ministries. As a result, the proposed central overseeing
Monthly remunerations of boards members before being dissolved in mid- 
1989 by the incoming government were £sl00 (£5).
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agency has never been created. Indeed, even the ownership of the shares of these companies 
by the MFEP has generated heated debate between the MFEP and the Ministry of Industry. 
A senior official in the Ministry of Industry angrily argued that "We are all public 
employees, so what makes the officials of the MFEP superior to us ?"
Finally, all the officials we have spoken to, are of the opinion that a separate piece 
of legislation must be devised to deal with the newly created companies. We are not in 
favour of a separate legislation, if the objective is to grant the companies greater operational 
autonomy so as to improve performance, and at the same time maintain control. There is 
some evidence that this could be achieved under the company form as illustrated by the 
experience of the commercial banks. In the Sudan, the state banks were organised as 
"private" limited companies, with a great deal of operational autonomy, under the 
supervision of the Bank of Sudan. Indeed, they are relatively profitable, well-managed, and 
probably the only PEs with an up-to-date set of accounts. In 1987/88, for example, the four 
state-owned commercial banks reported a profit (before tax) of £s 125 million, an increase 
of 28 percent from the previous year (Auditor General Report, 1987/88). Therefore, it 
could be argued that, if there is an effective, well-staffed central overseeing agency and clear 
rules for state intervention in decision making, the company form under the company law, 
1925, is probably the appropriate way of organising PEs. Any other form with emphasis on 
accountability as explicity stated by the MFEP, would undoubtedly cripple the industries. 
The shares of these companies could be owned by the central overseeing agency with specific 
terms of reference outlining the responsibilities of all the parties involved. Nevertheless, it 
must be repeated that, the problem of striking a correct balance between autonomy and 
accontability is universal, and has never been resolved worldwide. Indeed, it has provided 
an impetus for the recent interest in privatisation.
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10.2.6 The Reform Objectives
As noted earlier, the ultimate objectives of the legal restructuring has never been spelt 
out in any official document. That is, was it an end in itself or just a first step towards 
denationalisation ? This state of affairs, in turn, has created a sense of unrest among the 
militant trade unions. Indeed, assuming that the legal reform is just a step towards full 
privatisation, the unions arranged a series of industrial actions, which paralysed the reform 
process8. These sorts of speculations were more powerful in cases where "the Sudan 
Development Corporation" was made a shareholder, because by its articles of association, 
the corporation could sell its equity in PEs to private investors.
Indeed, all PE managers interviewed attributed the delays in implementation, in part, 
to the uncertainty created by the legal reform. They pointed out that, the unions assumed that 
privatisation will soon follow, so they became less committed and started to think of their 
own fate. Such behaviour, however, seems to be consistent with the experience elsewhere. 
For example, Heald (1990) argues that "The civil service and PE managers charged with the 
implementation of the reform packages often believe that the reform is an inferior substitute 
for (some ill-specified form of) privatisation. Without the enthusiasm and belief on the part 
of key actors, it is difficult to be optimistic about the chances of success". Moreover, major 
issues at the macro level, such as the effects of drought, the question of the legal system, the 
civil war and preoccupation with maintaining the coalition forming the government together 
have diverted the attention from the economic issues. As a result, the implementation process 
was delayed, creating confusion, frustration, and uncertainty.
In summary, we believe, neither the military government, nor the elected government 
had had a clear vision about what should be done or the political will to undertake radical
8 The reform was initiated by a military regime, while 
implementation had to take place under an elected government, where trade 
unions were active.
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decisions regarding employment and prices. But, without these fundamental changes, it is 
difficult to suggest that legal restructuring alone would produce tangible results. Second, 
there is evidence that the legal restructuring was meant as an end, rather than a means to 
improve economic efficiency. The absence of any effort to reform the internal operating 
criteria (e.g. clarifying objectives, strengthening management selection and rewards, 
introducing commercial accounting systems, laying-off redundant staff, and granting 
sufficient autonomy to management), and measures to foster competition and market-based 
prices, provide a powerful demonstration of this assertion.
10.3 Agricultural Sector Reform
Agriculture in the Sudan is the single most important sector of the economy. It 
accounts for about 45 percent of GDP, and employs around 80 percent of the work force. 
Indeed, the manufacturing sector largely depends on the agricultural sector either as a source 
of raw materials (e.g. cotton, sugar cane, or groundnuts), or as a source of foreign exchange 
to acquire imported inputs. Therefore, the efficiency of the sector is a key determinant of 
economic performance. Indeed, the only way to promote exports and restore the country’s 
credit-worthiness would be through a significant turn around in the productivity of the 
agricultural sector. There are three main schemes, which together cover around 63 percent 
of land underirrigation, each organised as a public corporation. In what follows, we shall 
outline and discuss the reform process of the eldest (1925), and largest (2.1 million feddans) 
aagricultural scheme, the Gezira Scheme.
The Gezira Scheme was established by the British Administration in 1925, to supply 
the British textile industry with raw cotton. However, it came to play a significant role in the 
Sudanese economy in the post-independence period. The scheme is located in Central Sudan 
between the Blue and White Niles, where conditions are favourable for cotton production. 
It uses gravity irrigation and cultivates cotton; wheat; groundnuts; sorghum and vegetables.
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However, cotton is the single most important crop, as most of the production is available for 
exports. In terms of administration, the scheme is divided into 107 "blocks", each of which 
represents an accounting unit, headed by an agricutural inspector.
By the early 1980s, cotton production declined to its lowest levels ever (table 10.4). 
Therefore, in a bid to improve productivity, the traditional production relations were 
modified from the "Joint Account System" (JAS), to the "Individual Account System" (IAS), 
in 1981/82. Under the former tenancy relationship (JAS), the total costs of a variety of 
agricultural inputs provided by the scheme management were deducted from the gross 
proceeds derived from the sale of different crops9. The surplus was then divided between 
the partners (the government, management and tenants) according to a certain ratio. The 
following table shows the historical development of the tenancy relationship.
Table 10.2 















Pre 1950 35 40 25
1950/51- 1956/57 40 40 20
1957/58- 1962/63 42 42 10 2 2 2
1963/64- 1965/66 40 44 10 2 2 2
1966/67- 1968/69 36 48 10 2 2 2
1969/70- 1980/81 36 47 10 2 3 2
Source : Gezira Scheme
9 The major items of the joint costs were; land preparation; 
agricultural inputs (seeds; fertilisers, pesticides, etc); harvesting; 
packaging materials; transportation; insurance and selling expenses.
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We shall refer to these tenancy relationships in the course of the discussion that 
follows. Nevertheless, as it was, the Joint Account System (JAS) suffered the following 
major built-in deficiencies. First, by averaging costs, the system does not provide incentives 
for good producers; in fact it subsidised inefficient tenants. That is because tenant’s share of 
net proceeds was divided equally between tenants.
More important, in theory, the production costs of non-cotton crops were supposed 
to be deducted from the proceeds of those crops. However, the fact that other crops (i.e. 
wheat, groundnuts, etc), were marketed directly by tenants, meant that the government was 
unable to recover the production costs of these crops from tenants.
In effect, these costs were added to the joint costs, and deducted from the cotton 
proceeds - thus creating a distorted cotton costs. These distorted costs, in turn, made tenants 
to regard cotton as the "government crop"; consequently they were encourageed to exert 
more effort and time on non-cotton crops, at the expense of cotton; the country’s main 
export. Therefore, cotton yields declined from 5 kantars per feddan in 1970/71 to 2.3 
kantars/feddan in 1980/8110 (table 10.4).
Second, the JAS leads to continuous disputes between the partners regarding the share 
of each. As table (10.2) reveals, between 1950 and 1970, the partner’s shares were revised 
five times, largely to the advantage of tenants. Indeed, the only period that witnessed some 
sort of stability in the tenancy relationship is the period between 1970 and 1980, the military 
regime period. In fact, there is a positive relationship between the political system and 
stability of tenancy relationship. For example, between 1965 and 1969, when there was a 
democratic government, the production relations were revised twice, incidently to the
10 Kantar - 50 Kilogram - 110 lb; 
Feddan - 0.42 hectare - 1.04 acres.
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advantages of tenants. Therefore, it could be argued that the temporary stability between 
1970 and 1980, is attributed to "fear" from the regime rather than fairness of the system or 
any other factor.
Third, as production costs of non-cotton crops were added to joint costs; total costs 
exceeded cotton proceeds; consequently the scheme incurred persistent losses, and tenants 
debts mounted. As we shall see later, tenant’s share of losses is recorded as debts, and 
carried forward to the next season. Fourth, net proceeds were not available for distribution 
before they were actually earned, i.e. at the date of sale of the whole output. Thus, the 
system created a liquidity problem for tenants, and disturbed the government budgeting 
system, not least because the marketing process usually takes more than a year to be 
completed.
These are but some of the deficiencies of the JAS. In an effort to alleviate these 
shortcomings, and hence enchance cotton yield to restore the export growth; a new system, 
"The Individual Account System" (IAS), was introduced in 1981/82. Under the IAS, the 
government receives a fixed charge for the provision of land and water, determined semi­
annually by the government. As table (10.3) reveals, the land and water charges showed an 
upward trend for all products since they were introduced in 1981/82.
Tenants, on the other hand, are entitled for the value of their output in fbll, after 
deducting the production costs provided by the scheme management and the Land and Water 
charges. The system operates as follows : The scheme management borrows from the Bank 
of Sudan so as to provide seasonal advances to tenants, which are used to finance agricultural 
opreations. An interest charge of 8 percent is levied on these advances. The state acquires 
all the cotton produced at the ginneries gate, at a price determined by a national committee 
composed of the MFEP, Ministry of Agriculture; Agricultural Research Centre, and the
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scheme management. Thus, expenses beyond the ginneries gate are the responsibility of the 
state. However, the salaries and overhead expenses of the agricultural inspectors; field 
accountants and canal guards are treated as administrative expenses, and hence incorporated 
in the annual budget of the scheme. The optimum use of fertilisers, pesticides and the 
frequency of watering is a joint business between the scheme management and the 
Agricultural Research Centre. The allocation of land for the different crops is determined by 
the Ministry of Agriclutre in accordance with the government priorities.
Table 10.3 
Land and Water Charges per feddan 
(1981/82 - 1987/88)
(£s »
SEASON Cotton Wheat Groundnuts Sorghum Vegetables Total
1981/82 28.5 14 18 7 25 92.5
1982/83 28.5 14 18 7 25 92.5
1983/84 38 23.75 19 19 33.25 133
1984/85 50 31 25 25 44 175
1985/86 65 40 32.5 32.5 57 227
1986/87 80 49 40 40 70 279
1987/88 101 62 50 50 90 353
Source : Gezira Scheme
10.3.1 Advantages
The "Individual Account System” (IAS) has the following major advantages. First, 
it avoids the cross-subsidisation of the former system. Under this system, each tenant is 
personally liable for his costs, and receives the full value of his output. Thus, there are 
incentives for tenants to improve productivity in order to maximise their earnings. Indeed, 
there is evidence that cotton production has increased dramatically in recent years (table 
10.4). However, this is not to suggest that tenants earnings have increased in direct 
proportion with output, or that the turn-around in productivity is attributed to the introduction
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of the new system alone (see below). The following table compares cotton productivity under 
the two systems.
Table 10.4 
Cotton Yield (Kantar / Feddan)
1976/77 and 1986/87
(a) Joint Account System
YEAR 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81
YIELD 3.6 4.3 3.3 2.6 2.3
(b) Individual Account System
YEAR 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87
YIELD 3.9 4.7 4.9 5.2 3.5 4.9
Source : Scheme records
Thus, it is evident that productivity has improved remarkably following the 
introduction of the new system. However, the scheme was under a major rehabilitation 
project during this period, which made possible the flow of essential inputs on a timely basis. 
Therefore, it is difficult to attribute the dramatic improvement in productivity to the 
introduction of the system alone. A second advantage is that, tenants are now being paid at 
a specific time (June of each year), regardless of whether the output was sold or not. Thus, 
the system alleviates the tenants liquidity problem noted earlier. However, by so doing the 
system has created a liquidity problem for the state (see below).
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Graph 10.1 
Cotton Yield (Kantar/feddan) 
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10.3.2 Disadvantages
The system has the following major deficiencies. First, under this system, tenants are 
fully responsible for all the costs incurred, though they have no control over inputs; selling 
prices, or the-cropping pattern. The amount of fertilisers and pesticides to be applied, and 
the frequency of watering is determined by the scheme management in consultation with the 
Agricultural Research Centre. The Land and Water rates, and the selling prices are 
determined by national committees, while the allocation of land among the different crops 
is determined by the Ministry of Agriculture.
However, we shall increasingly argue that, the practice of holding tenants accountable 
for all the costs incurred without being able to influence the cost structure, is unfair and 
could be conterproductive. Indeed, the Sudan Tenants Union Federation has repeatedly
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complained of being "by passed" by the authorities when fixing selling prices, and the land 
and water rates. Second, the system does not provide incentives for the scheme management 
to control costs, since they have no financial stake in the profitability of the scheme. 
Furthermore, there is no management appraisal system. However, judging from the publicity 
attached to productivity in the local media and official statements, it could be fairly assumed 
that management’s main target is to maximise output so as to generate as much foreign 
earnings as possible for the Treasury. Therefore, as costs are bourne by tenants who are paid 
in local currency, it could be argued that the scheme management would try to maximise the 
output regardless of the costs incurred.
Indeed, there is evidence that production costs have increased dramatically in recent 
years, without being matched by a corresponding increase in selling prices. In particular, the 
costs of fertilisers and pesticides have risen, which accounted for about 50 percent of 
production costs. In fact, all the agricultural scientists we have spoken to, at the Agricultural 
Research Centre, indicated that, because they are not applied at the right time, the use of 
fertilisers and pesticides is ineffective and excessive by any standards (see below). 
Consequently, we found that the ratio of tenants who failed to break-even amounted to 48 
percent in 1988/89 season - accordingly tenant’s debts mounted. The following tables 
summarise this state of affairs. Table (10.5) shows the average cotton cost of production per 
feddan between 1981/82 and 1986/87, while table (10.6) outlines selling price per kantar for 
the two varieties of cotton cultivated (long and medium stables), and the accumulated tenant’s 
debts during the same period.
It is evident that, a combination of devaluations and soaring inflation rates, coupled 
with lack of motivation to control costs have trebled production costs, which reinforces our 
earlier argument that the main concern of management is to maximise output at any cost.
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Table 10.5 
Average Cotton Costs per feddan 

















1981/82 15.96 21.60 40.06 117.13 28.5 4.7 5.93 233.88
1982/83 21.92 22.85 51.07 136.45 28.5 27.02 7.23 295.04
1983/84 33.80 33.64 66.70 201.27 38 37.76 15.03 426.20
1984/85 37.41 30.61 62.65 199.44 50 30.01 25.50 443.62
1985/86 48.88 43.15 86.89 436.22 65 74.27 23.18 777.59
1986/87 65.22 53.55 155.47 396.90 80 53.19 33.60 834.93
Source : Gezira Scheme.
Table 10.6 
Selling Prices and Tenant’s Debts 
Between 1981/82 and 1986/87








1981/82 66 85 78.5
1982/83 68 87 91.3
1983/84 82 107 125.8
1984/85 106 135 229.6
1985/86 152 215 340.1
1986/87 158 245 471.2
Source: Gezira Scheme.
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the Gezira tenants are relatively in a better 
position than their counterparts in other schemes. This is because cotton prices are set at the 
national level for all cotton produced in the country, regardless of the cost structure of the 
scheme in which cotton was grown (e.g. method of irrigation, size or age of the scheme).
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For example, land and water rates in the Gezira Scheme, which uses gravity irrigation, are 
much lower than in other schemes that uses pump irrigation, such as the Rahad Scheme. 
Second, the well-established Gezira Scheme (1925) has a fleet of agricultural equipment, 
which are used to provide some agricultural operations (e.g. deep ploughing) at subsidised 
rates, while other schemes rely solely on the private sector to provide these services at the 
market rates11.
In either case, however, selling prices have failed to keep pace with the ever rising 
production costs; consequently tenant’s debts mounted over the years (table 10.6). Moreover, 
the government again failed to collect the land and water charges on non-cotton crops, which 
are still sold directly by tennants12. In effect, the land and water charges on these crops 
were added to cotton costs and deducted from cotton proceeds, whenever possible. The 
management collection policy is to deduct these charges, from the cotton proceeds whenever 
a tenant achieves a suiplus. If the net profit is insufficient in this year, the charges are 
recorded as debts and carried forward.
However, to avoid payments, tenants have developed a very peculiar practice. The 
tenant (say A) with significant acculumulated debts, would transfer his output to another 
tenant (say B) with no, or insignificant debts. Tenant (B) then cash in the proceeds, and 
remits tenant (A) the value of his crop. Thus, tenant (A) is theoretically insolvent, though 
in reality he might not. The scheme management while acknowledging the presence of this 
illegal practice, admitted that they failed to control it. They employed guards, but this 
solution did not work because the guards were paid the legal minimum wage rate (£s 300 per
11 The state is currently contemplating the privatisation of these 
services.
12 In March, 1990, the government used the armed forces to capture all 
wheat produced in the irrigated schemes. However, the aim was largely 
political, so as to claim that the Revolution had achieved self-sufficiency 
in wheat supply, and eliminated importing American wheat, under the slogan of 
"eat what we produce and wear what we make".
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month, £15), and more importantly, they were often recruited from the same community that 
is highly inter-related.
Other factors beyond the control of tenants is the regular supply of water and other 
inputs. Clearly, failure on the part of the scheme management to provide these critical inputs 
on a regular and timely fashion would reduce the yield, which in turn reduces the tenants 
earnings. Indeed, both the water supply and imported agricultural inputs were often cited as 
the most limiting constraints. In the Gezira Scheme which uses gravity irrigation, the drought 
of the recent years, the poor canal maintenance, and the dual management of the irrigation 
system between the Ministry of Irrigation and the Ministry of Agriculture, have adversely 
affected the delivery of water to tenants. The frequent power failures have similarly disturbed 
water supply to other schemes that rely on pump irrigation.
Another area where excessive government intervention and controls work to the 
detriment of production is in the acquisition of imported agricultural inputs, such as 
fertilisers, insecticides, and jute sacks. The problem here is mainly timing, because late 
arrival of critical inputs is the norm, inflicting serious damages to crops (see below). Apart 
from the severe shortages of foreign exchange, the MFEP considers applications for imports 
only on a quarterly basis, and the Bank of Sudan releases foreign exchange only when full 
account is provided on how the previous allocations were utilised. The acquisition of spare 
parts is subject to even more complicated procedures, because unlike agricultural inputs, 
spare parts needs are not assessed on seasonal basis, but rather when the need arises.
As a result, failure to provide essential agricultural inputs on timely basis causes 
serious damages to the crop, and the victim is the tenant. For example, in the 1988/89 
season, jute sacks arrived one month late for cotton picking, causing an estimated loss of 
about 15 percent of the value of cotton. The late arrival of fertilisers and other agricultural
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inputs is even more damaging, not least because cotton is a sensitive crop that requires 
certain treatments to be applied at a certain point in time. Nevertheless, it is the tenant who 
suffers, though he has no control over the supply of all inputs. It is the government who 
provides irrigation and foreign exchange to acquire inputs.
Third, the system demands more books of accounts, more clerical work, and 
consequently more accountants. Indeed, the load for the accountants has almost doubled 
following the introduction of the new system. For example, at the "Block " level, there are 
separate ledgers and subsidiary ledgers for each tenant to record transactions pertaining to 
different crops. In addition, the accountants usually perform other tasks, such as typewriting, 
store-keeping, cashiers and the like. They told the researcher that, "during the peak season 
(April to June of each year), we work more than 15 hours a day to prepare tenants 
statements; pay the tenants proceeds and close the accounts". As we pointed out earlier, this 
period also coincides with the preparation of the annual budget, which adds an additional 
burden on the accounts section. Lack of supporting facilities (e.g. calculators, stationaries, 
etc) were other complaints of the accounting staff. For example, the salaries of the whole 
staff (around 20,000 employees) are prepared manually. Furthermore, we observed that a 
large number of flies and other valuable documents were thrown on the corridors, due to a 
due to lack of storage facilities. All these factors contributed to a demoralised staff, which 
affected productvity indirectly as a vital service unit.
Fourth, the system does not take into consideration the soil fertility in different parts 
of the scheme, which is a very important variable. That is because the scheme is composed 
of two main parts; the Gezira part which was established in 1925, and the Managil extension 
established in the 1960s. At present, for a tenant to break-even, he must produce 4.5 
Kantar/feddan of medium stable, and 3.5 Kantar/feddan of long stable cotton. In fact, the 
available evidence from the scheme records suggests that, this production target is usually
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well below the average productivity in the Managil extension, while it requires considerable 
effort and large amount of fertilisers to be attained in the Gezira part. That is because the 
Gezira part has been cultivated for than 50 years, and hence the soil has lost its fertility. 
Indeed, our investigation revealed that, of the 48 percent reported to have failed to break­
even in the 1989/90 season, almost 40 percent came from the Gezira part. An alternative 
could be to allow these tenants to cultivate other crops (e.g. wheat, vegetables, sorghum, 
etc), which might be suitable in this soil. However, the Agricultural Manager asserted that, 
since other crops are marketed directly by tenants, it would be exceedingly difficult for the 
scheme management to collect the land and water rates on these crops. Moreover, he stated 
that, it would set a very serious precedent for other tenants in different part of the scheme 
to demand similar treatments.
Fifth, the system is socially disadvantageous to the inhabitants, simply because under 
the former system, 3 percent of net proceeds was allocated for social services. These funds 
were used to provide clean water supply; protect inhabitants against water-boume diseases 
(e.g. malaria and bilharsia) through continous spraying of canals; provision of educational 
facilities and health care. Under the present system, however, such services are no longer 
provided.
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that tenants are fully responsible for 
all the costs incurred; shortages of irrigation, and risks of diseases, though they have no 
control over agricultural inputs; water supply or the selling prices. The government, on the 
other hand, receives a certain predetermined land and water rates regardless of the yield or 
costs. However, this is not to suggest that the new system is favourable to the government. 
On the contrary, the system requires full payment to tenants regardless of whether the crop 
was sold or not. Indeed, the timing of payment (June of each year) coincides with the end 
of the fiscal year, and hence creates a liquidity problem for the state.
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Second, as we pointed out earlier, there are a number of cost items which are directly 
related to production, but are treated as administrative expenses, rather than production costs. 
These include the salaries of agricultural inspectors, field accountants and the associated 
overhead expenses, such as cars, houses and other fringe benefits. Consequently the 
administrative expenses mounted and constituted a real burden on the treasury. Although the 
land and water rates were continuously showing an upward trend, the MFEP repeatedly 
claimed that the rates are insufficient. The officials interviewed pointed out that, the 
persistent losses incurred by the scheme are largely attributed to the lower land and water 
rates. It might be true that land and water rates are low, however, it is very difficult to 
accept such arguements. According to this system, the scheme is a cost centre rather than a 
profit centre, simply because land and water rates are centralised revenues that belong to the 
central Treasury. Therefore, it is not easy to construct a Profit and Loss Account for the 
scheme under the present system. Nevertheless, I believe, the real issue as far as the MFEP 
is concerned, is not that the rates are too low, but rather failure to collect these revenues 
from the scheme. This is largely attributed to two main factors: (1) failure on the part of 
tenants to pay these rates, because costs have exceeded cotton proceeds, or (2) failure on the 
part of management to remit the revenues collected to the Treasury. That is because, due to 
the severe liquidity problems of the schemes management has retained these revenues to 
finance its administrative expenses. In 1987/88, for example, the Gezira scheme paid to the 
Treasury only £sl3 million, out of £s35 million estimated revenues required in land and 
water rates (MFEP). Furthermore, the Bank of Sudan usually provides short term (seasonal) 
loans to finance agricultural operations. The assumption is that these loans would be repaid 
at the end of the season. In reality, however, the agricultural schemes have failed to repay 
these advances, and consequently, the accumulated debts of the sector to the central Bank 
amounted to £s 1105 million by the end of 1987 (Auditor General Report, 1987/88).
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In summary, therefore, I believe the new system favours neither the tenants nor the 
government. The tenants although responsible for all costs incurred, and all the risks 
associated with production, they have no control over inputs, selling prices or cropping 
patterns. The Government has failed, for one reason or the other, to collect the land and 
water rates, its main source of revenues. The scheme management has no financial stake in 
the profitability of the scheme, and hence has no motivation to control costs. There is no 
management appraisal system, and management has no autonomy over operating decisions. 
As in other sectors of the economy, the MFEP maintains pervasive influence over personnel 
policies, budget format and timing, purchases, finance and investment.
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Chapter Eleven
The Reform Process II
Concurrent with the reform process discussed in the previous chapter, the authorities 
also initiated rehabilitation projects for the different sectors of the economy. In this chapter 
we shall outline and discuss these projects. In the first section, we shall discuss the sugar 
rehabilitation project, viz : its objectives, effects on sugar production and the main 
implementation defects. The second section will be devoted to the overall "Public Enterprise 
and Economic Management Project".
11.1 Structure of Sugar Industry
As part of the industrialisation process in the 1960s, two sugar factories were 
established, Guneid (1962) and New Haifa (1965). In the 1970s, however, the state embarked 
on an ambitious development programme for the sugar industry, partly to satisfy local 
demand, and partly to export sugar. In effect, four sugar estates were initiated, though only 
two (Sennar and Assalaya) were made operational, while the other two (Mellout and 
Mangala) were never operated due to the outbreak of a civil war in the area. Each of the four 
factories is composed of a sugarcane farm served by an extensive irrigation system, a sugar 
factory, and a fleet of agricultural equipment for cultivation.
As the Guneid Sugar case showed, the responsibility for the sugar sector policy and 
operation is divided among a number of government departments. These include the 
Ministries of Industry, Finance and Economic Planning, Commerce, Agriculture, Irrigation, 
Energy and Transport.
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11.1.1 The Need for Rehabilitation
As table 11.1 reveals, sugar production compared to the installed capacity has 
declined to its lowest levels in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Indeed, the industry was 
operating, on average, at one-third of the designed capacity. Therefore, the immediate 
concern was to improve sugar production, at least to satisfy the growing local demand.
Table 11.1 
Sugar Production (Tons) 
(1977/78 - 1982/83)















Source : Public Corporation for Sugar Trading, Khartoum.
In a bid to revitalise the industry, two pieces of reform were initiated in the early 
1980s : one, legal restructuring to provide the sector with greater operational autonomy, and 
two, rehabilitation of the sector. However, as we saw in chapter 10, the objective of granting 
the industrial sector greater operational autonomy never materialised, basically due to serious 
implementation deficiencies. As a result, the newly created companies continued to operate 
under the same restrictive government rules and regulations, the same work force, and the 
same management practices. Not surprisingly, therefore, the legal restructuring did not 
produce significant turnaround in productivity or financial performance.
Nevertheless, recognition that autonomy alone is insufficient to provide a solution to 
obsolete plants, deficient irrigation systems, or provide the much needed spare parts, have 
encouraged the government to seek the World Bank support. In response, the International 
Development Association (IDA) commissioned Tate and Lyle to identify critical areas that
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need support and to devise a rehabilitation programme. After extensive empirical 
investigation, the consultants proposed a five year rehabilitation project, covering the 
following areas : agriculture, irrigation, the factory, infrastructure, and the supporting 
services (namely training and management).
The programme was scheduled to commence in 1983/84, with the objective of 
improving cane yield, and raising total quantity of sugar produced to 316,000 tons by the end 
of the project life in 1988/891. However, due to financing difficulties, the project barely 
started in 1986/87, and the original production target to be attained by the end of the 
rehabilitation process (i.e. 1992/93), was modified to 278,600 tons of sugar (the Sugar 
Project Implementation Committee, Khartoum).
11.1.2 Project Costs
The total project costs amounted to $183.1 million , and were financed as follows :
Source IDA Arab Fund Saudi Fund Germany Sudan
Amount ($m) 60.3 59 38.5 23 2.3
(Ratio %) 33.3 32.6 21.3 12.7 0.1
11.1.3 Project Management
Following the agreement between the Government of Sudan and the World Bank in 
1983, a "Sugar Project Implementation Committee" (SPIC), was established to coordinate 
the project.2 However, due to the change of government in April, 1986, substantial changes 
in the staff was introduced by the incoming elected government. At present, SPIC is headed
1 Approximately, 55 percent of this production target was planned to be 
achieved through increases in cane area; 35 percent from improved cane yield, 
and 10 percent from enhanced extraction efficiency within the factories.
2 A summary of this agreement will be provided in the appendix.
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by a Sudanese chairman, assisted by technical, procurement and administrative managers. 
In addition, there is a project adviser (expatriate), and three conslutants (two expatriates and 
one national) in the fields of finance and sugar technology.
The SPIC was assigned the following major tasks : (1) To provide strategic planning 
and render policy advice in relation to the rehabilitation programme, and supervise the 
project. (2) To monitor the performance of the factories to achieve the specified production 
targets. (3) To provide technical assistance to the factories, identify critical areas that need 
further technical support and supervise the consultants. (4) To prepare proper accounting and 
management systems that enable the factories to operate on sound commercial basis. (5)
To establish sound personnel policies, including a comprehensive incentive system to enable 
the factories to attract and retain competent staff (SPIC, Khartoum). The SPIC would be 
liquidated six months after the expiry date of the project.
Our investigation revealed that, although SPIC is mandated to implement the 
rehabilitation project, in fact it has been handling such issues as timely availability of 
essential inputs and recurrent operating problems, due to the organisational vacuum created 
by the liquidation of the "Sugar and Distillery Corporation". Indeed, the chairman 
complained that" companies usually turn to this office to solve operating problems, such as 
finance and inputs, which are not our functions". By our observation, however, it appears 
that he is "enjoying" these tasks at the expense of his duties outlined above.
Nevertheless, the gap between the production plan and actual achievement remained 
very wide. Indeed, sugar production was declining as the following figure reveals.
It is evident that the rehabilitation project has so far failed to produce tangible results 













Source: Public Corporation for Sugar Trading, Khartoum.
First, the time lag between the preparation of the project in 1983, and actual 
implementation in 1987, rendered the original proposal laigely out-dated. In the meantime, 
the useful life of most machines expired, and new problems emerged which were not 
envisaged by the project. For example, the Assalaya and Sennar plants were only four years 
old at the time of the proposal. Indeed, such problems, which were not incorporated in the 
rehabilitation project, have constrained the operations of the factories. Lack of foreign 
exchange to make up for these deficiencies, is undoubtedly the main reason. Second, the 
implementation process was erupted many times by creditors - mainly the Arab Fund to 
whom Sudan is heavily indebted-insisting that the government pay its arrears before any new 
withdrawals could be made. This situation has so far occurred twice, for a total stoppage
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time of 9 months. Table (11.2) below shows the actual amount disbursed from the different 
sources as of June, 1990. It is evident that the actual amount disbursed from the Saudi and 
the Arab Fund combined is less than 18 percent of the total amount contributed, while 
disbursement from the other sources (i.e. the IDA and Germany) is almost 60 percent of the 
amount allocated. Furthermore, the chairman of SPIC claimed that the Saudi approval for 
the recommendations of the purchasing committee usually takes a considerable time, and is 
often rejected for unconvincing reasons, such as "you did not advertise in foreign 
newpapers", or that "the number of bidders is insufficient".
Table 11.2 
Actual Disbursements 
as of June 1990 
($m)
Source Amount Allocated Actual Disbursement Ratio of Actual 
Disbursement
IDA 60,323 32.2 53.4
Arab Fund 59,000 12.9 21.9
Saudi Fund 38,511 4.5 11.6
Germany 22.925 17.6 76.7
Total 180,759 67.3 37.6
Source: SPIC, Khartoum.
Nevertheless, the overall ratio of actual disbursement to the amount allocated is only
37.6 percent, which is very low after three years of the project life3. A number of factors 
are responsible for this state of affairs. First and foremost, the never-ending brain-drain to 
the Gulf states resulted in considerable delays, regarding hiring key staff, completing the 
necessary legal steps, providing timely certified accounts, and the like. Second, the political 
and legal instability have also played a major role in disturbing the implementation process, 
and caused deep concerns among creditors. During the last seven years, the Sudan
2
It was originally planned that, during the first two years, 66 
percent of the amount allocated must be disbursed (SPIC, Khartoum).
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experienced three types of government and innumerable cabinet reshuffles, and with every 
change in government, major changes in PEs management and SPIC personnel took place.
The consequences of the low disbursement, and consequently the slow progress of the 
implementation were detrimental. The useful life of existing assets expired, and the prices 
of new machines and spare parts soared. The officials interviewed also pointed out that the 
delay in factory rehabilitation has reduced the extraction rate by more than 10 percent and 
time loss of more than 40 percent. Moreover, lengthy delays in arrival and delivery of 
machines and spare parts, and the slow progress of rehabilitating essential activities, such as 
irrigation, have negatively affected agricultural operations and harvesting. Consequently, the 
gap between plans and actual achievements remained very wide. However, it must, be 
stressed that, the sugar industry is an integrated agro-industrial activity for which piece by 
piece rehabilitation is inappropriate; not least because a deficiency in any phase would affect 
the entire system. Therefore, until the whole project is completed, it would be very difficult 
to see a significant turnaround in productivity. However, the longer the rehabilitation process 
takes, the more difficult it becomes to attain the production target, simply because new 
problems might emerge. It must be emphasised that, shortages of local currency (i.e. the 
government share), and the lengthy, cumbersome bureaucratic procedures to make the 
payments for the civil works, and transportation of machines, have also caused considerable 
delays.
Third, our investigation revealed that the staff morale is unduly low. The staff 
interviewed indicated that, almost 10 years after being converted into companies, their 
salaries and other benefits are still determined by the state as part of the whole civil service 
pay package. Moreover, the sharp deterioration in real income received by the staff, and the 
worsening conditions in rural areas have made life difficult for the staff, and hence 
accelerated the turnover rates. Also, the public image towards the sugar factories is very low,
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due to frequent sugar shortages in the country4. In effect, all these factors amounted to one 
thing; lower staff morale. Likewise, there is a strong belief among the staff that the 
rehabilitation project is only a step towards preparing the industry for privatisation. 
Therefore, the fears that they might be laid-off, made the staff disinterested to make the 
rehabilitation succeed.
Fourth, the rehabilitation project did not provide finance to meet the annual input 
needs of the industry. The assumption was that, as a result of improved productivity brought 
about by the rehabilitation project, boosted morale, and improved producer prices (see 
below), the factories should be able to generate sufficient resources to acquire their input 
needs. However, the very fact that, production stagnated or indeed declined, meant that the 
factories failed to generate sufficient internal resources to meet their input needs. The severe 
shortages of foreign exchange in the economy created even more problems for imported 
items. The officials estimated that about 65 percent of the operating expenses require a 
foreign exchange component, that is $60 per ton of sugar produced. Therefore, the timely 
availability of foreign exchange is critical for the ultimate success of the rehabilitation effort, 
and hence the achievement of the production targets. The four PEs require about $14 million 
each year, while Kenana alone require about $22 million5.
Fifth, as noted earlier, sugar manufacturing is a two-way activity : sugarcane 
plantation and milling. Therefore, the coordination between the farm and the factory is 
critical for sugar production, because a deficiency in any of them would have a direct effect 
on the entire production cycle. At present, irrigation is the responsibility of the Ministry of
As we pointed out earlier, the severe shortages of basic consumer 
goods in rural areas has pushed up prices dramatically. The authorities 
usually give urban areas highest priorities at the expense of rural areas, for 
political reasons.
5 Although Kenana is a joint venture, it relies entirely on the state 
for its foreign exchange needs, because the state had acquired all its output 
to satisfy local demand, but failed to pay in hard currency (see chapter 8).
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Irrigation, sugar research is conducted by the Agriclutural Research Centre of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, while the sugar factories are operated by the Ministry of Industry, without 
specific legislation or regulation to govern the relationship between these ministries and the 
sugar factories.
The rehabilitation project maintained that, the responsibility for irrigation management 
and operation, and the sugarcane research to be transferred to the sugar companies. 
However, this clause has not yet been implemented. Similarly, the rehabilitation project 
envisaged that the production relations at the Guneid Sugar Company to be converted from 
the Joint Account System to the Individual Account System. Unlike other factories, sugarcane 
at Guneid is produced under a tenant farming system. The tenancy relationship 
(approximately 24000 farmers) is similar to the Joint Account System in the Gezira scheme 
(chapter 10), with the inherent disadvantages of lack of incentives and cross-subsidisation. 
Nevertheless, as with the previous requirement, the change of production relations has not 
yet taken place. The SPIC chairman argued that "changes in tenancy relationship, the transfer 
of responsibility for irrigation management, and sugarcane research require legislation from 
the Council of Ministers. Until that legislation is issued, we can not do anything". However, 
irrigation specialists we have met claim that, even if that legislation is issued, the smooth 
transfer is likely to take a considerable time, possibly extending beyond the remaining life 
of the project.
Sixth, the liquidation of the sectoral corporation (Sugar and Distillery Corporation) 
has created a coordination problem, because each company is a legal, separate entity. At 
present the transfer of the productive resources from one company to the other requires the 
intervention of the Minister of Industry. In addition, absence of a central overseeing agency 
has encouraged the companies to modify the original rehabilitation plan, so as to cater for 
emerging problems, which made life difficult for the SPIC.
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A major final reason for the stagnating or even declining sugar production is the lack 
of agricultural planning (i.e. insufficient sugarcane plantation and inadequate cane yield), 
coupled with the lack of preparation for cane cutting and transportation bottlenecks. As noted 
earlier, 90 percent of the production target was planned to be achieved from improved cane 
production. Indeed, as the case of the Guneid Sugar Company showed, the severe shortages 
of agricultural inputs, transportation of cane to the factory, and lack of cane cutters, are the 
main causes for the stagnant production. In the 1988/89 season, for instance, sugar cane 
equivalent to about 30,000 tons of sugar is reported to have remained uncrushed (SPIC). The 
reasons are two-fold : poor pay under the civil service rates (£s 300 per month, or £15), and 
insufficient planning by management to address the problem before it occurs.
11.1.4 Marketing and Pricing
As the case of the Guneid Sugar Company showed, the marketing of sugar is a 
government monopoly under the "Public Corporation for Sugar Trading (PCST), a 
department of the MFEP. The PCST is mandated to purchase local output, import additional 
sugar to satisfy local demand, and distribute sugar throughout the country. It acquires the 
entire local production at a price determined at the national level. At present, both producer 
and consumer prices are controlled by the state. Consumer prices have only recently 
(December, 1989) been set at the import parity level (albeit at the official rate), while 
producer prices are still far below the production costs. As a result, the Treasury generated 
gross revenues in an amount of £s 4250 per ton in 1989/90, while the factories continued to 
incur losses. The following table summarises this state of affairs.
Thus, the present pricing system is damaging to the industry, since it does not allow 
the factories to generate sufficient resources to maintain their assets or acquire the necessary 
inputs. Needless to say, the persistent use of this distorted pricing mechanism is crippling the 
industry, and more importantly runs counter to the very basic idea of a market economy, the 
critical prerequisite for the success of privatisation.
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Table 11.3
Producer6 and Consumer Prices, Production 
Costs and Revenues to the Treasury 
per ton of sugar










1988/89 2800 1900 2146 900
1989/90 6750 2500 2772 4250
(*) of this price, £s 500 is deducted for the irrigation charges, and hence is an additional 
revenue for the Treasury.
Source: Public Corporation for Sugar Trading, Khartoum.
The Ministry of Commerce, Cooperation and Supply annually determines the 
amount of sugar to be allocated to each region (table 11.4). The system of regional quotas 
to be distributed by PCST was originally meant to ensure that sugar is available throughout 
the country at the regulated price.
Table 11.4 
Regional sugar quotas 
(1988/89)





Khartoum 128,050 2,284 56
Northern 35,460 1,221 29
Central 120,170 4,652 26
Eastern 57,130 2,629 22
Darfur 56,045 2,686 15
Kardufan 61,070 3,529 17
Southern 49,250 6,100 8
Total 507,275 24,118 21
Source: Public Corporation for Sugar Trading, Khartoum. 
Department of Statistics, Khartoum.
6 Kenana Company is offered a different selling price. For instance, the 
selling price for 1988/89 was £S 2944 per ton of sugar. Thus the difference 
from PE's selling price is £S 1044 per ton.
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As can be seen from table (11.4), the quota system is largely biased towards the urban 
elites of Khartoum. The region of Khartoum, for example, is allocated 25 percent of the total 
quantity distributed for a 9 percent of total population, while the other 91 percent of the 
population consume the rest. That is largely because Khartoum is politically more influential, 
where shortages of sugar and other consumer goods normally provoke street riots by the 
organised labour unions. Consequently, the inadequacy of regional quotas has created an 
unofficial black market in the rural areas. Although with the current accounting and 
information systems it is difficult to trace sugar losses, the officials interviewed at the PCST 
indicated that much of the sugar is transferred to the black market after leaving the PCST 
control. As a result, the profit margin tended to shift from the legitimate producers to the 
illegal black marketeers who collected the scarcity premiums. Indeed, the presence of a 
highly profitable black market has increasingly syphoned-off supplies from the official 
market, thereby increasing the scarcities. In effect, the desired objective of lower prices to 
the consumers is lost.
11.1.5 Management, Accounting and Training
Under the rehabilitation project, a sum of $32 million was allocated for the supporting 
services of management, accounting and training. Initially, it was envisaged that the 
companies would be operated by foreign experts under a management contract. However, 
due to resistance from the bureaucrats and labour unions, that idea was soon abandoned and 
replaced by the so-called "advisers", with no powers to take decisions. Consequently, 
management selection, remunerations and sanctions continued to be a government business, 
as part of the whole civil service.
In 1987, three international consulting firms were contracted to advise on the 
replacement of the existing accounting systems (government accounting systems) with 
commercial accounting systems, capable of providing reliable and timely information for the 
management of commercial companies. In January, 1990, the effectiveness of the new
2 5 6
systems was thoroughly reviewed by the SPIC, and discussed in detail with the project’s co- 
financiers. The conclusion was that, the new accounting systems have not been of much 
success in providing reliable information to management as anticipated, basically due to 
implementation deficiencies. Consequently, it was decided to extend the contract until mid- 
1991 to enable the consultants to modify the systems. Moreover, the consultants were placed 
in line position rather than purely advisory position to enable them to take decisions. 
However, it is still the case that the companies will not be able to recruit and retain 
competent staff to operate the modified systems, given the present government pay scale.
The progress of the training component, under a contract to the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), has also been very slow and ineffective. 
Indeed, we understood that at one stage the authorities even considered the termination of 
the contract. The report for the planning phase was already over four months late by August, 
1990, when the data for this research was completed. However some technical training 
courses were arranged by SPIC, but no such training took place for the managerial staff.
11.1.6 Control
The rehabilitation project envisaged that, "The Sudan Sugar Board” (SSB) would be 
created under the Ministry of Industry, to perform the following tasks. (1) Monitor and 
evaluate the performance of the sugar companies. (2) Conduct market research. (3) Review 
the staffing position of PEs and carry out training programmes. (4) Monitor technical 
development in sugar industry, and advise the government. (5) Act as a buffer between PEs 
and the various government units involved (SPIC, Khartoum).
However, our investigation revealed that, the SSB never came into existence, and in 
the meantime a new structure emerged to perform the above tasks, and this was the "Sudan 
Sugar Council" (SSC). The officials interviewed indicated that, the SSC would not be a 
holding company as had the "Sugar and Distillery Corporation", but would rather perform
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functions beyond the capacity of PEs to perform independently, such as planning, 
procurement, pricing and training. The primary difference between SSB and SSC is that, the 
latter would include Kenana Sugar Company. Advocates argued that the involvement of 
Kenana is essential for the following reasons. First, without Kenana most of the principles 
of the SSC’s operations would either be invalidated or made difficult to sustain. Second, 
Kenana can be regarded as a "locomotive" that helps to pull the other PEs along the road to 
optimum operational efficiency. Third, Kenana itself can secure significant economies of 
management, and/or imporvements in operational procedures through its involvement in the 
various functions proposed for the SSC. Finally, advocates suggested that the precise role of 
the SSC should be left for the industry (public and private) to decide. The industries should 
finance and control the SSC through a Board of Directors to be drawn from the senior 
management of the companies.
Nevertheless, although a sugar council with the foregoing functions might seem 
desirable and sound, its effectiveness would depend on the degree of autonomy granted to 
PEs. As we argued earlier, although PEs were converted into "private" limited companies, 
they continued to operate under a multitude of rules and regulations that used to govern the 
public corporations (e.g. the Public Corporation Act, 1976; and the Financial Regulations 
Act, 1977). Moreover, their exact legal status is not at all clear (i.e. are they legal 
autonomous entities, or just productive units to be attached to a central agency ?) Second, 
the Kenana Sugar Company might also be reluctant to participate effectively on the council, 
on the grounds that it would allow the government bureaucracy to creep in. Therefore, given 
this state of affairs, it is highly unlikely that, a council with the foregoing functions would 
be made operational. Indeed, given the previous experience with similar central overseeing 
agencies, such as the Supreme Authority for Public Corporation proposed in 1971; and the 
Supreme Council for Public Corporations proposed in 1976, it could be argued that the 
proposed sugar council or sugar board may never come into existence. Nevertheless, there 
are a number of reasonable ideas floating around.
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From the above discussion, therefore, it could be concluded that, so far the progress 
of the implementation of the rehabilitation project has been disappointing, and very slow. As 
a result, sugar production did not improve, and the gap between the plans and actual 
achievement remained very wide. Indeed, sugar production has been declining, and there is 
no reason to suggest that during the remaining life of the project (only two years), a dramatic 
turnaround in production would take place. As a matter of fact, there is ample evidence to 
suggest that the pace for the implementation could be slowed down, if not being brought to 
a halt. The project was financed mainly by Gulf states (54 percent), whom the Government 
of Sudan opposed in the recent Gulf crisis. In fact, even the rest of cost (45 percent), was 
financed by Germany and the World Bank who also took an opposite stance from that of the 
Sudan regarding the Gulf war. Therefore, they might suspend or withdraw funds at least for 
the time being, which would affect not only the sugar rehabilitation project, but also other 
rehabilitation efforts for the textile and agricultural sectors.
Second, the ultimate objectives of the rehabilitation project have never been spelt out 
in any official document, creating a sense of confusion. It is not at all clear whether the 
project is a first step towards privatisation, or a means to improve efficiency. However, if 
it was meant to be a step towards privatisation, then this is largely inconsistent with the 
experience in most DCs (e.g. Brazil and the Philippines) where rehabilitation prior to 
privatisation has been opposed on the grounds that the costs incurred might not be recovered 
(Vuylsteke, 1988). In addition, it might pose serious political concerns regarding the sale of 
a PE after it had been turned around by massive use of public funds. It is true that the 
decision to sell loss-making PEs in their present financial condition might be difficult. 
However, given the financial difficulties facing the Sudanese authorities, rehabilitation prior 
to sale is simply unrealistic. On the other hand, if the objective was to enhance efficiency, 
the authorities have done virtually nothing to that effect. It is certainly true that the 
rehabilitation project would replace the out-dated plants. But, as we saw earlier, the operating 
criteria are still deficient in a number of respects, and no measures were initiated to foster 
competition, the single most important factor to improving efficiency.
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11.2 The PE and Economic Management Project
From those early sectoral reform efforts, we now turn to discuss the most recent, 
overall PE reform project. As we saw earlier, by mid-1980s, the poor performance of PEs 
was causing real concerns to the Sudanese authorities and international aid donors, notably 
the World Bank. Indeed, the authorities have been exploring ways of revitalising the sector, 
and have approached the World Bank for that purpose. In response, the World Bank 
commissioned two studies in 1985/86, to identify the critical areas that need support, at a 
cost of $0.5 million, financed by the IDA (table 11.5). Following these empirical 
investigations, the Government of Sudan submitted a formal request for a "technical 
assistance credit" in September, 1986. The loan was approved in May, 1987, and 
subsequently a four-year reform project was adopted (1987/88 - 1991/92).
The project was composed of three main components : (1) PE reform, (2) 
improvement of national planning and economic management, and (3) development of human 
resources.
Project cost







Long Term Experts - 1.152 1.152
Short Term Consultants 0.664 3.000 3.644
Formal Training 0.591 1.850 2.441
Equipment / Vehicles 0.293 0.486 0.799
Operating Costs 1.950 - 1.950
Contingencies, Prices 0.979 0.207 1.186
PPF Advance0} - 0.500 0.500
Total 4.457 7.192 11.652
% 38% 62% 100%
Financing ($m)
IDA 1.805 7.192 9.000 (77%)
Government of Sudan 2.652 - 2.652 (23%)
Total 4.457 7.192 11.652
(1) Project Preparation Facility
Source : Public Corporation Department (MFEP), Khartoum.
In what follows, we will outline and discuss the PE reform component viz: objectives, 
costs, and implementation.
11.2.1 Objectives of PE Reform
The Director of the Public Corporation Department (MFEP), cited the following 
objectives of the PE reform: (1) "to substantially reduce the number of PEs", (2) "to improve 
the institutional setting in which the remaining PEs operate", and (3)"to eliminate or 
substantially reduce the government subsidies to PEs".
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11.2.2 Cost of PE Reform
The amount allocated for PE reform under the project, was approximately $5 million 







Long term experts - 0.432 0.432
Short term experts 0.528 1.200 1.728
Training 0.300 1.047 1.347
Equipment / Vehicles 0.131 0.216 0.347
Operating costs 0.651 - 0.651
Contigencies 0.392 0.101 0.493
Total 2.002 0.101 4.998
This amount would finance the following major activities : (1) diagnostic studies of 
10 PEs selected as a pilot group, (2) establishing a comprehensive government monitoring 
system, (3) strengthening internal planning and management of PEs, and (4) reviewing all 
existing legislation governing PEs, and implementing any necessary changes.
The Director of the Public Corporation Department (MFEP) pointed out that, due to 
the difficulty of addressing all PEs at a time, ten PEs were selected as a pilot group, 
according to the following criteria:
(.) impact on the economy,
(.) market orientation,
(.) size,
(.) potential for privatisation,
The enterprises selected for the diagnostic studies were : The Rahad Agricultural 
Scheme, Toker Agricultural Scheme, Animal Products Corporation, Guneid Sugar Company,
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Karima Fruit Factory, Friendship Textile Company, Maspio Cement Company, Duty Free 
Shops Coiporation, the Sudan Telecommunication Corporation, and the National Electricity 
Corporation. The basic idea of the diagnostic studies was to suggest an action plan for the 
government, i.e. whether to retain under public ownership, liquidate or privatise.
11.2.3 Rationalisation Fund
In a bid to alleviate the social impact of the reform project (e.g. mass redundancies), 
the Government of Sudan agreed to establish a "PE Rationalisation Fund". It was the 
intention that the Fund would provide such things as severance payments for the retrenched 
staff, loans for employees to acquire shares, and possibly re-training of retrenched staff 
(MFEP).
Management of PE Reform
The management of the PE reform component will be the responsibility of a central 
body called "The Central Bureau for Public Enterprises" (CBPE), to be created under the 
MFEP. In addition, the Director of Public Corporations stated that, the CBPE will be 
assigned the following tasks : (i) The management of the diagnostic studies and to 
recommend to the Government the appropriate course of action (i.e. retain, rehabilitate, or 
privatise). (ii)_Monitor and evaluate the performance of PEs. (iii) Establish a sound reporting
system for PEs. (iv) Design on-job training programmes, (v) Produce specific terms of
\
reference for PE managers, board of directors, sectoral ministries and other related 
institutions, (vi) Collect basic data on PEs (number, financial and technical position, 
government equity, etc).
The other two components (Economic Management and Human Resources 
Management), at a cost of $6 million, will provide assistance for the reform of the 
macroeconomic management and the human resource development. The management of both 
components was to be the responsibility of a secretariat to be established by the Minister of 
Finance, before the end of October, 1987.
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11.2.4 The Implementation Process
The project was scheduled to commence in mid-1987, with the selection of the 
consultant firms; establishment of the CBPE and the PE Rationalisation Fund; appointment 
of committee of experts to review the existing legislation/regulations regarding PEs; 
formation of task forces for clearing intra-Govemmental accounts and the backlog in PEs 
accounts; preparation of terms of reference for PE managers; shareholders, sectoral 
ministries, and the CBPE.7 However, our investigation revealed that, actual implementation 
barely started in late September, 1989, for the diagnostic studies of the ten enterprises. As 
regards the other main components of the project, however, no major progress was made as 
we shall see below.
11.2.5 The CBPE
The cornerstone for the success of the PE reform, was the creation of the Central 
Bureau for Public Enterprises, so as to locate the overall responsibility for the reform effort 
in a single central unit. However, our investigation revealed that, as other central overseeing 
agencies previously proposed (see chapter 9), the Bureau has not yet been established. A 
major reason is that, the location of the Bureau has generated a great controversy and heated 
debate among the government circles. The initial plan proposed by the World Bank envisaged 
that, the Bureau (composed of 5 full-time professionals representing sectoral ministries) 
would be placed under the MFEP. However, that proposal was categorically rejected by the 
sectoral ministries, on the grounds that it would strengthen the already pervasive influence 
of the MFEP. Consequently, sectoral ministries, notably the Ministiy of Industry, refused 
to nominate their representatives.
The whole issue was subsequently discussed in a "National Economic Conference", 
arranged by the incoming military government, and it was recommended that, the Bureau to
7 A detailed work plan will be provided in the appendix.
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be attached to the "Revolutionary Command Council". The MFEP, currently coordinating 
the diagnostic studies, however, managed to lobby against the implementation of that 
recommendation, and hence maintained the status quo. The Undersecretary for Finance and 
chairman of the Bureau insisted that "these enterprises are public entities, using public 
resources, and hence the CBPE must be accountable to the MFEP". In the end, the Bureau 
never came into existence, and the invaluable and much needed tasks outlined above, remain 
to be carried out before embarking upon any privatisation process.
Likewise, we found that no action was taken regarding either the Economic 
Management or the Human Resource Development component. Indeed, even the secretariats 
to be responsible for the management of both components have not yet been established. We 
failed to investigate this state of affairs in depth, because the Minister of Finance responsible 
to create these secretariats was under arrest. The issue is irrelevant for the present 
government, because the whole project has now been relegated to lower levels on the national 
agenda, and instead wholesale privatisation has been proposed (see chapter 6). Indeed, the 
Minister in charge of privatisation when asked about the privatisation costs stated that, "If 
possible, we might use the remaining funds of the project".
Finally:, the lack of funds to establish the PE Rationalisation Fund has undoubtedly 
played a significant role in delaying the implementation process. Indeed, our investigation 
revealed that the Rationalisation Fund envisaged under the project has not yet been 
established. All the officials interviewed attributed this situation to financing difficulties on 
the part of the Sudan Government, which is largely consistent with the experience in most 
DCs. As we saw in the introductory part of this these, the authorities in most DCs realised 
that, a policy designed to reduce the budgetary burden, actually costs a substantial amount 
of money in the short and medium term, which is not readily available. Indeed, these 
transaction costs, particularly employee benefits, have reportedly brought privatisation to a 
stand still in a number of DCs (Kikeri, 1990; Cowan, 1990; Vuylsteke, 1988).
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11.2.6 Work in Progress:
The Diagnostic Studies.
In September, 1989, international consultants - BMB (Dutch), Cooper and Lybrand 
(British), and a Sudanese counterpart (T.T. and PISCO) - were contracted to conduct the 
diagnostic studies of the ten PEs selected as a pilot group. In addition, representatives from 
the MFEP, responsible ministries, and the enterprises to be studied were invited to participate 
in the diagnostic studies. The primary purpose of involving these parties was to facilitate data 
collection, and to maintain the cooperation of the bureaucrats and line managers. The 
consultants started work in October, 1989, with a finalisation of a check list for data 
collection, and preparation for an introductory workshop. The purpose of the workshop was 
to gather all those involved in the diagnostic studies so as to inform them about:
(.) the methodology,
(.) the phases of the diagnostic process per enterprise,
(.) the envisaged time schedule for the studies.
Furthermore, the consultants also used to organise a so-called "diagnostic workshops", 
so as to foster mutual understanding and to seek consensus on conclusions and 
recommendations. All the parties involved were invited to participate in these diagnostic 
workshops. The researcher was also invited to attend three of these workshops. Up to 
August, 1990, the consultants had managed to complete the diagnostic studies of the Sudan 
Telecommunications, Guneid Sugar Company, Karima Fruit Factory, Animal Products 
Corporation, and the National Electricity Corporation.
Another piece of work in progress is the classification of PEs into commercial / non­
commercial, strategic / non-strategic units, so as to facilitate the action plan. A committee,
composed of civil servants, proposed two definitions of a commercial enterprise. First, 
commercial enterprises were defined as "Those dealing in buying and selling of commodities
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without modifying their basic nature". Accordingly, only those PEs engaged in the trading 
activities qualified for the above definition, and hence classified as commercial enterprises. 
Examples included the Public Corporation for Sugar Trading, Sudan Cotton Company, Duty 
Free Shops corporation, the Petroleum Corporation, the Gezira Trading and Services 
Company, and Kordufan Engineering Company. All the manufacturing enterprises, however, 
were excluded on the grounds that they often change the nature of the commodity (i.e. they 
transform a certain input into another product). The second definition proposed by the 
committee stated that, "a commercial enterprise is the one that operates in business ventures 
for the purpose of generating profits". Thus, the cornerstone according to this definition was 
the realisation of profits, regardless of whether the enterprise had "modified" the nature of 
the commodity or not. In addition, the committee emphasised the importance of the 
continuity of the profit objective for an enterprise to qualify for the above definition. For 
example, a government department that sells part of its assets and realises a profit, shall not 
be regarded as a commercial enterprise, simply because this activity is incidental and is not 
part of the purpose for which it was established. Therefore, in addition to the above 
enterprises (those classified as commercial enterprises under the first definition), the 
following list of enterprises, was added: all manufacturing; agricultural and mining 
enterprises.
Nevertheless, while the attempts to define commercial enterprises seem to be 
reasonable and objective (especially the second definition), the definition of strategic 
enterprises posed serious problems, and came out to be vague and subjective. The committee 
proposed the following definition: "strategic enterprises are those operating in ‘vital’ sectors 
of the economy, and ‘important’ for carrying out the government socio-economic 
development policies". The interpretation of the terms, ‘vital’, ‘important’, however, was 
less informative; subjective and somewhat ambiguous. Indeed, all the committee members 
interviewed gave conflicting and personal interpretations for these terms. This is not 
surprising, however; simply because there is no clear cut, universally acceptable definition
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that applies to all countries at different stage of development. Indeed, much of the available 
evidence indicates that countries differ widely in this respect (see below).
As a result the following PEs were classified as strategic : the National Electricity 
Corporation, the National Water Authority, the Sudan Airways, the Sudan Railways, the 
Sudan Telecom, the Post and Telegraph, the Sea Ports Corporation, the Civil Aviation 
Authority, and all the sugar factories. It is difficult to assess the merits of this classification, 
as there is no conclusive evidence from experience in various parts of the world. In 
Malaysia, for example, both the Sea Ports (Port Kelang) and the telecom industries have been 
privatised (Leeds, 1990; Vuylsteke,1988). In Japan, the telecom, the rail, and postal services 
have been sold, and in the UK, the telecom, electricity, water and airlines have been 
privatised. On the other hand, a large number of countries have opposed the privatisation of 
such industries. Examples from industrial countries include Italy and Germany, and from 
DCs include Brazil, Senegal, Morocco, and Turkey (Kapstein, 1988; Kikeri,1990; Leeds, 
1988). Indeed, even in the UK, the privatisation of public utilities has been heavily criticised 
by both politicians and academicians (Rees, 1986; Heald, 1990; Harris,1988; Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988).
However, the classification of the sugar industries as strategic is controversial and 
deserves special comment. In the Sudan, the sugar industry is a mixed sector, in which the 
private sector has now established itself, and has achieved a reasonable degree of success, 
as manifested by the experience of the Kenana sugar complex. The chairman of the 
committee argued that "sugar is a strategic commodity that affects every household in the 
country. Therefore, the state must maintain control over pricing and distribution". This line 
of argument, could be refuted as follows: First, all goods produced, by both public and 
private enterprises, are subject to price controls at the ex-factory; wholesale and retail levels. 
Second, all consumer goods, including sugar produced by Kenana sugar company, are 
distributed by the authorities (see chapter 13). Therefore, the privatisation of the sugar
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industry does not necessarily mean that the state would relinquish control over distribution 
or prices. Accordingly, the classification of the sugar industry as strategic is highly 
debatable.
In summary, therefore, it could be argued that, although the implementation process 
was considerably delayed, the PE reform project outlined above, is probably the most 
genuine, integrated and detailed effort ever devised to improve the internal efficiencies of 
PEs. First, the project emphasised careful investigation at the enterprise level as a 
prerequisite for an action plan, rather than advocating a certain policy (e.g. wholesale 
privatisation) as a quick fix for all PE’s problems. Second, the project envisaged the creation 
of a central overseeing agency to supervise the reform process, as well as performing other 
valuable tasks. In addition, the project envisaged reforming the operating criteria of PEs, 
such as clarifying objectives; strengthening management selection, and producing terms of 
reference outlining the responsibilities and authorities of PE managers; boards of directors; 
shareholders and sectoral ministries. Third, the PE reform project was supplemented by 
reforms in economic management and human development.
However, as with previous pieces of reform, the project runs the risks of excessive 
government intervention in internal markets. Therefore, in the absence of substantial 
improvement in macro policies, the project’s benefits may never materialise. Other risks 
include the high turnover rates in the civil service; lack of commitment by line managers and 
the bureaucrats towards the implementation of fundamental structural changes, and lack of 
political will to take the difficult decisions regarding employment and pricing. However, this 
state of affairs seems to be a common phenomenon in DCs. For example, Heald (1990) 
concluded that "Real commitment to public enterprise reform has been lacking in many 
developing countries".
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Nevertheless, these factors have considerably delayed the implementation process. The 
most detrimental example of such delays was seen in the establishment of the CBPE, which 
brought the whole project to a halt, and nobody seems to care about this situation. The Public 
Corporation Administration of the MFEP blames the sectoral ministries and vice versa, 
without any constructive dialogue between them. The central government, on the other hand, 
seems to be over-burdened with macro issues (e.g. the civil war), which diverted its 
attention. But this is a rather unusual situation, because in DCs generally the most limiting 
constraint to implement reform is the lack of finance. In this case, however, finance was 
available, in fact as of June, 1990, only one third of the project funds have been disbursed.
However, there are personal and bureaucratic interests at play. For example, the 
project envisaged that, the CBPE would be staffed by full-time professionals. In reality, the 
Under-secretary for Finance appointed himself chairman for no clear reasons. Two 
propositions can help explain this situation: First, to emphasise the role of the MFEP on the 
CBPE. Second, to safeguard himself, that is in the event of his removal from his current 
post, he could find a ready job, which is not uncommon in the Sudan.
The project is a typical World Bank approach to PE reform, in which the government 
classifies its PEs (i.e. which to remain public, and which to be privatised), and then sets a 
timetable for implementation (Shirley, 1989). But, unlike the experience elsewhere, the 
Sudanese project was not exposed to public scrutiny at any level, which could lead to 
subsequent reversal of the action plans adopted by a future government. In the end, the whole 
project has now been relegated to a back seat, and privatisation of a wide range of PEs has 
been proposed. This situation probably reinforces our earlier remarks that, in the Sudan, 
economic policies emerge on ad hoc basis and follow no consistent pattern.
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11.3 Conclusion
During the 1980s, the poor performance of PEs, and the slow down of foreign loans, 
have brought the public investment policy of the 1970s to a halt. Instead, the Sudanese 
authorities have devised various pieces of reform to improve the performance of PEs. The 
outcome of these reform projects, however, has not been encouraging, simply because 
implementation was flawed in many respects. For example, all industrial PEs were converted 
into "private" limited companies , basically to allow these companies greater operational 
autonomy (e.g. recruitment, rewards, financing, purchasing). In reality, however, they came 
out to be constrained by a multitude of rules and regulations. Moreover, although the legal 
reform is almost 10 years old, it has not yet taken its final shape. At present, there are no 
clear cut criteria for organising industrial PEs as corporations or companies, which created 
considerable ambiguities regarding their exact legal status.
Indeed, it seems as if these reform initiatives were imposed on the authorities. This 
is probably quite evident from the lack of political will to create sound macro-economic 
environment in which enterprises can operate effectively and efficiently. For example, if we 
assumed that the ultimate objective of these reform efforts was to enhance PE’s efficiency, 
then it could be argued that the authorities have done very little by way of improving 
efficiency. That is because, the prices of all goods produced and sold in the country are 
subject to government controls; personnel policies are subject to civil service rules, and more 
important no effort was made to foster competition through trade liberalisation; 
encouragement of exports or break-up of monopolies. Similarly, no effort was made to 
reform the operating criteria for PEs, by clarifying objectives; improving management 
selection, autonomy and incentives, introducing sound accounting practices or management 
information systems. Consequently, PEs continued to be managed by bureaucrats rather than 
professional business managers, never allowed to respond to competition by cutting costs 
(e.g. lay-offs), nor to raise prices when market conditions demand so. Indeed, the newly 
created companies were not even financially prepared to operate on sound commercial basis.
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Not surprisingly, therefore, the legal restructuring failed to bring about significant turnaround 
in productivity or financial performance.
The most convincing piece of reform to date was that devised by the World Bank, 
"The Public Enterprise and Economic Management". However, apart from the fact that the 
project was not supported by wider macroeconomic reforms, the implementation process was 
unduly slow. Therefore, the benefits of the project never materialised.
However, as we saw in chapter 6, the present government has abandoned the idea of 
improving the performance of PEs. Instead, it proposed to privatise a wide range of PEs over 
a three-year period. But would that be possible, and if so, would the potential benefits of 
privatisation be realised ? These are the issues to be examined in the following chapters.
27 2
Chapter Twelve
The Business Environment 
In the Sudan
"The evidence indicates that there is no shortfall o f entrepreneurial spirit in 
Africa, The most crucial limiting factor is not entrepreneurship, but 
weakness in the policy environment which inhibit effective investment",
(Marsden and Belot, 1987)
"Commitment to privatisation, in any form, must be accompanied by 
adoption o f policy environment that allows for competition and operation o f 
market forces. Governments must be made aware that i f  industires are 
protected from market forces little will be gained from privatisation",
(United States Agency for International 
Development, 1986).
These statements clearly indicate that a conducive business environment is a critical 
prerequisite for the success of privatisation. A sound business environment is characterised 
by a liberal trade policy, market-based prices for goods, capital and foreign exchange, few 
or no constraints on entry and exit, a competitive and efficient capital and product markets, 
a reasonable tax structure, adequate infrastructure, low inflation rates, and a stable political, 
economic and legal systems. (Galenson, 1984; Shirley, 1988; Marsden and Belot, 1987).
The purpose of this chapter will be to outline the existing business environment within 
which enterprises, public and private, operate in the Sudan. For the most part, it will
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describe the state of the art, solely to set the scene for identifying the major constraints to 
successful privatisation. The implications of the existing business environment on 
privatisation will be the focus of the following chapter.
The elements of the business environment will be examined under the following 
headings : (1) Investment Codes, (2) Trade Policies, (3) Price Mechanism, (4) Labour 
Policies, (5) Tax Structure, (6) Interest Rates and Credit Allocation Systems, (7) Political and 
legal systems, and (8) Infrastructure.
12.1 Investment Codes
In its 35-year history since independence in 1956, the Sudan has devised numerous 
investment codes, all of which were intended to promote private investment, local and 
foreign. These include: The Approved Enterprise (Concessions) Act, 1956; The Promotion 
and Organisation of Investment Act, 1967; The Industrial Investment Act, and The 
Agricultural Investment Act, 1972 (amended 1974); The Encouragement of Investment Act, 
1980. The present government also proposed a new Investment code, but this had not yet 
been approved when the data for this research was completed. Therefore, the following 
discussion will be based on the 1980 Act.
As in all other DCs, the successive investment codes in the Sudan provided a package 
of incentives to attract private investment, local and foreign. The 1980 Act provided the 
following incentives :
(1) exemption from business profit tax for a minimum period of five years, renewed 
at the discretion of the Minister of Finance,
(2) exemption from custom duties on machines and inputs,
(3) exemption from excise duties on domestic raw materials used in production, and 
reimbursement of excise duties on goods intended for exports,
(4) subsidised land, freight and electricity,
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(5) full protection against imports,
(6) the right to transfer profits in the same currency brought to establish theentity, 
and the right to repatriate capital in the event of liquidation or sale,
(7) no explicit discrimination was allowed between local and foreign investment in the 
granting of licenses or incentives.
Despite these incentives, however, gross investment declined from 23 percent of GDP 
in 1975/76 to only 7 percent of GDP in 1985/86. Public investment dropped from 8.6 
percent of GDP to 3.5 percent, while private investment dropped more sharply from 14.4 
percent to 3.5 percent (Bank of Sudan). The decline in public investment was caused, in the 
main, by the sharp deterioration in government revenues and the slow down of foreign capital 
flows (see chapter 10). Moreover, the out-break of the civil war had syphoned-off the meagre 
internal resources available to the detriment of public investment.
The sharp decline in private investment was attributed, in part, to the previous 
government policies, notably the violent nationalisation and confiscation measures of the 
early 1970s, which created an uncertain investment climate. Other factors include the severe 
shortages of foreign exchange to acquire spare parts and imported inputs, inadequate 
infrastructure^ and the tight administrative controls over prices, labour, exports and credit 
allocation. For example, the frequent power failures, the transportation bottlenecks and the 
shortages of raw materials, especially in rural areas, made those areas unattractive for private 
investors, despite the incentives provided. Similarly, the lack of foreign exchange inhibited 
foreign investors who failed to repatriate their capital gains and profits. Indeed, due to this 
single reason, a number of international airlines, notably Swiss Air and the British Airways, 
have suspended their flights to Khartoum. Moreover, the widening gap between the official 
exchange rate and the black market rate has induced an increasing number of investors to 
shift to the trading activities (e.g. imports), rather than undertaking the risky, tightly 
administered investment projects. Last but not least, the soaring inflation rates (currently
275
around 100 percent), uncertainty about economic policies, instability of the political and 
legal systems, the civil war, and the accumulated foreign debts, have dampened private 
investment. However, it must be stressed that, the authorities have done virtually nothing to 
remedy this highly distorted investment climate before embarking on privatisation (see 
chapter 13).
The Investment Bureau, under the administrative supervision of the MFEP, is the 
regulatory agency responsible for the administration of investment (i.e. licensing and granting 
of incentives). The Bureau is composed of a "Secretary General", a "Technical Secretariat", 
and a "Consultative Committee". Moreover, a Ministerial Committee was proposed under 
the Act, but it never came into existence. As a result, the Minister of Finance assumed its 
functions to approve investment projects and grant the incentives. However, the pervasive 
influence of the MFEP over the Bureau, had created a sense of unrest among other ministries 
and indeed hindered the smooth functioning of the whole system (see below).
12.1.1 Investment Licensing
In the Sudan, all investment projects in excess of £s 0.25 million (£12500), whether 
incentives are being sought or not, are subject to investment licensing, and projects 
established without a license are fined or confiscated. The Act specified the following 
criteria to obtain a license: (i) defense or strategic importance, (ii) use of domestic raw 
materials, (iii) earn foreign exchange or import substitutes, (iv) create jobs, (v) furtherance 
of cooperation and integration with African and Arab countries, (vi) contribute to national 
income. Needless to say, any investment project would satisfy at least one of these 
conditions, and as such these criteria are of little operational value. Thus leaving much to the 
discretion of the approving authorities.
The system operates as follows
(a) Applications are submitted to the concerned ministry, on a three-page form
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containing basic information on the project, and supported by a feasibility 
study, taxation card, and a certificate from a commercial bank indicating 
the financial position of the applicant. Copies of the application are sent to 
the Investment Bureau.
(b) The concerned Ministry analyses the application, and submits its 
recommendations to the Technical Secretariat.
(c) The Technical Secretariat prepares detailed analysis, and submits its 
recommendations to the Consultative Committee.
(d) The Consultative Committee reviews the application and submits its 
recommendations to the General Secretary.
(e) The General Secretary presents the application to the Minister of Finance 
for final decision.
The above investment licensing procedures, though few in number of steps, they 
normally take a considerable time. According to the provision of the Act, the concerned 
ministry has one month to study the project and submit its recommendations to the Technical 
Secretariat, while the General Secretary was allowed two months to present the application 
to the Minister of Finance to take a decision. In reality, this timetable is seldom followed. 
The General Secretary asserted that "It is difficult to process large number of applications 
given the limited manpower and the degree of detailed analysis required". Moreover, as 
noted above, sectoral ministries are unhappy about the pervasive influence of the MFEP, and 
hence they deliberately absent themselves from the meetings of the Consultative Committee, 
leading to considerable delays.
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However, the longer it takes to obtain a license, dampens private investment, 
especially in a context where inflation rates are rising by the day, and so are economic 
policies. Moreover, there is a wide room for irregularities, due to the lack of objective and 
transparent criteria upon which approval of projects and granting of incentives are based. 
More importantly, the lengthy and time-consuming procedures to obtain a license constitutes 
an entry barrier, and hence makes the threat of potential competition less effective. In 
summary, in the absence of a favourable investment climate, the costly incentives proved to 
be ineffective in accelerating private investment. The protection from imports promoted 
highly inefficient import substitutes, and investment licensing is disincentive to investment. 
All these factors, therefore, have hindered private investment, and are likely to erode the 
privatisation programme. Indeed, the Sudanese authorities have often attributed the declining 
trend of private investment to faulty laws, and hence devised numerous investment laws to 
provide more incentives. However, that proved to be irrelevant, basically due to the 
widespread distortions in the broader environment. More importantly, the frequent changes 
of investment codes have created an uncertain investment climate, and hence prevented the 
development of a vigorous private sector. Finally, Acharya (1979) found that the incentives 
favoured industry at the expense of agriculture, the single most important sector of the 
Sudanese economy.
12.2 Trade Policies
Economists argue that, sound trade policies are critical to the success of business 
enterprises, public and private (Ayub and Hegstad, 1986; Shirley, 1989; Marsden and 
Belot, 1987). In what follows, we shall outline the trade policies in the Sudan under these 
headings: (1) exchange rate, (2) exports, and (3) imports.
12.2.1 Exchange Rate System
Between 1956 and 1978, the exchange rate in the Sudan remained constant at £s 0.35 
/ US $. For the most part of that period, this rate appeared to be appropriate, as there were
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no major balance of payment problems. However, between 1974 and 1978, the oil price 
shock of 1973 pushed up the production costs of agricultural exports and manufactured goods 
above internationally - competitive levels. As a result, the incentive to produce these goods 
decreased, exports stagnated, the import bill swelled, and in consequence the government 
came under increasing pressures to devalue the Sudanese pound.
Therefore, in June, 1978, the exchange rate was devalued by 14 percent, from £s 
0.35 / US$ to £s 0.4 / US$. However, as demand for foreign exchange continued to outpace 
supply, a black market emerged at a rate well above the official rate, and the government had 
no choice but to devalue quite frequently so as capture the supply of foreign exchange 
through the official channels. As the matrix below reveals, the exchange rate was devalued 
by 14 percent in 1978; 25 percent in 1979; 80 percent in 1981; 44 percent in 1982; 92 
percent in 1985, and 80 percent in 1987. Nevertheless, despite all these devaluations, the 
demand for foreign exchange continued to exceed supply, and hence the gap between the 
"official" and "black market" rates increased.1 For example, in mid-1989, while the official 
exchange rate was £.s 4.5 / US$, the black market rate was in the range of £.s 23 / $. 
Following the Military Coup of 1989, possession of and trade in foreign exchange was made 
illegal, and a death penalty imposed.
Nevertheless, the severe shortages of foreign exchange in the official economy 
disrupted the regular flow of inputs and spare parts, leading to huge idle capacity. As a 
result, exports stagnated, defeating the very basic idea of devaluation. Moreover, the 
widening gap between the official and the black market rates induced an increasing number 
of investors to shift to trading activities, at the expense of production.
There are two official rates in the Sudan: the official rate for 
official transactions, and the commercial rate for non-official transactions. 
Official transactions refer to government imports and exports, while non­
official transactions refer to non-government transactions.
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Matrix 12.1 
Exchange Rate Movements (£S/US$)*
Date Action
June, 1978 First devaluation of 14 percent, from £S 0.35/$ to £S 0.4/$.
September, 1979 Second devaluation of 25 percent to £S 0.5/$, and 
introduction of dual exchange rates. The other called the parallel 
rate at £S 0.8/$.
November, 1981 The official and parallel rates unified at £S 0.9/$.
November, 1982 Devaluation of 44 percent, to £S 1.3/$, and 
introduction of free market rate at £S 1.75/$.
October, 1984 Free market rate set at £S 2.8/$.
Februaiy, 1985 The official rate devalued by 92 percent to £S 2.5/$, and the 
free market rate set at £S 3.4/$.
August, 1986 The free market rate set at £S 4/$.
August 1987 The official rate devalued by 80 percent to £S 4.5/$.
October, 1988 Free market rate to be operated by commercial banks set at 
£S 11.3/$, and then raised to £S 12.1/$.
July, 1989 Possession and trade in foreign exchange totally prohibited and 
a death penalty imposed.
(*) This is a simplified matrix of the major foreign exchange movements that took place 
during the last 12 years or so. A full documentation will be provided in appendix 4.
Source: Hussein, M.N., "Movement in the Foreign Exchange Rates in the Sudan", in 
"The Sudanese Economy in Disarray", edited by A.A.G. Ali, Khartoum University 
Press, (1988).
In summary, the over-valued exchange rate had two detrimental effects: One, it 
inhibited the flow of foreign exchange through the official channels, and hence disrupted 
production. Two, it promoted the so-called "rent-seeking economy", where individuals seek 
access to import licenses, rather than undertaking productive investment to provide the much 
needed goods and services. Both of these are likely to erode the privatisation programme (see 
chapter 13).
12.2.2 Exports
In the Sudan, all merchandise exports are subject to licensing from the Ministry of
280
Commerce, Cooperation and Supply (MCCS). The prospective exporter is required to submit 
an export contract specifying the type and quantity of goods to be exported, means of 
payment, prices, and date of shipment(see the attached export form). Moreover, to ensure 
domestic supply, the MCCS checks whether the goods intended for exports would not create 
a supply gap in the local market. In that case, the application will be rejected, whether the 
goods were produced by the public or private enterprises.
A committee headed by the Director General of the Export Licensing Section of the 
MCCS sets minimum prices for exports to ensure maximum flow of foreign earnings for the 
Treasury. The point is that, the widening gap between the official and black market rates, 
provided incentives for exporters to conceal part of their foreign earnings. To avoid this 
practice, the committee regularly reviews international prices, and accordingly sets minimum 
export prices. However, the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce complained that the 
minimum prices set by the committee are often too high, and the committee does not 
consider marketing strategies, which would require low prices to enable exporters to explore 
new markets.
In effect, the over-valued exchange rate has acted to inhibit exports, and in fact 
induced exporters to avoid the unrealistic minimum prices through smuggling. The result is 
a sharp decline in foreign earnings, which are vital for the productive sector, public and 
private. This situation, however, is by no means unique to the Sudan. The World Bank 
Report, 1981: "Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa", concluded that "Trade 
and exchange rate systems are at the heart of failure to provide adequate incentives for 
production and exports in much of Africa".
12.3 Imports
Like exports, imports licensing arrangements are complex and time-consuming. 
Indeed, there are different procedures adopted for government imports, public and private 
enterprises, and for commercial imports by both public and private agencies. Nevertheless,
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FORM EX.
«iH jD I 4j 15j  
£ jL A  j j j u a J
SUDAN EXCHANGE CONTROL
EXPORT OF GO ODS
fjtcL Cont. Serial N o............ - — . ■ ...... . . . . ...........  O lJ t  < A i j  »
Authorised Dealer Serial No. ..................... ........................... ,i~>l 1 viiiJI '*
B S /P P
N O T E  : This form Is to  be used for application for export of goods 
and declaration of th e  receipt of payment for the same.
•jA -JI sJ*i-
W A R N IN G  : Applicant is hereby warned tha t he will be liable to 
Prosecution if he fives false information.
:  j .  J L a «
U U J i  4_* j j j  «_UU 1 pOL> yij**  JE» C»UjL*
Name of Applicant ............................ v JU l f -uL.
(Full Name in Block Letters)
Postal Address —.......................................
I. Name and Address of the Buyer t f —'  -  I
2. Name and Address of the Agent J — O ' y O  f—'  — T 2.......................................................................
J. (a) Rate of Commission aJj _«-JI jl-u*  (1) — T 
(b) Method of Payment U a U -. a!  (o )  —
3. (a) ---------------------------- (b) ........................ ........
4. Sales C ontract Number and DateA^.aVXj *JjJ  — £ —JI ai*  -  ( 4. .....................................................................
S. Particular of Goods Description, Quality or Grade
j l  ^ 1  < «uL—ell ! ^ 'L a J I  (1) — e
5. (a) ........................................................................................
(b) Quantity i - s - f l l  M ( b ) ........................................................................................
(c) Sales price per unit (State F.A.S., if F.O.B.C.&F. of C.I.F., etc.)
C w jlj  c— / )  y y  t u-U 0 ^  0* £ - * 1  Cr*. „/*—
( {Jl > i . .«  j l
(c) ........................................................................................
(d) Total Sales Price J U * .’!fl > ^ - J l  (a ) (d) ...................................................  ..............................
6. F.O.B. Value of Goods in Sudanese Pounds
0>4_.tyJLi ( w y  ) 4 iu . . J1 j i lm  f  j l . ■ *. — "V
6...................................................... ...................................
7. Terms of Payment and Currency received or to  be received in 
Settlement of the Export aU J I  £*j J1 aL^W _  V
• 7*1 y l . i .11 <4«*l blJU i J ■< 5 1 *•-* - j
7...................................................................................................
8. Date of Export. ,y*-AM _  A B...................................................................................................
9. Country of Ultimate Destination a J I  „y_^ll ^^ UiJl _  \ 9...............................................................................................
10. Port of Despatch fly J I — I*
H P o r t  of Delivery sL jy*  _  U I I ..............
11 Means to Transport J - U t  <JL— j  — IT i l  .................................................................................
13. Country of Origin of Goods or Produce
( J L iJl j l  ) L a u  _  IT 13.................................................................................................
14. Docum entary »»■ . . . i. —
apart from the lengthy procedures, there is no guarantee that the state would provide the 
foreign exchange needed for approved import licenses. Indeed, the private managers 
interviewed singled out the uncertainty about the availability of foreign exchange to acquire 
the necessary inputs, as the most limiting constraint. Before 1989, manufacturers used to 
acquire their foreign exchange needs from the open market, and import their input needs. 
The incoming military government (mid-1989) made the holding and trade in foreign 
exchange illegal, thus killing this costly option (see below).
In summary, the over-valued exchange rate had reduced exporter’s earnings in local 
currency, inhibited the flow of foreign exchange (e.g. the savings of Sudanese working 
aborad) through the official channels, and hence crippled the productive sector, public and 
private. Similarly, the over-valued exchange rate has encouraged trading activities (the so- 
called rent-seeking economy), at the expense of production. This state of affairs, in turn, is 
likely to hinder the long term success of privatisation, not least because it is competition in 
export markets and competition against imports which encourage greater efficiency. We shall 
pick up these points in chapter 13, registering for the moment the fact that the trade policies 
in the Sudan are distorted in all respects. The Sudanese authorities rely solely on 
administrative controls for foreign exchange rate system, exports and imports. As a result, 
the use of market forces has been deemphasised, which is a real threat to the success of 
privatisation.
12.3 Price Controls
As the cases showed, the stringent price controls are among the most limiting 
constraints for business enterprises in the Sudan. According to the prevailing laws, all goods 
produced in the country are subject to price controls at the ex-factory, wholesale and retail 
levels. Indeed, there are different price determination mechanisms for imported goods, 
manufactured and agricultural products. In what follows, we shall outline briefly the pricing 
mechanism of the manufactured goods produced by both public and private enterprises.
282
The Industrial Costing and Pricing Unit (IPC), under the Ministry of Industry, is the 
responsible body to set ex-factory prices of all manufactured goods in the Sudan, while 
wholesale and retail prices are set by the Ministry of Commerce. Ex-factory (producer) 
prices are calculated on the basis of "cost-plus", where a profit margin ranging between 5 
and 15 percent is added to "allowable costs". The allowable costs include: raw materials and 
packaging2, salaries and wages, and overhead expenses (electricity, water, rent, insurance, 
interest, taxes, depreciation and maintenance costs). Requests for price adjustments are 
submitted to the IPC, and the claimed expenses must be documented, though the IPC has the 
right to conduct its own investigation. However, in most cases, prices are fixed on the basis 
of those permitted to identical goods produced by other firms, regardless of inter-firm 
differences in cost structure. If the requested adjustments are rejected or not granted in full, 
the producer has the right to appeal to a Ministerial Committee, who will make the final 
decision.
As the cases showed, price adjustments often take a considerable time to be approved. 
The Head of the IPC unit asserted that "The delays are often attributed to the fact that, most 
firms fail to provide certified financial statements. Therefore, we have to make thorough 
investigation to verify the cost items, and at times we visit the firms to ascertain the claimed 
expenses". However, we understood that, the IPC relies, to a large extent, on information 
provided by firms, and in a highly protected market like that of the Sudan, firms have every 
reason to report higher costs. Moreover, since all industrial firms are operating at very low 
levels of capacity, unit costs are higher, due to the fixed cost element. On the other hand, 
the long delays in getting price adjustments approved is detrimental to firms, especially in 
an inflationary environment like that of the Sudan. Moreover, depreciation charges are 
calculated on the basis of the historical costs, which are totally out-dated, due to the higher 
inflation rates and the continuous devaluations. Therefore, the under-stated depreciation
2 Imported input costs are converted into local currency for pricing 
purposes at the official exchange rate.
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charges reduce unit costs and hence lower prices. Finally, the concept of allowable costs has 
lost its appeal in view of non-availability of foreign exchange through the official channels, 
and non-availability of local inputs at the legal prices.
As noted earlier, before mid-1989, holders of valid import licenses, who failed to get 
foreign exchange through the official channels, used to acquire their foreign exchange needs 
from the black market at a much higher rate. Although, these black market rates were not 
recognised for pricing purposes, producers were able to stay in business, albeit at a loss. As 
the ITMD case showed, this solution was not without problems. Indeed, as firms incurred 
persistent losses, they either halted sales or went out of business.
As elsewhere in most DCs, the rationale for price controls are two-fold: (i) to ensure 
the supply of basic goods at reasonable prices afforded by the low income group, and (ii) to 
curb inflation. However, there is evidence that price controls have failed to achieve any of 
these objectives. First, the desire to protect the poor has never been achieved. At present, 
rural consumers acquire all their daily needs at prices well above the legal prices, simply due 
to lack of goods at the government - regulated prices. For example, a sample survey carried 
out by the World Bank in 1988 for 16 major products found that market prices are as high 
as 127 percent above the official prices within greater Khartoum area. Second, the desire to 
curb inflation has also been lost, where the current inflation rates are estimated at 100 
percent. Third, the unrealistic prices have crippled the productive sector, which failed to 
generate sufficient resources to finance operating expenses, let alone expansion and 
modernisation of plants. As a result, production declined, and severe shortages emerged, 
causing great hardship. Indeed, the only beneficiaries of these artificial prices are the black 
market traders, who have earned huge profits, without paying taxes. The point is that, while 
price regulation is easier to enforce at the enterprise level, it is extremely difficult at the 
retail level. At times of shortages, which are quite frequent, consumers have no choice but 
to accept what the traders are asking, without notifying the helpless authorities.
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12.4 Labour Policies
The Sudan has introduced a minimum legal wage rate (MLWR) in 1974, which has 
increased dramatically (in absolute terms) since then. The Minimum Legal Wage Act, 1974, 
established the MLWR at £s 16.5 per month ($47.5), which now stands at £s 300 per month 
($25). However, as the cases showed, there is some evidence that private firms are not 
adhering to the MLWR. Moreover, there are very restrictive laws to dismiss employees, 
largely to protect workers (see chapter 7). Indeed, as we saw in chapter 10, the desire to 
protect employment has considerably eroded the reform process of the industrial PEs. The 
fact is that, the labour movement has historically been very militant, and all political regimes 
since independence have sought their support. Nevertheless, the restrictive labour laws are 
likely to hinder the success of privatisation in the long run. Similarly, there is no income 
support system in the Sudan, and since the country faces severe financial difficulties, it is 
unable to afford paying generous benefits for retrenched staff. Finally, the turnover rates of 
skilled and highly qualified staff is very high in both public and private sectors, which have 
had disastrous effects on enterprises.
12.5 Interest Rates and Credit Allocation Policy
With inflation rates in the range of 100 percent, and with lending and deposit rates 
of 30 and 20 percent respectively, negative real interest rates have prevailed. Moreover, the 
Bank of Sudan lend to the central government (under section 57A  of the Bank of Sudan Act), 
at rates as low as 0.5 percent, while lending to PEs carries only 8 percent interest charge.
In fact, interest rates were legally abolished in 1984, as part of the general 
"Islamisation" of the Sudanese economy. Consequently, all lending has been on the basis of 
Islamic instruments, which rely on profit sharing. In late 1987, commercial banks were 
allowed to operate either on the Islamic methods, or under a "compensatory rate system", 
fixed by the Bank of Sudan. In reality, however, neither the compensatory rate system, nor 
the Islamic system was able to keep pace with inflation. As a result, commercial banks lost
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the incentive to provide medium and long term loans, and the general public lost the 
incentive to deposit their savings with the banks. Moreover, the ever rising inflation rates and 
the continuous devaluations led to loss of confidence in local currency, and hence accelerated 
demand for foreign exchange and real estates, at the expense of investment.
Thus, unlike the experience elsewhere (e.g. the UK), the Sudanese authorities have 
done virtually nothing to curb inflation through real high interest rates. However, this is a 
critical prerequisite for the development of the capital market, which is essential for the 
success of privatisation. Moreover, it must be stressed that, the effects of the Islamic 
instruments on the effectiveness of the market for corporate control is not at all clear, 
because the theory of "Islamic economics" is still at its infant stage.
As regards credit allocation, the Bank of Sudan administers commercial bank’s 
lending to private enterprises and "private" limited companies. The Bank of Sudan imposed 
a ceiling on commercial bank’s lending, and the banks who exceed their limits are fined (a 
5 percent charge). Moreover, the Bank of Sudan screens commercial loans in excess of £s 
300,000 (£15000), and medium and long term loans in excess of £s 100,000 (£5000). The 
purpose of such controls is to ensure that the limited resources available are allocated to 
priority uses,. However, the criteria for establishing the ceiling for different commercial 
banks are, to a large extent, subjective and lack economic rationale. The Bank of Sudan 
states the following criteria: (a) The bank’s resources vis a vis its loans and advances, (b) 
The degree with which the bank observes Bank of Sudan directives, (c) The degree of 
cooperation with the Bank of Sudan in solving the country’s foreign exchange needs, (d) The 
credit demand expectations, (e) The amount of bad debts in the bank’s portfolio.
Between 1986 and 1988, the total credits extended by the banking system, including 
the Bank of Sudan, have grown from £s 15 billion to 29 billion (Bank of Sudan). However, 
about 51 percent of this was extended to the central government, but we were unable to
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ascertain whether part of these loans were extended in turn to PEs. Nevertheless, the officials 
interviewed indicated that, a large part of these loans were used to finance the war expenses. 
Thus, it is evident that the use of market-based prices for capital, and market forces to 
allocate resources, have not been accorded much importance in the Sudan. Moreover, as 
credits have to be rationed and administratively controlled, the allocation procedures have 
become highly politicised, relying heavily on personal ties and political acceptance, rather 
than credit-worthiness. A good example of this is the case of the state bank (People’s 
Cooperative Bank) that was made bankrupt in 1983, solely due to credits extended to private 
borrowers on "Presidential" instructions, which later proved to be uncollectible.
Therefore, it could be argued that, the existing negative interest rates and the 
subjective credit allocation policies are likely to hinder efforts to mobilise private savings, 
entrepreneurial activities, and the development of efficient, competitive capital markets. 
However, it must be stressed that, an efficient capital market is a critical prerequisite to the 
success of the government privatisation programme.
12.6 Tax Structure
As we saw in chapter two, one of the arguments against state intervention in the 
economy wasjhat, high taxation to finance public spending had reduced incentives to invest, 
work, and maximise profits. Therefore, it was argued that, the tax rates should be reduced 
to provide incentives for entrepreneurs to invest and improve efficiency. However, the 
available evidence indicates that, the tax rates on business profits and personal income in 
most African countries are unduly high (Marsden and Belot, 1987). And the Sudan is no 
exception.
As table 12.1 reveals, the tax rates on coiporate profits in the Sudan are as high as 
70 percent, compared to 30 percent in Taiwan and 18.5 percent in Hong Kong (Marsden 
and Belot,1987). Moreover, due to the hyper inflation in the recent past, almost all
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enterprises have reached the upper tax bracket. Similarly, tax rates on personal income are 
also high, and again due to the continuous increases in salaries to keep pace with inflation, 
the salaries of most categories have reached the upper tax rate. These high taxation rates, 
however, run counter to the idea of privatisation, in the sense that they squeese business 
profits and personal income, and hence do not provide incentives for private investment, 
which is crucial for the long term success of privatisation.
12.7 Non-economic Factors
Non-economic factors refer to the degree of stability of political, legal and economic 
systems, the level of education and the sophistication of accounting systems. These factors, 
though difficult to quantify, are critical to the success of privatisation, not least because they 
would have serious repercussions on business enterprises.
During the last decade, the Sudan has experienced political and legal instability. In 
April, 1985, a long serving military government was overthrown, and an elected government 
assumed power in 1986, following a one-year transitional government.
Although the military regime stayed 16 years in power, its earlier economic policies, 
notably nationalisation and confiscation measures in the early 1970s, have had a detrimental 
impact on private investment. Moreover, that regime introduced a set of restrictive laws that 
regulated prices, credit allocation and foreign exchange rate, imports and exports. And in a 
bid to contain the growing political unrest, that regime introduced in 1983 strict Islamic 
codes, and in the same year a civil war broke out. Following the overthrow of that regime, 
an elected "coalition government" came into office in 1986. However, the very fact that it 
was a coalition government made it vulnerable to frequent changes and cabinet reshuffles. 
Thus, the struggle to hold the fragile coalition together, preoccupation with the war, and the 
question of the legal system (i.e. whether or not to abolish the Islamic codes imposed by the 
previous regime) diverted the attention away from the economy.
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Table 12.1 
Summary of the tax Rates
(1) the financial sector_____





100.001 -  1000,000




Rate (%)Tax Base (£S)




6,001 -  12,000
12,001 - 24,000
24,001 - 40,000 
40,000 - 200,000
above 200,000
(3) Personal Income Tax Rates
Rate (%)Tax Base (£S)
0 - 3,000 exempted
3,001 - 4,000
4.001 - 6,000
6.001 -  8,000 
8,001 -  12,000
12,001 - 14,000
14,001 - 18,000 40
18,001 - 22,000
above 22,000
Source: Taxation Department, Khartoum.
289
Indeed, the main issues that dominated the public debate during this period (1985 and 
1989) were the questions of the legal system and the war. However, the war is unlikely to 
come to an end unless the Islamic codes were abolished, which is categorically rejected by 
the Muslim Fundamentalists. Indeed, by the time a negotiated peaceful settlement was about 
to be concluded, the Muslim Fundamentalists arranged a military coup and seized power in 
mid-1989.
The incoming military government then reinforced the stringent price controls with 
the declared intentions to crack down black market activities. Indeed, three Sudanese were 
sentenced to death in the early days of the "revolution" for merely possessing foreign 
exchange. These controls, however, only compounded the problem and proved to be 
counterproductive, where goods soon disappeared, causing great hardship, while foreign 
exchange dealers transferred their activities abroad (see chapter 13). The government 
commitment to privatisation, however, is beyond any doubt. It is led by Muslim 
fundamentalists who strongly support private ownership. In Islam, they claim, there is no 
public ownership, this is socialism and runs counter to the teachings of Islam. But, the 
government is opposed by all other political parties, sided with Iraq in the Gulf Crisis, and 
hence lost the support of the rich Gulf states. In addition to this isolation, it is faced with 
severe economic difficulties, and has lost the support of the international financial community 
after the Sudan was declared "non-cooperative" by the IMF in July, 1990.
The level of education is very low (around 70 percent of the population are illiterate), 
there are no accounting standards, or a body to govern the profession. There is severe 
shortages of qualified accountants and managers, and indeed even the limited number 
available have travelled abroad.
12.8 Infrastructure
As it stands at present, the Sudan’s infrastructure is inadequate by any standards. 
Frequent power failures are facts of every day life, and have been a major constraint to
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capacity utilisation for all business enterprises. Many private enterprises were forced to instal 
their own generator sets, but even this costly alternative did not work, due to the frequent 
fuel shortages. The transportation bottlenecks greatly limit the size of the domestic market. 
There are only 12500 miles of roads (of which only 1500 miles are paved), and 1800 miles 
of rail connecting a land area of one million square miles. As a result, firms are unable to 
reach consumers outside their regions, and the difficulties of delivering imported inputs from 
the Port do not help enterprises, public and private, to function efficiently. Inadequate 
communication services is another constraint in the Sudan. As the STPC case showed, 
telephone services are very poor within Khartoum area, while intercity calls virtually do not 
exist. There are no accounting standards, and qualified accountants and managers are in short 
supply.
Therefore, it could be concluded that, the business environment in the Sudan is 
distorted in a number of respects. First, all investment projects must be approved by the 
authorities, based on subjective criteria, which creates an entry barrier to the detriment of 
potential competition. Second, protection against imports competition and the complex 
procedures for exports, run counter to the efficiency criteria, because of reduced competition. 
Third, the exchange rate is over-valued, and foreign exchange allocation is being 
administered .by a committee of bankers, based on no objective and transparent criteria. 
Indeed, as the cases showed, the uncertainty about timely availability of inputs and spare 
parts has stunted both public and private enterprises. Fourth, there are stringent price 
controls on all goods produced in the country or imported, though the state is unable to 
enforce price controls at the retail levels, due to the scarcity of goods. Indeed, the severe 
shortages of consumer goods has fuelled black market activities, resulting in massive profits 
for traders, at the expense of consumers and producers. Fifth, there are restrictive labour 
laws, and the brain-drain is a real constraint for doing business. Sixth, the inflation and 
taxation rates are high by international standards, the capital market is underdeveloped, and 
the private sector is dominated by small family businesses, who raise capital through
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borrowing rather than issuing shares. Seventh, the infrastructure base (i.e. roads, power 
supply, and communication services) is totally inadequate and unreliable, posing a real 
constraint to the development of competitive and efficient enterprises. Last, but not least, the 
political, economic and legal systems are far from stable, creating an inconducive investment 
climate.
In the following chapter, we shall discuss the implications of the existing business 
environment on the Sudanese privatisation programme, and its likely benefits.
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Chapter Thirteen
Privatisation Constraints, Mechanism 
and Benefits in the Sudan
The purpose of this chapter will be to assess the relevance of privatisation to the 
Sudan, its major constraints, and the appropriate privatisation techniques. It will consist of 
three main sections. In the first section, we shall analyse the major privatisation constraints 
along the lines of the "Contingent privatisation model" developed in chapter 5. In the second 
section, we shall assess the likely benefits of privatisation in the Sudan. The third section will 
be devoted to the likely privatisation techniques.
13.1 Privatisation Constraints
The major obstacles to privatisation in the Sudan will be examined along the 
"contingent privatisation model", in which we proposed that the success of the policy will 
be contingent on the following variables:
(1) The business environment,
(2) The level of development of the capital market,
(3) The socio-political factors,
(4) The financial performance of privatisation candidates,
(5) The government capacity to formulate and implement privatisation.
2 9 3
13.1.1 The Business Environment
"The broad economic and legal environment fo r doing business in a given 
country is critical to the success, and sometimes the feasibility, o f 
privatisation (just as it is a determinant o f the level and success o f private 
investment in general)
(Vuylsteke, 1988)
As we pointed out in chapter 12, the existing business environment in the Sudan is 
distorted in so many respects. The cumbersome, time-consuming investment licensing 
procedures act to inhibit investment, and create entry barriers to the detriment of potential 
competition. The protectionist policies adopted to protect both public and private enterprises 
from international competition, provide a shelter for inefficient enterprises. Moreover, the 
protected local markets are likely to be more profitable than international markets, and hence 
discourage local firms to seek export markets. However, as we pointed out in chapter 3, it 
is competition - actual or potential, local or foreign, that determines performance, rather than 
the ownership pattern. Similarly, the procedures to lay-off excess staff are expensive and 
time-consuming, and the bankruptcy procedures are complex. Therefore, the desire to protect 
employment, through restrictive labour laws, has created an exit barrier. Clearly, these entry 
and exit barriers would hinder the success of privatisation in the long run. The point is that, 
in the absence of an effective competition policy, and liberal labour policies, the potential 
benefits are unlikely to be realised.
Second, the inappropriate trade policies (i.e over-valued exchange rate, the 
cumbersome imports and exports procedures) run counter to the very basic idea of a market 
economy - a prerequisite for privatisation. For example, the over-valued exchange rate 
(figure 13.1), coupled with the price control mechanism have hampered production, exports, 
and led to scarcities. Also, the over-valued exchange rate inhibited the flow of foreign
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capital, including the savings of the Sudanese working abroad (see below). However, in the 
absence of a well-developed capital market in the Sudan, these foreign resources are critical, 
not only to acquire the privatisation candidates, but also to provide the foreign exchange 
necessary for their subsequent operations. As the cases showed, the most limiting constraint 
to capacity utilisation is the lack of imported inputs and spare parts caused by lack of foreign 
exchange. In addition, the severe shortages of foreign exchange have considerably 
complicated the repatriation of earnings and capital gains, and hence is distinctive to foreign 
investment.
The setting of minimum prices for exports, and the cumbersome procedures have 
discouraged exports. As a result, exports stagnated, and the country’s foreign earnings 
reduced, which hampered production. In December, 1988, the previous government 
announced that it will abolish export licensing and the setting of minimum exports prices. 
However, until it was ousted in mid-1989, no action was taken in this regard. Similarly, the 
present government proposed that it will liberalise exports, and allow exporters to retain 40 
percent of their foreign exchange earnings (see chapter 6). We have no idea whether they 
honoured this promise. But, given the government attitudes, which tend towards tight 
controls over foreign exchange, and the severe shortages of foreign exchange in the 
economy, there is no reason to suggest that they will implement that decision.
However, it must be stressed that, trade policy reform is unlikely to be effective if 
the existing price controls remained untouched. As we argued earlier, the rigid price controls 
have crippled both public and private enterprises and reduced incentives to invest and 
produce. As a consequence, scarcities developed causing hardship. Therefore, it could be 
argued that, the success of the Sudanese privatisation programme depends entirely on creating 
a sound business environment, which relies on market forces, rather than administrative 
controls. In an environment where private enterprises are unable to operate freely in a 
competitive environment, the potential benefits of privatisation are unlikely to be realised.
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Indeed, it is these inappropriate trade policies and the unrealistic pricing mechanisms that 
eroded the earlier PE reform efforts. However, allowing the market forces to operate 
effectively could, in the short term at least, pose serious socio-political problems, such as 
rising prices and unemployment. These side effects, in turn, are likely to entail heavy 
political costs, which the fragile political system in the Sudan may not be able to tolerate. 
Indeed, experience shows that these socio-political factors have forced a large number of 
governments in DCs to proceed very slowly on the privatisation front (Leeds, 1988, 
Kapstein, 1988; Callaghy and Wilson, 1988, Vuylsteke, 1988).
Third, the high tax rates on business profits and personal income reduced incentives 
to invest and maximise profits. Generally, local investors evade taxes through massive 
participation in black market activities, and manipulation of accounts. Indeed, in the absence 
of any accounting standards and a body to govern the profession, manipulation of accounts 
is probably the easiest and safest way to evade taxes. However, foreign investors, 
accustomed to international reporting standards, might find it difficult to cope with the higher 
taxes, and hence hesitate to come in. A related hurdle is the frequency of changes of the tax 
codes. Indeed, during the last decade, the tax rates in the Sudan were revised three times. 
As Marsden and Belot (1987) argue "legislative insecurity, largely due to institutional 
changes, come second on the list of constraints for German businessmen". Other factors cited 
by Marsden and Belot (1987) and are relevant to the Sudan are the widespread "corruption", 
and the "slow and arbitrary decision making". Although the first is difficult to prove, the 
sharp deterioration of real income received by civil servants, leaves no room to suggest 
otherwise. As to the second, striking examples are the investment licensing and price 
adjustments, which could be delayed in the Sudan for more than a year. Indeed, such delays 
have recently been more acute as the country lost its most competent staff to competitors 
abroad.
Fourth, as we have already noted, the infrastructure base in the Sudan is in complete 
disarray, and constitutes a real constraint for doing business. In addition, the frequent fuel
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shortages have rendered other solutions to the power problems (e.g generators) largely 
ineffective. Therefore, it might have been more appropriate to build modem roads, electricity 
generating companies and telephone services than granting the costly incentives specified in 
the investment code of 1980.
Finally, the instability of political, economic and legal systems, and the tight 
administrative controls prevailing in the economy, have considerably reduced business 
confidence, and indeed provided a strong motive for capital flight. As pointed out earlier, 
the present government had reinforced stringent price controls and prohibited trade and 
possession of foreign exchange. As a result, investors liquidated their Arms and travelled 
abroad to start a new business. The system works as follows: a businessman who wants to 
repatriate his capital will leave his wealth with an agent (normally a relative), and travel 
abroad. There, he agrees with the Sudanese working abroad to acquire a certain amount of 
hard currency at the prevailing market rates. Then, he notifies his agent to pay the seller’s 
relatives the agreed amount. Upon receipt of confirmation from Khartoum, the sellers release 
the foreign exchange. Thus, the lack of business confidence not only inhibited the flow of 
foreign exchange, but also accelerated the flight of local investors.
It is thus evident that, the business environment in the Sudan is highly distorted, and 
hence constitutes a real constraint to private investment and private sector development. In 
fact, the World Bank classified the Sudan among the 14 African countries with "a high policy 
and institutional distortions" (Gulhati, 1987). Moreover, it is evident that, the Sudanese 
authorities have treated privatisation as an end in itself, rather than part of an integrated 
approach designed to move to a market economy. However, it seems that this attitude is 
common among policy makers in DCs. For example, Heald (1990) found that "it is 
astonishingly difficult to persuade the relevant policy-makers and politicians to discuss 
privatisation within the context of an integrated policy framework". Nevertheless, the 
available evidence indicates that, the sequencing of privatisation and macro-economic reform
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is critical for the success of privatisation (Kay and Thompson, 1986, Hemming and 
Mansoor, 1988; Shirley, 1988). Privatisation is not an end in itself, but a means to improve 
enterprise efficiency. Therefore, before embarking on any privatisation measures, the 
Sudanese authorities would need to create a competitive environment, move towards market- 
based prices for goods, capital and foreign exchange, eliminate entry and exit barriers, 
reform the tax codes, improve the infrastructure base, and above all boost investors 
confidence. The point is that, it is more important to create a sound business environment, 
than it is to transfer ownership.
13.1.2 The Capital Market
A primary objective of the financial system in any country is to mobilise public 
savings for investment purposes. However, there is ample evidence to suggest that the 
Sudanese banking systems have failed to attract either domestic savings, or the savings of the 
Sudanese Nationals Working Abroad (SNWA).
The inability to mobilise domestic savings is attributed to the negative interest rates 
prevailing in the economy. As noted in chapter 12, during the last decade, the government 
policy over interest rates has been ustable, and at times confusing. For example, while 
interest charges were abolished in 1984, a so-called "compensatory rate system" was 
introduced in 1987 to supplement the Islamic system. However, as we pointed out in chapter 
12, neither the compensatory system nor the Islamic system was able to keep pace with 
inflation1. As a result, both deposits, and medium and short term tending became 
unrewarding. Thus, the negative interest rates are the main constraints to the development 
of efficient capital market, which is critical to the success of privatisation.
1under the compensatory rate system, interest on loans and deposits were 
supposed to be adjusted periodically to reflect changes in inflation. However, 
we found that no new rates were introduced since they were fixed in November, 
1897.
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Greene and Villanueva (1990) stated two contradicting views about the effects of real 
interest rates on private investment. On the one hand, real interest rates would raise the cost 
of capital to the detriment of private investment. Indeed, high interest rates might even lead 
to a recession. On the other hand, the under-developed capital markets in DCs and the poor 
credit worthiness, imply that DCs have no alternative but to rely on domestic savings. 
Therefore, it is essential that real interest rates be introduced to mobilise public savings for 
privatisation purposes. Nevertheless, the prevalence of the negative interest rates is a clear 
indication that, the Sudanse authorities have done nothing to control inflation, a prerequisite 
for enhancing the business confidence.
Apart from the negative interest rates, we found that the increasing government 
deficits have absorbed more than 50 percent of the limited credit available. For example, in 
1988/89 the extra-budgetary expenses to finance the government deficits, mainly the war 
expenses, were 13 percent of total government expenditure, and 2.9 percent of GDP 
(MFEP). More importantly, this deficit financing contributed to a large monetary expansion, 
which accelerated inflation. In turn, higher inflation contributed to adverse effects on private 
investment.
Remittances From Abroad
The Sudan has a significant number of citizens working in the Gulf states, and hence 
their remittances constitute a potential source for the much needed foreign exchange. 
According to the official records of the "Secretariat for the Sudanese Nationals Working 
Abroad" there are around 350,000 registered migrants, though other sources estimate a figure 
as high as 1.6 million migrants (Galal el Din, 1985; Choucri, 1885)2. Although, existing
2 There are two venues to get a job abroad: (1) through the official 
channels, where a foreign employer approaches the authorities ashing 
permission for a certain category (e.g teachers) to work for him for 
a certain period. (2) An individual in his own way (e.g. a relative or 
an advert on newspapers), obtains a job, signs a personal contract, and 
leaves. The first category are the only migrants recognised by the 
Secretariat, whereas no records are available on the second category.
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information on the earnings of the SNWA is sketchy and inadequate, the Secretariat estimates 
that average annual earnings to be around $17,000, excluding other allowances, such as free 
health care, transportation and possibly free accommodation. Moreover, most migrants leave 
their families behind, either for education purposes or because the host country does not 
accept families. As a result, Galal el Din (1985) estimated that, the migrants on average 
spend about 40 percent of their earnings, implying that 60 percent of their earnings could be 
remitted.
Thus, using this information on the officially registered migrants, Galal el Din (1985) 
estimated an annual remittance potential of $3.6 billion, which is five times the value of 
exports, and two and a half times the value of imports for 1988/89. In reality, the actual 
remittances through the official channels for 1987, 1988, and 1989, were $250 million, $445 
million and $249 million respectively (Bank of Sudan). Thus, the actual remittance for the 
three years were less than 28 percent of a one year potential remittances.
In a bid to encourage remittances through the official channels, the authorities 
introduced a set of incentives, such as licences to import cars. However, these incentives 
proved to be largely ineffective, because the black market rate has by far exceeded the 
official exchange rate (Graph 13.1). A related constraint to the inflow of remittances through 
the official channels is the lack of banking systems in rural areas. Therefore, it is more 
convenient for the migrants to deliver their earnings personally or through a friend. In 
addition, most of the less educated migrants are reluctant to deal with banks, either because 
they are unfamiliar with the procedures involved, or because they do not trust the banking 
systems (Galal el Din, 1985). Moreover, the instability of political and economic systems 
have deterred the flow of remittances. As a result, an increasing number of migrants prefer 
to invest their savings abroad. For these reasons, therefore, the flow of remittances through 
the official channels has always been a fraction of the remittance potential, a phenomenon 
related to the over-valued exchange rate and the distorted business environment.
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Nevertheless, it is evident that the problem in the Sudan is not the lack of capital, but rather 
the lack of a sound business environment.
Graph 13.1 
Foreign Exchange Rate Movements 
Between 1978 and 1989 (£S/US$)
Official Rate Commercial Rate Black Market Rate
*
Similarly, the flow of foreign investment is unlikely to be forthcoming for a number 
of reasons. First, the country’s external debt arrears are quite substantial, which have 
significantly reduced the Sudan’s credit worthiness. By the end of 1989, the arrears were 
around $8.4 billion, representing around two-thirds of the country’s foreign debts (estimated 
at $13.5 billion). As we saw earlier, due to these accumulated arrears, the IMF has declared 
the Sudan "non-cooperative", and hence not eligible for the use of the IMF resources. More 
importantly, it is the IMF who recommends the extension of credits to DCs. Likewise, the 
World Bank officials indicated that, apart from financial aid on humanitarian grounds, the 
Bank is not providing any loans for the Sudan at the moment. Second, the over-valued
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exchange rate, the distorted business environment, and the instability of political, legal, and 
economic systems are likely to deter foreign investors. Third, the fact that the Sudan had 
sided with Iraq in the recent Gulf war would undoubtedly inhibit the flow of Arab capital.
In summary, the internal capital market is under-developed, and the flow of foreign 
capital, including the savings of the Sudanese working abroad, is minimal. Therefore, the 
government proposals to privatise a large number of PEs in three years, is simply unrealistic. 
Indeed, even in industrial countries with highly efficient capital markets, such as the UK and 
Japan, there were suspicions about the ability of the capital market to absorb the flotation of 
large PEs. Thus, in the UK, only 50.2 percent of British Telecom shares were initially sold, 
while in Japan the authorities decided to sell the shares of Nippon Telephone and Telegraph 
in 5 tranches (Vickers and Yarrow, 1989).
13.1.3 Socio-political Factors
Experience shows that socio-political factors have been a major constraint to 
privatisation in a large number of DCs (see chapter 6). In what follows, we shall outline 
briefly the political system in the Sudan since independence, primarily to assess its likely 
impact on privatisation.
In the Sudan, political instability was the norm in the post-independence period. 
Indeed, only two years after independence, a military coup took place. In 1964, a civilan rule 
returned to power, and remained until mid 1969, though numerous reshuffles took place in 
the interim. In 1969, a military rule came to power, and remained until 1985, though it 
started pro-communist and ended pro-mu slim fundamentalists. In 1986, a civilian rule came 
to power following a one year transitional government. Although the Prime Minister 
remained in office until mid-1989, his coalition government was subject to frequent changes 
and reshuffles. Moreover, preoccupation with the civil war that broke out in 1983, and the 
effects of the drought of the mid-1980s, the government had little time to devote to the
302
declining economy. Although a few measures were announced, such as rationalisation of 
prices and privatisation of some loss-making PEs, implementation was too slow, due to 
massive street riots and strikes. It was under these conditions of weak, indecisive government 
that the Sudan’s transition to a military rule took place in mid-1989. The present government, 
led by Muslim Fundamentalists, is ideologically committed to the principles of private 
ownership, which is necessary for the success of privatisation. In addition, the fact that it is 
a military rule imposing capital punishment, without a fair trial, on industrial strikes, enabled 
it to eliminate political and trade unions opposition to privatisation. As a result, the decision 
to embark on privatisation as a major policy option, did not pose any serious problems. 
However, a number of reservations must be made in this respect.
First, political commitment to privatisation is an insufficient condition for its success. 
In Turkey, for example, the government is ideologically committed to privatisation, and yet 
implementation lagged far behind plans (Leeds, 1988; Aricanli and Rodrick, 1990). Second, 
its continuity and ability to put an end to the civil war are highly doubtful. It is led by 
fundamentalists who planned to implement strict Islamic codes, which is one cause of the 
current civil war. It is opposed by all other political parties, who have formed a broad 
coalition to overthrow it. Thus, as before, preoccupation with its own survival and the civil 
war are likely^  to erode its plans to implement radical economic policies. The point is that, 
in the absence of political stability and wider public support, the government ability to force 
change through is highly debatable.
Nevertheless, the implications for privatisation are numerous. First, political 
instability is likely to deter the flow of foreign capital, which is essential for the success of 
privatisation. As noted earlier, foreign capital is not only needed to acquire PEs, but also to 
provide the foreign exchange needed to acquire inputs and spare parts. In fact, the Sudan, 
like many other African countries, is not that attractive for foreign investors (Marsden and 
Belot, 1987). Second, under such a suppressive regime, where there is no freedom of
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speech, the implementation process is widely open for irregularities, such as sales to political 
loyalists at low prices, or extension of generous concessions. Third, the fact that the policy 
has not been exposed to public scrutiny would undoubtedly affect its credibility and 
continuity if the present regime is ousted. Indeed, fears of a future reversal of the policy 
could deter investors, local or foreign. The fact that political and labour opposition was 
eliminated, does not in any way mean that they were in full agreement with the policy. 
Moreover, experience shows that the heavy reliance on the bureaucrats could lead to 
considerable implementation delays, especially if they are not committed to the policy 
(Heald,1990; Cowan,1990). Fourth, in order to contain the growing black market activities, 
the authorities have resorted to stringent price controls and prohibited possession of foreign 
exchange outside the banking systems. As we saw earlier, these administrative controls 
proved to be counterproductive, where scarcities developed, local investors travelled abroad, 
and the business confidence further eroded. Finally, the privatisation of the agricultural 
schemes is likely to raise serious political and technical problems. In each of these schemes 
proposed for privatisation there are some 50,000 families relying on them for their living. 
Therefore, privatisation could expose these families to exploitation by the new owners, or 
at least criticised on this ground. On the other hand, regulation is likely to pose serious 
technical problems for the authorities. We shall pick up these problems under the technical 
constraints (see below).
In summary, in the post-independence era, political instability was the norm. Indeed, 
the only period that witnessed some sort of political stability was the previous military regime 
era (1969 - 1985). However, taking into consideration that the regime started Marxist and 
ended up Muslim Fanatics, explains how unsettled the regime was. For this reason alone, 
foreign investors, including the Sudanese working abroad, are unlikely to take an active part 
in the privatisation programme. Indeed, even the limited number of local investors could be 
considerably reduced, if political opponents refused to take part.
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13.1.4 Financial Performance
As we saw in the introductory part of this thesis, the success of privatisation will 
depend, among other factors, on the profitability of the privatisation candidate. Profitable 
PEs are likely to attract investors, while unviable, loss making PEs might not. On the other 
hand, financial restructuring prior to sale could be expensive, given the financial difficulties 
now facing the Sudanese authorities. In addition, the justification of privatisation might be 
extremely difficult once the enterprise has been turned around at massive costs.
As table 13.1 reveals, almost all PEs selected for privatisation in the Sudan have been 
the choric loss-making PEs. This approach is largely inconsistent with the experience 
elsewhere, where the first privatisation candidates were, in the main, the profitable and well- 
managed PEs (see chapter 3). Indeed, as noted in chapter 6, failure to privatise the two sweet 
factories was cited by a number of Sudanese officials as evidence that the current 
privatisation programme is bound to failure.
However, it must be stressed that, PEs in the Sudan are incurring persistent losses 
because they operate in a highly distorted economic environment, which hinder private 
enterprises too. Indeed, Marsden and Belot (1987) argue that "Private firms in the Sudan 
are in desperate state, due to high cost levels, lack of credit, and disruption in the supply of 
imported inputs". Therefore, given the existing business environment, there is no reason to 
suggest that denationalisation alone would automatically improve performance.
The Sudanese authorities proposed to privatise a large number of PEs over just a 
three-year period, including preparation for privatisation. The officials interviewed, citing 
the British example, confidently argued that they can carry out the plan within the specified 
timetable (1990-93). However, apart from the fact that the UK is a developed country, its 
privatisation programme has evolved over a ten-year period, under a stable government with 
sufficient majority in the Parliament.
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Table (13.1)
Financial Position of Some 
Privatisation Candidates (£S m)
Year® Corporation Estimated Capital Accumulated Losses
(a) Agriculture
1985/86 Blue Nile 15 25
1983/84 Northern 33 70.1
1976/77 Nuba Mountains 1.8 1.2
1978/79 Toker 1.1 4.0
1985/86 White Nile 21 63.3
(b) Industry
1985/86 Babanuosa Diary 
Products
0.14 2.567
1985/86 Onion Dehydration Plant 1.06 5.554
1985/86 Sweet Factories® 0.18 6.823
1984/85 Textile Mills® 55.2 29.8
1981/82 White Nile Tannery 2.61 1.376
(1) indicates the year in which the enterprise was last audited.
® these are Rea and Kirikab sweet factories.
(3) these are: Shendi, El Douim, Kadogli, Nyala and the friendship textile mills.
Source: Auditor General Report, 1987.
As Heald (1990) argues "It has been within such a political context that the necessary 
legislative programme, administrative arrangements and financial mechanisms have been 
affected". In the Sudan, however, the capital market is too thin, technical expertise in severe 
shortages, and the political system is unstable. Moreover, the authorities have committed 
themselves to this over-ambitious privatisation programme without adequate preparations. For 
example, almost all PEs selected for privatisation do not have adequate accounting records, 
and have not been audited for years. Indeed, there is no central government unit with 
accurate number of PEs, size of staff, government equity or financial position. Therefore, 
a considerable amount of work is needed to collect these basic data, which might extend
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beyond the three-year period. However, it seems that the authorities are keen to privatise as 
urgently as possible. For example, the authorities started forming committees to prepare for 
privatisation, after the privatisation plan was announced. Indeed, the privatisation plan was 
announced in May, 1990, while the budget for 1990/91 contained a sales proceeds of £s 500 
million, which indicates the haste with which the government intends to finalise this 
complicated transaction. Nevertheless, as noted in chapter 4, hurried privatisations are likely 
to do more harm than good. As Shirley (1988) argues "The success of privatisation should 
be judged not in terms of the sale or the contract itself, or the price paid...Rather, the test 
is whether there are net benefits to the economy as a whole".
13.1.5 Technical Constraints
Experience shows that, planning and implementing privatisation is a complex matter 
that requires a variety of skills (merchant banks, auditors and lawyers), rarely found in most 
DCs. And the Sudan is no exception. The technical expertise required to implement this new 
complicated policy are in short supply. In fact, the authorities have resorted solely to civil 
servants who have no experience in the privatisation phenomenon. Moreover, most of the 
highly qualified, experienced civil servants have either left the country or have been 
dismissed, under "The Dismissal in the Pursuit of Public Interest Act, 1981". Under this Act, 
a civil servant could be dismissed on purely political reasons by the concerned Minister. 
Indeed, Ozanne (1991) notes that "all independent institutions have been emasculated, and 
the civil service purged of non-Islamic zealots".
Moreover, a number of high ranking civil servants we have spoken to, were reluctant 
to take part. For some, the reasons are pragmatic, they do not want to make their colleaques 
redundant, while others are politically motivated. In addition, the legal framework for the 
various actors (e.g. the MFEP, the sectoral ministries, the privatisation committee, the 
Minister for Cabinet Affairs) is not yet clear, which would allow confusion, overlap and 
conflict to develop. These factors, therefore, are likely to undermine the government capacity
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to implement a viable privatisation programme using its indigenous human resources. On the 
other hand, the use of foreign advisers to formulate and implement privatisation has been de­
emphasised (see chapter 6). It is true that the wider the involvement of the Sudanese would 
broaden the public support for the policy, but they have no experience. Indeed, even the 
Minister in charge - a university lecturer at the Faculty of Engineering - has grand ideas, but 
not a clear vision of the mechanical steps needed. It is a trial and error exercise.
However, this is not to suggest that the use of foreign advisers is always desirable. 
It is true that foreign experts would provide the necessary skills to formulate and implement 
privatisation. However, as Vuylsteke (1988) points out, they are often unaccustomed to local 
conditions upon which privatisation techniques must be adapted, and would only be 
concerned with ownership transfer. Moreover, Heald (1990) argues that "if the objective of 
privatisation is greater efficiency, such an approach brings serious pitfalls, because merchant 
banks are singularly unconcerned with competition, trade policy or foreign ownership". 
Nevertheless, the difficult technical problems involved, such as valuation, preparing PEs for 
privatisation, identification of buyers, and concluding the sales transaction, are likely to pose 
serious problems in the sudan.
Another constraint in the Sudan is the lack of funds to finance the sales expenses 
associated with privatisation, such as employee benefits, financial restructuring and the 
administrative expenses. It is true that these transaction costs are once and for all, but the 
problem is the lack of finance. As we saw in chapter 11, failure to establish the 
rationalisation fund envisaged under the Public Enterprise and Economic Management 
Project, was partly responsible for the implementation delays. Another example is the case 
of the two small candy factories, where the highest bid received did not even cover the 
privatisation costs. More importantly, for a government very anxious to minimise the social 
impact of privatisation, and in a context where there is no income support scheme, 
employment issues are likely to constitute a major constraint. As we saw in chapter 10, the
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major political impediments to PE reform were the consumer and employment protection 
policies adopted by the successive governments. Indeed, the socio-political costs of staff 
retrenchment have forced the previous government to pay the salaries of an ailing private 
concern (see chapter 6). On the other hand, if the authorities decided to leave the entire work 
force intact, or forced potential buyers to retain the whole work force, as in Banama, 
Bangladesh and Malaysia (Cowan, 1990), the sales price would be considerably reduced, and 
more important defeats the efficiency claims of the policy. In short, the employment issues 
have been the single most limiting constraint to privatisation in DCs, and the Sudan is no 
exception.
Another technical constraint is regulation. At present, almost all PEs selected for 
privatisation operate in mixed sectors alongside private concerns. Therefore, in the normal 
circumstances, competition among domestic firms, and possibly from imports, might be 
sufficient to ensure that prices are at competitive levels. However, such normal circumstances 
virtually do not exist in the Sudan. The internal market is too small, the government 
intervention in the internal market is too excessive, and international competition is not 
allowed. Indeed, the government slogan is "eat what we produce, and wear what we 
manufacture". Moreover, the level of sophistication of financial reporting is very low, there 
are no reporting standards or a body to govern the profession. Therefore, the flow of 
accounting data is irregular, the legal system is not yet settled, and hence regulation is likely 
to be a protracted business. Indeed, there are very few private firms with a sound, up-to-date 
set of accounts prepared on consistent basis, which reduces very much the quantity and 
quality of information.
A final technical problem relates to the privatisation of the five agricultural schemes. 
As noted earlier, there are some 250,000 people relying on these schemes, which raises the 
question of their welfare following privatisation. There are concerns that the new owners 
might exploit these farmers, and hence these enterprises must be regulated, with all the
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problems of regulation noted above. Moreover, in one of these schemes, the Northern 
Agricultural Corporation, the land is owned by the residents, while the state owns the pump 
station. Therefore, a question arises as to what will happen if the landlords refused to 
cooperate with the new owners.
In summary, the Sudanese capital market is underdeveloped, and the soaring inflation 
rates rendered the prevailing interest rates negative in real terms, which made deposits and 
long term lending unrewarding. The growing government deficits, caused by poor 
government revenues and the increasing war expenses, have absorbed more than 50 percent 
of the limited credit available. The Bank of Sudan imposed a ceiling on commercial bank’s 
lending to private enterprises, and approves credits in excess of £s 300,000, based on 
subjective criteria. The business environment is characterised by tight administrative controls, 
over-valued exchange rate, inadequate infrastructure, highly protected enterprises, severe 
shortages of foreign exchange, and weak business confidence. The legal framework within 
which private enterprises operate is by no means clear, and the political system unstable. The 
financial performance of the privatisation candidates is rather weak, and turning them around 
depends entirely on the availability of finance, particularly foreign exchange, and the business 
environment in general. The government capacity to plan, manage and execute a viable 
privatisation plan has been seriously undermined by the growing brain drain, and the disarray 
in the civil service caused by the worsening local conditions and the sharp decline in real 
income. Although there was no significant political opposition to privatisation, may be due 
to fear rather than acceptance through constructive dialogue.
For all these reasons, therefore, it could be concluded that the scope of privatisation 
in the Sudan is likely to be limited. Indeed, assuming that the Sudanese authorities managed 
to privatise part of their PEs, the potential gains of privatisation, namely efficiency and fiscal 
impact, are likely to be insignificant (see below).
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13.2 The Privatisation Benefits
13.2.1 Efficiency Benefits
As we saw earlier, one of the main arguments often made in favour of privatisation 
is that, it would enhance efficiency. However, research established that efficiency is 
determined by the market structure, rather than the ownership structure (see chapter 3). 
Therefore, there is no economic objection to privatise PEs operating in competitive markets. 
As matter of fact, almost all PEs selected for privatisation in the Sudan operate in a mixed 
sector. Moreover, the duality of objectives (economic and social) could be reduced to the 
single objective of profit maximisation, and the number of government agencies able to 
influence the operations of PEs could be reduced to a small number of owners. It is also true 
that the salaries of private managers are much higher than their public counterparts (see 
chapter 7). However, a few caveats are in order.
First, the same factors that contributed to the unsatisfactory performance of PEs 
equally inhibit private enterprises. These would include the severe shortages of foreign 
exchange, unrealistic prices and the inadequate infrastructure. Moreover, both public and 
private enterprises are protected against imports competition, and the domestic market is too 
small, which limits competition, the key determinant of efficiency. Second, the proposition 
that privatised PEs would be exposed to the disciplines of the capital market is irrelevant in 
the case of the Sudan, due to the current status of the Sudanese capital market. In fact, there 
is no one single private enterprise that raises capital by selling shares, but rather through debt 
financing, which is often extended on the basis of political or personal ties. In addition, the 
state controls credit and foreign exchange allocation based on subjective criteria. Third, the 
claims that privatisation would reduce or eliminate political interference in the operations of 
privatised entities is also debatable. In the Sudan, government intervention in the internal 
market is unduly excessive, and hence, directly or indirectly, it could influence the operations 
of private firms. First, the state grants investment licensing, sets the selling prices, approves 
exports and imports, and allocates foreign exchange. Second, at times of shortages,
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management has no autonomy in marketing the goods, instead they are transferred to the 
authorities to be distributed according to a rationing system. Third, the state directly 
influences the minimum wage rate, and at times imposes certain payments on private 
employers for political reasons. For example, in mid-1990, on the first anniversary of the 
"revolution", the government granted a one-month salary for all the employees in the 
country, public and private. Fourth, the state could also influence the hiring and firing staff, 
under the political umbrella of the so-called "public interest". As we saw earlier, in the 
Sudan, there is a law that empowers sectoral ministers to dismiss any civil servant for pure 
political reasons. Thus, the state could threaten private employers not to recruit political 
opponents or to dismiss those already employed. However, the procedures to dismiss 
incompetent and surplus staff are cumbersome, expensive, and time-consuming.
In summary, political interference in the Sudan is not confined to PEs, private 
enterprises are equally subject to a web of administrative controls. Indeed, if the financing, 
pricing, and employment decisions are taken away from enterprises, then eventually 
managerial autonomy is lost. For these reasons, therefore, it is difficult to suggest that 
denationalisation alone would enhance economic efficiency.
13.2.2 The Fiscal Benefits
The single most often cited objective by all the officials interviewed is the fiscal 
impact of privatisation. For example, the Minister of Industry stated that "Industrial PEs have 
been selected for privatisation because they are becoming a burden on the budget. Moreover, 
they are in desperate need for finance, which the government does not have". Similarly, the 
officials of the MFEP indicated that, the government transfers to PEs in 1988/89 represented 
about 19 percent of GDP, in return for only 4.3 percent of total government revenues, or 0.4 
percent of GDP. Thus, the budgetary burden of PEs is quite evident, but must be qualified.
First, a close investigation revealed that a large portion of the government transfers
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were made for the large public utilities, the Rail, Telecom and the Agricultural schemes, 
which were not selected for privatisation3. Indeed, the officials of the MFEP indicated that 
only the Rail, Telecom, and the River Transport Corporations are entitled for subsidies, 
while PEs organised as public corporations borrow from the central bank. However, PEs 
organised as "private" limited companies, and which form the bulk of privatisation 
candidates, are neither entitled to receive subsidies, nor have access to the soft central bank 
credits. They raise capital from the banking systems, and hence their privatisation is unlikely 
to have any significant impact on the budget. Indeed, of all PEs selected for privatisation, 
only the agricultural schemes are entitled for the cheap central bank financing, though their 
privatisation is likely to raise serious political and technical problems (see 13.1.5). A second 
qualification is that the deficits generated by PEs are largely attributed to their social 
obligations and the government policies, such as pricing (see chapter 3). Third, in the Sudan, 
there is no single private enterprise that raises capital by issuing shares, but rather by 
borrowing from the banking systems. Therefore, the pressure on the capital market would 
increase rather than diminish. Fourth, the claims that privatisation would generate significant 
sales proceeds are debateable in the Sudan, (i) Almost all PEs selected for sale are in 
desperate state, and could only be sold at a fraction of their book values, (ii) As the cases 
showed, the pervasive over-staffing and the huge accumulated debts are likely to greatly 
reduce the sales proceeds, (iii) The distorted business environment, the political instability, 
the rush to privatise as quickly as possible, and the limited liquidity available might force the 
government to sharply reduce sales price, and/or extend considerable concessions to induce 
buyers.
Finally, the claims that buyers would pay a higher price in anticipation of future 
profits, is also questionable in the case of the Sudan. In a context where there are tight
3 As of December, 1988, the claims on PEs were as follows: Gezira 
Scheme, £s 690 million; other agricultural schemes, Ls 638 million; Sudan 
Rail, Cs 146 million; Cotton Public Corporation, Cs 1,239 million, and the 
claims of commercial banks on the private limited companies were Cs 996.5 
million (Bank of Sudan).
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administrative controls over all operating decisions, there is no reason to suggest that 
privatisation by itself would lead to greater profitability. The same factors that contributed 
to the poor performance of PEs (shortages of inputs, inadequate infrastructure and unrealistic 
prices) are likely to hinder private enterprises. In turn, the claims that higher profitability 
would lead to higher tax revenues is simply irrelevant. Indeed, even if there is some 
improvement in profitability, tax revenues are unlikely to increase, because the collection of 
taxes in the Sudan is inefficient. The reasons are two-fold: there are no reliable data upon 
which to base taxes, and the tax administration is very weak. Therefore, tax evasion through 
manipulation of accounts or collusion with taxation officers is likely to reduce tax revenues. 
As Heller and Schiller (1989) argue "where tax evasion is common, and the government is 
unable to ascertain the true profit situation, the government may be net loser from 
privatisation by virtue of lower sales price and lower subsequent tax receipts. Where the 
purchaser is a foreign company, tax evasion may also imply a leakage of profits outside the 
domestic economy".
In short, the pressure on the Treasury would be reduced if, and only if, laige public 
utilities were privatised. Similarly, there is no assurance that sales proceeds would be 
significant, due to sales to political favourites, extension of costly concessions, and the weak 
government bargaining capacity. Therefore, it could be concluded that the Sudanese 
privatisation programme is unlikely to generate significant fiscal gains.
13.3 Privatisation Techniques
As we saw in chapter 2, the choice of an appropriate privatisation mechanism depends 
on the status of the equity market, the financial position of the privatisation candidate, and 
the government objectives. In the sudan, however, the capital market is underdeveloped, the 
number of business investors is small, there are no standardised accounting systems, the level 
of education is very poor and the performance of the privatisation candidates is very poor. 
Therefore, a public offering of shares is unlikely to be a major privatisation technique. As
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we saw in chapter 6, for a variety of reasons, the use of debt/ equity swaps are unlikely to 
be a feasible alternative. Similarly, management/employee buy-out is not a feasible 
privatisation mechanism, because there is no history of share ownership in the Sudan, the 
confidence in the financial system is low, and the method is faced by serious financing 
problems. Moreover, Vuylsteke (1988) points out that it requires a competent management 
and a constant staff, which is difficult to satisfy in the Sudan given the current high turnover 
rates.
Finally, privatisation through management contracts and leasing is also unlikely to be 
a major privatisation mechanism. First, experience shows that, it is often difficult to conclude 
and enforce a satisfactory contract for both leasing and management contracts (World 
Development Report, 1988). Second, given the current economic difficulties, the Sudanese 
authorities might be in a very weak bargaining position to conclude a viable leasing contract. 
Thus, as in Togo, generous concessions might be granted, which run counter to the very 
basic idea of the policy. Third, the distorted business environment would frustrate any 
genuine efforts to improve performance through leasing or management contracts.
Therefore, private sales to local and foreign investors are likely to be the main 
privatisation techniques. However, private sales are neither desirable nor easy to conclude. 
First, the method is widely open to irregularities or criticism since there were no 
predetermined privatisation rules developed to govern the implementation process. Indeed, 
there are reasons to suggest that the government would favour the Islamic financial 
institutions owned by the Muslim Fundamentalists. As Ozanne (1991) argues "The 
government has recklessly put the profit of a small cartel of Islamic banks and political 
objectives of a cartel of extremists before the welfare of millions of Sudanese citizens". In 
such cases, therefore, private sales are likely to lead to massive concentration of wealth in 
a narrow segment of the population, with all its political consequences. Second, in a context 
where the number of investors is limited, the capital market underdeveloped, the business
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environment inconducive and the political system unstable, it might be difficult to find buyers 
with sufficient financial resources and managerial expertise to acquire all these PEs in such 
a short period of time. For these reasons, foreign investors might not be willing to take an 
active role in the privatisation programme. Indeed, in their quest to oust the existing regime, 
political opponents might instruct their supporters not to participate, thus limiting the number 
of prospective buyers.
13.4 Conclusion
In the Sudan, privatisation has been treated as an end in itself, rather than a means 
to improve economic efficiency. The Sudanese authorities have done virtually nothing to 
foster competition or introduce realistic prices for goods, capital and foreign exchange, which 
are essential prerequisites for a market economy. In the absence of radical measures to 
stimulate a free market economy, however, privatisation is unlikely to generate significant 
and lasting economic benefits. Indeed, there is ample evidence to suggest that PEs are likely 
to dominate the Sudanese economy for a considerable time to come. Apart from the various 
constraints outlined above, the country is currently facing a civil war, partly due to so-called 
"unbalanced regional development". As a result, if the civil war ever come to an end, the 
central government would be forced to make substantial public investment in those rural 
areas. The other alternative, i.e private investment, is simply not feasible, due to the various 
political, economic, and legal constraints cited earlier. Moreover, the impediments to private 
investment are likely to be of a long term nature, simply because the question of 
ethnic/religious minorities has never been resolved in any national setting. Therefore, the 
conclusion is that, the scope of privatisation in the Sudan is likely to be limited, and its 
benefits uncertain. As a result, improving the performance of PEs under the current 
ownership structure is inevitable. A theoretical approach to this effect would be developed 







In sharp contrast to the philosophy of public ownership that dominated the post-war 
period, the privatisation of publicly-owned enterprises is currently a topical issue on the 
development agenda worldwide. It was argued that, the massive public investments of the 
post-war period and central planning have failed to accelerate economic growth, and hence 
the time for change has come. Indeed, an increasing number of governments, in both 
developed and developing countries, regardless of their ideological convictions have declared 
their intentions to retreat from the economic activities, and to rely more heavily on private 
ownership and free markets. And the Sudan is no exception.
The current interest in the privatisation policy is attributed, in the main, to the 
political developments that took place during the last decade (the rise of the right in the West 
and the downfall of socialism in the East), and the growing dissatisfaction with the 
performance of PEs. In addition, governments in DCs were exposed to increasing external 
pressures to shift to a market economy, on the grounds that free markets are more efficient 
in allocating resources than central planning, and that private initiatives are the best way to 
accelerate economic growth. Privatisation, it was claimed, would eliminate the budgetary 
burden of PEs, improve economic efficiency, lead to the development of efficient capital 
markets, and widen "real" public ownership (often referred to as popular capitalism).
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However, the highly political nature of the policy initially made the privatisation 
policy an extremely divisive concept between ideological supporters and opponents (Rees, 
1986). As for DCs, the veiy fact that, the policy has been advocated by "outsiders", was 
quite sufficient to generate considerable resentment, even among those sympathetic with this 
unproven policy. As Bienen and Waterbury (1989) argue "There is a general perception in 
the LDCs that the packages are imposed by the creditors with little sensitivity to local 
conditions and constraints".
Through time, however, the socialism doctrinaire that dominated the post-war period, 
and the one that emphasised public ownership, became less a constraint to privatisation. The 
political developments that took place in the "Eastern Bloc" were taken as an indicator of the 
failure of a centrally-planned economy to accelerate economic growth, and hence paved the 
way for change. As Heald (1990) argues "The political climate has changed remarkably. 
Rather than international agencies pressing privatisation upon unwilling governments, they 
may now have to caution against the infeasible and inappropriate". More importantly, policy 
makers in most DCs have realised that PEs have failed to achieve their objectives, as the 
drain on the Treasury increased, and the import substitutes never materialised. Therefore, 
privatisation has been contemplated in a bid to contain the budgetary burden of PEs, and to 
improve economic efficiency. Two claims were made in this respect. First, it was claimed 
that privatisation would eliminate the deficits generated by PEs, because the privatised 
industries would no longer be financed by the Treasury. As we saw in chapter 3, however, 
research has failed to establish a clear cut case for this proposition. The other main 
proposition has been that, private firms are more efficient than their public counterparts. As 
with the previous proposition, such claims should be treated with great caution, simply 
because no conclusive evidence exists.
Apart from the lack of firm evidence to support these economic propositions, 
experience shows that governments in DCs have found it increasingly difficult to implement
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privatisation. A critical prerequisite for the implementation and success of the policy is the 
presence of a strong political commitment to the principles of privatisation, armed with a 
clear vision of the preparatory work that need to carried out before embarking on 
privatisation. In the absence of political will and wider public support for the policy, the 
difficult economic, technical and socio-political constraints could hamper implementation. In 
particular, measures to stimulate a free market economy (e.g price rationalisation, trade 
liberalisation and labour shedding), could entail heavy socio-political costs, leading to 
considerable delays, if not abandonment of the policy. As Commander and Killick (1988) 
argue "It is common for PEs to be used as a means of subsidising consumers. The 
substitution of market-determined prices for the previously subsidised prices will create a 
group of unambiguous losers".
Advocates claim that there is no firm evidence to show that PEs have achieved their 
distributional objectives. For example, Van De Walle (1989) argues that "PEs often reflect 
an urban bias and inadequately serve rural population, where there may be larger pockets of 
poverty". As the Sudanese experience showed, price controls intended the help the poor 
ended up helping urban elites, while consumers in rural areas are actually paying a price 
much higher than the legal price. Indeed, Commander and Killick (1988) conceded that 
"These (the losers) may or may not be made up of poverty groups, for state subsidies are a 
notoriously inefficient way of alleviating poverty. Subsidies tend to have a strong urban 
bias...".
Nevertheless, the argument that wholesale privatisation would have a detrimental 
impact on the poor, and would deter the state from perusing its socio-economic objectives 
need to be taken seriously, due to their political consequences. Apart from the violent price 
rise that would follow the move towards a market economy - a prerequisite for the long term 
success of privatisation - there are likely to be mass redundancies prior to privatisation. This
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is serious, because unlike the situation in industrial countries, job prospects in other sectors 
of the economy are likely to be bleak, and most DCs do not have the income support systems 
of industrial countries. Moreover, there are other interest groups (e.g the military and the 
bureaucrats) who have vested interests to maintain the status quo regardless of their political 
convictions. These groups are often well-organised, militant, and well-aware of the fact that 
they stand to lose by the advent of privatisation, while the potential gainers are scattered, and 
not sure that they will gain, simply because the potential benefits of privatisation are 
uncertain. Therefore, the well-organised ^ politically influential interest groups could influence 
the scope and pace for privatisation before the potential gainers are organised to support it 
(Bienen and Waterbury, 1989). In short, the socio-political consequences of the policy have 
deterred even committed leaders to implement large-scale privatisations. A good example is 
Turkey, where the process of transferring public assets to private ownership has faced a 
difficult path, though the government is ideologically committed to the policy (Leeds, 1988).
Another critical constraint in many DCs is the lack of financial resources and 
managerial expertise to respond to privatisation. In most DCs, the low levels of income, the 
poor resource mobilisation capacity, the over-valued exchange rates, the weak investor 
confidence in the financial systems, and the unstable political and legal systems, have led to 
serious financing constraints and deterred foreign investors (Kikeri, 1990; Hemming and 
Mansoor, 1988). In addition, the government- imposed restrictions on certain local groups 
(e.g ethnic/religious groups) have further limited the available options (Callaghy and 
Wilson, 1988). Indeed, the main argument in favour of PEs were the widespread market 
failures, and nothing has changed in the interim. The market is still underdeveloped, how to 
operate a free market economy poses a real problem, and the private sector is dominated by 
traders rather than business investors. The fact is that, the reality of the market in most DCs 
is entirely different from the image of the market portrayed by the enthusiastic supporters of 
free markets. As Ghai (1985) argues, "Its (the World Bank) use of the market as a touchstone
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not only belittles the social and political purposes of public enterprises, but also demonstrates 
a misunderstanding of the historical reality and operations of the market in Africa". Another 
impediment to privatisation in DCs is the lack of technical expertise to implement this new 
and complicated policy. As noted in chapter 6, privatisation requires a variety of technical 
skills and administrative capacity to help in formulating and executing a viable privatisation 
programme, which are often not available, and the use of foreign experts has been met with 
a hostile attitude.
Apart from these constraints, we found that the business environment in the Sudan 
is distorted in so many respects, and the authorities have done virtually nothing to create a 
supportive environment for doing business. The present government declared its intentions 
to shift to a market economy, but still relies on administrative controls. In addition, trade 
liberalisation was firmly rejected, the prevailing interest rates are negative in real terms, the 
exchange rate is under-valued, there are no standardised accounting systems, and the task of 
dismantling the bureaucracy remains. The country is currently facing a civil war, and one 
of its main reasons is the so-called "unbalanced development". Consequently, it is not at all 
clear what would happen if the civil war ever come to an end, i.e would the government 
undertake public investment projects, or would regional development be left to private 
initiatives?. In either case, substantial public investment to build a modem infrastructure base 
appears to be inevitable. Finally, there is a considerable disagreement about the whole legal 
system, that is whether to return to the conventional laws that were prevailing since 
independence, or to adopt the Islamic codes. At present, the Islamic laws have been adopted, 
though their implications on business enterprises is not yet clear, because the whole 
experience is still at its infant stage. The instability of the legal system, in turn, would 
undoubtedly hamper entrepreneurial activities in the economy.
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In view if this state of affairs, therefore, the main conclusion is that, the scope of 
privatisation in the Sudan appears to be limited, which is consistent with the experience 
elsewhere. Indeed, assuming that the Sudanese authorities managed to privatise part of their 
PEs, the potential benefits are likely to be limited. The point is that, due to the lack of the 
necessary conditions for the success of privatisation, there is no reason to suggest that a 
change of ownership would enhance economic efficiency. Privatisation is not an end in 
itself, and can not be carried out in isolation of the broader political, economic and legal 
environment. Successful privatisation requires a gamut of policies, not least of which is a 
conducive business environment. This would include liberal trade policies, flexible prices, 
and labour policies, few constraints on entry and exit, adequate infrastructure, reasonable and 
fair taxes, lower inflation rates, stable political and legal systems, and realistic interest and 
exchange rates. The paradox is that, these wider reforms are bound to entail heavy socio­
political costs, but without these sweeping and painful reforms there is no reason to suggest 
that the benefits of privatisation, namely economic efficiency, would be realised.
14.2 The Need for Alternatives
Like the situation in most DCs, the Sudanese experience shows that, privatisation has 
been on the political agenda for a considerable time, but no major progress was made. 
Moreover, as the experience elsewhere, the potential benefits of the policy are uncertain, and 
the large-scale privatisations of industrial countries appear to be irrelevant. Therefore, the 
conclusion is that, the political, economic, and technical constraints to privatisation, suggest 
that the policy of streamlining the PE sector is a relatively long term process, and requires 
the support of a range of policies. Indeed, the available evidence indicates that, a large 
number of PEs are likely to remain under public ownership for a considerable time to come 
in DCs (Nellis, 1986; Kirkpatrick, 1988). If this were so, then what should policy makers 
in DCs do to improve the performance of their PEs in the interim. In what follows, we shall 
outline a theoretical model to this effect.
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14.3 Performance-Improving Model
As we pointed out in the introductory part of this thesis, the poor performance of PEs 
is by no means universal. Worldwide, there are sufficient examples of well-managed, highly 
profitable PEs, such as IRI in Italy, CVRD in Brazil, Hindustan Machine Tools in India, the 
Tea Development Authority in Kenya, the Telecommunication Authority in Ethiopia, and 
Electricity Supply company in Tanzania (Shirley, 1983; Ayub and Hegstead, 1986; Nellis, 
1986). Such evidence clearly indicates that performance could be improved under the present 
ownership structure, and hence we should direct our attention to the performance determinant 
factors, i.e what makes these enterprises profitable, though they are publicly-owned?. A 
second justification of this line of thinking is the lack of a conclusive evidence to support the 
view that ownership is the sole determinant of performance. Worldwide, there are sufficient 
stories of private business failures, indeed one reason for the expansion of PEs were the 
rescue operations mounted by governments for private firms that failed in the market place. 
The point is that, the mainstream literature suggests that it is the market structure within 
which a firm operates, rather than ownership structure that determines performance. 
However, a change of ownership in itself will neither foster competition, nor lead to market- 
based prices (Van De Walle, 1989). Third, in the vast majority of cases, PEs have been 
turned around in a relatively short period prior to privatisation. In the UK, for example, 
Yarrow (1986) found that the biggest jump in profitability occurred in the run up to 
privatisation. Fourth, in a number of cases where serious attempts have been made to clarify 
objectives, strengthen management selection and rewards, as in Pakistan and South Korea, 
performance has significantly improved (Hartmann and Nawab, 1985; Park, 1987). 
Similarly, New Zealand’s "Corporatisation" policy (i.e to operate PEs on strictly commercial 
basis), has reportedly produced a significant turn around in performance (Jones, 1991). 
Similar approaches were adopted in Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Togo 
(Vuylsteke, 1988; Shirley, 1983). Indeed, Aylen (1987) argues that "A programme of 
privatisation in a developing country is really a programme for reform". Finally, as noted
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above, governments in DCs have found it increasingly difficult to implement privatisation, 
and that its potential gains are by no means assured. Indeed, we are by no means alone in 
advocating internal reform under public ownership. For example, Kirkpatrick (1988) argues 
that "If the prospects for widespread privatisation in DCs are more limited than the rhetoric 
would suggest, then internal restructuring of public sector organisation and management are 
likely to make a more significant, if less newsworthy, contribution to improving public 
enteiprise performance in DCs”. Similarly, Coburn and Wortzel (1986) state that "On 
balance, privatisation - however desirable - may not offer the long-awaited solution to the 
problems of state-owned enterprises, particularly in the developing world where the problem 
is most acute, and where privatisation is most urgently needed . Therefore, while pursuing 
privatisation, governments and international development policy makers are encouraged not 
to lose sight of the possibilities for reforming state-owned enterprises". On the same lines, 
Wortzel and Wortzel (1989), Hemming and Mansoor (1988), made a persuasive argument 












(1)This inodel is developed from the literature , particularly Ayub and Hegstad (1986), 
Coburn and Wortzel (1986), Shirley (1983, 1989).
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For these reasons, therefore, it could be asserted that PE reform is another viable 
option for improving PE performance. In what follows, we shall discuss the above theoretical 
approach proposed to improve performance in the interim.
14.3.1 Competition
The available evidence clearly indicates that, competition - local or foreign, actual or 
potential - is a key determinant of enteiprise performance, public or private. Competition 
enhances performance by exerting pressure on management to control costs, allocate 
resources more efficiently, innovate, seek new markets, and respond to consumer needs. 
Thus, if the principal aim is to improve performance, it is essential to promote competition, 
regardless of the ownership structure (Van De Walle, 1989: Wortzel and Wortzel, 1989; 
Ayub and Hegstad, 1986; Shirley, 1989; Kay and Thompson, 1986).
There are a number of ways to increase competition. One, through deregulation (i.e 
removal of statutory entry barriers), or restructuring large holding companies into smaller, 
competitive units. However, it must be repeated that, if the size of the privatised entities was 
left intact, deregulation is unlikely to be sufficient to foster competition. Likewise, the 
technical and financial advantages of the former public monopoly would give the private 
monopoly considerable market powers to deter entry or to make life difficult for the new 
rivals (Yarrow, 1986; Bishop and Kay, 1989). In DCs, however PEs are normally 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector, where there is a wide room to increase competition 
(Heald, 1990). Indeed, even in the case of "natural monopolies", it was suggested that
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competition could be created through franchising or contracting-out. That is to allow private 
firms to use the public assets and supply the market through bidding. Contestable markets 
is yet another way to foster competition, regardless of the number of firms in the market. 
As we saw in chapter 3, the Contestable Market Theory suggests that if there are no entry 
and exit barriers, existing firm(s) would be subject to "hit and run" by a transient, who could 
enter the market, earn a profit, and if need arises collect the gains and depart costlessly. 
Thus, in areas that are likely to satisfy the contestability conditions, such as road and air 
transport, this would provide a feasible alternative to foster competition.
A second alternative is to encourage PEs to seek export opportunities, which could 
generate significant efficiency gains. For example, Shirley (1983) pointed out that, by 
exposing "Hindustan Machine Tools" in India to a small amount of international competition 
(8 percent of sales), has contributed to the company’s "dynamism and professionalism", 
similarly, Ayub and Hegstad (1986) found that, three of the best seven performing industrial 
PEs in Zambia are exporters, while none of the loss-making PEs are exporters. A third 
alternative is to encourage import competition through trade liberalisation. A major pitfall 
of this approach, however, is to promote trade liberalisation policies without preparing PEs 
to operate in a competitive market, by clarifying objectives, improving management 
selection, rewards, and autonomy. In the end, it must be stressed that, all these measures 
to increase competition must be supported by a competent body to ensure real competition, 
such as the Mergers and Monopolis Commission in the UK.
14.3.2 The Business Environment
The above measures to expose enterprises, public or private, to a competitive 
environment would do little to enhance efficiency, if the political, economic, and legal 
environment for doing business is unstable and inconducive. Therefore, a competitive 
environment must be supported by sweeping reforms in the political, legal and
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macroeconomic environment. Indeed, the Sudanese experience demonstrated that the major 
impediments to PE reform were the widespread distortions in the broader environment. The 




As noted earlier, PEs were often assigned vague and conflicting objectives, partly 
due to the presence of social goals, and partly due to the numerous lines of communication 
(i.e plurality of owners resulting in conflicting messages being sent to PEs). As a result, 
performance evaluation became a protracted business, losses were attributed to social goals, 
and internal inefficiencies concealed. Therefore, the state needs to assess carefully other 
alternatives of achieving its social goals, such as providing incentives for private firms to 
develop rural areas. Alternatively, PEs should be allowed to operate on strict commercial 
basis once they were established. As Jones (1982) argues "where the investment decisions 
were made on social grounds, the modes of operations need not".
Thus, the first step in PE reform would be formulate clear, unambiguous set of 
objectives. A .starting point in this direction is probably the performance contracts applied 
in France, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia (Shirley, 1989; Nellis, 1988). Performance 
contracts are "negotiated agreements" between the state and PEs, which specify the rights 
and responsibilities of both parties (Nellis, 1988). They have the advantages of clarifying 
objectives, increasing both side’s understanding of the strength and weakness of the other, 
and identifying the costs of attaining the goals. Their main disadvantages are that, the 
negotiation process is complex and time-consuming, requires skills and reliable information, 
and the state might not honour its "non-interference" commitment (Shirley, 1989).
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B: Financial Autonomy
A second organisational factor that is critical for improving the performance of PEs, 
is the delegation of more powers to PE managers to raise capital from the capital market. As 
noted earlier, PEs normally have no autonomy over all financing decisions, unable to raise 
prices to reflect market conditions, or to lay-off redundant staff so as to minimise costs. 
Nevertheless, PE managers often complain about the lack of finance, though the cheap public 
funding often reduces the pressure on management to use this scarce resource in an efficient 
manner. Therefore, by withdrawing public funding and exposing PEs to the disciplines of 
the capital market, might enforce greater efficiency. However, before that, massive financial 
restructuring would be necessary, so as to enable PEs to borrow from the open market. 
Moreover, in order to expose PEs to the disciplines of the capital market, a sound reporting 
system that generates reliable and timely information must be developed. As Ayub and 
Hegstad (1986) point out, a sound financial reporting system would help both the market and 
the government to evaluate the enterprises. Indeed, it is essential even for internal 
management to perform their planning, controlling and decision making functions.
The point is that, PEs could be exposed to the capital market disciplines, including 
bankruptcy and takeover, in the same sense as their private counterparts. If there are social 
objectives assigned to PEs, the cost of such tasks should be carefully assessed, and paid for 
by the government.
C: Performance Evaluation System
Another critical prerequisite for PE reform is the development of an appropriate 
performance evaluation mechanism, to assess whether the PE is meeting its targets. Although 
no satisfactory model is readily available, we believe a starting point in this direction is the 
performance evaluation systems developed in Pakistan and South Korea. As noted earlier, 
a critical prerequisite for an effective evaluation scheme is a comprehensive information
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system, skilled staff and a competent overseeing agency, a set of clear objectives, and 
political will and commitment to operate the system. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that, 
the task of devising and implementing an effective control system for PEs is probably the 
most daunting and protracted business (see below).
D: Managerial Autonomy
A final organisational variable that determines performance is the degree of 
managerial autonomy over operating decisions. In order to operate on sound commercial 
basis, PE managers should have full discretion to choose the appropriate strategies to achieve 
the enteiprise objectives, and to influence all operating decisions for that purpose. Ayub and 
Hegstad (1986) distinguish three roles for private enterprises: the ownership role performed 
by the shareholders and involves formulating broad goals, hiring and firing of board 
members and approving the annual accounts; the strategic role performed by the board of 
directors and involves setting strategic plans, monitoring performance and appointing senior 
management; and the operating role, which is performed by senior management, and involves 
operating the enteiprise in accordance with the stated plans. Under public ownership, 
however, such a distinction often exists in theory, but is seldom adhered to. The fact is that, 
due to the multiplicity of objectives, lack of information flows and plurality of principals, 
government intervention in operating decisions is unduly excessive, while strategic guidance 
is lax (Ghai, 1985; Wortzel and Wortzel, 1989). As a result, PE managers are often 
obliged to seek approval for routine operating decisions, which is ill-suited for commercial 
enterprises operating in a dynamic environment. The point is that, PEs are subject to various 
environmental threats and opportunities, and hence the standardised rules and regulations of 
the civil service are likely to hamper their operating criteria. PEs need to respond differently 
from other public sector units so as to cope successfully with their dynamic, turbulent 
environment, both internal and external.
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In a bid to satisfy these requirements, different countries have devised various 
organisational forms, such as the holding companies. The rationale is that, the holding 
company could act as a buffer against undue intervention, assists in pooling scarce 
managerial talents, provides effective coordination, and leads to benefits of scale, in terms 
of purchasing, marketing, and finance. Experience shows that, the degree of centralisation 
of such organisational arrangements varies from the highly decentralised structures as in 
Sweden and Norway, to the highly centralised structures as in Ghana and Zambia (Ayub and 
Hegstad, 1986). As a result, there is no conclusive evidence regarding the efficiency of this 
organizational form (Shirley, 1983; Ayub and Hegstad, 1986).
Nevertheless, the Swedish experience demonstrates that, a solution could be found by 
placing governments at arm’s length, which is the essence of the public corporation theory 
as developed in the UK. "The attractiveness of the theory", Ghai (1985) argues "is that it 
appears to minimise political control, avoids partisan uses of economic power, and promises 
little disruption of the operating norms and methods of the industrial and commercial 
worlds". If there were any deficiencies, Heald (1985) notes might have been due to 
implementation rather than design. Clearly, a government that can not withhold interfering 
in PEs is likely to do the same for private enterprises.
Nonetheless, it must be repeated that, the desire to resolve the management and 
control problems of PEs has never been accomplished in a satisfactory manner. Indeed, it 
provided the strongest case for the full privatisation of enterprises operating in a competitive 
environment, on the grounds that "competition is the best regulator" (Rees, 1986). Indeed, 
the threat of privatisation might be sufficient to discipline the management and work force, 
create a new organisation culture, and hence enforce greater efficiency. As noted earlier, 
however, it is not all clear how would privatisation resolve the control problems of industries 
with considerable market powers or joint ventures. Indeed, in these cases, it was argued that
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privatisation leaves "a trail of unanswered questiones" (Steel, 1984). The lack of information 
and technical expertise, on the other hand, would make regulation at best difficult, indeed 
might favour public ownership (Van De Walle, 1989).
14.3.4 Managerial Styles
"What public enterprise demands are all the qualities, such as administrative flair, energy, 
readiness to accept responsibility, and knowledge o f the principles o f business organisation 
that private enterprise requires, plus something else",
(Hanson, 1965)
Although the "something else" has never been clearly defined, the quality of 
management (i.e education, experience, pay, tenure and attitudes towards the bureaucracy) 
is a key determinant of performance. As Nellis and Kikeri (1989) argue "Profitable 
performance will be due to competent, hard-working managers, using their resources in a 
shrewd manner, capable of resisting production reducing or cost-increasing demands of the 
government". The point is that, management engenders zeal and confidence, lead by 
example, maintain morale and direction for the rest of the staff, and set the organisation 
culture.
The available evidence, however, indicates that the quality of management varies 
widely across countries. In Brazil, for example, PEs were able to recruit competent 
managers, largely because the state had granted PEs greater operational autonomy, and had 
excluded PEs from the rigid civil service pay rules (Trebat, 1983). In most African 
countries, however, PE managers are closer in their attitudes to the bureaucrats than to 
entrepreneurs (World Development Report, 1988). Ayub and Hegstad (1986) attribute 
these variations to the low pay, high turnover rates among senior management, lack of 
incentives, the tight bureaucratic controls, and the severe shortages of qualified managers.
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These deficiencies, arguably could be rectified through internal reforms. For example, 
the selection of PE managers could be based on qualifications rather than political acceptance 
as is often the case, and allowed to operate independently in a competitive environment. They 
could be recruited on specific terms of reference, and specific term of office, which is vital 
for the success of the enterprise. For example, the success of India’s Hindustan Machine 
Tools, Ethiopian Telecom Authority, and Tanzania’s Electricity supply company, were 
attributed, in part, to the continuity of senior management (Shirley, 1983). PE mangers could 
be paid competitive salaries. Although higher salaries might encourage political appointment, 
we believe, just as with privatisation, political will is a critical prerequisite for the success 
of PE reform. Also, management contracts might provide a feasible solution to the 
management - related problems, while emphasising managerial training in the interim.
In summary, this is a simplified integrated theoretical approach to improve the 
performance of PEs in the interim or on a permanent basis. However, it must be emphasised 
that, unless the government is willing to adopt the whole model with vigour, no significant 
efficiency gains are likely to be realised. That is, half-way solutions of adopting parts and 
dropping others is likely to do more harm than good. Indeed, the early PE reform efforts in 
the Sudan have failed to improve productivity and financial performance solely because they 
were implemented in an unsustained and incomplete fashion (see chapters 10 and 11). Heald 
(1990) claims that "Policy design is a crucially important stage of the process of either public 
enterprise reform or of privatisation". Although policy design is certainly important, the 
Sudanese experience showed that the failure of the reform effort was attributed to 
implementation deficiencies rather than faulty design, due to lack of technical expertise and 
political will. As Van De Walle (1989) argues "States in the developing world are 
increasingly hampered by the budget cuts which austerity has imposed in recent years, but 
they have always been characterised by the inadequate managerial capacity".
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In the end, it must be stressed that, we are not in a way suggesting that 
denationalisation should be avoided, but rather that its implementation is facing a difficult 
path, and its potential benefits are uncertain. As Kirkpatrick (1988) argues "... the 
significance of privatisation as a policy option for LDCs has been exaggerated. 
Denationalisation is likely to be difficult to achieve, its potential benefits often appear to be 
limited, and its adoption may involve significant political costs". Equally, we are not 
claiming that PE reform is easy, but is possible and there are sufficient examples to 
demonstrate this assertion.
14.4 Implications for other DCs
From the findings of this research, a number of policy issues could be deduced, which 
might be of help to policy makers in other DCs. First, the Sudanese experience indicates that 
both PE reform and privatisation have been treated in the isolation, rather than part of a 
broader programme of reform designed to shift to a market economy. As a result, the 
outcome of the reform effort has been disappointing, and there is no reason to suggest that 
the benefits of privatisation would materialise. As we argued all along, privatisation is not 
an end in itself. Its a means to improve efficiency, which depends on factors in the broader 
political, economic, and legal environment for doing business. Therefore, emphasis should 
be on creating a sound business environment, with or without ownership transfer. Second, 
the Sudanese authorities have proposed to privatise a wide range of PEs over just a three-year 
period, in a context where the capital market is rudimentary, lack of technical expertise is 
a severe constraint, the business environment is highly distorted, and without adequate 
preparations (e.g sorting out the actual number of PEs, their financial position or the size of 
the work force). However, experience shows that hurried privatisation should be avoided, 
and adequate, time-consuming preparations are inevitable (Heald, 1990).
Third, the timing of offering PEs for sale would require careful planning, so as to
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reduce the pressure on the small and efficient capital markets in DCs. Moreover, the granting 
of costly concessions to attract buyers, in particular high protection from competition, should 
be avoided, simply because they contradict the very basic idea of the privatisation policy. As 
Heald (1990) argues "The relevance of privatisation lies in the promotion of competition and 
divestiture of enteiprises in the industrial sectors which can be made competitive, not in the 
invitation of large-scale privatisations which raise complex monopoly and regulatory 
problems". Fourth, experience shows that, in most cases, transparency and wider 
consultations with the parties involved have been sacrificed for the seek of speeding up the 
implementation process. This is a critical deficiency, especially in private sales under a one 
party system, typically found in most African countries, because the chances for irregularities 
are greatly increased. Therefore, this approach should be avoided, because if the privatised 
firms failed in the market place, the state might be forced to mount a rescue operation, and 
hence the vicious circle continues. The challenge, therefore, is to make the privatisation 
process as open as possible, and at all stages (Shirley, 1988). Finally, due to various 
political, economic and technical factors, wholesale privatisation like those in the UK are 
simply irrelevant to DCs, and should be avoided.
In the end, it is certainly true that governments in DCs have found it extremely 
difficult to implement privatisation, and that its potential gains are by no means assured. But, 
the policy is increasingly spreading worldwide. Indeed, in most cases, the emphasis has now 
shifted from "why privatisation" to "how privatisation". Nevertheless, it must be repeated 
that, its a long term process that requires careful planning, time-consuming preparations, 





Public Enterprises in Sudan 
Summary Sheet.*7
Total Number of PEs : 191
Wholly State-owned Enteiprises : 158
Joint ventures : 33
(a) State-Owned Enterprises (b) Joint Ventures
Sector Individual PEs Subsidiaries Individual
Enterprises
Subsidiaries
Industry 41 4 4 -
Agriculture 21 13 4 3





Energy and M ining
14 - " ■
Finance 9 - 3 -
Others 15 - 5 12
3 - - -
Total --------- --------- --------
138 20 18 15
a/ There is a large number of enteiprises under the Military Economic Board, on which 
information is available. In addition, there are 19 non-operating PEs.
Appendix 1-A 
List of Public Enterprises 
in the  Sudan
Enterprise Sector Legal Form: Com­
pany (1925) 
Corporation (1976)
A: Wholly State-Owned Enterprise
1 Abu Naama Kenaf Factory Industry 1976
2 Aroma Cardboard Factory Industry 1976
3 Arts and Letters Publishing Company Industry 1925
4 Assalaya Sugar Company Industry 1925
5 Babanousa Milk Factory Industry 1976
6 Blue Nile Packing Press Industry 1976
7 Blue Nile Printing Press Industry 1976
8 Central Region Printing Press Industry 1976
9 Edeweh Weaving Mill Industry 1925
10 El deweim Textile Factory Industry 1925
11 El Guneid Sugar Company Industry 1925
12 Fine Spinning Mill Industry 1925
13 Friendship Ready Made Fabric Industry 1925
14 Gezira Tannery Industry 1925
15 Government Printing Press Industry 1976
16 Haj Abdalla Spinning Mill Industry 1925
17 Hasaheisa Textile Company Industry 1925
18 Kadolgi Weaving Mill Industry 1925
19 Karima Fruit and Vegetable Canning Industry 1925
20 Kassala Onion Dehydration Factory Industry 1976
21 Khartoum Central Foundary Industry 1976
22 Khartoum Tannery Industry 1925
23 Kosti Weaving Mill Industry 1925
24 Kirikab Sweet Factory Industry 1925
25 Mangala Spinning Mill Industry 1976
26 Maspio Cement Company Industry 1925
27 New Haifa Sugar Company Industry 1925
28 Nile Cement Company Industry 1925
29 Nyala Tannery Industry 1925
30 Nyala Textile Mill Industry 1925
31 Port Sudan Spinning Mill Industry 1976
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32 Public Spinning and Weaving Company Industry 1925
33 Plastic and Ceramic Corporation Industry 1976
34 Rea Sweet Factory Industry 1925
35 Sennar Sugar Company Industry 1925
36 Shendi Weaving Mill Industry 1925
37 Sata Company (Shoes) Industry 1925
38 Sudan-Ren Fertilizer Company Industry 1925
39 White Nile Tannery Industry 1925
40 Wau Vegetable Canning Factory Industry 1976
41 Public Leather Industry and Tracing Industry 1925
42 Agricultural Research Corporation Agriculture 1976
43 Alkadro Slaughter House Agriculture 1976
44 Animal Products Corporation Agriculture 1976
(i) Fishery Equipment Project -
(ii) Khartoum Agricultural Project -
(iii)Poultry Production Project -
(iv) Suba Agricultural Project -
45 Blue Nile Agricultural Corporation Agriculture 1976
46 Crop Protection Company Limited Agriculture 1925
47 Delta A1 Gash Agricultural Corporation Agriculture 1976
48 Earthmoving Branch Corporation Agriculture 1976
49 El Suki Agricultural Corporation Agriculture 1976
50 Gezira Scheme Agriculture 1976
51 Nuba Mountain Agricultural Corporation Agriculture 1976
52 Mechanized Farming Corporation Agriculture 1976
(i) Damazin Mechanized Farming -
(ii) Damazin Ginning Factory -
—(iii) Delta Toker Ginning Factory -
(iv) El Rank Mechanized Farming -
(v) Fishery Branch Corporation -
(vi) Gazram State Farm -
(vii) Habila State Farm -
(Viii) Samsam State Farm -
(ix) Sudan-Minex Gold Mining -
53 New Haifa Agricultural Corporation Agriculture 1976
54 Northern Agricultural Corporation Agriculture 1976
55 Public Corporation for Irrigation Works Agriculture 1976
56 Rahad Agricultural Scheme Agriculture 1976
57 Toker Agricultural Corporation Agriculture 1976
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58 White Nile Agricultural Corporation Agriculture 1976
59 Khartoum Dairy Production Company Agriculture 1925
60 Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation Agriculture 1976
61 Anzara Agricultural and Industrial Complex Agriculture 1976
62 African Housing Company Commerce 1925
63 Al-Sharg Development Company Commerce 1925
64 Central Distribution House Commerce 1976
65 Cotton Public Corporation Commerce 1925
66 Duty Free Shops Corporation Commerce 1976
67 Equatoria Trading Corporation Commerce 1976
68 Exhibitions and Fairs Corporation Commerce 1976
69 Gezira Trade and Services Company Commerce 1925
70 Gum Arabic Company Commerce 1925
71 Kordufan Development and Trading Commerce 1925
72 National Development and Trade Company Commerce 1925
73 National Estate Company Commerce 1925
74 Nile Import and Trading Company Commerce 1925
75 Northern Darfur Trading Company Commerce 1925
76 State Corporation for Cinema Commerce 1976
77 Sudan Building Materials Corporation Commerce 1976
78 Sudan Cotton Company Commerce 1925
79 Sudan Oilseed Company Commerce 1925
80 Sugar Trading Corporation Commerce 1976
81 Sudanese Company for Building and Construction Commerce 1925
82 Juba Trading Company Commerce 1925
83 Sudan News Agency Commerce 1976
84 Arkawit Resort Hotels and 
Tourism
1976
85 Atbara Resthouse Hotels and 
Tourism
1976
86 Friendship Hall Corporation Hotels and 
Tourism
1976
87 Friendship Palace Hotel Hotels and 
Tourism
1976
88 Green Village Hotel Hotels and 
Tourism
1976
89 Juba Hotel Hotels and 
Tourism
1976
90 Khartoum Airport Resturant Hotels and 
Tourism
1976




92 Morgan Family Park Hotels and 
Tourism
1976
93 Nile Tourism Corporation Hotels and 
Tourism
1976
94 Red Sea Hotel Hotels and 
Tourism
1976
95 Sudan Hotel Hotels and 
Tourism
1976
96 Sudanese International Tourist Company Hotels and 
Tourism
1976




(ii) Ice and Lemonade Factory
(iii) Supplies and Catering
98 Wau Resthouse Hotels and 
Tourism
1976
99 Betro Transport Company Transport 1976
100 Capital Transport Corporation Transport 1976
101 Civil Aviation Authority Transport 1976
102 Livestock Roads Corporation Transport 1976
103 River Nile Shipping Company Transport 1925
104 Seaports Corporation Transport 1976
105 Shikan Transport Company Transport 1925
106 Sudan Airways Company Transport 1925
107 Sudan Shipping Lines Transport 1925
108 Sudan Railways Corporation Transport 1976
109 Sudan River Transport Corporation Transport 1976
110 Wad El Hadi Truck Unit Transport 1976
111 Post and Telegraph Corporation Transport 1976
112 Telecommunication Corporation Transport 1976
113 Agricultural Bank Finance 1925
114 Bank of Sudan Finance 1925
115 Bank of Khartoum Finance 1925
116 Estate Bank Finance 1925
117 El Nelein Bank Finance 1925
118 Industrial Bank Finance 1925
119 National Export and Import Bank Finance 1925
120 National Reinsurance Company Finance 1925
121 Regional Insurance Company Finance 1925
122 Sudanese Commercial Bank Finance 1925
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123 Sudanese Development Corporation Finance 1925
124 Sudanese Saving Bank Finance 1925
125 Sudanese Investment Company Finance 1925
126 Unity Bank Finance 1925
127 Angesena Hills Mining Corporation Energy 1976
128 National Electricity Corporation Energy 1976
129 National Water Corporation Energy 1976
130 Petroleum Public Corporation Energy 1976
131 Red Sea Development Corporation Energy 1976
132 Sudan Mint Company . . Energy 1925
133 Sudanese Mining Corporation Energy 1976
134 Development of Amatong Corporation Miscellaneous 1976
135 Western Savanna Corporation Miscellaneous 1976
136 Commission for Relief Miscellaneous 1976
137 National Council for Research Miscellaneous 1976
B: Joint Ventures
138 African Drilling Company Agriculture 1925
139 Afro-Arab Groundwater Company Agriculture 1925
140 Amarat and Sudan Investment Company Finance 1925
(i) Amarat and Central Region Company
(ii)Amarat and Eastern Region Company
(iii)Amarat and Khartoum Company
(iv) Amarat and Gezira Company
(v) Amarat and Sudan Company for Air 
Transport
141 Abu Dhabi and Sudan Investment Company Finance 1925
142 National Bank for Development Finance 1925
143 Arab Mining Company Mining 1925
144 Arab Vegetable Oil Company Industry 1925
145 Islamic Cooperative Development Bank Finance 1925
146 Kenana Sugar Company Industry 1925
147 National Cigarettes Company Commerce 1925
148 Port Sudan Refinery Energy 1925
149 Rainbow Factories Industry 1925
150 Red Sea Tannery Industry 1925
151 Saudi-Sudan Corporation for Utilization of Red 
Sea Resources
Mining 1925
152 Sudan-Arab Company Agriculture 1925
153 Sudan-Arab Authority for Agriculture Agriculture 1925
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(i) Sudanese-Arabian Poultary
(ii) Sudanese-Arabian Fruit and Vegetable 
Company
(iii) Sudanese-Arabian Forage Company
154 Sudanese-Egyptian Company Finance 1925
(i) Sudan-Egypt Fishing Company
(ii) Sudan-Egypt Agricultural Integration 
Company
(iii) Sudan-Egypt Mining Company
155 Sudanese-Kuwaiti Investment Company Finance 1925
(i) Sudanese-Kuwaiti Hotel
(ii) Sudanese-Kuwaiti Company for Animal 
Production
(iii) Sudanese-Kuwaiti Company for Roads




Ahlia Cotton Company Commerce
Al-Aktan Trading Company Commerce
A1 Ayam Printing House Commerce
A1 Sahafa Printing House Commerce
Aybe National Corporation Industry
Blue Nile Brewery Industry
Port Sudan Cotton Company Industry
Sugar Public Corporation Industry
Food Public Corporation Industry
Watania Distillery Company Industry
White Nile Brewery Industry
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Appendix 2 
Sugar Rehabilitation Project 
Summary of Agreement 
The Sugar rehabilitation agreement between the Government of Sudan (GoS)
and the International Development Association (IDA) signed in 1983, envisaged the
following
(I) The GoS would complete formal establishment of the four estates as
independent companies.
(II) GoS and the sugar companies will follow procurement procedures for
goods and services prescribed for the project, and hire technical services 
in accordance with IDA guidelines.
(III) GoS and the sugar companies would recruit firms to provide Management 
Assistance and Training Services by October, 31, 1984. Such recruitment 
will be on the basis of competitive selection from a list of pre-qualified 
firms having qualifications and experience acceptable to IDA.
(IV) The Sudan Sugar Board will be established, and an Executive Director 
and Secretary with experience and qualifications satisfactory to IDA will 
be appointed prior to Board presentation.
(V) GoS will transfer ownership of assets used to operate pump stations and
major canals from the Ministry of Irrigation to the sugar companies no 
later than July, 1, 1985.
(VI) GoS will ensure that the sugar companies have access to essential 
imported recurrent inputs, including sufficient supplies of fuel to operate 
the factories, field equipment and the electrical generators. (GoS clarified 
that while these inputs are normally procured with foreign exchange made 








on companies incorporated under the 1925 Companies Act which would 
restrict them from obtaining foreign exchange from other legal foreign 
exchange sources).
Each of the companies will furnish initial balance sheets based on 
principles acceptable to IDA no later than March, 31, 1985.
The four sugar companies will provide unaudited financial statements 
within six months of the close of each project year, and audited financial 
statements and an independent audit report to IDA within nine months 
of the close of each fiscal year.
GoS will arrange for a review of the performance of each company every 
year by an independent management consultant, and hold an exchange 
of views with IDA no later than September, 30 each year on remedial 
measures proposed by each consultant.
GoS, in cooperation with the sugar companies, will conduct jointly with 
IDA, a mid-term review of the project no later than December, 31, 1986. 
The companies will be permitted to market their production directly, 
subject to Government allocation and pricing procedures, and will receive 
the full producer price for their production.
GoS will:
(a) use the principle of import parity pricing for determining the 
producer price for sugar on the basis of a six-year historical cost 
moving average (adjusted for international inflation) of the daily 
international sugar price. The import parity price would be calcu­
lated using an exchange rate which reflects the rates applicable to 
the recurrent imported inputs to the sugar industry in the previous 
year.
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(b) adjust this price taking into account the cost of production of an 
efficient producer, and the financial viability of the sugar com­
panies, bearing in mind the excise duties on sugar.
(c) announce such producer prices not later than October, 1 each year,
starting in 1985.
(XHI) The sugar companies will not incur debt if such debt shall result in:
(a) the debtiequity ratio for that company rising above 1:1, or
(b) the companies net revenues becoming less than 1.5 times the
maximum debt-service requirement in any succeeding year.
(XIV) GoS and Guneid Sugar Company will ensure that an individual account




Public Enterprise and Economic Management 
Project
The Public Enterprise Component 
Work Plan
First Year.
(1) Establish pre-qualification short list of consultants and equipment suppliers (May-July, 
1987).
(2) Preparation of tender documents and requests for proposals (May-July, 1987).
(3) Advertise for tenders, send requests for proposals (September, 1987).
(4) Assign additional 3 full-time CBPE staff (September, 1987).
(5) Project launch workshop, preparation of Action Plans (October, 1987).
(6) Begin preparation of instructions to PEs Re: closing accounts and audits (October, 
1987).
(7) Selection of first-year short-term consultants (November, 1987).
(8) Selection of consulting firms for diagnostic studies (10 PEs) (November, 1987).
(9) Finalization of Action Plans (November, 1987).
(10) Appointment of committee of experts to review existing legislation/regulations regard­
ing PEs (December, 1987).
(11) Prepare initial financial plans for the 10 PEs (December, 1987).
(12) Appoint a task force for clearing intra-govemmental accounts (work to be completed 
by no later than December, 1989).
(13) Begin diagnostic study 1 (Tokar Agricultural Corporation) January, 1988.
(14) Appointment of working group to prepare terms of reference for PE managers, 
boards, shareholders, sectoral ministries, CBPE, etc. Work to be completed by May, 
31, 1988.—
(15) Complete diagnostic study 1 (Tokar) and begin diagnostic study 2 (March, 1988).
(16) Begin inventory of all PEs. (to be completed by September, 1988).
(17) Complete diagnostic study 2 (telecom), and begin diagnostic study 3 (Animal Prod­
ucts), (May, 1988).
(18) Establish "Public Enterprise Rationalization Fund", (May, 1988).
(19) Complete diagnostic study 3 (Animal Products) and start diagnostic study 4 (Duty
Free Shops), (July, 1988).
(20) Decision regarding recommendation of diagnostic study 1 (Tokar), (July, 1988).
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Second Year
(1) Divest Rea and Kirikab Sweet Factories.
(2) Design in-service training programmes for key government institutions and selected 
enterprises.
(3) Complete a comprehensive inventory of all PEs by type, sector, share of government 
equity and basic financial information.
(4) Submit results of detailed diagnostic studies of pilot enterprises for decision.
(5) Establish a monitoring system for the pilot PEs.
Third Year
(1) Prepare implementation action plans on the basis of decisions concerning retention, 
privatisation and liquidation.
(2) Introduce new financial and management information systems within the PE sector as 
developed for the pilot enterprise.
(3) Promulgate and implement new legislation.
(4) Clear all intra-Govemment accounts.
(5) Introduce objectives, targets, and incentives for the pilot PEs.
(6) Commence the process of privatizing appropriate enterprises according to the results 
of the action plans.
(7) Begin implementation of rehabilitation plans for the pilot enterprises to be retained 
under public ownership.
Fourth Year
(1) Expand application of new procedures and systems linking the individual enterprises 
to the relevant government entities as developed for the pilot PEs to the sector as a 
whole.




Sudan: Exchange Rate History
Date Action
Pre-June, 1978 Official exchange rate maintained at £S 0.35/$, rate which prevailed since inde­
pendence in 1956.
June, 8, 1978 Official rate devalued to £S 0.40/$.
March, 27, 1979 Rate for workers remittances raised to £S 0.67/$.
September, 16,1979 Worker remittance rate and nil-value import system abolished, and the official rate 
set at £S 0.50/$. Parallel rate of £S 0.90/$ established for selected imports and 
exports.
September, 21,1980 All exports except cotton and all imports except pharmaceuticals and "government 
imports (sugar, petroleum, wheat and agricultural inputs) moved form the official 
rate to the parallel rate.
June, 8, 1981 Cotton exports and imported inputs moved to parallel rate.
July, 11, 1981 Street market legalized and exchange dealers licensed. Free market rate of about £S 
1.05/$.
September, 15, 1981 Official and parallel rates unified at £S 0.90/$. Three-fourth of non-cotton export 
proceeds, all cotton proceeds and "government imports" valued at the unified rate, 
remainder at free rate of about £S 1.14/$.
June, 30, 1982 Maximum buying and selling rates of £S 1.13/$ and £S 1.15/$ set by decree for free 
market, which shrinks sharply. Black market begins to emerge at previous free rate 
of about £S 1.40/$.
August, 25, 1982 Maximum rates on free market rate removed.
November, 15, 1982 Official rate devalued to £S 1.30/$. Free market rate set at £S 1.75/$.
February, 27, 1983 Four commercial banks (later extended to 11) licensed to deal at free market rate.
May, 18, 1983 Licenses of foreign exchange dealers revoked, as were those of five commercial 
banks who raised rate to £S 2.05/$.
June, 7, 1983 Licenses of commercial banks reinstated, and five dealers licensed.
March, 6, 1984 All exports except cotton and gum arabic were valued at the commercial rate.
February, 12,1985 Official rate devalued to £S 2.5/$, and free market rate set at £S 3.4/$. Private foreign 
exchange dealing revoked.
August, 12, 1985 Commercial banks allowed to set their free rate in consultation with the Bank of 
Sudan. Officially, the Sudanese pound was begged to a basket of currencies. Basket 
was abandoned in October as the pound appreciated due to a fall in the dollar and 
change in government.
February, 25, 1986 Committee of 7 bankers established to allocate the available foreign exchange. All 
private foreign exchange dealings were to be channeled to the committee.
August, 7, 1986 Free market rate set at £S 4.0/$.
August, 16, 1987 Official rate devalued to £S 4.5/$.
October, 9, 1988 Free market to be operated by commercial banks established at a rate of £S 11.1/$, 
later raised to £S 12.2/$.
July, 15, 1989 Possession and trading in foreign exchange prohibited and a death sentence imposed.







(1) General information regarding the objectives of the enterprise, legal form, 
organisation structure, age, size, sources of finance, and the central government.
(2) Boards of directors and managing directors: terms of reference (in theory and 
practice), terms of office, selection criteria, remuneration, composition of board 
members, qualifications, and frequency of meetings.
(3) From your point of view, what are the main problems of your organisation?
(4) Is there any legislation specifying the relationship between the enterprise and the
central government? To whom do you report?
- Do you face any external interference in the internal operations of your entity? If 
yes, from whom?
- At the enterprise level, are there specific terms of reference for the functional 
managers?
(5) How frequent do you meet with the functional and regional managers? Are there any 
agenda prepared and distributed before these meetings?
(6) Is the enterprise able to utilise its designed capacity? If not, why?
(7) How do you rate the financial performance of the enterprise (profitable, loss making 
or just breaking even)?
(8) The flow of financial and operational data is it adequate and reliable? If not, why? 
How does that effect your decision making, planning and controlling?
(9) Is there any performance evaluation system? If yes, please tell me about it?
(10) For the public corporations that were converted into companies: What were the 
deficiencies of the corporate form?
- What were the objectives of the conversion?
- Were there any studies prior to the legal restructuring?
- Were there any deficiencies in implementation? If yes, what are these?
- What were the effects on: objectives; management selection, autonomy and rewards; 
salary scales; relationship with the central government, productivity and financial 
performance?
- Were there any labour shedding following the legal restructuring? If yes, what was 
the union response?
(11) Do you face any competition (domestic/foreign)? Are you able to complete 
effectively? If not, why?
(12) How do you look to the future of the enterprise: should it remain under public 
ownership or should it be privatised? Why?
- If it is to remain public, what sort of reforms (if any) should be introduced?
(13) Long ago the government announced that it itends to introduce private managers to 
operate PEs. What happened?
- Do you think private managers will do better? Why?
(2) Financial Managers
(1) What are the main functions of the financial manager in this enterprise?
- Are there any specific terms of reference?
(2) Could you please tell me about your staff, viz: number, qualifications, tenure, and 
salary scales?
(3) Are salaries in line with competitors? Is there any over/understaffing situation?
- ratio of salaries to sales?
- ratio of salaries to operating expenses?
(4) Are your accounts up-to-date? Are they audited on time? If not, why? What are the 
implications on decision making?
(5) Is the financial management system adequate, in terms of cash flow management, 
collection of receivables, cost control, and monitoring of performance?
- What are the main reasons for the deficiencies (if any)?
(6) How significant is the volume of accounts receivables? What is the policy for 
collection? How does that affect your working capital position? What is the ratio of 
accounts receivables to current assets?
(7) How are annual budgets prepared? Who approves the budget? Are they approved as 
proposed? If not, how do you finance the difference?
- How do you find the attitudes of the officials at the Ministry of Finance?
- What sort of problems you normally face when you ask for more funds? How long 
does it take to be approved?
- Are there any other sources of finance? if yes, what are these?
(8) How sound is the financial position of the enterprise?
- Do you have any costing systems?
- Do you make any exports? If yes, are you allowed to retain part of your foreign 
earnings?
- How do you obtain your inputs (local and imported)?
(9) How frequent do you report to management? How do you find the attitudes of 
management towards accounting data?
(10) For the public corporations that were converted into companies: What were the 
effects on:
- the accounting systems?
- the financial performance and productivity?
- budget preparation and approval?
- frequency of reporting?
- lines of communications with the central government and within the company?
(3) Personnel Managers
(1) Do you have the optimum number of staff, over-staffing or under-staffing?
(2) What are the criteria for the recruitment of key posts?
- Could you please tell me about the duration of senior management during the last 
decade?
- Could you please tell me about the promotion and training policies?
- What are the effects of the civil service rules on the recruitment and promotion 
policies?
- Are promotion and rewards (if any) related to productivity and financial 
performance?
- What are the procedures to discipline inefficient staff? Can you lay off surplus staff?
(3) How does the change of governments affect your staffing position?
(4) How are worker’s disputes normally resolved ( I mean between management and
unions, between unions and government or else?
(5) How do you look to the future of the enterprise: remain public or go private? Why?
(6) For the corporations that were transformed into companies: What were the effects of 
change on the organisation structure, relations with government, number of staff, 
salary scales, and management autonomy?
Macro level:
(1) Chairman; Supreme Investment Authority (ministerial status).
(1) Could you please tell me about the investment licensing procedures, the time it takes 
for projects to be approved, the criteria for approval, and the incentives offered?
(2) Could you please tell me about the various reform efforts undertaken (objectives, 
cost, implementation process and difficulties encountered)?
(3) What were the measures taken to implement privatisation (preparing PEs, 
management, finance, price setting, etc)?
- Are there any rules for price setting and selection of buyers? Would foreigners be 
allowed to participate?
(4) How do you plan to finance privatisation costs? Are there any measures to alleviate 
its social costs?
-Are there any measures to mobilise private resources?
-Are there any reforms in the financial sector?
(5) Had the policy been debated with the parties involved?
(2) Ministry of Finance and Sectoral Ministries
Here, the following officials were interviewed:
(i) Director General, Public Corporation Administration, MFEP.
(ii) Director for Budget, MFEP.
(iii) Directors of Public Corporation Bureaus: Ministries of Industry, Transport, and
Agriculture.
(iv) Directors of Import and Exports Units, MCCS.
(a) General Information:
(1) Evolution of PEs, legal form, objectives of PEs, total number of PEs, financial 
position, government equity in each, and number of staff.
(2) The organisational arrangement linking various government agencies and PEs (theory 
and practice).
(3) The main problems of PEs and the measures taken to reform PEs.
(b) Finance:
(4) What are main sources of finance for PEs?
(5) Who approves their budgets ?
(6) Are PEs required to pay dividends, taxes, or both? Are they able to pay these in
practice? If not, why?
(7) From a recent Auditor General Report (1986/87), I noted that a large part of PE’s 
current assets are tied up in accounts receivables from other PEs and government 
units, why is that? What are the implications for working capital?
(8) Is there any central unit to monitor and analyse these financial transactions? What was
done, or should be done, to clear these accounts?
(9) What are the procedures for PE’s borrowing both at home and abroad? Are foreign 
loans guaranteed by the state?
-What are the procedures for foreign exchange allocation, provision of subsidies and 
financial support?
(10) For PEs that normally receive seasonal credits, such as agriculture, were they able 
to repay these loans on timely fashion? If not, what is the government policy for 
collection?
(c) Management and Control
(11) Although the Public Corporation Act, 1976, proposed that a Supreme Council for 
Public Corporations shall be established, I came to know that the council has never 
been established. Why was that? In the absence of the Council who performs its 
tasks?
(12) - 1 noted from a recent Auditor General Report that a large number of PEs were not 
audited for years, why was that?
- How_adequate is the flow of information between PEs and the central government?
- Are there any measures to bring the accounts of PEs up-to-date?
- What are the implications of this state of affairs on control, pricing and financing?
(13) How are prices determined? A number of PE managers I have spoken to claim that 
prices normally do not cover the production costs, is that true? Why?
(14) Is there any central unit within the government with a comprehensive knowledge of 
the number of PEs, their financial position, size of staff, or government equity?
- Do you have a record of the actual performance of PEs?, If not, why?
(15) What are the criteria for the selection of chief executives and board members?
- Who appoint them?
- Who determines their salaries, their term of office?
(16) How do you evaluate the performance of PEs (i.e. how do you determine success or 
failure of PEs)?
- Is there any system of rewards and punishment?
- Is there any relationship between increases in salaries or bonus payments to 
productivity?
- How are workers disputes normally resolved?
- How autonomous are PE managers in relation to pricing, recruitment, purchasing, 
investment, financing and salary determination?
(17) For PEs that perform social goals, are they compensated for carrying out such tasks? 
Is that considered in performance evaluation?
(18) What were the main objectives of legal conversion to companies?
What were the effects of legal restructuring on: objectives, size of staff, salaries,
relations with the government, accounting systems and management practices,
productivity and financial performance?
(19) As far as I know, the previous government had formed a number of committees to 
review all the laws governing PEs, what happened in this respect?
(2) The Auditor General
(1) What is the role of the Auditor General? What are the problems you face in carrying
out that role?
(2) Does the chamber has sufficient resources (both human and financial) to audit all PEs 
on time? Are you able to recruit qualified staff? If not, why?
(3) From your experience, what are the major problems of PEs?
(4) Are there any arrears in accounts? If yes, why? What was done to clear the backlog?
(5) How do you rate the financial performance of PEs?
- Are there any PEs that are performing profitably?
If any, what are they? What makes these PEs profitable?
(6) How effective is ministerial control?
- From your experience, were PEs able to recruit competent financial managers? If 
not, why?
(7) During the last decade the currency was devalued many times and the country
experienced hyper inflation rates, was there any revaluation of assets to reflect current 
market values? If not, why?
(8) Are the financial management systems of PEs adequate? If not, why?
- Are there any reported cases of corruption?
- What was done to strengthen the internal control systems in those PEs?
- What happened for the corrupt personnel?
(9) Are there any accounting standards in the country?
- Are there any reforms in the accounting practices?
- Is there any body to govern the accounting practices in the Sudan?
(10) Do you have a record of inter-departmental accounts? If yes, how significant are
they? How do they affect the working capital of PEs?
- Is there any central unit to monitor these accounts?
- In your 1983/84 report you stated that the capital accounts of most PEs is under­
estated due to accounting errors. Has that been corrected? If not, why?
(11) Do you normally obtain the budgets to compare them with actual results? If not, why?
(12) How do you look to the future of PEs: should they remain public or go private? why?
(13) Do you have a record of Sudan foreign debts? If yes, how was it spent? If not, why?
(3) Bank of Sudan: Director of Public Corporations Department.
(1) Could you please give me an idea about PE’s debts to the Bank of Sudan (size and 
procedures for credit extension to PEs)? What is the bank’s policy for collecting these 
debts?
- Does the central bank extend credits to the newly created companies? To the private 
sector?
(2) Do you have a record of foreign loans extended to PEs? If yes, could you tell me 
how they were spent?
(3) Where do PEs and private firms obtain foreign exchange for their imported input 
needs?
(4) Could you please give me an idea of the interest and foreign exchange rates 
movements during the last decade?
(5) Debt: Equity swaps were suggested in 1987 as a means of reducing the country’s 
foreign debts. Is there any action taken? If yes, please tell me about the size of the 
transaction, and how it was carried out?
(6) From your experience, what are the main problems of PEs?
How do you look to their future: should they remain public or go private? Why?
(4) The Taxation Department (MFEP).
- Are public and private enterprises usually able to provide your department with up- 
to-date audited accounts? If not, why? How do you assess taxes?
- Are there any differences in accounting practices between public and private firms? 
If yes, how does that affect your work?
- From your experience, could you please give me an idea about accounting practices 
in Sudan? Are there any standardised acconting methods ? Is there any incentives 
offered to private investors?
- Could you please give me a copy of the cuurent tax rates?
(5) Private enterprises
For the purpose of identifying the main problems of private enterprises in the Sudan, 
we also visited two private firms: International Tyre Manufacturing and Distributing
Company (ITMD) and the Sudan-Arab Oil and Soap Company. In both companies, 
the following officials were interviewed: The Managing Directors, Fiancial and 
Personnel Managers.
(1) What are the main constraints on private firms in the Sudan (both internal and 
external).
(2) How do you rate the financial performance of your company?
(5) Do you have any idle capacity? If yes, why?
(6) How do you set your selling prices? Your salary scales?
(7) How do you obtain your input needs (domestic and imported iputs?
- Is there any government interference in investment, purchases and recruitment?
(8) What are the procedures for dismissing surplus and inefficient staff?
- Are there any problems in labour legislation you want to tell me about?
(9) Do you face any competition (domestic or foreign)? Are you able to compete 
effectively? Do you make any exports? If yes, are you allowed to retain your foreign 
earnings?
(10) Do you think your products are reaching consumers at the stated prices? If not, why?
(11) How do you find the general business environment in the Sudan (in terms of entry,
exit, pricing, financing, infrastructure and input supply)?
(12) As a businessman, what are the main problems of PEs? In what ways do they differ 
from the problems facing private firms?
(13) Do you think privatisation will solve these problems? Why?
In addition, the following officials were also interviewed:
(1) The chairman of the Industrial Production Corporation (1971-77).
(2) The chairman of the rehabilitation units for agriculture, sugar and textile.
(3) The director of the Efficiency Improvement Unit, Khartoum.
(4) The director of the Industrial Research and Consultancy Centre.
(5) The director of the Industrial Costing and Pricing Unit, Ministry of Industry.
(6) The Commissioner for labour.
(7) The director of the Public Corporation for Sugar Trading.
(8) The chairman of the Foreign Exchange Allocation Committee, Bank of Sudan.
(9) A number of ex-managers of various PEs, as well as a former Minister of Industry
who devised the legal reform of the Industrial sector in the early 1980s.
(10) The World Bank, Khartoum and Washington.
All these interviews were conducted in Arabic and later translated into English, 
except those for the World Bank officials in Washington.
Appendix 6 
Number of World Bank Projects With 
Divestiture Components 
(Approved as of June, 1989)
Region Country SALs* SECALs* TALs* PELs* PSD* Total
AFRICA Benin 1 1 2
Burundi 2 2
Cameroon 1 1
CAR 2 1 3
Congo 1 1 2
Gaboon 1 1
Gambia 2 1 3
Ghana 2 1 1 4
Guinea 2 1 3
G. Bissau 2 2
Madagascar 2 1 3




Sao Tome 1 1 2
Senegal 2 1 3
Sudan 2 2
Togo 3 1 4
Uganda 1 1 1 3
Zaire 1 1
Sub-total 25 4 8 9 2 48
LAC* Chile 1 1 2
Costa Rica 1 1
Hinduras 1 1
Jamaica 3 1 1 5
Mexico 1 1
Panama 2 1 3
Uruguay 2 2
Venzuala 1 1
Sub-total 11 0 3 2 0 16
6-1
EMENA1' Morocco 1 1
Tunisia 1 1
Turkey 1 1
Sub-total 1 0 0 2 0 3
Asia Indonesia 1 1
Nepal 1 1
Philippines 1 1 2
Sub-total 1 1 0 1 1 4
Grand Total 38 5 11 16 3 71
a/ SALs: Structural Adjustment Loans.
b/ SECALs: Sectoral Adjustment Loans.
d  TALs: Technical Adjustment Loans.
d/ PELs: Public Enterprise Loans.
e/ PSD: Private Sector Development.
f/ LAC: Latin American Countries.
g/ EMENA: Europe, Middle East, and North Africa.
Source: Kikeri, S. (1990), "Bank Lending for Divestiture”, World Bank Working Paper 
No. 338, Washington D.C.
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